Syed Yakoob vs K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 593 of 1963

Decision Date: 7 October 1963

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, J.C. Shah, Raghubar Dayal, Subba Rao

In the matter titled Syed Yakoob versus K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others, a judgment was rendered on 7 October 1963 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar and the bench comprised Justices P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, J. C. Shah and Raghubar Dayal. The petitioner was Syed Yakoob and the respondents were K.S. Radhakrishnan together with other parties. The decision was reported in 1964 AIR 477, 1964 SCR (5) 64 and is cited in several later reports including R 1965 SC 111 (15), R 1969 SC 966 (5), F 1971 SC 1902 (20), F 1975 SC 2151 (23), RF 1976 SC 232 (10), R 1983 SC 1102 (6), F 1984 SC 1447 (3). The issues involved a certiorari application under Article 226 of the Constitution, the issuance of a two‑stage carriage permit under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (section 47), and questions of jurisdiction of the High Court.

The State Transport Authority had issued a notification, pursuant to the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, inviting applications for two‑stage carriage permits for the route from Madras to Chidambaram. A large number of applications were received. The Authority granted the first permit to one applicant and decided to reopen the competition for the second permit. The petitioner, together with several other applicants, appealed to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal confirmed the grant of the first permit and, regarding the second permit, allowed the petitioner’s appeal, directing that the second permit be awarded to him. Respondent No. 1 filed a petition in the High Court under Article 226 seeking a writ of certiorari. A single judge holding that the Tribunal had disregarded relevant considerations and had allowed irrelevant factors to dominate, set aside the Tribunal’s order and declared the rule absolute. The petitioner then preferred a Letters Patent appeal, which was dismissed by a Division Bench on the ground that the Tribunal had overlooked material considerations in favour of Respondent No. 1. The petitioner subsequently obtained special leave to approach the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226. The Supreme Court, sitting as a bench of Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Shah and Dayal, held that the petitioner’s contention was well founded and must prevail. The Court explained that a writ of certiorari is a supervisory remedy intended to correct jurisdictional errors, acts beyond jurisdiction, failure to exercise jurisdiction, or illegal exercise of jurisdiction, including breaches of natural‑justice principles, and that the court exercising certiorari does not function as an appellate court.

In this case the Court explained that findings of fact reached by a lower court or tribunal are binding. An error of law that is evident on the face of the record may be corrected by a writ of certiorari, but an error of fact, even if serious, cannot be corrected by that remedy. The Court further held that a writ of certiorari may be issued when it is shown that, in recording a finding of fact, material admissible evidence was omitted. The Court added that the admission of inadmissible evidence affecting the impugned finding also constitutes a ground for the writ, because it alters the finding. A finding of fact that is based on no evidence is also characterised as an error of law and is therefore amenable to a writ of certiorari. However, a finding of fact cannot be challenged in a certiorari proceeding on the ground that the material evidence was insufficient to support the finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence and the inference to be drawn from the evidence remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal. The Court relied upon the decision in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104. It also cited Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, [1958] S.C.R. 1240, and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1168. The Court observed that it is neither possible nor desirable to catalogue every situation that may constitute an error of law apparent on the record. It added that such a determination depends on the specific facts, circumstances and the nature of the misapplied law. The Court also noted that, relying on its earlier decision in K.M. Shanmugam v. S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd., a party could not invoke Article 226 of the Constitution to have all factual questions reheard. The Court explained that the purpose of such a rehearing could not be to raise a public‑interest plea under section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and that precedent was held inapplicable. In the instant dispute the question was whether respondent No. 1 possessed a workshop at Chidambaram, one of the two termini of the route. The Court further observed that the tribunal had failed to consider certain evidence relating to that claim. The Court classified that issue as an appreciation of evidence, which lies outside the scope of a certiorari proceeding. Consequently, the High Court was in error in granting the writ of certiorari. The Court also instructed that when issuing a writ and making it absolute, the order must be drawn with precision. Unless specific allegations are made against them, the State Transport Authority or the Appellate Tribunal should not be represented by counsel, as their position in ordinary cases is the same as that of courts and other tribunals. Per Subba Rao J., where a tribunal ignores or fails to investigate a material circumstance relevant to a question of public interest under section 47 of the Act raised by a claimant, the finding may be vitiated by an error of law apparent on the record and is liable to be set aside by a writ of certiorari.

In this case the Court observed that the finding recorded against the applicant for a permit was tainted by an error of law apparent on the face of the record, and therefore the finding was liable to be set aside by a writ of certiorari. It was further held that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had failed to consider the specific claim raised by respondent No 1 concerning the existence of his workshop at Chidambaram, and that omission justified the Tribunal’s decision to set aside its earlier orders. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Madras High Court had not exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution when it issued the writ. The matter was described as a clear instance in which the Tribunal arrived at a conclusion unsupported by any evidence and contrary to the particular claim advanced before it. Since respondent No 1 had obtained the highest number of marks, the Court noted that, had his claim been proven, it would have altered the result in his favour. The Court therefore declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 to overturn the High Court’s order. The judgment was delivered in Civil Appeal No 593 of 1963, an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 19 December 1962 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No 157 of 1961. Counsel for the appellant included senior lawyers, while counsel for respondent No 1 and for respondents Nos 2 and 3 appeared on the other side. The judgment was pronounced by Justice Gajendragadkar, with Justices Wanchoo, Shah and Dayal concurring, and Justice Subba Rao delivering a dissenting opinion. Justice Gajendragadkar framed the short question for decision as the limits of the High Court’s power to issue a writ of certiorari in matters involving orders of the appropriate authorities granting or refusing permits under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The State Transport Authority, Madras, issued a notification on 4 July 1956 under section 57(2) of the Act inviting applications for two‑stage carriage permits to operate an express service on the Madras‑to‑Chidambaram route. One hundred and seven applications were received; some were rejected as time‑barred or defective, while the remaining applications were examined. On 8 May 1957 the Authority determined that Provincial Transport (Private) Ltd., Madras, was the most suitable applicant and granted it one permit. Regarding the second permit, the Authority found none of the remaining applicants suitable and therefore declined to award it, deciding instead to invite fresh applications under section 57(2). Eighteen claimants, including the appellant Syed Yakoob and respondent No 1 K. S. Radhakrishnan, appealed this decision before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal affirmed the grant of the first permit to Provincial Transport (Private) Ltd., and, concerning the second permit, it allowed the appellant’s appeal and directed that the second permit be issued to him, thereby rejecting respondent No 1’s claim.

In this case, the Appellate Tribunal had confirmed the grant of the first permit to Provincial Transport (Private) Ltd. Regarding the second permit, the Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the appellant and ordered that the second permit be issued to him, thereby rejecting respondent No 1’s claim to that permit. The Tribunal’s order was dated 7 July 1958. Respondent No 1 challenged the validity of that order by filing writ petition No 44 of 1959 in the Madras High Court. The single judge, Srinivasan J., who heard the writ petition, held that the Tribunal had ignored material considerations in deciding the grant of the second permit and had relied on considerations that were not relevant to the issue, which vitiated the Tribunal’s order. Consequently, the writ petition was granted in the absolute sense. The appellant thereafter filed an appeal before a Division Bench of the same High Court under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Division Bench affirmed the single judge’s order, stating that it could be sustained because the Tribunal had indeed overlooked material considerations favourable to respondent No 1, and therefore the Division Bench affirmed the learned judge’s decision on that ground alone. However, the Division Bench disagreed with the single judge’s finding that an irrelevant consideration had vitiated the Tribunal’s decision, holding that the consideration in question was not irrelevant and thus differing from Srinivasan J.’s view. As a result, the Division Bench dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The appellant then obtained special leave to approach the Supreme Court, adding respondent No 1, the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal as respondents 2 and 3. Counsel for the appellant argued that the High Court, by issuing a writ of certiorari against the Tribunal’s order, had exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court considered that argument to be well‑founded and required acceptance. The Court noted that the scope of the High Courts’ jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari under Article 226 had been repeatedly examined and that the legal position on the matter was settled. A writ of certiorari could be issued to correct jurisdictional errors committed by inferior courts or tribunals, including orders passed without jurisdiction, beyond jurisdiction, or resulting from a failure to exercise jurisdiction. The writ could also be issued where, in the exercise of its conferred jurisdiction, a court or tribunal acted illegally or improperly, for example by deciding a matter without giving the affected party an opportunity to be heard, or by adopting a procedure contrary to principles of natural justice.

In this case the Court explained that the power to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory power and that the Court exercising that power may not function as an appellate body. Consequently, any factual findings that an inferior Court or Tribunal arrives at after evaluating evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in a writ proceeding. Only an error of law that is apparent on the face of the record may be corrected by such a writ; an error of tact, even if it appears serious, is not within the scope of correction. Regarding a factual finding recorded by a Tribunal, the Court held that a writ of certiorari may be granted if it is shown that the Tribunal, in arriving at that finding, wrongly refused to admit admissible and material evidence or wrongly admitted evidence that was inadmissible and that such erroneous admission influenced the impugned finding. Likewise, a finding of fact that is based on no evidence at all constitutes an error of law and therefore may be corrected by a writ of certiorari. The Court cautioned, however, that a factual finding of a Tribunal cannot be challenged in a writ petition on the ground that the material evidence before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to support the finding. The question of whether the evidence led on a particular point is adequate and the inference to be drawn from that evidence remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal and cannot be agitated before a writ court. The Court therefore affirmed that the jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari must be exercised within these limits, as reflected in earlier decisions such as Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque (1), Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam (2), and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh (3). The Court also observed that it is not easy to define precisely what constitutes an error of law apparent on the face of the record. To be correctable, the error must be a legal error that is clearly evident from the record. Where it is manifest that the legal conclusion reached by an inferior Court or Tribunal stems from an obvious mis‑interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, from ignorance of that provision, from a deliberate disregard of it, or from reasons that are plainly wrong in law, the conclusion may be set aside by a writ of certiorari. In all such situations the impugned conclusion must be so plainly inconsistent with the applicable statutory provision that the High Court can readily determine that the error of law is apparent on the face of the record.

In this case the Court observed that an error of law must be apparent on the face of the record in order to be corrected by a writ of certiorari. The Court also recognized that on some occasions the alleged error may not be evident without a detailed argument, yet the essential requirement remained that the error be of a nature that satisfied the test of being apparent on the record. The Court explained that when a statutory provision can reasonably be given two different constructions and the lower Court or Tribunal adopts one of those constructions, the resulting decision does not automatically become subject to correction by a writ of certiorari. Moreover, the Court held that it is neither feasible nor advisable to attempt a comprehensive definition of every situation that could be described as an error of law apparent on the face of the record; each alleged error must be examined in light of the particular facts, circumstances, and the specific scope of the legal provision that is claimed to have been misinterpreted. Turning to the matter before it, the Court found that the question raised by the appellant presented no difficulty at all. The issue that had been brought before the High Court by respondent number one was confined to a very narrow scope and involved a short and simple question of fact. The factual background showed that the appellant and respondent number one were contesting competing claims for a second permit on the route under consideration. The appellant’s claim was influenced by the fact that he maintained a workshop at Madras, which was one terminus of the route, whereas respondent number one operated a workshop and a place of business only at Cuddalore, an intermediate station on the same route, and did not have a workshop at either of the two termini, the other terminus being Chidambaram. The findings of the Authority likewise reflected this situation. Respondent number one contended before the High Court that the Appellate Tribunal, in concluding that he did not possess a workshop at Chidambaram, had failed to take into account material evidence that he had produced. On this narrow ground a writ was issued in favour of respondent number one. Counsel for the respondent argued that the issue of whether respondent number one had a workshop at Chidambaram was a pure question of fact and that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of the Appellate Tribunal or to correct it by issuing a writ of certiorari, and he relied on the relevant authorities to support this position.

The Court observed that both the transport Authority and the Appellate Tribunal had, in effect, concluded that respondent No 1 did not maintain a workshop at either of the two terminal stations on the route, and that neither body had supplied any reasons to support that finding. The Court held that the absence of reasons by itself did not give the High Court any ground to intervene under Article 226. It was conceded that it would have been preferable for the Appellate Tribunal to explain why it rejected respondent No 1’s contention that a workshop existed at Chidambaram, but the Court expressed the view that the Tribunal’s failure to give such an explanation, or to refer specifically to the evidence placed before it by respondent No 1, did not amount to a fatal error that would warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari under Article 226.

The Court further noted that respondent No 1 had not alleged that any admissible evidence he wished to rely upon had been excluded from the Tribunal’s record. The argument that certain evidence had not been duly considered pertained to the Tribunal’s assessment of the evidence, a matter that lay outside the scope of a writ inquiry under Article 226. The Court pointed out that when respondent No 1 applied for the permit, he had sent a letter dated 11 July 1956 stating that he possessed a workshop at Chidambaram and that he operated it so as to maintain service efficiently and without any breakdown. It was argued that this letter had not been challenged by any party and that the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal had completely ignored it in arriving at the conclusion that respondent No 1 did not have a workshop at Chidambaram. Although the Court agreed that neither the Authority nor the Tribunal had provided reasons for their factual findings, it held that this omission alone did not justify the High Court’s conclusion that the letter had not been considered, and therefore the High Court was not correct in issuing a writ of certiorari on that sole ground.

Beyond the issue of the letter, the record showed that respondent No 1’s claim of a workshop at Chidambaram was contradicted by one of the other permit applicants and was inconsistent with the reports submitted to the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal by the transport department. Specifically, D Kanniah Pillai, one of the applicants, had expressly stated in his application that the other applicants, including respondent No 1, were operating away from the headquarters and did not have a workshop at Chidambaram. Accordingly, the Court concluded that it would be erroneous to assume that respondent No 1’s claim was undisputed by any competitor.

In the present case the respondent identified as No 1 asserted that he operated a workshop at Chidambaram and that no other competitor disputed this claim. More importantly, the record contains reports prepared by the Regional Transport Officer for South Arcot that address the location of workshop and repair facilities. The officer’s report is organised into separate columns. Column 4 records the existence and place of any workshop, repair or maintenance facilities for each applicant. Column 5 records the applicant’s residence or place of business. For respondent No 1, column 4 indicates that he maintained a workshop at Cuddalore pursuant to a Government Order, and column 5 records his residence and place of business also at Cuddalore. A comparable report concerning the appellant shows that the appellant’s workshop facilities were situated at Madras and that his residence and place of business were at the terminus. When the dispute was later placed before the Appellate Tribunal, a fresh report was obtained from the Secretary of the State Transport Authority. That later report likewise states that respondent No 1’s workshop was located at Cuddalore on the route, while the appellant’s workshop was at Madras. Consequently, on the specific question of whether respondent No 1 possessed a workshop at Chidambaram, the only evidence in his favour is his own declaration, which is directly contradicted by the two Transport Officer reports, and the same declaration was also contested by one of the permit applicants.

Given this factual matrix, the Court concluded that the High Court was not entitled to reevaluate these factual issues and to deem the Appellate Tribunal’s finding as unsupported by evidence. To suggest that the Tribunal ignored material considerations in concluding that respondent No 1 did not own a workshop at Chidambaram would be unreasonable, because the evidential material reveals a stark conflict between the parties’ statements and the Transport Officers’ reports, the latter being the more reliable source. It is evident that, had respondent No 1 owned a workshop at Chidambaram, such a fact would have been recorded in column 4, which is expressly intended to list every location where a claimant maintains workshop and repair facilities. It also emerged that, before Srinivasan J., the appellant’s counsel conceded that the allegation of a Chidambaram workshop by respondent No 1 had not been challenged before the Transport Authorities, a concession that apparently impressed Srinivasan J. However, the Division Bench hearing the Letters Patent Appeal observed that this concession was improperly made, noting that the record clearly shows that respondent No 1’s claim was indeed challenged.

The Court observed that the claim raised by one of the permit applicants had been plainly inconsistent with the Transport Officer reports previously cited. Consequently, the concession on which Justice Srinivasan had relied was correctly excluded from consideration by the Division Bench when it examined the appeal. The Division Bench had expressed the view that, apart from that concession, the Appellate Tribunal appeared to have overlooked the claim made by respondent No 1 in his letter dated 11 July 1956. The Court found it difficult to sustain that finding. In the Court’s opinion, not only could the plea advanced by respondent No 1 not be properly entertained under Article 226, but even on its merits the plea lacked a sound basis. The issue for which respondent No 1 sought the High Court’s intervention under Article 226 was a simple factual question, and the Court was satisfied that, on that question, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in concluding that respondent No 1’s assertion of a workshop at Chidambaram was unfounded. Moreover, even if that conclusion had seemed unsatisfactory to the High Court, it would not have justified the issuance of a writ under Article 226, because the Tribunal’s finding was supported by evidence and was not based on an absence of proof. The Court also added that, although the Division Bench had been convinced that the concession on which Justice Srinivasan had substantially acted had been erroneously made before him, the Bench’s attention did not appear to have been drawn to the Transport Officer reports previously referenced. The Court was certain that, had those reports been considered, the Division Bench would have hesitated to affirm Justice Srinivasan’s finding. It appeared that Justice Srinivasan had been inclined to view the Tribunal’s decision as tainted by consideration of matters that were irrelevant. However, the Division Bench held that those considerations could not be characterized as irrelevant. Those considerations centered on whether preference should be given to a permit applicant whose headquarters were at the terminus, as opposed to an applicant who possessed only a branch office at that terminus. The usual practice of the Tribunals under the Act was to award one mark in column 3 to an applicant with headquarters at the terminus and only half a mark to an applicant with a branch office there. While the Division Bench held that the basis for allocating marks in this manner could not be deemed irrelevant, it indicated that the policy underlying this practice might be open to doubt. In the Court’s view, it would have been preferable for the Division Bench to have refrained from expressing an opinion on this aspect, especially when it concluded that the matter primarily fell within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal.

The Division Bench had not expressed any opinion on this aspect of the matter, particularly when it concluded that the issue was primarily for the Appellate Tribunal to decide. Counsel for respondent No. 1 relied on a recent decision of this Court in K.M. Shanmugam v. The S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd. (1) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 809. to support the contention that the error of the Appellate Tribunal amounted to a violation of section 47 of the Act. The counsel argued that, under section 47(a), the Appellate Tribunal was obligated to consider the interests of the public generally when deciding whether to grant a permit. He further asserted that the Tribunal ignored the fact that respondent No. 1 owned a workshop at Chidambaram, and that by refusing the permit it had sacrificed the public interest. This argument appears at first glance to be far‑fetched and fanciful, yet the counsel insisted that the observations made by this Court in the Shanmugam case were in his favour. In our view, that earlier decision does not assist the counsel’s contention. In K.M. Shanmugam, this Court held that the Tribunal had committed a clear error of law by deciding that, because the first respondent had a branch at Kumbakonam, its other branch at Manmargudi should be ignored. The judgment explained that it is untenable to ignore a well‑equipped office located on the route for which a permit is sought merely because the company also has an unrelated branch elsewhere. The Court observed that the Appellate Tribunal had adopted precisely that untenable view, and therefore the error was evident on the face of the record. In that context, this Court referred to the mandatory provisions of section 47. We do not think that the Shanmugam decision can be legitimately invoked by the counsel in the present case. Only after it is proved that respondent No. 1 actually owned a workshop at Chidambaram could any question arise about the public interest under section 47. If, as in the present proceedings, the Appellate Tribunal found that respondent No. 1 did not own such a workshop, no consideration of public interest can arise at all. The present writ proceedings therefore focus solely on that factual finding. Moreover, the Shanmugam decision cannot be used to justify a party whose permit application has been rejected to approach the High Court under article 226 and ask it to decide all factual issues on the ground that such facts might help invoke section 47.

In this case, counsel for the petitioner argued that even if the Court were to find that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ in the present proceedings, the order of the High Court should nevertheless not be set aside under Article 136 of the Constitution. He maintained that the jurisdiction granted by Article 136 is very wide but is exercised at the Court’s discretion, and that when an order furthers the ends of justice, it should not be reversed on technical grounds. The Court was not persuaded by this submission. While it can be conceded that, in appropriate circumstances, the Court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 where the interests of justice plainly favour such a course, the Court found no basis to entertain a plea that seeks to preserve an order that was clearly rendered without jurisdiction. Accepting the petitioner’s argument would, in the Court’s view, permit a majority of cases in which High Courts have interfered with questions of fact by issuing writs of certiorari against decisions of special tribunals to be defended on the ground that the High Courts acted in the interests of justice, thereby immunising those decisions from appellate scrutiny. In the circumstances of the present matter, the Court saw no justification for invoking considerations of justice to rescue the impugned order.

The factual findings of the tribunals were that respondent No 1 does not own a workshop at Chidambaram, and, after weighing other relevant circumstances, this fact proved decisive against respondent No 1 and in favour of the appellant. Consequently, a decision based on the tribunal’s factual findings cannot be reopened on the speculative ground that a further enquiry should be conducted, for doing so would undermine the finality of the tribunals’ determinations. If High Courts were permitted to disturb factual findings in writ proceedings, it would lead to an endless search for correct facts and would effectively transform High Courts into appellate courts competent to hear questions of fact. Accordingly, the Court emphasized that, when entertaining petitions for writs of certiorari, it is essential to treat findings of fact recorded by specially constituted tribunals, which possess the jurisdiction to decide such matters, as final between the parties unless it is shown that such findings are unsupported by any evidence. On this basis, the Court concluded that the petitioner's plea that, in the interests of justice, the order under appeal should not be set aside cannot be upheld. There remains one further point to consider.

It appears that, in the writ petition filed by respondent No 1, the petitioner sought the setting aside of the orders issued by the Authority and by the Appellate Tribunal, and consequently a rule was issued in accordance with the prayer contained in that petition. That rule was thereafter made absolute. The petition of respondent No 1 did not contest the grant of a permit to Provincial Transport (Private) Limited; however, because of the prayer made, the final orders issued in those proceedings could, if read strictly, be interpreted as having annulled both the Authority’s order and the Appellate Tribunal’s order. Such an interpretation was not, and could not have been, the intention of the High Court when it granted the writ. The Court observed that, when a writ is granted and made absolute, the drafting of the order should be done with particular care so that the operative effect is clear and accurate. Accordingly, the Court set aside the order passed by the High Court, allowed the appeal, dismissed the writ petition filed by respondent No 1, and ordered respondent No 1 to pay the costs of the appellant in this Court. The counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3 sought to recover his costs; the Court declined to allow that request. The Court explained that, although the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal may be proper parties in such proceedings, they are not normally required to be represented by lawyers unless specific allegations are made against them that necessitate a reply. Their role is analogous to that of courts or other tribunals against whose decisions writ proceedings are instituted; they do not have an interest in the merits of the dispute, and therefore their legal representation is unnecessary and inappropriate. Consequently, the Court directed that respondents 2 and 3 each bear their own costs.

I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment of my learned brother, Gajendragadkar J. I cannot agree. The facts are limited in scope and are as follows: the State Transport Authority, Madras, invited applications for the grant of two‑stage carriage permits on the route from Madras to Chidambaram. A total of one hundred and seven applications were received by the Authority. Both the appellant and the first respondent were among those applicants. The Authority awarded one of the permits to Provincial Transport (Private) Limited, Madras; that particular permit is not the subject of the present dispute. Regarding the second permit, the Authority found that none of the applicants were suitable and therefore refused to grant the permit to any of them, directing that fresh applications be called for. In response to that refusal, the appellant, the first respondent, and other aggrieved parties filed appeals before the Appellate Tribunal.

In the proceedings before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, the party now called the appellant had earlier been respondent sixteen, while the party now called the respondent had earlier been appellant seven before that Tribunal. The first respondent achieved the highest aggregate marks, namely seventy‑one and one‑half, under columns one through five according to the marking scheme approved by the State Government. In contrast, the appellant obtained only forty‑one and one‑half marks under the same scoring scheme, a substantially lower total than that of the first respondent. Despite the first respondent’s superior score, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed his claim because his workshop and place of business were situated at Cuddalore, which lay en route and not at either terminal of the route. Excluding the first respondent, the Tribunal compared the appellant with another competitor, identified as appellant fourteen, and ultimately preferred the appellant. The principal reason for this preference was that the appellant’s workshop was located at the headquarters in Madras, satisfying the requirement of having facilities at a terminal. Consequently, the Appellate Tribunal rejected the first respondent’s application and granted the official carriage permit to the appellant. The first respondent then instituted a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the Madras High Court, seeking a writ of certiorari to set aside the Tribunal’s order. The petition was heard by Justice Srinivasan, who annulled the Tribunal’s order on the primary ground that it had failed to consider a material and relevant circumstance. The omitted circumstance was that the petitioner had the necessary repair and maintenance facilities at Chidambaram, which was one of the terminals of the route. In view of this omission, the judge set aside the Tribunal’s entire decision.

On a letters patent appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court consisting of Chief Justice Ramachandra Iyer and Justice Venkataraman heard the matter. The bench held that the judge should not have decided the factual question of whether the first respondent had facilities at Chidambaram. Nevertheless, the bench agreed that the Tribunal had indeed overlooked the first respondent’s claim that he possessed such facilities at Chidambaram. The appeal proceeded before this Court. Counsel for the appellant argued that the Tribunal, based on the material before it, had concluded that the first respondent lacked any facilities at the terminal. Consequently, counsel submitted that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the Tribunal’s factual determinations. Counsel for the first respondent countered that the respondent had expressly indicated in his letter dated July 11, 1956, to the Transport Authority that he possessed the necessary repair and maintenance facilities at Chidambaram. He further contended that both the State Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had disregarded this material circumstance. He argued that this circumstance was relevant to the public‑interest considerations under section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Accordingly, counsel maintained that the High Court was correct in setting aside the Tribunal’s order under article 226 of the Constitution and in directing the Tribunal to decide the appeal on its merits. Alternatively, counsel submitted that even if the Tribunal might have found that the respondent lacked facilities, the High Court’s intervention was justified because the matter involved a fundamental right to conduct transport business. He further argued that the issue required consideration of public interest under the Motor Vehicles Act.

In this matter the Court observed that, although there could have been some material on which the Appellate Tribunal might have based a conclusion that the first respondent lacked the alleged facilities, three learned Judges of the High Court, after examining the admissions made and the material placed before them, held that the Tribunal had not actually decided that question. The High Court judges merely granted the Appellate Tribunal a further opportunity to determine the appeal on its merits, and therefore the Court concluded that it was not a fit case for this Court to intervene under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Court further noted that the first respondent possessed a fundamental right to carry on a transport business, and that the Motor Vehicles Act imposed reasonable restrictions on that right in the public interest. Under Section 47 of the Act the Regional Transport Authority, in considering an application for a stage‑carriage permit, must have regard, inter alia, to the interests of the public generally. The Court explained that the fact that the first respondent had a separate workshop, or at least the necessary repair and maintenance facilities, at one of the termini of the route—namely Chidambaram—was a matter directly relevant to the public‑interest consideration. The scheme of the marking system suggested by the Government likewise recognised the importance of such facilities at either terminus of a route. The Court stated that if the first respondent had placed this circumstance before the concerned authorities in support of his permit claim and the authorities had either ignored it or failed to investigate it, the High Court would have been justified in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the order of those authorities and to direct them to ascertain the truth of the first respondent’s claim and, if verified, to take it into account before granting a permit to any claimant. In such a scenario the High Court would not be interfering with a factual finding of the Appellate Tribunal based on the material before it, but would merely be setting aside an order on the ground that an important and material circumstance had been ignored or not investigated. The Court further observed that when a tribunal disregards or fails to investigate a material circumstance presented by a claimant and then arrives at a finding adverse to that claimant, such a finding can be said to be vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Applying these principles to the present facts, the Court noted that the State Transport Authority was considering competing claims of one‑hundred‑seven persons for two permits and rendered its decision on 8 May 1957. The first respondent had filed his application for a permit on 11 July 1956 and, on the same day, sent a letter to the Authority stating that “Chidambaram is one of the termini of this proposed route. A separate office and workshop are located at Chidambaram in order to maintain the service efficiently and without any breakdown or whatsoever.” The Court emphasized that this statement formed part of the material that should have been taken into account.

The Court observed that, aside from a single applicant, none of the persons named in the applications expressly denied the first respondent’s assertion that he possessed a separate office and workshop at Chidambaram. This point had been acknowledged before Justice Srinivasan, although the judge had characterised the admission as somewhat broader than the respondent actually made. The counsel representing the appellant did not retract this limited admission when the matter was before the Division Bench. Only one applicant, identified as Kanniah Pillai (applicant No. 43‑D), made a statement in his own application that could be read as an indirect denial. He wrote that applicants numbered 43, 57, 69, 78 and 81 were residents of Chidambaram, but clarified that applicant 57 was a fleet owner, that applicants 69 and 78 had no workshop, that applicant 81 was a new entrant, and that the remaining applicants were situated far from the headquarters and also lacked a workshop at Chidambaram. Apart from this vague and implied denial by Kanniah Pillai, the record contained no other indication that any applicant contested the first respondent’s claim. Consequently, the appellant never, at any stage of the proceedings, refuted the first respondent’s allegation that he maintained a workshop at Chidambaram. With this background, the Court examined the order of the State Transport Authority. The Authority had disregarded the first respondent’s letter asserting the existence of a workshop at Chidambaram, and instead, in a general clause, described the first respondent and several other applicants as residents situated either in the middle of the route or off it, suggesting that they were not as advantageously positioned as an applicant who possessed facilities at one end of the route. This could be interpreted as an implied finding against the first respondent, a finding the respondent complained was made in complete disregard of his claim. Similarly, the Appellate Tribunal, in disposing of the eighteen appeals before it, observed that the first respondent, despite having obtained the highest number of marks, including those in column 1 of the mark list, “had his workshop and place of business en route at Cuddalore and not at either of the terminii of the route.” This observation, the Court noted, also ignored the first respondent’s specific claim that his workshop was at Chidambaram, which was one of the terminii, and that, except for one applicant, none of the others had denied this fact. The High Court therefore concluded, based on the material before it, that both the State Transport Authority and the Appellate Tribunal had failed to consider the first respondent’s explicit claim concerning the location of his workshop at Chidambaram. Accordingly, the High Court correctly set aside the Tribunal’s order so that the Tribunal could reevaluate the first respondent’s claim. The Court found no flaw in the High Court’s reasoning and saw no excess of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, counsel for the appellant, Mr Setalvad, argued that material relevant to the Tribunal’s finding had indeed been before it and that the Tribunal had based its conclusion on that material.

The appellant relied upon an extract from the report of the Regional Transport Authority, South Arcot, dated 31 January 1957. That report had been forwarded by the Regional Authority to the State Transport Authority. In column four of the report, under the heading “possession of workshop or repair or maintenance facilities and its location”, the entry next to the first respondent’s name read “maintaining a workshop at per G.O. at Cuddalore”. In a subsequent report sent by the State Transport Authority to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, column eight under the heading “Place of residence or principal place of business and the nearest distance” recorded for the first respondent “Cuddalore‑on the route”. The information supplied by the Transport Authority was apparently derived from the earlier Regional Authority report. The appellant also relied on a letter dated 10 January 1957, written by the first respondent to the Secretary of the State Transport Authority, to support the contention that, although on 11 July 1956 the first respondent had claimed a workshop at Chidambaram, he had not mentioned that workshop in the letter. A careful reading of the letter, however, showed that the first respondent did refer to his sector and terminal qualifications. On the basis of these documents, the appellant argued that material existed on which the Appellate Tribunal could have reached the conclusion it did, namely that the first respondent did not have a workshop at either terminus of the route.

In reality, the Tribunal had not expressly relied upon any of these documents to hold that the first respondent lacked a workshop at Chidambaram. Moreover, the appellant had not introduced the documents before Justice Srinivasan or before the Division Bench, claiming that the Tribunal’s finding was based on them. The letter from the first respondent did not support the appellant’s contention, and the two reports did not state that the first respondent had no workshop at Chidambaram. The officers who prepared the reports had not conducted any enquiry into the truth of the first respondent’s claim that he maintained a workshop at Chidambaram. Consequently, there was no evidence to contradict the first respondent’s claim, which explained why the appellant did not place those documents before the High Court to show that material existed before the State Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal for the purpose of concluding that the first respondent had no workshop at Chidambaram. A review of the two orders revealed that, amid the multitude of applications, the specific claim of the first respondent had been entirely overlooked by both the Transport Authority and the Appellate Tribunal. This represented a clear instance of a finding rendered by the Tribunal without any evidential basis and by disregarding a specific claim raised before it.

The Court expressed the opinion that the High Court had correctly set aside the order issued by the Appellate Tribunal. The subsequent issue for consideration was whether the present matter was suitable for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution, requiring the exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction. The learned Judge Srinivasan, and subsequently the Division Bench on appeal, examined the materials that had been placed before them together with the concession that had been made, and they concluded that the Appellate Tribunal had failed to attend to the specific claim advanced by the first respondent. The first respondent had obtained the highest number of marks, and the Court observed that, if his claim were proved true, it would inevitably shift the balance of advantage in his favour. The Court noted that the appellant had not relied upon the material before the High Court when making his case. The High Court, however, granted the Appellate Tribunal a further opportunity to examine the first respondent’s claim. Although the High Court ultimately set aside the Tribunal’s order, the judgment plainly indicated that the Tribunal retained the power to reconsider the issue, a point that the counsel for the first respondent expressly acknowledged. The Court further observed that the appellant possessed every opportunity to demonstrate that the first respondent did not have a workshop at Chidambaram, yet instead of following the straightforward procedural route, the appellant appeared to be attempting to prevent further inquiry that might reveal the truth. In view of these circumstances, the Court held that the matter did not warrant the deployment of its extraordinary jurisdiction to overturn the High Court’s decision. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the costs were awarded against the appellant, being ordered to pay the costs incurred by the first respondent. In the final order, the Court affirmed that, in accordance with the majority view, the appeal was dismissed, the writ petition filed by Respondent No 1 was dismissed, Respondent No 1 was directed to pay the appellant’s costs in this Court, and Respondents 2 and 3 were each ordered to bear their own costs.