Union of India vs H.C. Goel

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 30 August, 1963

Coram: J.R. Mudholkar, K. Subba Rao, K.N. Wanchoo, N. Rajgopala Ayyangar, P.B. Gajendragadkar

In the matter Union of India versus H. C. Goel, decided on 30 August 1963 by the Supreme Court of India, the Bench comprised Justices J. R. Mudholkar, K. Subba Rao, K. N. Wanchoo, N. Rajgopala Ayyangar and P. B. Gajendragadkar, with the judgment authored by Justice Gajendragadkar. The Court identified two short questions of law that required resolution. The first question concerned whether the Government possessed the authority to depart from the factual findings recorded by the enquiry officer tasked with conducting a departmental enquiry against a delinquent government servant under Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. The second question examined whether a High Court, while hearing a writ petition filed by a government officer who had been dismissed from service, could hold that the Government’s conclusion regarding the officer’s misconduct was unsupported by any evidence. The Court indicated that it would answer both questions affirmatively, meaning that the Government was entitled to reject the enquiry officer’s factual findings, but the High Court could not declare the Government’s conclusion entirely unsubstantiated. Accordingly, the appellant, the Union of India, succeeded on the first point concerning the Government’s competence to differ from the enquiry officer’s findings, but failed on the second point concerning the High Court’s authority to invalidate the Government’s conclusion. During the hearing, the learned Attorney‑General explained that the Union was advancing the appeal primarily as a test case, not merely to preserve the dismissal order against the respondent, but to obtain a definitive ruling from this Court on the two legal issues presented.

The factual backdrop began with the respondent, H. C. Goel, who entered the Central Public Works Department on 26 November 1941. By approximately 1945‑46 he had been selected for a Class I post, and in January 1956 he was serving as Surveyor of Works in Calcutta. Feeling that his seniority had not been correctly fixed, he submitted a representation to the Union Public Service Commission seeking redress. In mid‑January 1956 he travelled to Delhi and, on 19 January 1956, visited the residence of Mr. R. Rajagopalan, the Deputy Director of Administration, with the intention of explaining the merits of his case. During the conversation, it is alleged that Goel apologized for not having brought “rasagullas” for Mr. Rajagopalan’s children, an apology that caused Mr. Rajagopalan to frown and express displeasure at the implied suggestion. Later in the interview, Goel is reported to have produced from his pocket a folded one‑hundred‑rupee note, an action that prompted stern disapproval from Mr. Rajagopalan. Goel responded with a simple “No” and placed the wallet containing the note back into his pocket. After a few more minutes the interview concluded, and Goel departed from Mr. Rajagopalan’s residence.

Soon after the meeting, Mr. Rajagopalan conveyed the incident to Mr. Ananthakrishnan, who was the Director of Administration of the Central Public Works Department, and, acting on Mr. Ananthakrishnan’s advice, he prepared a written complaint. In that complaint Mr. Rajagopalan set out the facts as they had occurred and he also recorded that, at the close of the interview, the respondent had asked whether he could see Mr. Rajagopalan again on the following day to learn the outcome of his representation. Mr. Rajagopalan replied that he might make the enquiry when he happened to be in Delhi again. On receipt of this written complaint, the appellant resolved to institute a departmental enquiry against the respondent, to suspend him, and to serve him a notice dated 9 February 1956. That notice enumerated four specific charges and required the respondent to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. The first charge alleged that the respondent had met the Deputy Director of Administration of the Central Public Works Department at the Deputy Director’s residence without obtaining the necessary permission. The second charge alleged that the respondent had voluntarily expressed regret for not having brought sweets from Calcutta for the Deputy Director’s children. The third charge alleged that the respondent had offered a folded note, which by its size and colour appeared to be a one‑hundred‑rupee note, as a bribe with the intention of persuading the Deputy Director, Sri Rajagopalan, to support his representation concerning his seniority before the Union Public Service Commission. The fourth charge alleged a violation of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules framed under the Civil Service (Classification) Regulations. The respondent thereafter submitted his explanation, and the matter was investigated in accordance with Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules by an officer named Mr. Kapoor. The enquiry officer examined both Mr. Rajagopalan and the respondent, considered the evidence placed before him, and concluded that the charges had not been proved to a satisfactory standard. He recorded his findings in a report dated 10 April 1956. The appellant reviewed Mr. Kapoor’s report and, on a provisional basis, determined that the respondent ought to be dismissed from service; consequently it issued a second notice to the respondent on 14 June 1956, inviting further explanation, which the respondent supplied. At that juncture the respondent’s case was forwarded to the Union Public Service Commission. In its report dated 30 October 1956, the Commission advised that the first charge should be withdrawn, that the second charge did not constitute a sufficient ground for framing a disciplinary charge, that the third charge could not be established on the basis of the evidence, and that, as a result, the fourth charge failed automatically. Accordingly, the Commission recommended that none of the penalties prescribed under Rule 49 of the Civil Service Rules be imposed on the respondent. The appellant re‑examined the matter in light of the Commission’s observations, but, adhering to the provisional conclusion previously reached before the issuance of the second notice, it asked the Commission to reconsider the case and remitted the matter back to the Commission for further consideration.

In December 1956, the matter was again transmitted to the Union Public Service Commission on the eighth day of that month. Upon re‑examining the case, the Commission reaffirmed the opinions it had previously expressed and communicated those reaffirmed views to the appellant on 15 January 1957. After reviewing the entire record in light of the Commission’s reaffirmation, the appellant concluded that sufficient grounds existed to justify the respondent’s dismissal and consequently issued an order of dismissal on 13 March 1957. The respondent thereafter instituted a writ petition (No. 201‑D of 1957) before the Punjab High Court, seeking to set aside the dismissal order on the basis of Articles 226 and 311 of the Constitution. A learned single judge of that High Court examined the petition and held that the respondent had failed to establish a cause for striking down the dismissal order. Unsatisfied, the respondent then filed an appeal under the Letters Patent, which was heard by a division bench of the same High Court. That bench allowed the respondent’s appeal, observing that the enquiry officer had submitted a report favourable to the respondent and therefore the appellant was not entitled to depart from the officer’s findings. The bench further reasoned that because the appellant had passed the dismissal order on the premise that the enquiry officer’s findings were erroneous, the order violated the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed and the respondent’s dismissal was set aside. Following this, the appellant applied to the High Court for a certificate, but the application was denied. The appellant then sought special leave to appeal before this Court, and having obtained that leave, the present appeal was brought before us. The first issue for determination is whether the appellant possessed the authority to adopt a view on the evidence that differed from the enquiry officer’s conclusions and to proceed on the ground that those conclusions were unsound and erroneous. If it is held that the appellant was barred from departing from the enquiry officer’s findings, then the subsequent actions taken by the appellant would be inconsistent with Article 311 of the Constitution. Conversely, if the appellant’s power to disagree with the enquiry officer’s conclusions is not seriously questioned, then the contention that the appellant violated Article 311 by issuing a second notice to the respondent would fail. Article 311 comprises two sub‑articles, and its effect is now settled law. The safeguards afforded to public servants concerning dismissal, removal or reduction in rank under Article 311 have been examined by this Court on numerous occasions, and it is now well‑established that a public servant who is entitled to the

In this matter, the Court explained that a public servant who is protected by Article 311 of the Constitution must be given two distinct chances to defend himself. The first requirement is that the servant must receive a clear notice of the charge that is to be addressed before any departmental enquiry can commence. Once such notice is served, the servant must be allowed to present his explanation, and the enquiry must then be conducted in accordance with the established rules and the principles of natural justice. After the enquiry concludes, the enquiry officer evaluates the evidence, records his conclusions and forwards a report to the Government concerned. This reporting constitutes the initial stage of the enquiry, and it may lawfully begin only after the charge has been served upon the delinquent public servant. Subsequently, after the Government receives the enquiry officer’s report, it is entitled to examine both the report and the evidence presented against the public servant. The Government may either accept the report in whole, reject it in whole, or differ with it on some points. If the report contains findings that favor the public servant and the Government concurs with those findings, there is no further action required; the servant who may have been suspended is then entitled to reinstatement along with any consequential reliefs. However, if the report favours the servant but the Government is of the opinion that the charges framed against the servant are prima facie proved, the Government must provisionally determine what punishment, if any, should be imposed and must issue a second notice to the servant for that purpose. In instances where the enquiry officer’s findings are mixed—some in favour of the servant and some against him—the Government is likewise authorized to consider the entire matter. If, after such consideration, the Government concludes that some or all of the charges are, in its view, prima facie established, it must again provisionally decide the appropriate punishment and serve a second notice to the servant. The Court clarified that the purpose of the second notice is to enable the servant to address two distinct concerns: first, to demonstrate that he is innocent of the charges, and second, to show that any punishment the Government proposes to impose would be unduly severe. The Court further observed that this procedural position under Article 311 closely mirrors the position afforded to government servants under section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The scope and effect of both section 240 of the 1935 Act and Article 311 of the Constitution have been examined repeatedly by the judiciary, and the Court noted that it was unnecessary to revisit those authorities in detail. It referred the parties to the decisions in Secretary of State for India v. I M Lal ([1945] F.C.R. 103) and the subsequent case concerning the High Commissioner for India and Pakistan, as well as to Khem Chand v. Union of India ([1958] S.C.R. 1080), for further elucidation of the principles involved.

In the decisions reported as Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lal (75 I.A. 225) and Khem Chand v. Union of India (UOI) & Ors ([1958] S.C.R. 1080), the courts indicated that it had never been suggested that the findings recorded by an enquiry officer terminated the inquiry and bound the Government that appointed the officer. The High Court, however, observed that certain passages of the Federal Court judgment in I. M. Lal and of this Court’s judgment in Khem Chand supported the respondent’s argument that the appellant was bound by the favourable findings of the enquiry officer in the present departmental enquiry. Before analysing those passages, the Court examined the principle underlying the respondent’s contentions. It was clear that the enquiry officer conducted the enquiry against the respondent as a delegate of the appellant, because the officer invariably acts on behalf of the Government when a departmental enquiry is ordered. The purpose of the enquiry was straightforward: it enabled the Government to investigate the charges that had been framed against a delinquent public servant, to consider the evidence that was produced, and to decide whether the charges were proven. The fact that a duly appointed enquiry officer carried out the enquiry did not change the legal reality that the charges were framed by the Government and that only the Government possessed the authority to impose punishment on the public servant. Consequently, on a principled basis, it was difficult to accept the respondent’s claim that the findings of the enquiry officer bound the appellant in the present case. The Court further explained that accepting the respondent’s contention would lead to absurd and untenable outcomes. If the enquiry officer found the public servant guilty, the Government would be prevented from re‑examining the matter; even if the Government later concluded that the findings were erroneous, it would still be forced to treat the servant as guilty and impose a penalty, a result that contradicted the constitutional rights of the appellant, which included the power to decide on punishment. Likewise, if the enquiry officer recorded findings in favour of the public servant, the respondent argued that those findings would be final, regardless of any error or unsoundness, leaving the appellant powerless and obligated to accept the servant’s innocence. Such a situation created an anomalous position and ignored the true constitutional authority of the appellant.

In the matter before the Court, reference was made to the nature of the enquiry officer and to the extent of the enquiry that the officer is authorized to conduct. It was observed that, on occasion, the enquiry officer frames several charges against a public servant and records findings with respect to each of those charges. In such circumstances the Government is not compelled to accept every finding. It may accept some findings and reject others, and thereafter it must decide the subsequent course of action based on its own conclusions derived from that selective acceptance. This principle was illustrated by a precedent that arose before the Court in the case of The State of Assam and Another v. Bimal Kumar Pandit. In that decision the Court examined the requirements that a second notice must satisfy when the Government wishes to proceed after an enquiry that produced multiple findings. The Court held that the second notice must plainly set out, to the public servant, the specific grounds on which the Government intends, at least provisionally, to act in imposing the punishment that is specified in the notice. The notice therefore must convey a clear description of the proposed disciplinary action and the factual basis upon which that proposal is founded.

The Court further considered the practical effect of the respondent’s contention that the Government is bound to accept the enquiry officer’s findings without any discretion. It was pointed out that if that contention were correct, the purpose of issuing a second notice would be greatly diminished. The second notice is intended to give the public servant an opportunity to show cause not only against the proposed punishment but also against the findings that underlie the proposed punishment. If, as the respondent argued, the Government could not modify or disregard those findings, the public servant would be deprived of a meaningful chance to contest them, rendering the opportunity to show cause ineffective. In the Court’s view, the respondent’s argument leads to an absurd result and therefore lacks merit. Consequently, the Court concluded that the contention raised by the respondent was fundamentally unsound and should be rejected.

The Court also addressed the question of whether the enquiry officer is required to recommend a specific punishment when an enquiry is held. It was explained that, unless a statutory rule or a specific appointing order expressly obliges the officer to make such a recommendation, the officer is not bound to suggest any particular penalty for a delinquent officer even when the charges are proved. However, when the enquiry officer does make a recommendation, that recommendation, like the officer’s findings on the merits, is intended solely to provide appropriate material for the Government’s consideration. Neither the findings nor the recommendations are binding on the Government. This principle was affirmed by the decision in A. N. D’Silva v. Union of India, where the Court held that the Government retains full discretion to decide the appropriate disciplinary measure irrespective of the enquiry officer’s suggestions.

Finally, the Court examined the observations on which the respondent relied to support his case. The respondent cited the decision in Secretary of State for India v. I. M. Lal, where Spens C.J. interpreted section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. In that case, the Chief Justice observed that whenever an enquiry results in a definitive proposal for dismissal or reduction in rank, the person concerned must be informed, either in full or in a sufficiently summarized form, of the enquiry’s results and the findings of the enquiring officer. The person must then be given an opportunity to show cause, using that information, as to why the proposed dismissal or reduction should not be imposed. The respondent argued that these observations imply that the second notice can be issued only on the basis of the enquiry officer’s recorded findings. The Court disagreed with that interpretation, finding it to be a misreading of the precedent. The observations of Spens C.J. were intended to ensure that the public servant is aware of the findings when they are adverse, not to restrict the Government’s ability to consider the findings independently or to render the findings binding. Accordingly, the Court rejected the respondent’s reliance on that observation as a basis for his contention.

The Court observed that the argument presented by the respondent was completely misconceived. It explained that, in the earlier case of I. M. Lal, the findings of the enquiry were adverse to the employee and that the observations of Spens C.J. must therefore be understood in that context. The Court held that when the findings are adverse to a public servant and the Government, after reviewing the evidence, accepts those findings on a provisional basis, it is appropriate for the Government to issue the second notice based on those findings. Consequently, the employee must be informed clearly about the nature of the findings that form the basis of the notice. However, the Court stressed that this does not make the enquiry officer’s findings binding or conclusive of the entire matter. The Court further noted that a similar observation is required with respect to the remarks of S. R. Das C.J. in the case of Khem Chand ([1958] S.C.R. 1080). Summarising the Chief Justice’s conclusions, the Court quoted that a public servant is entitled to a second opportunity only when, after the enquiry has concluded and the competent authority has considered the seriousness of the charges proved against the servant, the authority tentatively proposes one of the three permissible punishments and communicates that proposal to the servant. The Court clarified that the reference to “charges proved against the Government servant” was not intended to suggest that the enquiry officer’s findings are final. Rather, the enquiry report together with the recorded evidence constitutes the material on which the Government must ultimately decide. The purpose of the enquiry conducted by a competent officer is to produce a report that serves as the basis for the Government’s action. Accordingly, the Court held without hesitation that the High Court had erred in concluding that the appellant could not lawfully differ from the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. The Court further explained that if the enquiry officer’s report is not binding on the Government, then the constitutional safeguards provided by Article 311(1) and (2) have not been violated by the appellant, and the respondent’s grievance must therefore fail. The Court added that this conclusion did not finally settle the appeal. It remained to consider whether the respondent was correct in asserting that, in the present case, the Government’s conclusion was unsupported by any evidence. The Court described such a conclusion as perverse and afflicted with a clear and patent error apparent on the record, warranting its quashing by the High Court. Finally, the Court observed that, in matters involving writ petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed or otherwise dealt with in a manner invoking Article 311, the High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, may examine whether the Government’s conclusion underlying the impugned order of dismissal is based on any evidence.

In this case, the Court observed that the Government’s conclusion was not supported by any evidence at all. The Court acknowledged that an order of dismissal issued against a Government servant who is found guilty of misconduct may be characterized as an administrative order. Nevertheless, the Court explained that the proceedings conducted against such a public servant under the statutory rules, which are intended to determine whether the servant is guilty of the charge framed against him, are of a quasi‑judicial character. Consequently, there is little doubt, according to the Court, that a public servant may invoke a writ of certiorari if he can convince the High Court that the ultimate conclusion reached by the Government in those proceedings – the very conclusion that forms the basis of his dismissal – is founded on no evidence. The Court further noted, in fairness to the learned Attorney‑General, that the Attorney‑General did not seriously dispute this legal position. The Attorney‑General, however, attempted to argue that if the appellant acted in good faith, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with the Government’s conclusion even though the High Court might feel that the conclusion was based on no evidence. He contended that conclusions reached by the Government without any evidence could not, in law, be distinguished from conclusions reached in bad faith; thus, he suggested that perverse factual conclusions could be attacked only on the ground of bad faith, and because bad faith was not alleged in the present case, the respondent could not seek correction of the appellant’s view in writ proceedings. The Court rejected this contention. It held that an exercise of power that is bad in faith may be attacked on that ground alone and is always liable to be set aside because it is not a bona‑fide exercise of power. However, the Court also held that the absence of a bad‑faith allegation and the assumption of good faith in favour of the appellant do not preclude a successful challenge to a factual conclusion when it is evident that no evidence supports it. The Court clarified that the two infirmities – lack of evidence and bad‑faith motive – are separate and distinct, although both may coexist in some cases. It observed that situations may arise where the Government acts in good faith yet reaches a conclusion unsupported by any evidence, and similarly, situations may arise where the Government acts in bad faith and the conclusion lacks evidential support. In the latter circumstance, the lack of evidence may be a product of bad faith, but the Court stated that proving the absence of evidence does not require a further demonstration of bad faith in order to issue a writ of certiorari. Therefore, the Court declined to accept the Attorney‑General’s argument that, because no bad‑faith allegation was raised against the appellant, a writ of certiorari could not be issued.

In this case, the Court turned to the substance of the respondent’s claim that the appellant’s finding that the third charge framed against the respondent was proved rested on no evidence. The Attorney‑General emphasized that the appellant was acting with a determination to eradicate corruption, and that if the appellant’s view was at least reasonably possible, the Court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the appellant. The Court agreed that this principle was sound, but it added that the appropriate test was simply whether any evidence existed on which a finding could be made that charge number three was proved against the respondent. The Court explained that, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court could not re‑evaluate the sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence supporting a particular conclusion, because that matter belonged to the authority that had originally dealt with it. However, the High Court could and must examine whether any evidence at all supported the impugned conclusion. In other words, assuming the entire record of the enquiry was accepted as true, the Court asked whether the conclusion that the charge was proved logically followed from that record. This method avoided a full weighing of the evidence and instead required a legal test of whether the conclusion necessarily followed from the evidence as it stood. Applying this approach, the Court was inclined to hold that the respondent’s grievance was well‑founded, because, in its view, the finding implicit in the appellant’s order—that charge number three was proved against the respondent—was not supported by any evidence. The Court then examined the narrow factual material concerning this point. It noted that the respondent had expressed regret to Mr Rajagopalan for not having brought sweets for the officer’s children. There was a dispute about whether the respondent made this statement at the beginning of the interview or at its conclusion. The complaint filed by Mr Rajagopalan indicated that the interview commenced with the respondent’s expression of regret, whereas Mr Rajagopalan’s testimony placed the remark at the close of the interview. Nonetheless, it was clear that the respondent had indeed expressed such regret. If the version that the remark was made at the start of the interview was accepted, especially since it was supported by the complaint, it could suggest that Mr Rajagopalan’s stern disapproval was prompted by the statement.

In this part of the proceeding, the Court observed that the remark made by the respondent about not bringing sweets could be viewed as a warning, but noted that this issue was separate from the matter presently under consideration. Regarding the alleged hundred‑rupee note that the officer, Mr. Rajagopalan, said the respondent had taken from his wallet, the officer admitted that the note had been folded twice. He further stated that he had noticed the note was blue in colour and that its dimensions were larger than those of the usual ten‑rupee or five‑rupee notes. The Court described Mr. Rajagopalan as a straightforward officer who gave his testimony in an entirely candid manner. He explicitly told the enquiry officer that it could not be concluded that the hundred‑rupee note, which he believed the respondent had removed from his wallet, had been offered to him as a bribe; instead, he felt that the whole circumstance needed to be examined in its proper context. The officer also confessed that his eyesight was not perfect, thereby acknowledging a possible limitation in his observation.

The respondent, for his part, explained that when Mr. Rajagopalan asked him questions, he reached into his pocket to retrieve some papers in order to locate his appointment letter. He further asserted that as soon as the officer appeared to discourage him, he placed the paper back into his pocket. In light of this evidence, the Court questioned how any conclusion could be drawn that the respondent had attempted to offer a bribe to the officer. Mr. Rajagopalan made an unequivocal statement that the respondent had not offered him any bribe; his only reference was to the fact that the respondent had taken out a paper from his wallet, which the officer perceived as a double‑folded hundred‑rupee note. While it was clear that the officer harboured suspicion about the respondent’s conduct and therefore lodged a report immediately, the Court held that such suspicion, even when expressed by an honest and straightforward officer, could not, as a matter of law, be treated as evidence against the respondent.

The Court emphasized that, although it fully appreciated the appellant’s desire to eradicate corruption from public service, it could not allow mere suspicion to replace the requirement of proof, even in the context of domestic enquiries. The Court noted that the procedural rules governing criminal trials might not be identical to those applicable to disciplinary proceedings; however, the fundamental principle that the innocent must not be punished applies equally to regular criminal trials and to disciplinary inquiries conducted under statutory rules. After a careful examination of all evidence presented in the present enquiry and having considered the arguments advanced by the learned Attorney‑General, the Court concluded that the record did not contain any evidence capable of sustaining the appellant’s finding that charge number three had been proved against the respondent. The Court further added, incidentally, that the Union Public Service Commission had examined the matter on two occasions and had reached a firm decision that the principal charge against the respondent had not been established.

The Court arrived at the firm decision that the principal charge against the respondent had not been established. While it is true that the appellant succeeded on the pure point of law that was raised in the appeal, that success did not translate into a successful appeal on the facts. The Court carefully examined the evidentiary record and concluded that, on the merits, there was no sufficient material to sustain a finding that the respondent should be punished. In other words, no case had been made out that would justify imposing any disciplinary sanction on the respondent. Accordingly, the Court directed that the appellant be required to pay the costs incurred by the respondent in defending the proceedings. As a result of this assessment, the appeal was dismissed in its entirety.