T.Devadasan vs The Union Of India And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Petition No. 87 of 1963

Decision Date: 29 August 1963

Coram: J. R. Mudholkar, Raghubar Dayal, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, K. Subba Rao, S. K. Das

In the matter styled T Devadasan versus The Union of India and another, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on the 29th of August, 1963. The decision was authored by Justice J R Mudholkar, who sat together with Justices Raghubar Dayal and N Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioner was identified as T Devadasan, while the respondents were the Union of India and an additional party. The case was reported in the 1964 volume of the All India Reporter at page 179 and also appears in the Supreme Court Reports, volume 4, page 680. Various citation references to later reports of this decision are listed, indicating its continuing relevance in subsequent jurisprudence. The citation record includes references such as 1965 SC 1430, 1967 SC 52, 1968 SC 507, and others extending to 1992 SC 1. The principal legal issue involved the constitutional validity of a reservation practice commonly referred to as the “carry forward rule” under the provisions of the Constitution of India, specifically Articles 14, 16(1), 16(4), 46 and 335, which relate to equality, employment, reservation for backward classes, and the duties of the State concerning scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.

The factual background presented in the headnote explains that on 6 February 1960 the Union Public Service Commission issued a notification announcing a limited competitive examination for promotion to the regular temporary establishment of Assistant Superintendents of the Central Secretariat Service, scheduled to be held in June 1960. The notification stipulated that 12½ percent of the vacancies would be reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes and 5 percent for members of the Scheduled Tribes. The examination results were declared by the Commission in April 1961, leading the Government to make forty‑five appointments, of which twenty‑nine were filled by candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Consequently, the actual reservation realized in that year amounted to sixty‑five percent, considerably exceeding the percentages prescribed in the original notification. It was observed that if the reservation had been limited to the statutory 17 percent, only eight vacancies would have been filled by scheduled‑caste or tribe candidates, with the remaining positions awarded to other candidates on the basis of merit. To justify the higher number of reserved appointments, the Government of India and the Public Service Commission relied on the “carry forward rule” as set out in an Office Memorandum of Instructions dated 7 May 1955. That memorandum declared that when a sufficient number of suitable candidates from the reserved communities are not available in a given year, any unfilled reserved vacancies should be treated as unreserved and filled by the best available candidates, and that the number of such treated‑as‑unreserved vacancies should be added as an additional quota to the normal reservation for the following year. The petitioner, who was an assistant of Grade IV in the Central Secretariat Service and anticipated promotion to Section Officer (Assistant Superintendent) through the usual promotional pathway, challenged the validity of the carry forward rule, contending that the rule violated Articles 14, 16 and 335 of the Constitution. The Court ultimately held that the rule, by allowing scheduled‑caste and scheduled‑tribe applicants to obtain more than fifty percent of the vacancies in a particular year, was unconstitutional, reinforcing the principle that equality before the law does not demand absolute uniformity of treatment in every circumstance.

In the judgment, the Court reproduced the wording of the carry‑forward instruction, stating that if approved candidates are unavailable in a given year against the added quota, a matching increase must be made to the reserved vacancies in the second year thereafter. The petitioner, who served as an assistant in Grade IV of the Central Secretariat Service and expected promotion to Section Officer (Assistant Superintendent), contested the legality of this carry‑forward rule. The challenge was based, among other grounds, on the allegation that the rule violated Articles 14, 16 and 335 of the Constitution of India. The Court recorded a dissenting opinion by Justice Subba Rao, who held that the carry‑forward rule was unconstitutional because it could enable candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes to obtain more than half of the vacancies in a particular recruitment year. Article 14, according to the Court, forbids the State from denying any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws, which the Court interpreted as equality among equals rather than absolute uniform treatment in every circumstance. The Court explained that the provision of the Constitution does not demand identical treatment regardless of factors such as age, sex, education or other differentiating characteristics. A state‑made provision reserving a certain proportion of appointments for backward classes in public services is not inconsistent with Article 14, provided that the reservation is not so excessive as to effectively deprive members of other communities of reasonable employment opportunities. While Article 16(4) permits the reservation of a reasonable percentage of posts for members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the Court emphasized that the method adopted must strike a reasonable balance between the interests of backward classes and those of other employees. To achieve the guarantee contained in Article 16(1), the Court observed that each year of recruitment must be examined independently, without automatically carrying forward unfilled reserved positions. The Court referred to the decisions in Manager, Southern Railway v Rangachari, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 586 and M. R. Balaji and Others v State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 439, as authorities supporting its analysis. Justice Subba Rao further observed that the carry‑forward provision is intended solely for reservation of appointments for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and unless it can be shown that an unreasonably disproportionate portion of the cadre has been filled by those groups, the provision cannot be said to violate fundamental rights. He acknowledged that reservation may inevitably cause a modest lowering of standards, but held that such a consequence does not render the provision itself invalid or undesirable. Finally, the Court interpreted the phrase “nothing in this article” in Article 16(4) as a legislative device expressing the intention that the power conferred is not limited by other provisions of the article.

The Court observed that the power granted under the constitutional provision is not limited in any manner by the principal clause of the article; rather, it operates outside that clause. The provision does not carve out a narrow exception, but instead reserves a power that is not constrained by the other provisions of the article. The term “any” in the phrase “any provision” found in Art.16(4) is given the broadest possible meaning, thereby allowing the State to determine the character of the provision at its own discretion. Once a class is declared a backward class, the determination of whether the class is sufficiently represented is left to the subjective satisfaction of the State, and the Court is not called upon to prescribe the specific method of reservation. The judgment concerned an original jurisdiction matter, Petition No. 87 of 1963, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the petitioner and counsel for the respondents appeared, and the judgment was delivered on August 29, 1963 by the Acting Chief Justice S. K. Das, with Justices Raghubar Dayal, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and J. R. Mudholkar, and a dissenting opinion by Justice K. Subba Rao. The petitioner, a graduate, held the position of Assistant in Grade IV of the Central Secretariat Service, having been recruited in 1956 and becoming a permanent employee on 1 January 1958. The next promotion he could anticipate was to the post of Section Officer (Assistant Superintendent) within the same service. Recruitment to that post was conducted as follows: forty percent by direct recruitment of candidates who had attained lower ranks in the Indian Administrative Service examination or similar examinations; thirty percent by promotion from Grade IV to Grade III based on a departmental examination periodically administered by the Union Public Service Commission (U.P.S.C.); and the remaining thirty percent by promotion from Grade IV on the basis of seniority combined with fitness. On 6 February 1960 the U.P.S.C. issued a notification announcing that a limited competitive examination for promotion to the regular temporary establishment of Assistant Superintendents of the Central Secretariat Service would be held in June 1960, and that twelve and a half percent of the vacancies would be reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes and five percent for members of the Scheduled Tribes. The examination results were declared in April 1961. The U.P.S.C. recommended sixteen candidates for unreserved vacancies and twenty‑eight candidates for reserved vacancies, and subsequently recommended two additional candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Although the notification envisaged forty‑eight vacancies—sixteen unreserved and thirty‑two reserved—the commission actually recommended only thirty candidates for the reserved category. Ultimately the Government made forty‑five appointments, of which twenty‑nine were filled by candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The petitioner highlighted that his percentage of marks in the examination was sixty‑one, whereas some of the twenty‑nine reserved‑category candidates had marks as low as thirty‑five, and argued that it was improper for the U.P.S.C. to apply a lower qualifying standard for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates compared with other candidates.

The petitioner’s record showed that he obtained sixty‑one percent of the marks in the examination, while some of the twenty‑nine candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes scored as low as thirty‑five percent. He argued that the Union Public Service Commission lacked authority to establish a separate qualifying standard for candidates of those communities and another standard for all other applicants. According to the petitioner, if the Union of India and the Commission had observed the statutory reservation of seventeen and one‑half percent in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, he would have enjoyed a reasonable opportunity to be appointed as Assistant Superintendent. He contended that the actual reservation applied in this case amounted to sixty‑five percent, which far exceeded the percentage specified in the Commission’s notification governing the competitive examination. The petitioner further explained that, had the reservation been confined to the statutory seventeen and one‑half percent, only eight of the vacancies could have been allocated to members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, with the remaining positions filled on the basis of merit among the other candidates. He observed that the respondents – namely the Union of India and the Union Public Service Commission – sought to justify the higher reservation by invoking the so‑called “carry forward rule.” To understand that rule, the petitioner referred to several resolutions issued by the Government of India through the Ministry of Home Affairs. On 13 September 1950, the Government published a resolution setting out its policy on communal representation in public services. That resolution provisionally prescribed reservations as follows: for Scheduled Castes, twelve and one‑half percent of vacancies when recruitment was conducted by the Union Public Service Commission or through any open competitive test, and sixteen and two‑thirds percent where recruitment was not by open competition; for Scheduled Tribes, a reservation of five percent of the vacancies filled by direct recruitment, irrespective of whether the recruitment was by open competition or not. The resolution also mentioned a separate provision for Anglo‑Indians, which the petitioner noted as irrelevant to the present dispute. Importantly, the 1950 resolution stipulated that a minimum qualification standard would be prescribed in every case and that the reservations would be conditioned upon the availability of a sufficient number of qualified candidates from the specified communities who were suitable in all respects for the positions. These directives were applied to all services under the Government of India’s control. Subsequently, on 28 January 1952, the Government issued supplementary instructions on the same subject; the relevant excerpt concerning recruitment by open competition states that if candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Anglo‑Indian community obtain fewer vacancies through competition than the percentage reserved for them, the shortfall shall be made up by nominating duly qualified candidates of those communities who have passed the test but whose ranks are lower than those of candidates from other communities for whom no reservation is made.

In the recruitment process, the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the Anglo‑Indian community often secure through competition a number of positions that is less than the number of vacancies that have been reserved for them. The shortfall is compensated by nominating duly qualified members of these castes, tribes and communities who have passed the relevant test or selection procedure but have obtained ranks lower than those of candidates belonging to other communities for whom no reservation was made. This mechanism is reflected in the provision identified as clause 5(3).

Clause 5(3) provides that where a sufficient number of candidates belonging to the communities for which reservations are made, and who are eligible and deemed suitable by the recruiting authorities for the reserved quota, are not available, any vacancies that remain unfilled shall be treated as unreserved. Such unfilled vacancies are to be filled by the best available candidates irrespective of community. However, the provision also mandates that a corresponding number of vacancies shall be reserved in the following year for the communities whose vacancies were therefore filled as unreserved, and this addition is to be made on top of the number of vacancies that would ordinarily be reserved for them under the orders contained in the Resolution. For further clarification, the Court referred to Rule III in Appendix ‘A’.

Clause (4) of the same paragraph stipulates that if, again, suitably qualified candidates from the reserved communities are not available to fill the vacancies that were carried forward from the previous year under clause (3), those vacancies shall likewise be treated as unreserved and the reservations attached to them shall lapse.

Appendix ‘A’, Rule III, explains how vacancies should be recorded in the roster to avoid any gaps. It states that if a reserved vacancy, for example the twenty‑fifth point in the roster, cannot be filled because a suitable Scheduled Caste candidate is unavailable, the vacancy is to be treated as unreserved and the candidate appointed in its place should be shown against that point. Conversely, if later in the same year a Scheduled Caste candidate cannot be recruited for an unreserved vacancy, that reservation must be carried forward to the next year. After the Scheduled Caste quota for that subsequent year has been satisfied, the first unreserved vacancy that appears in the roster, for instance the thirty‑second point, shall then be treated as a reserved vacancy for the Scheduled Castes.

The supplementary instructions embodied in these rules were issued because there were not enough qualified candidates from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to fill the reserved vacancies. Even the practice of carrying forward unfilled vacancies for one year proved inadequate to achieve the Government of India's policy of ensuring adequate representation of these communities in public services. The Government examined the possibility of conducting separate examinations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes but ultimately rejected that approach. Consequently, by Office Memorandum No. 2/11/55‑RPS dated 7 May 1955, the Government of India amended sub‑paragraphs (3) and (4) of paragraph 5 of the Supplementary Instructions dated 28 January 1952. The amendment substituted the following wording: “3(a) If a sufficient number of candidates considered suitable by the recruiting authorities are not available from the communities for whom reservations are made in a particular year, the unfilled vacancies should”.

The Government of India issued Office Memorandum No. 2/11/55‑RPS on 7 May 1955 to amend the earlier supplementary instructions concerning reserved vacancies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The amendment stipulated that any reserved vacancy which could not be filled by a suitable candidate from the designated community should be treated as an unreserved vacancy and filled by the best available candidate regardless of community. The vacancy that was thus converted to an unreserved post would be counted as an additional quota and added to the normal quota of reserved vacancies that were to be made in the succeeding year. If, in that succeeding year, suitable candidates were still unavailable for the additional quota, the shortfall would be added to the quota for the second succeeding year. Consequently, the vacancies that remained unfilled in 1954 because no appropriate Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe candidates were found were added to the regular quota for 1955. Recruitment made against those vacancies in 1955 was first applied to the additional quota carried forward from 1954. Should the 1955 recruitment also fail to find suitable candidates, those vacancies would again be treated as unreserved for 1955, and the total quota of reserved vacancies for 1956 would consist of the unused portion of the quota forwarded from 1954 together with the unused portion from 1955, plus the normal percentage of vacancies that were to be reserved for 1956. The memorandum further required that an unutilised quota could not be carried forward for more than two years. An annual report detailing the number of reserved vacancies that had been treated as unreserved because of a lack of suitable Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe candidates had to be sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs in the prescribed annexure together with the regular communal returns. In addition, each ministry was directed to take adequate steps to ensure that any failure by subordinate authorities to observe the reservation rules would be detected early by a reviewing authority within the ministry. Paragraph (b) of the amendment allowed that, where a suitable Scheduled Caste candidate was unavailable, a Scheduled Tribe candidate could be appointed to the reserved vacancy, and vice‑versa, provided that adjustments were made in the subsequent points of the recruitment roster, as clarified in Rule III of Appendix A.

The petitioner has challenged these Government instructions before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petitioner contends that Article 16(1) guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Counsel for the petitioner acknowledges that Article 16(4) permits the State to make provisions for reserving appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens that the State believes is not adequately represented in its services. However, counsel argues that such reservation cannot be so extensive as to nullify or destroy the right conferred by clause 1 of Article 16. The petitioner points out that, according to the Court’s earlier decisions, clause 4 is a limited exception to clause 1 and must be interpreted in a manner that does not render the main provision meaningless. The petitioner further submits that clause 4 should be read together with Article 335, which, while recognizing the need to consider the claims of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, also mandates that the efficiency of administration be maintained. Finally, the petitioner asserts that because no reservation of posts for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is made in the offices of the Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, the Supreme Court, or the Armed Forces, the scheme violates Article 14, and that the Union Public Service Commission lacks authority to recommend candidates from Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes for reserved posts when those candidates have scored significantly lower marks than candidates from other communities.

In the petition, the petitioner argued that clause (4) of article 16 was only a narrow exception to clause (1) of the same article and, because it was subordinate to the principal provision, it could not be interpreted in a manner that would render the main provision meaningless. The petitioner further contended that clause (4) must be read together with article 335, which, while requiring consideration of the claims of members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, also emphasised that the efficiency of the administration should be preserved and should not be allowed to suffer. The petitioner asserted that because no reservation of posts in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes existed in the offices of the Lok Sabha, the Rajya Sabha, the Supreme Court or the Armed Forces, the operation of the reservation scheme infringed article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioner maintained that the standard for all candidates must be identical and that the Union Public Service Commission did not possess the authority to recommend candidates from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the reserved posts when those candidates had obtained considerably lower marks than candidates belonging to the more advanced communities. These points formed the core of the petitioner’s submissions.

The respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the carry‑forward rule was perfectly valid. They observed that the rule had been in force prior to the commencement of the Constitution and that, as a matter of public policy, it was decided to continue the rule after the Constitution came into effect so as to give effect to constitutional provisions. Accordingly, the Government had issued supplementary instructions in 1952, and the respondents explained that the rule had been extended for a period of two years because the representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the services remained inadequate, a situation that attracted persistent criticism in Parliament, from the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and from other quarters. For this reason, revised supplementary instructions were issued in 1955 as a policy measure. The respondents relied upon the provisions of article 16(4) and article 335 to support the legality of those instructions. They further argued that, in view of the prayers contained in the petition, the petition was untenable because the persons who would be adversely affected had not been joined as respondents, and that the petition failed to disclose any justiciable issue. According to the respondents, the right to promotion could not be the subject of a court complaint, and questions of policy could not be agitated before a court of law. They denied that the petitioner possessed any right, let alone a fundamental right, and rejected the allegation that the carry‑forward rule negated equality before the law or equal opportunity in appointments to State posts. Consequently, they contended that the alleged infringement of a fundamental right could not give rise to a cause of action under article 32. While responding in detail, the respondents reiterated these positions.

The respondents acknowledged that, for the competitive examination conducted under the March 1961 notification, twenty‑eight vacancies that had been filled during the two preceding years had been occupied by candidates belonging to communities other than the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This situation arose because suitable candidates from the Scheduled Castes and Tribes were not available at that time. The respondents further explained that, by applying the carry‑forward rule, those twenty‑eight vacancies were set aside to be filled through the competitive examination held in 1961, in addition to the allocation of seventeen and one‑half percent of the total vacancies scheduled for that year. The principal issue before the Court, therefore, was whether the carry‑forward rule, as it was amended in 1955, is unconstitutional on the ground that its operation would practically destroy the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 16(1) of the Constitution, or whether it infringes the guarantee embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court noted that if the rule were found invalid on either of these bases, no further question required consideration. It observed that the argument founded on Article 14 essentially rests on the same considerations as the argument that Article 16(1) is violated by the rule. Article 14 provides that the State shall not deny any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The Court clarified that “equality” under this article means equality among equals; it does not demand absolute uniform treatment of all persons irrespective of differences such as age, sex, education, or other characteristics that naturally exist among people. The purpose of Article 14 is to prevent the State from making invidious or arbitrary distinctions between citizens who fall within the same description, while allowing reasonable classification when the differences between groups are relevant to the purpose of a law. The Court accepted as a matter of fact that members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are, in general, socially and educationally backward compared with other communities in the country, a condition attributable to historical causes that need not be examined here. Nevertheless, their backwardness remains a reality, and Article 16(4) was intended to ensure that such persons are not unduly disadvantaged in obtaining employment in the various services of the State. Consequently, this provision contemplates reserving appointments or posts in favor of backward classes that are not adequately represented in the State services. Accordingly, when the State enacts a rule providing for reservation of appointments and posts for such backward classes, it cannot be said to have violated Article 14 merely because members of the more advanced classes may not be considered for those posts, even if they are equally or more meritorious, or because the reservation is not applied across every type of State service.

In explaining the effect of a reservation rule, the Court observed that although members of more advanced classes might be equally or even more meritorious, the purpose of the rule is not to deny them appointment simply because they belong to a class that is not covered by the reservation. The rule is intended to provide a reasonable allowance for the historical backwardness of scheduled castes and tribes by setting aside a certain proportion of appointments for them in public services. By doing so, the State aims to give members of backward classes an opportunity that is comparable to that enjoyed by members of the more advanced classes. However, the Court cautioned that if the reservation is so excessive that it effectively removes a reasonable chance of employment for members of other communities, the situation changes. In such a case, a member of a more advanced class could legitimately claim that the State has denied him equality. This point was central to the argument presented by counsel that the rule violated Article 16(1) of the Constitution because the extent of reservation allegedly destroys the guarantee of equality contained in that provision. To assess this contention, the Court found it necessary to examine the actual operation of the rule.

The rule in question mandates that seventeen and one‑half percent of the total vacancies each year be reserved for candidates belonging to the scheduled castes and tribes. It further provides that if, in any particular year, suitable candidates from these categories are not available, the reserved posts for that year will be “dereserved” and filled by candidates from other classes, while the same number of posts will be carried forward to the following year. Should the same shortage recur in the next year, those unfilled reserved vacancies will again be carried forward to the third year. Consequently, in the third year the number of posts to be filled from scheduled castes and tribes will consist of the statutory seventeen and one‑half percent of that year’s total vacancies plus the cumulative vacancies that remained unfilled in the two preceding years. The rule therefore allows for the perpetual carry‑forward of unfilled reserved vacancies for the two years before a recruitment cycle and adds to them the fresh quota of seventeen and one‑half percent for the current recruitment year. To illustrate the impact, the Court considered a scenario where, for two consecutive years, no candidate from scheduled castes or tribes qualified for any of the reserved posts. Assuming that in each of those years a total of one hundred vacancies existed in a particular service, the reservation would amount to eighteen posts per year. Because none of these eighteen posts were filled, a total of thirty‑six reserved vacancies would be carried forward to the third year. If, in that third year, again one hundred vacancies are to be filled, another eighteen would be set aside for scheduled castes and tribes, making the total number of reserved posts fifty‑four, leaving only forty‑six for candidates from the more advanced classes. This illustration shows how the reservation could exceed fifty percent of the total vacancies under the rule’s carry‑forward mechanism.

When the reserved vacancies were not filled in the first two years, a total of thirty‑six positions were carried forward to the third year. Assuming that in the third year the total number of vacancies to be filled remained one hundred, the applicable rule required that eighteen of those positions be reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. By applying the carry‑forward provision, the number of posts that would have to be filled by persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes increased to fifty‑four, leaving only forty‑six posts for candidates from the more advanced classes. Consequently, the reservation rate exceeded fifty percent. The Court had previously held in M. R. Balaji & Ors. v. The State of Mysore that a reservation exceeding one half of the seats in an educational institution for members of backward classes is unconstitutional. Speaking for the Court, Justice Gajendragadkar observed that, in general, a special provision should be less than fifty percent, and the precise percentage would depend on the prevailing circumstances of each case. He further stated that when the State enacts a special provision for the advancement of weaker sections under Article 15(4), it must act objectively and rationally, taking reasonable and even generous steps to promote those weaker elements, while weighing the extent of the problem, considering the needs of the community at large, and formulating a balance that reflects the various relevant considerations. In the Balaji case, the reservation was set at sixty‑eight percent and the Court struck it down. The issue before the Court in that case concerned the reservation of seats in an educational institution for members of “backward communities” under Article 15(4), which authorises a special provision for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes, including the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Article 16(4), by contrast, specifically provides for reservation of appointments or posts in favour of such classes. The Court noted that the difference in wording between the two provisions is not of substantive significance, because it has accepted that reservation may be made under Article 15(4). Moreover, at page 474 the Court remarked that what is true with respect to Article 15(4) is equally true with respect to Article 16(4). The Constitution‑makers, it observed, presumed that while providing adequate reservation under Article 16(4) the State would avoid unreasonable, excessive, or extravagant reservation, since such excess would eliminate general competition in a large field, generate widespread dissatisfaction among employees, and materially affect efficiency. Accordingly, a special provision improperly made under Article 15(4) would be comparable to an excessive reservation made under Article 16(4).

The Court observed that any reservation made under Article 16(4) which goes beyond the permissible and legitimate limits would be liable to be challenged as a fraud on the Constitution. The principle articulated in that earlier decision was held to be directly applicable to the facts of the present controversy. According to the ratio of the earlier case, a reservation that exceeds fifty percent of the total vacancies is per se destructive of the guarantee contained in Article 15(1), which declares that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any combination thereof. In addressing the effect of such a large‑scale reservation, the Court cited its observation at page 467, stating: “But if a provision which is in the nature of an exception completely excludes the rest of the society, that clearly is outside the scope of Article 15(4). It would be extremely unreasonable to assume that in enacting Article 15(4) the Constitution—intended to provide that where the advancement of the backward classes of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes was concerned, the fundamental rights of the citizens constituting the rest of the society were to be completely and absolutely ignored.” The Court then illustrated the startling consequence of the carry‑forward rule as it stood after the 1955 amendment by presenting a hypothetical scenario. If, in the third year of the illustration, the total number of vacancies were reduced to fifty instead of one hundred, nine of those fifty positions would be earmarked for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Adding to this the thirty‑six positions that had been carried forward from the two preceding years would result in a total of forty‑five reserved positions out of the fifty available, which corresponds to a reservation rate of ninety percent. In the actual matter before the Court, forty‑five vacancies had indeed been filled, and twenty‑nine of those appointments were made in favour of members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes on the basis of the reservation permitted by the carry‑forward rule. This actual outcome translated into a reservation percentage of approximately sixty‑four point four percent. Because the result of operating the carry‑forward rule produced such a high proportion of reserved posts, the Court held, on the authority of Balaji’s case (1), that the rule is constitutionally flawed. The Court further noted that even in the earlier decision of The General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari (2)—a case where reservation of vacancies for promotion had been upheld—Justice Gajendragadkar, delivering the majority opinion, had observed: “It is also true that the reservation which can be made under Article 16(4) is intended merely to give adequate representation to backward communities. It cannot be used for creating monopolies or for unduly or illegitimately disturbing the legitimate interests of other employees. In exercising the powers under Article 16(4) the problem of adequate representation of the backward class of citizens must be fairly and objectively considered and an attempt must always be made to strike a reasonable balance between the claims of backward classes and the claims of other employees as well as the important consideration of the efficiency of administration.” From both of these decisions, the Court concluded that the essential problem is to ensure adequate representation for members of the backward classes as mandated by Article 16(4) while avoiding a distortion of the constitutional guarantee of equality.

In this case, the Court observed that the purpose of the Constitution could not be addressed by enacting a universal rule without taking into account the consequences that would arise from year to year, and that the precise method to be employed was a matter for the Government to consider. The Court noted that while the Government was free to devise any method, that method had to achieve a reasonable balance between the claims of the backward classes and the claims of other employees, as had been pointed out in Balaji’s case(1). It was emphasized that the guarantee contained in Article 16(1) was intended to ensure equality of opportunity for all citizens with respect to employment and appointments to any office under the State, meaning that at each occasion of recruitment the State must treat all citizens equally. The guarantee was described as belonging to each individual citizen, and consequently every citizen seeking employment or appointment to a State office was entitled to an opportunity whenever the vacancy was to be filled. To give effect to this guarantee, the Court held that each year of recruitment had to be examined independently, and that reservation for backward communities should not be so excessive as to create a monopoly or to unduly disturb the legitimate claims of other communities. The Court further recalled its earlier ruling that clause (4) of Article 16 functioned as a proviso or exception to clause (1), and that a proviso could not be interpreted so broadly as to nullify or destroy the main provision. It warned that holding that unlimited reservation could be made under clause (4) would in effect erase the guarantee in clause (1) or render it illusory. No constitutional provision or statutory enactment could be construed so as to destroy another provision that was enacted at the same time. The Court acknowledged the argument advanced by counsel for the respondent, Mr. Ganapathy Iyer, that the express words of Article 16(4) required giving effect to the provision that “nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments…”, but clarified that this did not mean that the State’s provision should virtually obliterate the remainder of the Article, particularly clauses (1) and (2). The overriding effect of clause (4) on clauses (1) and (2) could only extend to permitting a reasonable number of reservations in certain circumstances, and nothing beyond that. The Court then addressed the contention raised by counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Gopalakrishnan, who had earlier conceded that there might be no reservation at all for members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, or any backward class, and who argued that the proper way for the State to discharge the duty imposed by Article 16(4) would be to adopt a method similar to that which had been appealed to the Government of Maharashtra in exercising its powers under Article 15(4).

In this matter the Court examined the approach taken by the Government of Maharashtra in exercising the authority granted under Article 15(4). The Court noted that counsel for the respondent referred to a passage from the Court’s decision in the Balaji case, reported in the 1963 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports at page 439. The passage stated that the Maharashtra Government had decided to provide financial assistance and monetary grants to students pursuing higher education when the annual income of their families fell below a prescribed minimum. The Court observed that, although that particular scheme was not before it and it was not required to give an opinion on it, the Court could comment that any State adopting such a measure might relieve and assist the advancement of the backward classes in the State because social and educational backwardness was primarily due to poverty. The passage further suggested that the State could also create new educational institutions, polytechnics, vocational centres, and even rural universities to generate more opportunities for higher education. It described this dual strategy as a rational, broad and scientific approach consistent with the noble ideal of a secular, welfare‑oriented democratic State envisioned by the Constitution. The passage added that such an approach could be supplemented, if necessary, by special provisions of reservation for the backward classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and that other methods might also achieve the same result. Recognising the diversity of social and economic conditions across the country, the passage warned against expecting uniformity of approach, and emphasized that executive action to implement Article 15(4) must align with the policy declared in Article 46 and the Preamble, aimed at securing social and economic justice. The passage concluded that executive action must be based on an objective approach free of extraneous pressures, intended to deliver justice.

The Court then considered whether the measures adopted by the Maharashtra Government represented a permissible method of discharging the duty imposed by Article 15(4). While acknowledging that the Maharashtra scheme could be one of the ways to fulfil that duty, the Court stressed that the case before it required strict adherence to the express language of Article 16(4). The Court observed that Article 16(4) unambiguously authorised the State to reserve a reasonable percentage of posts for members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Consequently, the Court held that the provision of reservation of a reasonable proportion of posts for these communities fell squarely within the competence of the State, and that the percentage to be reserved must depend on the circumstances prevailing at the relevant time.

The Court observed that the proportion of reservations must necessarily vary according to the circumstances that exist at different times. In support of the rule that was being challenged, the respondents relied on a passage from the judgment of Justice Wanchoo in Rangachari’s case (1) which stated: “Art. 16(4) tells us that it may be made either by reserving appointments to the services or reserving posts in the services. Appointments, in my opinion, clearly mean the initial appointments to a service, for a person is appointed only once in a service and thereafter there is no further appointment. Therefore, when the article speaks of reservation of appointments it means reservation of a percentage of initial appointments to the service. Posts refer to the total number of posts in the service and when reservation is by reference to posts it means reservation of a certain percentage of posts out of the total number of posts in the service. The reason why these two methods are mentioned in this Article is also, in my mind, plain. The method of reservation of appointments would mean that the goal of adequate representation may be reached in a long time. Therefore, in order that the goal may be reached in a comparatively shorter period of time, the Article also provides for the method of reservation of posts.” The Court noted that Justice Wanchoo’s view stands alone and does not appear to have been adopted by the majority of the Court in that case. Moreover, the issue of the carry‑forward rule had not been contested in Rangachari’s case, and consequently that Court had no occasion to express an opinion on its validity.

The Court further pointed out that the Government resolution under consideration did not provide for reservation of any posts within the service cadre; instead, it only provided for reservation of vacancies. The Court explained that even if the Government had provided for reservation of posts for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, a reservation of one hundred percent of vacancies to be filled in a particular year, or a reservation of vacancies exceeding fifty percent, would be unconstitutional according to the decision in Balaji’s case (1). Counsel for the petitioner advanced substantial argument based on Article 335 of the Constitution, which reads: “The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State.” The Court observed that the necessity of maintaining administrative efficiency, even while giving effect to the provisions of Article 16(4), had already been emphasized in Rangachari’s case (1). Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to elaborate further on that point.

Having held that the carry‑forward rule as modified in 1955 is unconstitutional, the Court turned to the question of the appropriate relief to be granted to the petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner clarified that the relief sought was limited to a declaration of the rule’s invalidity, and no further relief could be granted because the individuals who had already been appointed and could be affected by this decision were not joined as respondents in the petition.

The petitioner sought only a formal declaration that the rule was invalid and expressed a hope that the department concerned would implement this Court’s decision appropriately. The Court noted that no additional relief could be granted because the individuals who had already been appointed, and who might be affected by the declaration, had not been joined as respondents in the petition. Consequently, the petition was held to succeed in part, and the carry‑forward rule as amended in 1955 was declared to be invalid. The Court ordered that the costs of the petition be borne by the State. Justice Subbarao then recorded his regret that he could not agree with the majority view. He described the issue before him as a short but difficult question: whether the impugned provision for reservation of posts made by the Government of India in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes infringed Article 16(4) of the Constitution. He referred to the citation [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 439. The facts, he observed, were fully detailed in the judgment of his learned brother, and there was no need to repeat them. He then set out the relevant constitutional provisions for consideration. He read Article 16 as follows: “(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. (4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.” He proceeded to quote Article 46: “The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.” He also quoted Article 335: “The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State.” He explained that these three articles, together with other provisions not presently before the Court, were intended to uplift the Castes and Tribes and that there was no conflict among them. He observed that Article 46 is a directive principle of State policy; although it is not justiciable, it remains fundamental to the governance of the country. He described Article 335 as a mandatory direction obligating the State to consider the claims of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in appointments to the relevant services and posts. He noted that Article 16(4) empowers the State to make provisions for reserving posts and appointments for backward classes, which certainly include the Castes and Tribes. While Article 335 is mandatory in character, he stated that Article 16(4) is directory and permissive, meaning the State may choose to make such reservations or may refrain if it believes that satisfying Article 335 addresses the situation. In his view, Article 335 had no bearing on the construction of Article 16(4) of the Constitution.

The Court observed that the assessment of the Government’s provisions must be based solely on Article 16(4) of the Constitution. It explained that Article 14 establishes the general rule of equality, while Article 16 applies that rule specifically to opportunities for appointments under the State. Article 16 declares that every citizen shall have equal opportunity for employment or appointment to any office of the State. The Court noted that if this rule were applied in isolation, the socially disadvantaged groups would be left behind in a society whose basic structure is already uneven. In such a scenario, the principle of equality would remain a mere utopian ideal unless it were given practical effect. The Court illustrated this point with a horse‑race analogy: two horses—one a champion racehorse and the other an ordinary horse—are made to start from the same point. Although both are theoretically given an equal chance to run, the ordinary horse does not have an equal opportunity to compete with the champion. To make the competition meaningful, a handicap such as extra weight or a longer starting distance must be provided. The Court linked this illustration to the historical reality that centuries of systematic oppression reduced a large portion of the community to a condition of serfdom. It argued that raising the standards of such groups would be virtually impossible if the doctrine of equal opportunity were enforced strictly without any assistance. Therefore, the framers of the Constitution introduced clause (4) of Article 16 to allow for affirmative measures that would level the playing field until the disadvantaged can compete on their own merits.

The Court further explained that the phrase “nothing in this article” functions as a legislative device intended to emphasize that the power granted under clause (4) is not limited by the rest of Article 16, but instead exists outside its main provision. Rather than creating a narrow exception, the phrase preserves a broad authority that remains unhindered by the other clauses. In examining the scope of clause (4), the Court identified three salient expressions: (i) “any provision for the reservation of appointments”, (ii) “in favour of any backward class of citizens”, and (iii) “in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State”. The word “any” in “any provision” is interpreted to have the widest possible range, leaving the exact nature of the reservation to the discretion of the State. The limitation on this discretion is found in the words “for the reservation of appointments or posts”, which means that the State’s power is not further restricted beyond the need to make reservations for appointments or posts. The reservation must be directed toward a backward class of citizens. Although the Constitution does not define “backward class”, the Court noted that determining whether a class is backward is a factual inquiry that must satisfy certain objective criteria. In the present case, it was accepted that Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes qualify as backward classes. The third condition requires that, in the State’s opinion, the class is not adequately represented in its services. Once a class is identified as backward, the question of adequate representation is left to the State’s subjective satisfaction. Consequently, to invoke clause (4), (i) a backward class of citizens must exist, and (ii) that class must be, in the State’s view, insufficiently represented in the State’s services.

In this case the Court observed that the phrase “for the reservation of appointments or posts” appears in the provision and that, once a provision is intended for such reservation, the clause does not place any further limitation on the State’s power to devise any measure to accomplish that purpose. The reservation, the Court explained, must be directed toward any backward class of citizens. Although the Constitution does not define the term “backward class”, the Court held that determining whether a particular class is backward is a factual question that must satisfy certain objective criteria. The Court noted that, for the purposes of the present dispute, it was agreed that the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes qualify as backward classes. The third requirement, according to the Court, is that the State must be of the opinion that the concerned class is not adequately represented in its services. Once a class is recognised as backward, the assessment of whether it is adequately represented is left to the State’s subjective judgment. Consequently, the Court concluded that to invoke clause (4) of Article 16, two conditions must be satisfied: first, there must exist a backward class of citizens; and second, the State must hold that this class is not adequately represented in its services. When both conditions are met, the State may make any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of that class. The Court further pointed out that, in the present matter, it was not contested that the two conditions had been fulfilled; therefore the remaining issue was whether the measure adopted actually amounted to a reservation of appointments or posts for the identified backward classes. Counsel for the petitioner argued that Article 16(1) grants an individual right to every citizen and that clause (4) of the same article, embodying the principle of social justice, constitutes an exception to that individual right. Accordingly, the petitioner contended that the question must be decided for each selection, examining whether the provision represents a reservation or, in effect, a denial of the fundamental right. The counsel further maintained that, because every citizen possesses an individual entitlement to apply for appointments whenever vacancies arise, a citizen cannot be denied that right merely because, in a prior selection, members of his community had received a share exceeding theirs. It was also submitted that the notion of reservation for a community entails carving out a portion of the entire field, and that if a provision covers the whole field or a substantial part thereof, it ceases to be a reservation and therefore falls outside the protection of clause (4). The petitioner warned that the “carry forward” principle, if extended logically, would eventually destroy the right itself. Finally, the counsel argued that Articles 16 and 335 must be read together, and that such a joint reading indicates that reservation cannot be implemented at the expense of efficiency. The Court clarified that its focus was confined to the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, not to the policy considerations underlying them.

In this case, the Court observed that the Constitution makers expressly provided for reservation of appointments and posts in favour of the designated Castes and Tribes. Consequently, the only issue to be decided was whether the State, in the present matter, failed to make such reservation of appointments or posts. The Court found it difficult to accept the contention that the “carry forward” rule does not constitute reservation of appointments for the specified Castes and Tribes. It recognised that reservation of appointments may be achieved through various mechanisms and that it is not for the Court to prescribe the specific mode by which a State should implement reservation.

To illustrate the permissible ways a State may fulfil its constitutional duty under Article 16(4), the Court referred to observations made by Justice Wanchoo in the earlier decision of The General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari (1). Justice Wanchoo explained that if a service contains one thousand posts and the backward classes have no representation, the State may deem it necessary to ensure adequate representation. Assuming that thirty appointments are required each year to keep the service at full strength, the State could opt to reserve a fixed percentage of these annual appointments for the backward classes. If a ten‑percent reservation of appointments was adopted, it would take roughly thirty‑four years to achieve representation equal to ten percent of the total posts, a period which might be considered excessively long. Alternatively, the State might choose to reserve a fixed percentage of the total posts themselves – for example, one hundred posts representing ten percent of the cadre. Under this approach, the State could direct that all appointments to those reserved posts be filled by candidates from the backward classes, provided they meet the minimum qualifications. If the required number of qualified candidates is available each year, the representation could be achieved in about four years, after which no further reservation would be needed. Justice Wanchoo’s illustration demonstrates that reservation can be effected either by reserving a proportion of the annual appointments or by reserving a proportion of the total posts, thereby achieving the intended representation within a shorter time frame. Although those observations were made in a different factual context, they clarify that the Constitution allows reservation to be implemented either through appointment‑wise or post‑wise methods.

The discussion explained that in order to keep a service at full strength, the reservation provision may be applied through a variety of methods. One method involves reserving a fixed number of posts for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and then appointing only candidates belonging to those communities until the reserved percentage is achieved. Another method permits the State, in the same situation, to direct that a particular percentage of the vacancies advertised be filled by candidates from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; under this scheme the required number of reserved posts would be attained over several years. A third alternative provides that, if in a given year the number of applicants from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes does not meet the reserved percentage, the vacancies that remain unfilled may be carried over to the next selection round. A fourth alternative, instead of carrying forward the unfilled vacancies, allows those vacancies to be filled by candidates belonging to other communities, while the unfilled reserved seats are added to the quota for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the subsequent selection. A fifth alternative proposes that, rather than employing a carry‑forward mechanism, the State may decide that if the first selection does not produce enough candidates from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, a larger percentage of such candidates be selected in the next year or the year after. A sixth alternative suggests that, without expressly fixing a reservation in the overall cadre strength, the State may adopt any of the preceding approaches until it is satisfied that the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have obtained an adequate representation in the particular service. The examples given are illustrative only; the State may devise other effective and equitable methods beyond those listed. Any of these schemes, however reasonably framed, would inevitably cause hardship to some candidates who are not from the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes because, in the absence of reservation, those individuals might have been selected. Nevertheless, such hardship does not negate the character of the scheme as a reservation of seats for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In the case presently before the Court, the State had adopted the carry‑forward principle. Instead of fixing a

The State had directed that any vacancy reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in a particular selection, which remained unfilled by candidates belonging to those communities and was instead filled by other candidates, should be added to the quota for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the next selection and similarly in the following selection. Consequently, because the posts reserved in the first year were taken by applicants who were neither Scheduled Castes nor Scheduled Tribes, the number of posts available to such non‑reserved candidates in the subsequent selection was proportionally reduced. This mechanism inevitably caused hardship to individuals who applied in the second or third selection, even though, taken collectively, the non‑reserved candidates had benefited in the earlier round(s). The Court observed that such individual injustice, which is inherent in any reservation scheme, does not, in its view, convert the reservation provision into something other than a reservation. The Court found no merit in the argument that the “carry‑forward” principle had resulted, in the third year, in eighty percent of the total applicants being selected from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, thereby destroying the fundamental right. Assuming that reservation fell within the State’s competence, the Court could not see how a fortuitous circumstance of high selection percentages in a particular year would invalidate the reservation. The Court illustrated a hypothetical situation: if, for two consecutive selections, no candidates from Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes applied and the reserved vacancies were filled by candidates from other castes, and in the third year the State, considering the actual representation of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the cadre, reserved all or most of the posts for them, such a measure would still constitute a reservation. The effect of applying the “carry‑forward” rule is practically the same as reserving the posts directly. Whether the reservation is made in a single selection or spread over several selections, it is merely a convenient method of implementing the reservation provision. The Court held that, unless it is shown that an unreasonably disproportionate portion of the cadre strength is filled by Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, it is not possible to claim that the provision ceases to be a reservation and instead amounts to an extinction of the fundamental right. No allegation or evidence of such disproportionate filling was presented in the present case. Since the provision clearly dealt with reservation—which the Court affirmed—it could not be said to be detrimental merely because it might cause some decline in the standard of service. The Court acknowledged that reservation, by its nature, may lead to a modest lowering of standards, but this alone does not render the provision improper. Moreover, the State had prescribed minimum qualifications for the posts, ensuring that all appointments satisfied the established eligibility criteria.

All the appointments that had been made were filled by persons who possessed the qualifications that the State had prescribed for the posts. The Court observed that it was not for the Court to determine how much the efficiency of the administration might suffer because of this provision; that assessment was left to the State, which had a clear interest in preserving the standards of its own administration.

The petitioner relied heavily on the decision in M. R. BalaJi v. State of Mysore (1) to argue that whenever a State reserves more than fifty per cent of the posts in a single selection for backward classes, the provision ceases to be a reservation and instead destroys a fundamental right. The Court noted that if that earlier decision had indeed laid down such a proposition, it would be bound by it. However, a careful reading of the BalaJi judgment showed that the Court had not expressed any such rule.

In the BalaJi case, sixty‑eight per cent of seats in colleges were reserved for backward communities. The petitioners before that Court contended that the order issued under Article 15(4) of the Constitution was invalid because the basis on which the State had identified and listed the socially and educationally backward classes was unintelligible, irrational, and fell outside the scope of Article 15(4). They further argued that the degree of reservation prescribed was so unreasonable and extravagant that the order amounted to a fraud on the constitutional power conferred on the State.

Justice Gajendragadkar, speaking for the Court, gave three reasons for holding that the provisions were contrary to Article 15(4). First, the concept of backwardness was not meant to be relative; it could not include any class that was merely backward in relation to the most advanced classes, and the test for backwardness had to be social and educational. Second, the criteria adopted by the State to determine social and educational backwardness were neither correct nor sound. Third, the subdivision made by the order between backward classes and “more backward” classes was not justified under Article 15(4). The Court traced the history of the order, examined all relevant circumstances, and concluded that reserving sixty‑eight per cent in those facts amounted to a fraud on the constitutional power granted by Article 15(4).

The judgment therefore rested primarily on two grounds: the State had used an improper criterion to identify backward classes, and the State had committed a fraud on its constitutional authority. In the present matter, the Court noted that it was not contested that the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes constitute backward classes, and there was no material on which the Court could...

The Court observed that there was no basis on the record to hold that the Government had committed a fraud on the constitutional power conferred on it. The only observations that the counsel for the respondent could rely upon were those reproduced on page 470 of the earlier judgment, which stated: “The adjustment of these competing claims is undoubtedly a difficult matter, but if under the guise of making a special provision a State reserves practically all the seats available in all the colleges, that clearly would be subverting the object of Art. 15(4). In this matter again, we are reluctant to say definitely what would be a proper provision to make. Speaking generally and in a broad way, a special provision should be less than 50 per cent, how much less than 50 per cent would depend upon the relevant prevailing circumstances in each case.” The Court explained that those general observations were made in the specific context of admissions to colleges and, therefore, could not be transferred directly to the question of reservation of appointments in recruitment to a particular service cadre. It was noted that the doctrine of “destruction” of a fundamental right depends upon the total strength of the cadre and the percentage of posts reserved out of that total strength. Moreover, the language used in the observations, namely the words “generally” and “broadly,” indicated that the remarks were intended only as a flexible guide rather than as a rigid rule of law, even within the college‑admission context. Consequently, the Court could not conclude that, in the present case, the provision made by the State amounted to something other than a reservation and that it served a purpose not sanctioned by the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the writ petition and ordered that the petitioner pay costs. In accordance with the majority view, the Court finally allowed the writ petition and awarded costs to the successful party.