The Central Bank Of India Ltd vs P.S. Rajagopalan Etc

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos 823-826 of 1962

Decision Date: 19 April 1963

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

The case titled The Central Bank of India Ltd v P.S. Rajagopalan etc was decided on 19 April 1963 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar. The bench that heard the matter comprised Justices P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta, J. C. Shah and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioner was the Central Bank of India Ltd and the respondents were P.S. Rajagopalan and others. The citation of the decision is 1964 AIR 743 and 1964 SCR (3) 140 together with several other citations.

The dispute arose under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947). Four respondents, who were clerks in the clearing department of the bank, claimed that in addition to their ordinary duties they had operated an adding‑machine supplied for that department. They relied on paragraph 164(b)(1) of the Sastry Award and contended that they were entitled to a special allowance of ten rupees per month for that work. The bank raised objections to the claim, but the Labour Court rejected those objections and ordered that the allowance be paid to each respondent. The bank then appealed to the Supreme Court by way of special leave.

The bank’s contentions before the Supreme Court were that section 33C(2) did not apply because the right to the allowance was contested, that the Labour Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by hearing applications that fell outside the scope of section 33C(2), and that only comptists could claim the special allowance. The bank further argued that the respondents had not even claimed to be comptists, and therefore their applications should have been dismissed.

The Court held that section 33C(2) does include situations where a workman seeks a monetary determination of a benefit even though the employer disputes the existence of the right on which the claim is based. For the purpose of making such a determination, the Labour Court is authorized to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman’s right depends. The Court distinguished section 33C(2) from section 36A, observing that the former deals with the implementation of individual rights of workmen, whereas the latter concerns the interpretation of an award when a dispute arises and the appropriate Government is satisfied that the dispute should be referred under section 36A.

The Court further explained that the reach of section 33C(2) is broader than that of section 33C(1). While claims under section 33C(1) must be referable to a settlement, an award or the relevant provisions of Chapter V‑A, section 33C(2) is not confined by those limitations. The Court noted that three categories of claims listed in section 33C(1) fall within section 33C(2), making it akin to an execution proceeding, yet it also recognized that claims not based on settlements, awards or Chapter V‑A provisions may still be competent under section 33C(2). Finally, the Court observed that the respondents’ claim for the special allowance as comptists rested solely on the description of them as operators of the adding‑machine.

In discussing the implementation of individual rights of workmen, the Court explained that section 36A is confined to the interpretation of an award when a dispute arises between the workmen and the employer and the appropriate Government is satisfied that the dispute should be resolved under that section. By contrast, section 33C(2) deals with the enforcement of individual rights of workmen falling within its provisions. The Court observed that the scope of section 33G(2) is broader than that of section 33G(1). It further noted that claims made under section 33C(1) must be referable to a settlement, an award, or the relevant provisions of Chapter V‑A, whereas such limitations do not apply to section 33C(2). The Court identified three categories of claims mentioned in section 33C(1) that fall within section 33C(2), describing section 33C(2) as a kind of execution proceeding. Nonetheless, it held that claims not based on settlements, awards, or the provisions of Chapter V‑A may also be competent under section 33C(2). The Court then held that the respondents’ claim for a special allowance as “camptists” could not be sustained merely because they described themselves as adding‑machine operators. The Court also observed that no period of limitation is provided for an application under section 33C(2). The judgment cited several authorities, including Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K.L. Kharbanda, (1962) 1 L.L.J. 234; M/s. Kasturi and Sons (P) Ltd. v. Shri N. Saliva‑teeswaran, [1959] S.C.R. 1; Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. Shri S. B. Bhatt, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 220; and M/s. Sawatrum Ramprasad Mills Co. Ltd. v. Baliram, (1962) 65 Born.L.R. 91. The judgment proceeded to set out the civil appellate jurisdiction, noting civil appeals numbered 823 to 826 of 1962, which were special leave appeals from the order dated 7 March 1962 of the Central Government Labour Court at Delhi in L.C.A. Nos. 246 to 249 of 1962. Counsel for the appellants and respondents were listed, and the judgment dated 19 April 1963 was delivered by Justice Gajendragadkar. The Court explained that the group of several appeals was placed together for final disposal because they raised a common question of law regarding the construction of section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Court proposed to decide this point in the appeals filed by the Central Bank of India Ltd. against its employees, and that the decision on this point would guide the disposition of the remaining appeals in the group. The appeals arose from applications made by four respondents under section 33C(2) of the Act. Each respondent claimed that, in addition to his routine duties as a clerk, he operated the adding machine in the clearing department of the branch during the period specified in the petition annex, and therefore was entitled to a special allowance of ten rupees per month as provided in paragraph 164(b)(1) of the Sastry Award.

According to the petition, each respondent listed in the annex claimed a special allowance of ten rupees per month for operating the adding machine that was provided for use in the clearing department of the branch. The claim was made on the basis of paragraph 164(b)(1) of the Sastry Award, and each respondent sought payment of the amount calculated for the period shown in his respective computation. The appellant, Central Bank of India Ltd, contested these claims and raised three preliminary objections concerning the competence of the applications. First, the appellant asserted that under the Award the respondents were entitled only to non‑monetary benefits that could be computed, and therefore section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was not applicable to their claim. Second, the appellant contended that the applications could not be maintained without a reference made by the Central Government. Third, it was argued that because the applications required an interpretation of the Sastry Award, they fell outside the purview of section 33C(2). On the merits, the appellant maintained that the special allowance specified in paragraph 164(b)(1) was intended solely for Comptists, that is, operators of a Comptometer, and could not be claimed by the respondents who only operated adding machines. The appellant supported this position by describing the operation of a Comptometer as requiring a considerable amount of manipulative skill, a series of complex, rapid operations, and months of training, whereas operating an adding machine required no special training and did not even demand the skill of a typist. Consequently, the appellant argued that the respondents were not eligible for the special allowance.

The Central Government Labour Court, before which the respondents filed their applications, rejected all three preliminary objections raised by the appellant. On the merits, the Labour Court held that the respondents were entitled to the special allowance under the relevant clause of the Sastry Award and consequently allowed the applications. The Court ordered the appellant to pay each respondent the amount claimed. The appellant has now approached this Court by way of special leave, contending that the Labour Court exceeded its jurisdiction by entertaining the applications because, in its view, the respondents’ claims were outside the scope of section 33C(2) of the Act. The appellant therefore seeks a declaration that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to determine the matter.

In this provision, the statute directed that a worker who was owed money could apply to the appropriate Government for recovery of that money. If the Government was satisfied that such a debt existed, it was required to issue a certificate specifying the amount to the Collector. The Collector would then recover the amount in the same way that arrears of land revenue are recovered. Sub‑section 2 provided that where a workman was entitled to receive from the employer any benefit that could be measured in monetary terms, the amount of that benefit could be determined by the Labour Court designated by the appropriate Government, subject to any rules made under the Act. Once the Labour Court made that determination, the amount could be recovered according to the procedure laid down in sub‑section 1. Sub‑section 3 empowered the Labour Court, if it considered it appropriate, to appoint a Commissioner for the purpose of calculating the monetary value of the benefit. The Commissioner was to take such evidence as was necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court, and the Labour Court was to fix the amount after considering the Commissioner’s report and the other circumstances of the case. It was accepted by all parties that sub‑section 1 created a special mode of execution. It recognised that when money was due to a workman under a settlement, an award, or under the provisions of Chapter VA, the workman was not obliged to pursue the ordinary civil‑court execution process; instead, the workman could use the summary procedure described in sub‑section 1. This subsection presupposed that a definite sum was owed to the workman and that the sum had not been paid. Once the appropriate Government was satisfied that the sum was due, it had to issue the certificate to the Collector, which would result in recovery of the sum in the same manner as arrears of land revenue. The scope and effect of sub‑section 1 were not contested. There was also no dispute that the term “benefit” in sub‑section 2 was not limited to monetary benefits that could be directly expressed in money; it also embraced non‑monetary benefits to which the workman was entitled. In such cases, the workman could approach the appropriate Labour Court and request that the benefit be computed in monetary terms. After such computation under sub‑section 2, the resulting amount had to be recovered using the mechanism of sub‑section 1. In other words, the legislature provided a method for determining the amount due under sub‑section 2 and then clearly prescribed that recovery of that amount must follow the procedure of sub‑section 1. Sub‑section 3 authorized the Labour Court to appoint a Commissioner for the purpose of computing the monetary value of the benefit.

The provision authorises the appointment of a Commissioner to determine the monetary value of a benefit, and it specifies that a Commissioner so appointed must collect any evidence that is required and then transmit a report to the Labour Court. After receiving the Commissioner’s report, the Labour Court is obliged to assess the amount payable, taking into account the contents of the report as well as any other relevant circumstances of the case. Consequently, proceedings initiated under subsection (2) may be concluded directly by the Labour Court, or, where appropriate, the Court may reach a decision after considering a report submitted by a Commissioner it has appointed for that purpose. It follows that when the valuation of a benefit claimed by a workman in monetary terms necessitates an inquiry and the taking of evidence, the Labour Court may either conduct that inquiry itself or may assign the task to a Commissioner it designates. This understanding has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the decision of Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. V. K. L. Kharbanda (1962 L.L.J. 284). The matter that now requires determination differs slightly from the issues previously decided. The appellant argues that subsection (2) may be invoked only by a workman who is already entitled to receive the specified benefit, and that the workman’s entitlement must be undisputed for the provision to apply. According to this argument, any dispute concerning the workman’s right to the benefit should be resolved through other procedures authorized by the Act, and because the appellant contests the respondent’s entitlement to the special allowance, the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim. In other words, the appellant contends that the opening words of subsection (2) assume an admitted, vested right in the workman and therefore exclude cases where that right is contested. The respondents, however, maintain that subsection (2) is sufficiently wide to cover every instance in which a workman seeks a benefit and requests that the benefit be quantified in monetary terms. They argue that any defences raised by the employer against such a claim must also be examined by the Labour Court under subsection (2). Under this broader construction, any question that arises between a workman and his employer concerning the monetary computation of a claimed benefit would fall within the ambit of subsection (2). Before addressing the parties’ construction dispute, it is appropriate to briefly consider the legislative history of the provision. The original enactment of the Act was premised on the principle that industrial disputes should be adjudicated between trade unions or labour representatives on one side and the employers on the other.

In this case, the Court explained that the statutory scheme originally envisaged disputes between workmen’s employers on one side and the workmen, represented collectively, on the other. For that reason, section 10 (1), which governs the reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals, has been interpreted by this Court to mean that only those disputes which are referable under s. 10(1) are the disputes that are raised by “the trade Unions to which the workmen belong or by the representatives of workmen acting in such a representative character.” The Court observed, however, that by denying individual employees a speedy remedy for enforcing their existing rights, the Act failed to give due protection to them. The Court noted that when an individual employee does not seek to create an industrial dispute aimed at changing the terms and conditions of service, but merely wishes to implement or enforce a right that already exists, it should not be necessary for him to resort to the remedy prescribed by s. 10(1) of the Act. This observation formed the basis of the criticism that the Act omitted a provision for the speedy enforcement of the rights of an individual workman.

To address that criticism, the Legislature introduced an amendment in 1059 by inserting section 20 into the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (No. 48 of 1950). Section 20 of that Act created a mechanism for the recovery of money due from an employer under an award or decision. The Court held that this provision filled the lacuna that became apparent because, even after an award was made, individual workmen were not provided with a swift remedy to implement or execute the award; consequently, s.20 was intended to supply that remedy. Section 20 (1) provides that if money is due under an award or decision of an industrial tribunal, it may be recovered either as arrears of land revenue or as a public demand by the appropriate Government upon an application made by the person entitled to the money. Section 20 (2) then addresses the cages where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit under an award or decision of an industrial tribunal that can be computed in monetary terms, and it provides that the amount of such benefit may be determined, subject to the rules framed for that purpose by the industrial tribunal, and that the determined amount may be recovered as provided in sub‑s. (1). In other words, the provisions of s.20 (2) roughly correspond to the provisions of s.33C(2) of the Act. The Court identified two points of distinction: first, s.20 (2) is confined to benefits claimable by workmen under an award or decision of an industrial tribunal; second, the application for recovery must be filed before the industrial tribunal that made the award or decision. These two limitations are not present in s.33C(2). Section 20 (3) corresponds to s.33C (3). Accordingly, the Court noted that s.20 of this Act provides a speedy remedy to individual workmen.

In this case the Court observed that the legislative scheme provided workmen with a means to enforce the rights granted to them by awards or decisions of industrial tribunals. The Court further noted that section 34 of the Act created a special provision for determining whether the conditions of service of an individual workman had been altered while industrial proceedings were pending, and to that end the section inserted provision 33A into the Act. Section 20, which was introduced by Act 48 of 1950, came into force on 20 May 1950. The Court then traced the subsequent legislative developments. In 1953 the Legislature expanded the protective framework for workmen by adding Chapter VA to the Act and by passing Amending Act No. 43 of 1953. Chapter VA was intended to address the claims of workmen in situations of lay‑off and retrenchment. Within that Chapter, section 25(1) established the mechanism for recovering monies due from employers under the provisions of Chapter VA. The provision expressly stipulated that any money due from an employer could be recovered in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue or as a public demand made by the appropriate Government, upon an application filed by the workman who was entitled to the money. The Court emphasized that this mode of recovery was without prejudice to the workman’s right to pursue any other lawful method of recovery. By inserting this provision, the Legislature demonstrated that, having created additional rights for workmen in respect of lay‑off and retrenchment, it also sought to ensure a swift remedy for the recovery of the amounts owed by employers. The Amending Act of 1953 became operative on 23 December 1953. Approximately three years later the Legislature enacted the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (No. 36 of 1956). That Act repealed the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act No. 48 of 1950, section 25 I of Chapter VA, and inserted sections 33C(1), 33C(2), 33C(3) and 36A into the Act. As a result, the provisions concerning recovery were consolidated in section 33C, while section 36A was added to address situations where doubt or difficulty might arise in interpreting any provision of an award or settlement. The 1956 Act commenced on 28 August 1956. To complete the legislative background of section 33C, the Court referred to Amendment Act No. 18 of 1957, which introduced two further provisions into Chapter VA, numbered sections 25FF and 25FFF, and which came into force on 6 June 1957. The Court concluded that the legislative history demonstrated a clear intention: after establishing a broad framework for collective bargaining and the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, the Legislature recognized the necessity of providing individual workmen with a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights. Accordingly, section 33A was inserted in 1950 and section 33C was added in 1956, both of which illustrate the circumstances in which an individual workman may enforce his or her rights without having to rely on collective mechanisms.

In this case the Court observed that section 33‑C was intended to give an individual workman a prompt remedy for enforcing his existing right without having to rely on section 10(1) of the Act or on his union to plead his cause. Accordingly, while interpreting section 33‑C the Court said that the construction must not be so expansive as to pull into its ambit matters that are properly dealt with under section 10(1). The Court explained that when an industrial dispute arises between employees acting collectively and their employer, the dispute must be resolved in the manner prescribed by the Act, for example by reference to section 10(1), and such collective disputes could not be brought within the scope of section 33‑C. At the same time, the Court noted that the legislative policy behind section 33‑C was to furnish a speedy remedy to an individual workman for enforcing or executing a right that already existed. Therefore it would be unreasonable to exclude from section 33‑C those cases in which an individual workman seeks to implement an existing entitlement. In other words, while the Court had to ensure that cases which rightfully fell within the ambit of section 33‑C were not omitted, it also had to remember that matters falling under section 10(1) could not be placed within the ambit of section 33‑C. The Court then turned to the language of subsection (2) of section 33‑C to determine its true scope. It asked whether the words “any workman entitled to receive from the employer any benefit there specified” meant that the workman’s right to the benefit must be undisputed by the employer. The appellant contended that subsection (2) should be read in the same way as subsection (1), arguing that if a dispute existed as to the workman’s right to receive the money due under an award, the appropriate government could not adjudicate it, and that the Labour Court could only deal with the monetary computation of the benefit. The Court was not persuaded by this submission. It held that a fair and reasonable construction of subsection (2) made clear that if the workman’s right to the benefit was contested, the Labour Court had to determine that right before proceeding to calculate the monetary value. If the entitlement was not contested, the Labour Court could directly compute the amount, but in cases of dispute the Court must first decide whether the workman indeed possessed the right to the benefit.

In this case the Court observed that the Labour Court must first decide whether the workman actually possesses the right to receive the benefit that he claims, and only if the Court finds in favour of the workman may it proceed to the subsequent step of calculating the monetary value of that benefit. The Court found that the introductory words of subsection (2) do not support the construction urged by the appellant unless additional words are inserted into that clause. The phrase “Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit” was held not to mean “where such workman is admittedly, or admitted to be, entitled to receive such benefit.” The appellant’s suggested reading would require the insertion of the words “admittedly, or admitted to be,” and the Court said that such insertion is not permissible. Moreover, the Court warned that accepting the appellant’s construction would effectively place the choice in the hands of the employer, who could simply object on the ground that the workman’s claimed right is not admitted, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the workman’s application. The provision under section 33C(9) was noted to indicate that, in some cases, the determination of the monetary computation must be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right, and that such enquiry is incidental to the principal determination that subsection (2) assigns to the Labour Court. Relying on the authority of Maxwell, the Court reiterated that “where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution.” Consequently, the Court held that subsection (2) of section 33C embraces situations where workmen claim that the benefit to which they are entitled should be expressed in monetary terms, even though the underlying right to that benefit may be disputed by the employer. The Court also observed that it would be incongruous if, under subsection (3), the Labour Court were authorised to delegate the entire task of computing the monetary value of the benefit to the Commissioner, assuming that the sole function of the Labour Court under subsection (2) were to determine the existence of the right. Instead, subsection (3) becomes intelligible if the Commissioner is permitted to handle only a portion of the Labour Court’s broader assignment under subsection (2). Finally, the Court noted an argument that, in order to decide whether a right exists, the Labour Court would necessarily have to interpret the award or settlement on which that right is based, and that such interpretation is not within its jurisdiction under section 33C(2) because the power to interpret awards or settlements is expressly provided elsewhere.

It was observed that section 36A was inserted by the Amending Act No 36 of 1956 at the same time as section 33C, and the appellant argued that the legislature’s simultaneous enactment meant that questions of interpretation should be dealt with under section 36A and therefore lie outside the scope of section 33C(2). The Court found no merit in that argument. Section 36A merely provides a mechanism for interpreting any provision of an award or settlement when difficulty or doubt arises, as explained in the reference to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes p. 350. This power is normally invoked when the employer and the employees disagree on the meaning of an award or settlement and the appropriate Government is convinced that a defect or uncertainty exists in a particular provision. Occasionally awards or settlements may be obscure, ambiguous, or otherwise difficult to construct, and in such circumstances the parties may move the appropriate Government to refer the matter under section 36A. Historically, when awards or settlements were defective in this manner, there was no remedy for the parties to resolve their doubts, and section 36A now supplies that remedy. However, the scope of section 36A differs from that of section 33C(2). Section 36A is concerned solely with interpretation and does not address the implementation or execution of the award, whereas the sole purpose of section 33C(2) is to deal with the implementation of individual workmen’s rights. While section 33C(2) focuses on executing individual rights, section 36A is limited to resolving interpretative disputes between workmen and the employer when the Government is satisfied that such a dispute warrants reference under that provision. The Court also noted that when the Labour Court is empowered to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his existing rights, it is effectively exercising execution powers, and it is well settled that a court executing a decree may interpret that decree for the purpose of execution. Although an executing court may not go behind the decree or alter its provisions, the same limitations apply to the Labour Court. Accordingly, the Labour Court, like an executing court, is competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under section 33C(2). Consequently, the Court held that for the purpose of making the necessary determination under section 33C(2), the Labour Court may, in appropriate cases, interpret the award or settlement upon which the workman’s right rests. The Court reiterated that this observation aligns with the enactment of section 33C.

In this case, the Court observed that the legislature intentionally left out certain words that appear in section twenty of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. The Court found it striking that comparable limiting words were used in sub‑section one of section thirty‑three‑C because that provision deals with situations where money is owed under a settlement, an award, or the provisions of Chapter five‑A. Consequently, the Court concluded that a claim made under sub‑section one of thirty‑three‑C can relate only to a settlement, an award, or the relevant provisions of Chapter five‑A. Those limiting words do not appear in sub‑section two of the same section, and therefore the scope of sub‑section two is unquestionably broader than that of sub‑section one. The Court noted that even for the larger class of cases that fall under sub‑section two, once the Labour Court makes a determination, the execution of the amount reverts to the mechanism provided in sub‑section one. For this reason sub‑section two expressly states that the amount so determined may be recovered pursuant to sub‑section one. The Court said that it was unnecessary in the present appeals to list exhaustively or even to outline broadly all other categories of claims that could fall within sub‑section two. The Court recognized that the three categories of claims mentioned in sub‑section one are included in sub‑section two, and in that sense sub‑section two can be regarded as a form of execution proceeding. However, the Court also indicated that claims not based on settlements, awards, or the provisions of Chapter five‑A may also be competent under sub‑section two, illustrating its wider reach. The Court then identified certain claims that would not fall within sub‑section two because they formed the subject matter of the appeals grouped for decision. For example, if an employee is dismissed or demoted and alleges that such dismissal or demotion is wrongful, the employee cannot seek recovery of salary or wages under sub‑section two. Although the dismissal or demotion may give rise to an industrial dispute that can be tried, once it is established that the employer has terminated or demoted the employee, a claim that the termination or demotion is unlawful and that the employee remains entitled to benefits under the existing contract cannot be brought under sub‑section two. Likewise, if a settlement has been properly reached between the employer and employees but the settlement fails under section eighteen nine or three of the Act and is governed by section nineteen two, the employee cannot, notwithstanding the settlement, claim the benefit as if the settlement had terminated.

The Court explained that when a settlement remains in force, no claim may be brought under section 33C(2) that would conflict with that settlement. If the parties intend to end the settlement, the proper procedural steps must be taken to terminate it, and any dispute that arises thereafter must be dealt with according to the other procedures provided by the Act.

The Court then concluded that the ambit of section 33G(2) is broader than that of section 33G(1) and cannot be fully merged with it. However, the Court declined to specify which additional situations might fall within section 33G(2) but not under section 33G(1), stating that it was unnecessary to decide that point at this stage.

The Court also noted, incidentally, that its earlier observation in Punjab National Bank Ltd. that section 33C is a provision of a judicial‑execution nature should not be taken to mean that the scope of section 33G(2) is identical to that of section 33G(1). The citation for that observation is Punjab National Bank Ltd., 1962, L.L.J. 234, page 238.

The Court proceeded to refer to several authorities that are relevant to the discussion. In Kasturi and Sons (Private) Ltd. v. Shri N. Salivateeswaran, the Court examined the scope and effect of section 17 of the Working Journalists (Condition of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955. It observed that the procedure prescribed by section 17 differs from that prescribed by section 33C(2). Under section 33C(2), when an employee claims a sum of money, an enquiry by the Labour Court is contemplated, and only after the Labour Court decides the matter does the decision become enforceable under section 33C(1) by a summary procedure. No such enquiry is envisioned by section 17.

In Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. S.B. Bhatt, the Court interpreted section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. It held that when an authority exercises jurisdiction that is made exclusive by section 22, it must consider various questions incidental to the claims falling within that jurisdiction. The Court added that, although it would be imprudent to lay down a rigid rule for determining the scope of such incidental questions, care must be taken not to unduly expand or restrict the authority’s jurisdiction. The Court indicated that the same approach has been adopted in interpreting section 33C(2).

The respondents relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Sawa‑tram Ramprasad Mills Co. Ltd. v. Baliram, seeking a wide construction of section 33C(2). In that case, the High Court considered a claim under Chapter VA of the Act and held that the claim, together with all questions incidental to its determination, could be properly decided under section 33C(2). The High Court also made broad observations about the jurisdiction conferred on the Labour Court by section 33G(2). The Court described those observations as obiter dicta and noted that, insofar as they conflict with the present decision, they are not justified by the terms of section 33C(2).

S.C.R. 220. (3) (1962) 65 Bom. L.R. 91. The Court observed that there can be no doubt that a claim of the type in question, together with every issue incidental to its decision, may be properly determined under section 33C (2). In arriving at this conclusion, the High Court undoubtedly made certain broad and general remarks concerning the scope of the jurisdiction conferred on the Labour Court by section 33G (2). The Court characterised those remarks as obiter dicta and held that, to the extent they conflict with the present decision, they cannot be justified by the language of section 33C (2). Consequently, the preliminary argument advanced by the appellant, which alleged that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the respondents’ applications, was found to fail and was rejected. Having disposed of the jurisdictional issue, the Court proceeded to consider the merits of the respondents’ claim.

The Court noted that the respondents based their claim for a special allowance on paragraph 164(b)(1) of the Sastry Award, asserting that they operated the adding machines supplied by the appellant for use in its clearing department. The appellant counter‑argued that the special allowance was available only to Comptists and that, because the respondents had not claimed to be Comptists, their applications should be dismissed. To resolve this dispute, the Court turned to the relevant provisions of the Sastry Award as amended by the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Chapter X of the Sastry Award addresses the question of special allowances. In paragraph 161 of that chapter, the Tribunal observed that certain posts, even among clerical and subordinate grades, require special qualifications or skill for efficient performance, and therefore an extra payment is warranted as recognition and compensation for such special skill or responsibility. Paragraph 162 examined three alternative suggestions for providing a special payment and ultimately decided that a special allowance should be paid to those categories of employees who, by virtue of their special qualifications or skill, merit recognition. Paragraph 163 clarified that the allowance prescribed by the Tribunal was intended as a minimum, leaving banks free to grant a higher amount if they deemed it necessary. Paragraph 164 then listed ten categories eligible for special allowances. The first category covered Graduates, which the Tribunal dealt with in paragraph 164(a). Paragraph 164(b) dealt with the remaining nine categories, with Comptists listed first among them. The Tribunal stipulated that Comptists were to receive a special allowance of Rs 10 per month in each of the four classes of banks—A, B, C, and D. The respondents relied on this specific provision in support of their claim.

When the Sastry Award was placed before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal examined the issue in paragraph 140 of its decision. It observed that, during the hearing, it became apparent that the titles used for particular categories of employees varied from one bank to another. To prevent disputes between banks and their staff as to whether a specific category was entitled to a special allowance under the Award, the Tribunal directed each bank to provide statements indicating the different names it assigned to the categories of employees for whom the Sastry Award had provided special allowances. Several banks responded by furnishing the requested information. The Tribunal then listed eight categories whose equivalents had been supplied in the banks’ statements. In relation to the Comptists, Statement B‑247 submitted by the Imperial Bank of India revealed that the bank referred to that category as “adding‑machine operators” and “addressographers.” After presenting these equivalents, the Tribunal cautioned that the listed equivalents were useful but did not exhaust the subject. Consequently, in the absence of complete data, the Tribunal left it to each bank to determine the appropriate allowance by considering the duties and responsibilities attached to each post. The Tribunal’s consideration concluded at that point.

In the present proceedings, the respondents have based their claim solely on the fact that they operate adding machines and therefore contend that they should be regarded as adding‑machine operators. They further argue that, because the Imperial Bank of India equated adding‑machine operators with Comptists in its statement, they must be treated as Comptists for the purposes of paragraph 164(b)(1) of the Sastry Award and consequently be entitled to the special allowance of ten rupees. The Tribunal, in allowing the respondents’ claim, appears to have accepted this argument, observing that, according to the Labour Appellate Tribunal’s decision, adding‑machine operators must be placed in the same category as Comptists. In other words, the Tribunal seemed to hold that because the Imperial Bank of India described the employees who performed the work of Comptists as adding‑machine operators, any bank employee who operates an adding machine, even for a brief period, should be classified as a Comptist and should receive the special allowance. This conclusion is regarded as erroneous. It is true that the Imperial Bank of India used the term “adding‑machine operators” for its Comptists, possibly because, at the relevant time, its Comptists performed the functions of adding‑machine operators and addressographers, making the distinction moot for that bank.

In this case, the Court observed that the terminology used by the Imperial Bank of India to describe its employees—whether as Comptists, adding‑machine operators or Addressographers—could not be imposed on other banks that had not adopted the same nomenclature. The Court emphasized that the mere fact that the Imperial Bank grouped these three types of work under a single category did not make that classification binding on all banking institutions. The Court further referred to the award recently issued by Mr Justice Desai, who served as the National Industrial Tribunal in the Bank Disputes, where paragraphs 5.242 and 5.265 clearly distinguished the position of Comptists from that of adding‑machine operators, addressographers and photostat‑machine operators. In the present appeals, the respondents failed to lead any evidence in support of their claim. The appellant, however, examined its officer, Mr Shivodkar, who testified that an adding‑machine could be operated by a clerk after only half an hour of practice because it performed only mechanical additions. In contrast, operating a comptometer required the employee to undergo three months of training and practice, owing to the need for complex calculations. Mr Shivodkar added that the several respondents each spent about two hours a day working on the adding‑machine, and that this time was included within their ordinary working hours. Although there was some discussion before the Bar regarding the nature of work performed on the comptometer versus the adding‑machine, the Court found no doubt that the adding‑machine was a simple device that did not demand the level of skill or efficiency expected of a typist. The Court noted that the Sastry Tribunal had rejected a similar claim for special allowance made by typists, underscoring that the respondents’ reliance on the description of adding‑machine operators could not sustain a claim for the special allowance accorded to Comptists. Consequently, the Court held that the sole basis on which the Labour Court had allowed the respondents’ claim was unsound, and therefore the order of that Court could not be affirmed.

The Court further recorded that the respondents had asked for an opportunity to substantiate their claim on the merits. They argued that they had been advised that the equivalence provided by the Imperial Bank of India itself gave a firm foundation for their claim; consequently, they had made no additional allegations in the present proceedings and had not produced any evidence to demonstrate the nature of the work they performed that would justify a special allowance. The appellant, on the other hand, vehemently contended that the respondents had delayed in presenting their applications, a point that would later be considered in relation to the appropriate exercise of judicial discretion. The Court noted the respondents’ position but, having found the basis of the claim legally untenable, concluded that the Labour Court’s order could not be sustained, while also recognizing the need to allow the respondents a chance to prove their case.

In this matter the Court observed that the present applications themselves demonstrate that no special indulgence should be granted to the respondents for directing the Labour Court to reconsider the cases, once it is established that the legal foundation on which the claim was permitted is not supported by law. The Court noted that although the Sastry award was rendered in 1953, the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was delivered in 1954 and became final on 21 October 1955, the respondents did not bring forward their claims until 1962. The Court recalled that it has previously stressed that industrial adjudication ought not to encourage claims that are unduly delayed. Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that no statutory limitation period is prescribed for filing an application under section 33C(2). Accordingly, it would be unwarranted to deny the respondents an opportunity to prove their case solely because they approached the Labour Court after a considerable lapse of time. Consequently, the Court set aside the order previously issued by the Labour Court and remanded the matters back to that Court. The remand was accompanied by a direction that the Labour Court should permit the parties, if they wish, to amend their pleadings and to adduce evidence in support of their respective positions.

The Court further explained that the respondents may be allowed to demonstrate that the work they perform can properly be described as the work of Comptists. In addition, the respondents may optionally show that the duties carried out by adding‑machine operators at the Imperial Bank of India, who were regarded as equivalents of Comptists at the relevant time, are now being performed by them in the appellant’s branches. If the Labour Court is satisfied that the respondents’ work can reasonably be treated as the work of Comptists as understood in the banking industry, the Court should then assess the respondents’ claim for special allowance on that basis. The Court reiterated that the Labour Appellate Tribunal had made it clear that the specific title of a post is not decisive; what matters is the nature of the duties and responsibilities attached to the position. Therefore, if the nature of the duties and responsibilities performed by the respondents justifies concluding that they are indeed Comptists, they may claim the special allowance. In light of these observations, the Labour Court is directed to proceed with the cases after remand. The parties should be allowed to file amended pleadings within fourteen days of receiving the record in that Court. The Labour Court should then fix an early date for taking evidence and should dispose of the matters as quickly as possible. Accordingly, the appeals were allowed, the orders of the Labour Court were set aside, and the matters were sent back to that Court for final disposal in accordance with law. No order as to costs was made.

The Court examined the petitions raised by the parties and concluded that the appellate relief sought by each petitioner was warranted under the applicable legal standards. Accordingly, the Court formally permitted the appeals, thereby overturning the earlier determinations of the lower tribunal in the previous proceedings. In addition to granting the appeals, the Court directed that the entire cause be sent back to the subordinate court for further adjudication. The remand order required the lower court to reconsider the matters in accordance with the instructions now provided by the appellate authority. The appellate judgment indicated that the lower forum should conduct any necessary hearings, collect evidence, and render a fresh decision consistent with the legal principles outlined. No further instructions concerning costs or additional procedural measures were included in the order, leaving those aspects to be addressed by the lower tribunal if appropriate. By remanding the cases, the Court ensured that the issues would be examined anew, allowing the parties to present any additional evidence or arguments that may be relevant. The decision thereby restored the jurisdiction of the lower court to determine the merits of the dispute in light of the appellate guidance. The parties were advised to comply with the remand and to prepare for the accelerated proceedings as directed by the appellate bench.