The State Of Orissa vs Dabaki Devi And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 454 to 465 of 1962

Decision Date: 24 October 1963

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In this case the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 24 October 1963. The matter was titled The State of Orissa versus Dabaki Devi and Others, and it involved several connected appeals. The bench that heard the appeal consisted of Justice A. K. Sarkar, Justice K. C. Das Gupta and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The official citation of the decision is 1964 AIR 1413 and 1964 SCR (5) 253, with later citations including R 1968 SC 843 and F 1976 SC 1115.

The dispute concerned the interpretation of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Orissa 14 of 1947), specifically sections 12 and 23 which relate to sales‑tax assessment, revision of assessment orders and the applicable time limits. The respondents, including Dabaki Devi, had been assessed to sales tax by a Sales Tax Officer under the provisions of the Act. The officer rejected the respondents’ claim for certain deductions from their taxable turnover. The respondents appealed that assessment to the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax, who allowed the claimed deductions and consequently reduced the taxable turnover.

Subsequently the Collector of Sales Tax, exercising authority under section 23(3) of the Act, revised the Assistant Collector’s order by increasing the taxable turnover that could be deducted. The respondents challenged the Collector’s revision by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Orissa, arguing that the revision orders were illegal because they were made more than thirty‑six months after the end of the quarters for which the original assessments had been made.

The High Court held that the revision orders were in substance reassessments under sub‑section (7) of section 12 of the Act, dealing with turnover that had escaped assessment or had been under‑assessed, and therefore the orders were barred by the limitation provision. The Supreme Court disagreed with that view. The Court held, by a majority of Justices Das Gupta and Ayyangar, that orders of assessment made by the revising authority are to be regarded as orders passed under both section 12 and section 23 of the Act, making the period of limitation prescribed in the second proviso to section 12(6) applicable. The Court also noted that the earlier decision in Gajo Ram v. State of Bihar (1955 7 S.T.C. 248) was disapproved.

Justice Sarkar, dissenting, contended that the thirty‑six‑month time limit in section 12(7) applied only to the calling for a return and not to the making of a reassessment order for escaped or under‑assessed turnover. He further argued that an order made in revision under section 23(3) was not an order of assessment and therefore the limitation period in the second proviso to section 12(6) did not apply.

The matter arose on civil appeals numbered 454 to 465 of 1962, filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated 8 July 1958 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.S. Nos. 289, 296 and 300 of 1956. Counsel for the appellant were K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey.

In all of the appeals, counsel Santosh Chatterjee and B. Kishore appeared for respondent No. 2 in Civil Appeals Nos. 454 to 460 of 1962, and counsel for the other respondents appeared in Civil Appeals Nos. 461 to 465 of 1962. The judgment of Judges K. C. Das Gupta and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar was delivered by Judge Das Gupta, while Judge A. K. Sarkar delivered a dissenting opinion. Judge Sarkar observed that the appeals required determination of whether the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, imposed a statutory time limit for making a revision order under section 23(3) that altered a prior assessment. He noted that the answer to this question depended upon interpretation of certain provisions of the Act, which would be examined in due course. The factual background was as follows: the respondents had been assessed to sales tax for several quarters by a Sales Tax Officer operating under the Act. Disagreeing with the assessments, the respondents appealed to the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax, contending that the Officer had incorrectly rejected their claims for specific deductions from their taxable turnover. The Assistant Collector allowed the appeals, thereby reducing the assessed turnover. Later, the Orissa High Court rendered a judgment in a separate case indicating that the Assistant Collector’s decision to permit those deductions was erroneous. Acting under section 23(3) of the Act, which authorises the Collector, on his own motion or upon application, to revise any order made under the Act by a person appointed under section 3, the Collector of Sales Tax revised the Assistant Collector’s orders by increasing the taxable turnover that could be deducted. The respondents then filed a petition in the High Court of Orissa under article 226 of the Constitution, seeking to set aside the Collector’s revision orders on the ground that they were illegal because they were made more than thirty‑six months after the expiry of the quarters for which the original assessments had been issued. The High Court accepted this contention, leading to the present appeals before this Court.

The High Court held that the revision orders were unlawful because they amounted to reassessments of turnover that had either escaped assessment or had been under‑assessed, and that under sub‑section (7) of section 12 of the Act such reassessments could not be executed for any quarter after a period of thirty‑six months from the quarter’s expiry. It was not disputed that many of the Collector’s revision orders were issued after that thirty‑six‑month period had elapsed. Judge Sarkar expressed the view that the High Court was clearly in error in relying on sub‑section (7) of section 12. He quoted the essential portion of that sub‑section, which states: “If the turnover of a dealer for any period has escaped assessment or has been under‑assessed, the Collector may at any time within thirty‑six months of the end of that period call for a return… and may proceed to assess.” He emphasized that the thirty‑six‑month limitation prescribed in this provision applied solely to the requirement to call for a return, and that the sub‑section did not impose any temporal restriction on the issuance of the reassessment order itself. Consequently, Judge Sarkar concluded that the provision did not render the revision orders in question illegal.

The Court observed that the provision concerning escaped or under‑assessed turnover did not render the orders appealed against illegal. It then turned to the second proviso of subsection 6 of section 12 of the Act, which appeared to impose a thirty‑six‑month time limit on such orders. The proviso was quoted in full, stating that any assessment made under the section was without prejudice to prosecution, and that no further revenue or criminal proceedings could follow a penalty imposed by the Collector. The provision further required that no order assessing the tax due from a dealer for any period could be passed later than thirty‑six months after the expiry of that period. The Court noted that the proviso would plainly apply if the orders in the present case were orders that actually assessed the amount of tax due. Consequently, the Court identified the pivotal question as the meaning of the words “order assessing the amount of tax due” used in the proviso. It affirmed that the entire section 12 must be examined in order to interpret those words correctly. In the interim, the Court observed that although section 12 primarily speaks of assessment by the Collector, it also permits assessment by other officers appointed under the Act. Under section 17, the Collector may delegate his assessment powers to subordinate officers who assist him in carrying out the statutory duties. Having set this preliminary context, the Court indicated that it would now analyse section 12 in detail to determine the scope of the term “order assessing the amount of tax due.” The analysis would involve a systematic review of each subsection of section 12, except for subsection 6 which dealt with the time‑limit provision. The Court emphasized that each of those subsections expressly provided for the making of an order of assessment. This introductory discussion prepared the ground for a detailed examination of the various situations contemplated by the subsections of section 12. The Court then proceeded to the next stage of its reasoning.

The Court noted that section 12 comprised seven subsections, each dealing with assessment in a particular circumstance, and that subsection 6 was the one containing the time‑limit proviso. Subsection 1 dealt with situations where the assessing officer was satisfied that the dealer’s return was correct without hearing the dealer or taking any evidence. Subsection 2 covered cases in which the officer was not satisfied and therefore required a hearing and evidence before making an assessment. Subsection 3 addressed situations where the dealer failed to appear or to produce evidence when summoned under the provisions of subsection 2. Subsection 4 provided for assessment when a dealer did not furnish returns that the Act mandated him to file. Subsection 5 related to instances where a dealer wrongfully failed to apply for registration under the Act. Subsection 6, already discussed, contained the proviso imposing the thirty‑six‑month limit on orders that assess tax due. Subsection 7 dealt with assessment of turnover that had escaped assessment or had been under‑assessed, completing the statutory scheme. After outlining the structure, the Court examined whether an order issued under section 23(3) could be characterised as an “order assessing the amount of tax due” within the meaning of the proviso. The Court observed that the only provision in the Act that expressly authorises assessment of tax is section 12, and no other section refers to an assessment order. Accordingly, the Court concluded that an order made under section 23(3) could not be described as an assessment order because it was not made under section 12. The Court further pointed out that section 23(3) merely revises an earlier order passed under the Act, which itself is an order of assessment made under section 12. This interpretation was supported by subsection 2 of section 23, which allows an appellate authority to confirm, reduce, enhance or annul an assessment, indicating that such actions are not themselves assessments. The Court therefore held that the Act does not contemplate any order that is not made under section 12 as an “order assessing the amount of tax due.”

The Court explained that an order can be called an “order of assessment of tax due” only when it is made under section twelve. Consequently, an order issued under section twenty‑three paragraph three is not described as an order of assessment because that subsection provides for the revision of an order previously passed under the Act, and therefore for the revision of an assessment order originally made under section twelve. This interpretation supports the view that the statute does not treat such a revisional order as an assessment order. The same conclusion is reinforced by subsection two of section twenty‑three, which states that the appellate authority, in disposing of any appeal, may "confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment." Clearly, the appellate authority is not regarded as making a new assessment when it confirms, enhances or reduces an existing assessment. If an appellate order that enhances the assessment is not an assessment order, then a similar order issued in revision cannot be considered an assessment order either. In the Court’s opinion, the Act does not envisage any order that is not made under section twelve as an order assessing the amount of tax due. Moreover, the Court noted that subsections (1) to (5) and (7) of section twelve deal with original assessment orders, distinguishing them from orders made in appeals, by way of revision, or by way of review of those original orders. The first part of subsection six and its first proviso expressly refer to orders made under the section, and therefore they do not apply to appellate or revisional orders. The second proviso, which is the subject of the present case, contains no explicit reference to assessment under the section; it would be unreasonable to assume that it was intended to apply to assessment orders issued in appeals or revisions, assuming such orders could properly be called assessment orders. If the proviso were intended to set a limitation period for an order made in appeal or revision, the provision would not have been placed in section twelve, nor would the order have been described as an “order assessing the amount of tax due.” The Court observed that it is possible that the time limit specified in the second proviso does not apply to an assessment order under subsection seven, but this does not affect the question before the Court. A recent amendment to section twelve expressly provides that the time limit in the second proviso does not apply to an order under subsection seven. Finally, the Court expressed the view that if the second proviso in section twelve paragraph six were to fix a period of thirty‑six months from the end of the period within which an order could be made under section twenty‑three paragraph three revising an assessment, the result would be disastrous for the taxpayer and could not have been intended, as it would allow the Collector to make the application.

In that case, the Court observed that a dealer could seek revision of either an assessment order made against him or an appellate order, and that such a request could become ineffective simply by allowing the thirty‑six‑month period to elapse. The Court emphasized that the Act contained no provision obliging the revising authority to decide a revision application within any specified time, and that the original assessment order could be issued at any point within the thirty‑six‑month window. Consequently, a dealer possessed no remedy for any delay in the issuance of an assessment as long as the assessment was made before the thirty‑six‑month deadline expired. The Court noted that it was therefore quite possible that, in many instances, only a short interval remained between the dealer’s filing of a revision application and the end of the thirty‑six‑month period. The Court held that if the time limit described in the second proviso were applied to an order under section 23(3), the authorities could effectively strip a taxpayer of the right provided by section 23(3). Such an interpretation, the Court stated, could not be accepted.

The Court explained that this difficulty became clearer when read with section 23(1), which granted a dealer the right to file an appeal within thirty days of receiving the assessment order. The Court observed that, just as a revision order could be an assessment order, an appellate order could likewise be an assessment order, and therefore an appellate order also had to be issued within the thirty‑six‑month period. The Court considered a hypothetical situation in which the thirty‑six‑month period expired during the thirty‑day window prescribed by section 23(1), a scenario that could occur because the assessment order might be made at any time within those thirty‑six months. In that situation, the interpretation favoured by the respondent dealers would cause the dealer’s right to appeal within thirty days to disappear, creating a direct conflict between section 23(1) and the second proviso to section 12(6). The Court declared that any interpretation producing such a conflict could not be correct. The Court further noted that the same reasoning applied to an application for revision, since the Act did not prescribe any time limit for filing such an application, thereby permitting it to be made at any time. The Court warned that an interpretation imposing, even implicitly, a time limit on the right to seek revision, when the statute did not expressly provide one, would be of doubtful validity. Accordingly, the Court refused to adopt that interpretation, describing it as neither the only possible construction nor one clearly supported by the language of the statute. While acknowledging that permitting assessment or revision orders to be made at any time could leave a dealer’s case unresolved for an extended period at the discretion of the authority, the Court concluded that this concern did not justify accepting the respondents’ view. The Court therefore dismissed the argument that such a “calamity” justified the contested interpretation.

The Court observed that the anomaly previously mentioned appears to be far more serious than the inconvenience it is intended to prevent, and it found that the imagined inconvenience is more fanciful than real. The Court further expressed the view that it is unlikely that the authorities would deliberately keep an appeal or a revision application pending without any purpose, because doing so would confer no advantage on them. For these reasons, the Court stated that it would allow the appeals. DAS GUPTA J. explained that the present matter comprised twelve separate appeals filed by the State of Orissa, each challenging a distinct order of assessment of sales tax made by the Collector of Sales Tax, Orissa, in the exercise of his revision powers under section 23 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. The respondents in each appeal were the dealers who had been assessed, and they had approached the Orissa High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking appropriate writs directing the State of Orissa not to collect the amounts that were alleged to have been illegally assessed. The High Court allowed each of those petitions and set aside the assessment orders issued by the Collector. Consequently, the State of Orissa filed the present appeals against the High Court’s orders, having obtained special leave to appeal from this Court. All of the assessment orders that were challenged had been issued more than thirty‑six months after the expiry of the period to which the assessments related. The central question of law that arose before the Court was whether the High Court was correct in holding that those orders were void because they violated the second proviso to subsection 6 of section 12 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. The Court noted that section 4 of the Act is the charging provision that declares the incidence of tax on sales, while section 5 deals with the rate of tax. The Court stated that, for the present purpose, it was unnecessary to examine sections 6 through 10, which concern the State Government’s power to declare certain goods as tax‑free, to exempt particular dealers, to prescribe the points at which goods may be taxed, to regulate the registration of dealers, to publish the list of registered dealers, and to address the matters of tax collection by dealers. Section 11, the Court observed, requires any dealer who is so directed by the Collector, by notice served in the prescribed manner, to file returns on the dates and to the authority prescribed. The provision that primarily concerned the Court was section 12, which governs the assessment of tax. The Court explained that the first five subsections of section 12 set out the various modes by which assessment may be made. Under the first subsection, the Collector is authorized to assess the tax based on the return filed if, after examining it, he is satisfied, without needing to require additional evidence.

The Court explained that, under the first sub‑section, the Collector could accept the amount of tax shown in the return submitted by a registered dealer if the Collector was satisfied that the return was correct and complete, or if the dealer presented evidence establishing its accuracy. The second and third sub‑sections addressed situations in which the Collector was not satisfied with the return. In those cases, the Collector was required to issue a notice and then assess the tax after hearing any evidence the dealer chose to produce in support of the return, together with any additional evidence that the Collector deemed necessary on specific points. If the dealer failed to comply with the terms of the notice, the Collector was authorised to determine the tax liability according to his own judgment, as provided in the third sub‑section.

The fourth sub‑section dealt with circumstances where a registered dealer did not file returns by the stipulated deadline. Even then, the Collector was mandated to assess the tax based on his best judgment, but only after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The fifth sub‑section allowed the Collector to assess tax against a dealer who, although liable to pay tax under the Act for any period, had not applied for registration. Sub‑section six then clarified that any assessment made under this section would not prejudice any criminal prosecution under the Act; however, if the Collector imposed a penalty in addition to the assessed amount, no further revenue or criminal proceedings could be instituted against that order. Moreover, the provision stipulated that an assessment order concerning any period must be issued no later than thirty‑six months after the expiry of that period.

Sub‑section seven provided that if, for any reason, a dealer’s turnover escaped assessment or was under‑assessed, the Collector could require the dealer to file a return within thirty‑six months of the end of the relevant period and could then assess the tax following the procedure set out in sub‑section five. After an assessment order was made under section twelve, a dealer could appeal to the authority prescribed by section twenty‑three, sub‑section one. The judgment further outlined the powers of the appellate authority, stating that, subject to any prescribed rules or procedures, the authority could confirm, reduce, enhance, or annul the assessment or penalty, or could set aside the assessment or penalty and direct the assessing authority to issue a fresh order after any further inquiry it directed. Finally, the Court noted that, subject to prescribed rules and with reasons recorded in writing, the Collector could, either on application or on his own motion, revise any order passed under the Act or its rules, and similarly the Revenue Commissioner could revise any order made by the Collector, subject to the same procedural requirements.

The Court observed that the Revenue Commissioner, assisted by a person appointed under section 3, could revise any order made by the Collector in a manner similar to that exercised by the Collector himself. Although the statute does not specify a time limit for exercising such revisional powers, the authority to act is expressly made subject to “such rules as may be prescribed.” Rule 54, framed by the State Government under section 29 of the Act, provides that the Collector may, on his own initiative, exercise his revision powers within one year from the date on which the original order was passed. The same rule stipulates that the Revenue Commissioner may likewise exercise his revision powers within one year from the date of any order issued by the Collector. In the cases before this Court, the impugned orders had been issued by the Collector of Sales Tax while purportedly exercising the revision power conferred by section 23(3). Nevertheless, the petitioners contended that, in substance, those orders were assessments made under section 12(7) of the Act. The High Court had held that section 12(7) also encompassed the assessment order issued by the revising authority under section 23(3), and consequently it ruled that any assessment order passed more than thirty‑six months after the end of the relevant period was barred by the limitation provision.

The State of Orissa argued that the High Court’s interpretation was erroneous because an assessment order issued by a revising authority is not automatically an order made under section 12(7). The Court noted that the revision power granted by section 23(3) is a distinct and separate authority from the power to make an assessment after obtaining a return in cases of under‑assessment or escaped assessment. The fact that a revising authority, in a particular case, issues a fresh assessment order that makes a dealer liable for tax, thereby treating the dealer as having been under‑assessed or to have escaped assessment, does not merge the two distinct powers. Accordingly, the Court found it difficult to agree with the High Court that section 12(7) includes the re‑assessment carried out by the revising authority under section 23(3). The remaining issue, however, was whether, even if the Collector’s orders were not made under section 12(7), they could still be considered assessment orders subject to the limitation prescribed by the second proviso to section 12(6). The appellant contended that the limitation in that proviso applied only to assessments made under section 12, and since the impugned orders were made under section 23, the limitation should not apply. The Court noted that the second “proviso” in section 12(6) appears to have no connection with the legislative provision in the first part of the subsection.

In this portion of the judgment the Court examined the first part of the sub‑section and observed that the provision already set out makes clear that an assessment made under section twelve is without prejudice to any prosecution instituted for an offence under the Act. The Court noted that the first proviso is clearly linked to that main provision, whereas the second proviso contains no saving clause or exception to the main provision and therefore bears no relation to the question of any prosecution. Turning to the substance of the matter, the Court held that the rule fixing a limitation period of thirty‑six months for the passing of a tax assessment order is, in reality, an independent legislative provision of the Act. Although the draftsmen placed this rule in the form of a proviso within section twelve paragraph six, the Court found that, in substance, it is not a true proviso to the main provision. The independent provision states that no order “assessing the amount of tax shall be passed after the lapse of thirty‑six months from the expiry of the period” for which the assessment is made. The language of this rule is not confined to orders of assessment made under section twelve; rather, it applies to any order that assesses tax, which inevitably includes assessments made under any other provision of the Act besides section twelve. Consequently, even if an assessment order issued under the revisional powers of section twenty‑three is held not to be an order made under section twelve, the thirty‑six‑month limitation from the expiry of the period for which the assessment is made will still apply. Counsel for the appellant, Mr Sastri, argued that because the provision appears as a “proviso” in section twelve paragraph six, the legislature intended it to apply only to those assessment orders to which the main provision, using the words “Any assessment made under this section,” relates. Since the main provision expressly deals only with assessments under section twelve, it was submitted that the limitation period in the second proviso should govern only such assessments. The Court reiterated its earlier reasoning that, although the limitation appears as a proviso, it functions as an independent legislative provision whose subject‑matter bears no connection to the main provision in section twelve paragraph six or to the earlier proviso. Accordingly, the Court saw no logical basis for interpreting the rule as limited to assessments under section twelve; on any reasonable construction, it operates as a limitation on any order of assessment made under the Act, irrespective of the specific provision relied upon.

The Court observed that even assuming the limitation provision applied solely to orders of assessment made under section 12, that construction would not benefit the appellant unless it could be demonstrated that the challenged orders of assessment were not made under section 12. The Court found it difficult to accept any such contention. It acknowledged that the orders were indeed issued pursuant to powers granted by section 23, but stressed that section 23 does not endow the appellate or revisional authority with an independent power to assess tax apart from the powers conferred by section 12. A careful reading of the language of section 23 clarified this position. First, the Court examined the powers of the appellate authority under clause 23(2). Among the various orders the appellate authority may pass in disposing of an appeal, clause (b) authorises the authority to “set aside the assessment … and direct the assessing authority to pass a fresh order after such further enquiry as may be directed.” The Court noted that counsel for the State did not dispute that when the appellate authority exercises this power, the “assessing authority” may conduct the fresh assessment only under section 12, and that in such a case the right to proceed with assessment would be subject to the three‑year limitation prescribed by the second proviso to section 12(6). Consequently, the appellate authority could set aside an assessment at any time, but the assessing authority could not give effect to the direction to make a fresh assessment if the three‑year period had already elapsed. This would effectively mean that if the appeal were decided after the three‑year period had ended or was near its expiry, the appellate authority’s powers would be limited to those listed in clause (a) of section 23(2), a result the legislature had not contemplated. In other words, accepting the appellant’s construction would create an anomalous situation: if the appellate authority set aside the assessment and remanded the matter for a fresh order, a fresh assessment could not be made after the limitation period, whereas if the appellate authority himself performed the reassessment, no limitation would apply. Under such a construction, the applicability of the statutory limitation would depend on the precise order the appellate authority chose to pass, giving the authority discretion to decide whether the limitation period attaches to the assessment. The Court concluded that this reasoning was sufficient to reject the appellant’s argument that section 23(2) itself creates an independent power to effect an assessment. The Court further indicated that the same analysis applies to a revision under section 23(3), because the powers of the revising authority and the orders it may pass are not conceived as differing in any material respect from those of the appellate authority.

In this case the Court held without hesitation that when an appellate or revisional authority issues a fresh assessment by increasing the liability, it is exercising the power conferred by section 12 and, in effect, performing the duty that an assessing authority would ordinarily perform. Accordingly, any assessment order issued by the appellate authority, or, as in the present appeals, by the revising authority, must be regarded as an order passed under both section 12 and section 23. As a consequence, the limitation period prescribed in the second proviso to section 12(6) becomes applicable to such assessment orders.

Mr Sastri then argued that applying the thirty‑six‑month limitation to appellate or revisional assessment orders would create an anomalous situation. He correctly observed that in many cases the original assessment order may be made on the final day of the thirty‑six‑month period or shortly before that date. In those circumstances no appellate or revisional assessment order could be made within the prescribed thirty‑six‑month window. Mr Sastri submitted that the legislature could not have intended such a result and therefore must have intended the limitation period to apply only to original assessment orders.

The Court responded that if the legislature had intended a narrow application, it could have expressed that intention plainly. The Court also noted that, apart from the provision in the second proviso to section 12(6), the Act contains no other limitation provision for assessment orders. Consequently, if Mr Sastri’s view were correct, the law would permit an appellate or revisional authority to issue its assessment order after an unlimited delay once the original assessment had been made within the thirty‑six‑month period. The Court found this outcome implausible and expressed doubt that the legislature, while stipulating a limitation period for original assessments, would have deliberately omitted a comparable limitation for appellate or revisional assessments.

The Court further observed that the rule‑making authority has, in Rule 54, prescribed a period of one year from the date of the original order within which the Collector or the Revenue Commissioner may, on his own motion, revise that order. However, the Court cautioned that this rule‑prescribed period is not immutable; it could be omitted or amended at any time. Moreover, the rule‑making authority has not prescribed any limitation period for the making of an appellate assessment order, nor for the time within which the Collector or revising authority must pass a revisional order when exercising revisional jurisdiction on an application by the dealer. This lack of a specific statutory or regulatory limitation underscores the Court’s conclusion that the limitation period in the second proviso to section 12(6) should apply uniformly to original, appellate, and revisional assessment orders.

It was observed that the authority, whether appellate or revising, must pass the order of assessment. The Court emphasized that the legislature had not enacted any special limitation rule specifically for revisional or appellate orders. Because the legislature had not prescribed any limitation period for orders issued by an appellate authority or a revising authority, the Court inferred that the limitation period provided in section 12(6) was intended to govern all assessments, whether original, appellate or revisional. The difficulty highlighted by counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sastri, might arise in a few instances. However, the Court considered that in most cases such a difficulty would not occur if the original assessment were made promptly, allowing the appellate or revising authority to act within the prescribed thirty‑six‑month period. Even if a difficulty arose in some cases, the Court held that this circumstance did not furnish a sufficient basis to conclude that Parliament had implicitly limited the statutory period only to original assessments. Counsel for the appellant also referred to a decision of the Patna High Court in Gajo Ram v. State of Bihar, wherein the court, while interpreting a similar provision in section 10(6) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944, held that a twenty‑four‑month limitation applied solely to original assessments. The learned judges in that case appeared persuaded by the argument that applying the same limitation to both original and appellate or revisional assessments would create absurdity. The Court found that argument unconvincing in the present context. Consequently, the Court concluded that the assessed orders under challenge were barred by limitation because they were issued more than thirty‑six months after the taxable period had ended. Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court was correct in setting aside the several assessment orders. The appeals were dismissed with costs, and a single set of hearing fees was ordered for all the appeals.