The Management Of The Express... vs The Presiding Officer, Labour Court,... on 18 December, 1963

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 18 December, 1963

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta

The case was titled The Management of the Express … versus The Presiding Officer, Labour Court … and was decided on 18 December 1963 by a Bench of the Supreme Court of India comprising Justices P B Gajendragadkar, K N Wanchoo and K C Das Gupta. The appeal arose from an industrial dispute that the Government of Madras referred to the Court for determination of whether the dismissal of Sri Brian Bobb and Sri C Sampath was justified and what relief, if any, they were entitled to receive. The present judgment considered only the dismissal of Sri Brian Bobb. Mr Bobb had worked as a journalist for many years and had previously been employed as News Editor of the Morning News in Dacca, Pakistan, a position he relinquished after the Pakistani Government refused to renew his visa. Subsequently he applied to Shri R N Goenka, Chairman of Express Newspapers Ltd., Madras, for a post on the editorial staff of any newspaper within the Goenka group. He was eventually appointed Chief Sub‑Editor of the Indian Express at Madurai and joined the newspaper on 28 February 1957. The appointment was expressly made on a probationary basis, as set out in the appointment letter dated 11 February 1957, which stated that the appointment would be for an initial six‑month probation period and that confirmation would follow only if his work was satisfactory and he found the job suitable. Before the six‑month period elapsed, Mr Bobb received a letter dated 11 July 1957 informing him that his work had been found unsatisfactory and that his probation was being terminated, with a statement that his accounts would be settled immediately.

The Madras Union of Journalists intervened on behalf of Mr Bobb and raised a dispute concerning his termination. It is noteworthy that, six days prior to the termination, on 5 July 1957, Mr Bobb had been elected President of the Madurai Branch of the Madras Union of Journalists. The Union contended that the dismissal was motivated by malice and was intended to punish Mr Bobb for his leadership role in establishing the Madurai Branch and for accepting the presidency of that Branch. In response, the Management of Express Newspapers argued that, because Mr Bobb had been employed only as a probationer, the termination of his services on the ground of unsatisfactory performance fell squarely within the employer’s lawful rights. The Labour Court examined the surrounding circumstances and concluded that the termination amounted to a clear case of victimisation. Accordingly, the Labour Court ordered that Mr Bobb be reinstated in his former position and that he be paid back wages calculated from the date of his dismissal. Dissatisfied with this order, the Management appealed to the Madras High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking to set aside the Labour Court’s finding of victimisation and to limit the relief to wages only for the period from 11 July 1957 to 28 August 1957, arguing that the Labour Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by directing reinstatement with back wages.

The Management invoked Article 226 of the Constitution in seeking relief against the order of the Labour Court. Before the High Court the Management advanced two principal submissions. First, it contended that the Labour Court’s finding that the termination of the employee’s services constituted victimisation was tainted by an apparent error. Second, it argued that, because the employee had been engaged on a six‑month probationary basis, the employer was entitled to terminate his services at the expiry of that period without incurring any liability, and consequently the Labour Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the employee’s reinstatement together with back wages. The Management submitted that, at most, the Labour Court should have awarded the employee wages covering the interval from 11 July 1957 to 28 August 1957. Mr Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar, presiding over the petition, rejected both submissions. He held that the Labour Court had not erred in its assessment of either oral or documentary evidence and that, although the employer could have terminated the employee’s services at the end of the six‑month probationary term, the employee would have remained on probation if the employer had taken no step to terminate or confirm him. Accordingly, the learned Judge declined to grant any writ of certiorari and dismissed the application. The Management’s subsequent appeal against that decision, made under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, was also dismissed. After obtaining special leave, the Management filed the present appeal challenging the dismissal of its earlier appeal.

The principal argument raised on behalf of the Management, articulated by counsel Mr Gupte, was that the High Court erred in law by holding that the employee continued to be in service as a probationer after the six‑month probationary period had elapsed. Mr Gupte contended that, absent a formal order of confirmation, the employee’s service should have terminated automatically at the conclusion of the probationary term. The Court found this contention to be wholly unsound. It observed that, under established law, an employee appointed on a six‑month probation continues to remain a probationer beyond that period unless the employer expressly terminates the employment or confirms the employee. The Court explained that a probationary appointment does not confer on the employer a right to dismiss the employee before the six‑month term expires, except in cases of misconduct or other sufficient reasons that would also justify termination of a permanent employee. At the end of the six‑month period, the employer may either confirm the employee or terminate the employment on the ground of unsatisfactory performance. If the employer takes no action—neither confirming nor terminating—the employee’s service persists in probationary status. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the High Court was correct in rejecting the Management’s contention that the employee’s service had automatically ended on 28 August 1957. The appeal was therefore dismissed with costs.

In the matters before the Court, the record showed that Mr. Bobb’s employment was deemed to have terminated automatically on the thirty‑first day after the date of August twenty‑eight, nineteen‑fifty‑seven. Counsel for the Management, identified as Mr. Gupte, urged the Court to review whether the decision of the High Court was correct in holding that the Labour Court’s determination on the issue of victimisation could not be disturbed. The Court observed that the Labour Court, after a thorough examination of the material placed before it, had reached the conclusion that the actions taken by the Management were not undertaken in good faith and that, in effect, they constituted victimisation of the employee. The Court further explained that the High Court possessed no authority to set aside that conclusion unless it could point to a manifest error visible on the face of the record or demonstrate that the Labour Court’s finding was unsupported by any evidence. Upon review, the High Court identified no such manifest error and, in addition, expressed its own support for the Labour Court’s finding. Consequently, the Court held that the Management was not entitled to contest the High Court’s endorsement of the Labour Court’s decision on the question of victimisation. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the Management was dismissed and the costs of the proceedings were awarded against it.