Syed Yakoob vs K.S. Radhakrishnan And Ors.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 9 October, 1963

Coram: J.C. Shah, K. Subba Rao, K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar, Raghubar Dayal

In this case, the Court observed that the appeal principally concerned the scope of the High Court’s authority to issue a writ of certiorari while examining orders made by the appropriate authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter referred to as “the Act.” The State Transport Authority of Madras, designated in the judgment as the Authority, published a notification on 4 July 1956 invoking section 57(2) of the Act and inviting applications for two‑stage carriage permits to operate an express service on the Madras‑to‑Chidambaram route. A total of one hundred and seven applications were received in response to that notification; a portion of those applications were dismissed because they were either time‑barred or defective in other respects, while the remaining applications that complied with the required formalities were subsequently examined by the Authority. On 8 May 1957 the Authority determined that Provincial Transport (Private) Ltd., Madras, was the most suitable applicant among those examined and consequently granted one of the two permits to that company. Regarding the second permit, the Authority concluded that none of the remaining applicants satisfied the requisite criteria, and therefore it refused to award the second permit to any of them, deciding instead to reopen the solicitation of applications under the same section 57(2) of the Act.

Following the Authority’s refusal to grant the second permit, eighteen claimants filed appeals before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, hereinafter called the Appellate Tribunal, seeking the issuance of the second permit. Among those appellants were the petitioner, Syed Yakoob, and the first respondent, K. S. Radhakrishnan. The Appellate Tribunal upheld the Authority’s decision to grant the first permit to Provincial Transport (Private) Ltd. and, concerning the second permit, the Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by Syed Yakoob, directing that the second permit be issued to him. Consequently, the claim of respondent No. 1 for the second permit was denied, and the Tribunal’s order was rendered on 7 July 1958. Respondent No. 1 challenged the validity of that order by filing writ petition No. 44 of 1959 in the Madras High Court. Justice Srinivasan, who presided over the writ petition, held that the Appellate Tribunal had ignored material considerations in determining the award of the second permit and had permitted irrelevant considerations to influence its decision, thereby contaminating the order. Accordingly, Justice Srinivasan declared the rule issued on respondent No. 1’s writ petition to be absolute. The petitioner subsequently contested that ruling before a Division Bench of the same High Court by filing an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Division Bench affirmed that the order of Justice Srinivasan could be sustained on the basis that the Appellate Tribunal had indeed overlooked material considerations in favour of respondent No. 1, and therefore upheld the High Court’s earlier intervention.

In that case the Division Bench affirmed only the judgment of the learned single Judge on the sole ground that the Appellate Tribunal had overlooked material considerations. Regarding the single Judge’s finding that an irrelevant consideration had vitiated the Tribunal’s decision, the Division Bench held that the consideration was in fact relevant and consequently disagreed with the view expressed by Srinivasan J. The Division Bench therefore concluded that the reasoning of the single Judge regarding the alleged irrelevant consideration was erroneous. As a result the Division Bench dismissed the appeal that was filed by the appellant against the Tribunal’s order. Consequently the appellant’s request for relief was denied and the order of the Appellate Tribunal remained in force. The appellant thereafter obtained special leave to approach this Court and, in the appeal, impleaded respondent No. 1 and also added the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal as respondents 2 and 3. Counsel for the appellant argued that the High Court, in issuing a writ of certiorari to challenge the Tribunal’s order, had acted beyond the jurisdiction granted by article 226 of the Constitution. The argument asserted that the High Court had misused its supervisory powers by entertaining a matter that required a substantive appellate review. The Court agreed with that submission and held that the contention was well‑founded and required acceptance by the tribunal. Accordingly the appellate court found no merit in the challenge to the Tribunal’s order and affirmed the Division Bench’s dismissal.

The Court observed that the scope of the jurisdiction of High Courts to issue a writ of certiorari under article 226 has been examined repeatedly and that the settled legal position was now clear. It explained that a writ of certiorari may be issued to correct a jurisdictional error committed by an inferior court or tribunal. Such an error occurs where an order is made without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or where the authority fails to exercise its jurisdiction at all. The Court further stated that the writ may also be issued when the court or tribunal, while exercising its conferred jurisdiction, acts illegally or improperly. For example, it may decide a matter without giving the affected party an opportunity to be heard or may adopt procedures that violate the principles of natural justice. However, the Court emphasized that the power to grant a writ of certiorari is a supervisory power and does not transform the High Court into an appellate court. Consequently the Court held that findings of fact arrived at by an inferior court or tribunal after evaluating the evidence cannot be reopened or re‑examined in a writ proceeding. The Court clarified that only an error of law that is apparent on the face of the record may be corrected by a writ, whereas an error of fact, even if serious, cannot be disturbed. Regarding factual findings, the Court said that a writ of certiorari may be issued only if the tribunal erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding. The Court added that a finding of fact based on no evidence at all constitutes an error of law and therefore may be corrected by a writ of certiorari. The Court warned that in dealing with such cases the tribunal’s exclusive authority to assess the adequacy and sufficiency of evidence must be respected and cannot be challenged in a writ petition.

The Court explained that a factual finding made by the Tribunal cannot be attacked in a writ of certiorari on the basis that the material evidence presented before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to support that finding. The assessment of whether the evidence on a particular point is adequate, as well as the inference of fact drawn from that assessment, lies exclusively within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, and those matters cannot be reopened before a writ court. Accordingly, the power given to High Courts under Article 226 to grant a writ of certiorari may be exercised only within these limits, as illustrated in the decisions of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque, Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam ([1958] S.C.R. 1240), and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh. The Court noted that defining what constitutes an “error of law apparent on the face of the record” is not easy. For a writ to be issued, the flaw must be an error of law, and it must be an error that is clearly visible on the record. When it is obvious that a lower Court or Tribunal’s legal conclusion is based on a plain mis‑interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or on a complete ignorance of that provision, or even on a deliberate disregard of it, or when the conclusion is founded on reasons that are legally wrong, that conclusion may be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In such situations, the erroneous conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the statute that the High Court can readily determine that the error of law is apparent on the record. The Court also recognised that, in some cases, the error may not be immediately obvious on the face of the record and may require an argument to reveal it; nevertheless, only an error of law that satisfies the test of being apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ. If a statutory provision can reasonably be interpreted in two ways and the lower Court or Tribunal adopts one of those constructions, its decision may not automatically be subject to correction by a writ of certiorari. The Court expressed the view that it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt a comprehensive definition of every situation that qualifies as an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether an alleged error meets this description must always depend on the specific facts and circumstances of each case and on the nature and scope of the legal provision that is claimed to have been misinterpreted or violated.

Whether an error qualifies as an error of law apparent on the face of the record must always be determined by looking at the particular facts and circumstances of each case and by examining the nature and scope of the legal provision that is alleged to have been misinterpreted or violated. In the matter that is currently before the Court, the issue raised by the appellant is straightforward and presents no difficulty at all. The point that respondent No 1 raised before the High Court is confined to a very narrow field; it is essentially a short and simple question of fact. The dispute concerned the rival claims of the appellant and respondent No 1 for a second permit on the specific route under consideration. The Appellate Tribunal, in reaching its decision, appears to have been ultimately influenced by the fact that the appellant possessed a workshop at Madras, which constitutes one terminus of the route, whereas respondent No 1 owned a workshop and a place of business only at Cuddalore, an intermediate station on the same route, and did not have a workshop at either of the two termini, the other terminus being Chidambaram. This assessment seems to be reflected in the finding recorded by the Authority as well. Respondent No 1 argued before the High Court that, in concluding that he did not have a workshop at Chidambaram, the Appellate Tribunal had failed to consider material evidence that he had produced. It is on this narrow ground that a writ of certiorari was issued in favour of respondent No 1. Counsel for the respondent, Mr Setalvad, contended that the question of whether respondent No 1 possessed a workshop at Chidambaram is a pure question of fact and that the High Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to disturb the finding of the Appellate Tribunal by issuing a writ of certiorari. He relied on the fact that both the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal, in substance, had found that respondent No 1 did not have a workshop at either of the two termini on the route, and that the absence of reasons supporting that finding should not justify the High Court’s interference with its jurisdiction under Article 226. It may be conceded that it would have been preferable for the Appellate Tribunal to explain why it rejected respondent No 1’s claim concerning the alleged workshop at Chidambaram. Nevertheless, the failure of the Tribunal to give a specific reason for that conclusion, or to refer expressly to the evidence adduced by respondent No 1, does not, by itself, amount to an error of such a character as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari under Article 226. Moreover, respondent No 1 has not alleged that any admissible evidence which he intended to rely upon was excluded from the record by the Tribunal. An argument that some evidence was not duly considered normally falls within the domain of evidence appraisal, which lies outside the scope of an enquiry conducted through a writ of certiorari under Article 226.

It was observed that the question of whether evidence had been properly considered belongs to the sphere of evaluating evidence, and therefore it lies outside the scope of a writ of certiorari under Article 226. The record showed that when respondent No 1 applied for the permit, he sent a letter dated 11 July 1956 stating that he maintained a workshop at Chidambaram and that the workshop was operating efficiently without any breakdown. The contention advanced was that this letter had not been challenged by any party and that both the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal had completely ignored it while concluding that respondent No 1 did not have a workshop at Chidambaram. Although it was noted that neither the Authority nor the Appellate Tribunal provided reasons for the factual findings they recorded, the Court held that this omission alone did not justify the High Court’s conclusion that the letter had been disregarded, and consequently the High Court was not correct in issuing a writ of certiorari on that sole ground. Beyond this point, the record demonstrated that respondent No 1’s claim of having a workshop at Chidambaram was contradicted by one of the other permit applicants and was wholly inconsistent with the reports submitted to the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal by the transport department. D Kanniah Pillai, another applicant, had specifically stated in his application that the remaining applicants, including respondent No 1, were operating away from the headquarters and did not possess a workshop at Chidambaram. Thus, it could not be said that respondent No 1’s claim was undisputed by any competitor. More importantly, the evidence included a report prepared by the Regional Transport Officer, South Arcot, which contained separate columns for various details. Column 4 of that report dealt with the existence of workshop, repair or maintenance facilities and their locations. For respondent No 1, column 4 indicated that he maintained a workshop as required by a Government Order at Cuddalore, and column 5 recorded his residence or place of business also as Cuddalore. A comparable report concerning the appellant showed that the appellant’s workshop facilities were at Madras and that his residence and place of business were at the terminus. When the dispute was later before the Appellate Tribunal, a fresh report was apparently obtained. This new report, prepared by the Secretary of the State Transport Authority, again indicated that respondent No 1 had a workshop at Cuddalore on the route, while the appellant’s workshop was situated at Madras.

In the present dispute the record showed that respondent No 1 had asserted that he owned a workshop at Chidambaram, whereas two reports prepared by Transport Officers indicated the opposite. Both reports contradicted his assertion, and one of the applicants had also challenged the claim. On the basis of this mixed evidence it was not appropriate for the High Court to treat the factual issue as a matter that could be decided without reference to the evidence, nor could it characterise the finding of the Appellate Tribunal as one made without any evidential foundation. To contend that the Appellate Tribunal ignored material considerations when it concluded that respondent No 1 did not possess a workshop at Chidambaram would be unreasonable, because the evidence revealed a sharp conflict between the parties’ versions. The version advanced by respondent No 1 was inconsistent with the Transport Officers’ reports, which were the more reliable sources. Moreover, column 4 of the report was intended to list every location where a claimant owned a workshop and repair facilities; had respondent No 1 truly owned a workshop at Chidambaram, it would have been recorded in that column.

The record further indicated that, before Justice Srinivasan, counsel for the appellant had conceded that respondent No 1’s allegation of a workshop at Chidambaram had not been contested before the Transport Authorities, and Justice Srinivasan was markedly impressed by that concession. However, the Division Bench that heard the Letters Patent Appeal observed that the concession was incorrectly made. The case file clearly showed that one of the applicants for a permit had challenged respondent No 1’s claim, and that the claim was plainly at odds with the Transport Officers’ reports. Consequently, the Division Bench correctly disregarded the concession on which Justice Srinivasan had relied when considering the appeal. The Division Bench also noted that, apart from the concession, the Appellate Tribunal appeared to have overlooked a letter dated 11 July 1956 written by respondent No 1. The present Court found this observation difficult to sustain. In addition, the plea raised by respondent No 1 could not be validly entertained under Article 226, and even on the merits the plea lacked substance. The question for which respondent No 1 sought intervention of the High Court under Article 226 was essentially a factual one, and this Court is satisfied that, on that factual question, the Appellate Tribunal was rightly justified in concluding that respondent No 1’s claim of a workshop at Chidambaram was untenable.

The Court observed that even if the High Court found the findings of the Appellate Tribunal satisfactory, that fact alone could not justify the issuance of a writ under Article 226. It noted that the Tribunal’s conclusions were supported by evidence and were not based on an absence of proof. The Court added that although the Division Bench had agreed that the concession on which Justice Srinivasan had substantially acted had been wrongly granted, the bench had not considered the reports prepared by the Transport Officers that had been referenced earlier. The Court expressed confidence that, had the Division Bench examined those reports, it would have hesitated before affirming Justice Srinivasan’s finding. Justice Srinivasan had been inclined to hold that the Tribunal’s decision was vitiated because it relied on certain considerations regarded as irrelevant. The Division Bench, however, ruled that those considerations could not be described as irrelevant. The matters in dispute concerned whether preference should be given to an applicant for a permit whose headquarters were located at the terminus as opposed to an applicant who operated only a branch office at the same terminus. The Court explained that the usual practice of the Tribunals under the Act was to award one mark in column 3 to an applicant with a headquarters at the terminus and only a half‑mark to an applicant with a mere branch office there. While the Division Bench held that this method of allocating marks was not irrelevant, it suggested that the policy underlying the practice might be open to doubt. In the Court’s view, the Division Bench would have been better served by refraining from any opinion on that policy aspect, especially when it concluded that the issue primarily fell within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal. Counsel for respondent No. 1 relied on a recent decision of this Court in K. M. Shanmugam v. The S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd. to argue that the error alleged against the Appellate Tribunal amounted to a violation of section 47 of the Act. He contended that, under section 47(a), the Tribunal was obligated to consider the public interest when deciding on the grant of a permit and that by ignoring the fact that respondent No. 1 owned a workshop at Chidambaram and consequently refusing his permit application, the Tribunal had sacrificed the public interest. The Court found this argument to be far‑fetched and fanciful, even though counsel cited the observations made in K. M. Shanmugam. The Court concluded that the earlier decision did not provide any assistance to the contention advanced by counsel for respondent No. 1.

In the earlier decision cited by counsel, this Court observed that the Tribunal had committed a clear error of law by stating that, because the first respondent possessed a branch at Kumbakonam, its other branch at Manmargudi should be disregarded. The Court explained that it was plainly untenable to hold that a company which maintains a well‑equipped office on the route for which a permit is being sought could be ignored merely because the same company also has another branch located elsewhere and unrelated to that route. The judgment further noted that the Appellate Tribunal had indeed taken that untenable view, and that, on the face of the record, this constituted an obvious error. In reaching that conclusion, the Court referred to the mandatory provisions of section 47 of the Act. Consequently, the Court does not consider that the earlier decision can be legitimately invoked by counsel in the present matter. Only after it is established that respondent No. 1 actually owned a workshop at Chidambaram could any subsequent question about the public interest arise. In the present case, however, the Appellate Tribunal has held that respondent No. 1 does not own such a workshop, and therefore no consideration of public interest is possible; the present writ proceedings are concerned precisely with that factual determination. The Court further observes that the precedent from K. M. Shanmugam does not empower a party whose permit application has been rejected to approach the High Court under Article 226 and ask it to resolve all factual issues on the ground that such factual findings might help invoke section 47. That is not the effect intended by the earlier decision. Counsel has also argued that, even if the High Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the writ in these proceedings, the Supreme Court should not set aside the High Court’s order under Article 136, because the nature of the questions raised by respondent No. 1, in his view, should preclude reversal on technical grounds and the Court’s wide discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 should be exercised where the order under appeal furthers the ends of justice. The Court is not persuaded by that submission. While it may be conceded that, in appropriate circumstances, this Court could decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 where the interests of justice clearly demand such a course, the Court sees no basis for entertaining a plea of that kind where the High Court’s orders have been shown to be without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court declines to entertain the request to refrain from reversing the High Court’s decision on the basis of any alleged technicality or broader considerations of justice.

Mr. Pathak had argued that, were his submission accepted, the majority of cases in which a High Court interfered with questions of fact by granting writs of certiorari against the decisions of special tribunals could be defended on the ground that the High Courts acted in the interests of justice and therefore the Supreme Court ought not to disturb those High Court decisions. The Court, however, found no real basis for invoking considerations of justice in the present matter. The tribunals that had examined the factual matrix concluded that respondent No 1 did not own a workshop at Chidambaram. In reaching that conclusion, the tribunals had also taken into account other relevant circumstances, and the finding that respondent No 1 lacked ownership of the workshop proved to be decisive against him and favourable to the appellant. Accordingly, a decision that rested upon facts duly found by the tribunal could not be reopened merely on the speculative premise that a further enquiry might promote justice. The Court warned that allowing High Courts to disturb factual findings in writ proceedings would generate an endless quest for correct facts and would effectively transform the High Courts into appellate courts competent to decide questions of fact. For this reason, the Court held that findings of fact recorded by special tribunals, which possessed the statutory authority to decide such matters, should be treated as final between the parties unless it could be demonstrated that the impugned finding was unsupported by any evidence. Consequently, the Court rejected Mr. Pathak’s plea that, in the name of justice, the order under appeal should be left untouched.

The Court noted another important point arising from the writ petition filed by respondent No 1. In that petition, respondent No 1 sought to have set aside the orders of the Authority as well as those of the Appellate Tribunal, and a rule was consequently issued in accordance with the prayer contained in the petition. That rule was later made absolute. It was clear, however, that the writ petition did not challenge the grant of the permit to Provincial Transport (Pvt.) Ltd. Yet, because of the prayer made by respondent No 1, the final orders issued in the proceedings could, if read strictly, be interpreted to mean that both the Authority’s and the Appellate Tribunal’s orders had been set aside – an interpretation that was not, and could not have been, the intention of the High Court when it granted the writ. The Court therefore suggested that, when a writ is issued and subsequently made absolute upon a successful petition, the wording of the order should be drafted with greater precision to avoid such technical ambiguities.

The Court exercised its authority to overturn the previous order of the High Court and consequently dismissed the writ petition that had been filed by respondent No. 1. In addition to the dismissal, the Court directed that respondent No. 1 shall bear the costs incurred by the appellant in these proceedings before the Supreme Court. Following this order, counsel identified as Mr. Ranganathan Chetty, who appeared on behalf of respondents 2 and 3, submitted a request for the recovery of his own costs. The Court examined this request and concluded that it could not be entertained. The Court observed that, although the State Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may be proper and necessary parties in a proceeding of this nature, the presence of legal representation for those bodies is justified only when specific allegations are made against them that require a substantive reply. In the ordinary course of writ proceedings, bodies such as the Authority and the Tribunal occupy a position comparable to that of other tribunals whose decisions are challenged; they do not engage in the merits of the dispute and therefore do not normally require counsel to argue on their behalf. Accordingly, the Court found the appearance of lawyers for respondents 2 and 3 to be unnecessary and, in some respects, inappropriate. For this reason, the Court directed that respondents 2 and 3 shall each bear their own costs. The direction was pronounced by Justice Subba Rao.

Justice Subba Rao subsequently noted that he had carefully reviewed the judgment authored by his colleague, Justice Gajendragadkar, and that he was unable to concur with the conclusions reached therein. He proceeded to set out the factual background of the matter, describing it as limited in scope. The State Transport Authority of Madras had issued a public invitation for applications for the grant of two‑stage carriage permits on the specific route connecting Madras and Chidambaram. A total of one hundred and seven applications were received in response to this invitation, and among the applicants were the present appellant and the first respondent. The Authority subsequently awarded one of the permits to Provincial Transport (Private) Limited, Madras; the present proceedings do not concern that particular permit. Regarding the second permit, the Authority determined that none of the applicants satisfied the criteria for award and therefore declined to grant the permit to any of them, directing that fresh applications be called for. In reaction to that refusal, the appellant, the first respondent and several other concerned parties filed appeals before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. Within the Tribunal’s records, the appellant was designated as respondent 16, while the first respondent was designated as appellant 7. The Tribunal’s assessment scheme, sanctioned by the State Government, allocated marks across columns one to five. Under this scheme, the first respondent achieved the highest aggregate score of seven and a half marks, whereas the appellant obtained only four and a half marks. Despite the superior score obtained by the first respondent, the Tribunal rejected his claim on the basis that his workshop and place of business were located at Cuddalore, an intermediate point on the route, rather than at either of the two termini. Excluding the first respondent from consideration, the Tribunal evaluated the remaining applications and, for reasons detailed in its order, preferred the appellant in a contest that also involved appellant 14. The principal factor influencing this preference was the location of the appellant’s workshop at the headquarters in Madras. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the application of the first respondent and granted the carriage permit to the appellant. Dissatisfied with that outcome, the first respondent instituted a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Madras High Court, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the Tribunal’s order.

The first respondent filed a writ of certiorari seeking to set aside the order issued by the Appellate Tribunal. The petition was heard by the learned judge, Srinivasan J., who decided to quash the Tribunal’s order. In reaching that conclusion, the judge held that the Tribunal had failed to consider a material and relevant circumstance that was essential to its enquiry, namely, that the petitioner possessed the necessary repair and maintenance facilities at Chidambaram, which was one of the termini of the route that was under consideration. On that basis, the learned judge set aside the Tribunal’s decision. The matter was then taken up on a Letters Patent Appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court comprised of Chief Justice Ramachandra Iyer and Justice Venkataraman. That bench observed that the learned judge should not have expressed an opinion on whether the first respondent actually had the facilities at Chidambaram. Nevertheless, the bench agreed with the lower judge that the Appellate Tribunal had overlooked the respondent’s claim that he maintained such facilities at Chidambaram. Consequently, the appeal was permitted.

Counsel appearing for the appellant, identified as Mr Setalvad, argued that the Appellate Tribunal had examined the material before it and had found that the first respondent did not possess the required facilities at the terminal. Accordingly, counsel contended that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the Tribunal’s factual finding. On the other hand, counsel for the first respondent, identified as Mr Pathak, submitted that the respondent had clearly stated in a letter dated 11 July 1956 to the Transport Authority that he did possess the necessary facilities. Counsel submitted that both the State Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had ignored this material circumstance, which was directly relevant to the public‑interest considerations under section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. For that reason, counsel argued, the High Court was correct in quashing the Tribunal’s order under Article 226 of the Constitution and in directing the Tribunal to decide the appeal on its merits. As an alternative submission, counsel stated that even if there existed some material on which the Tribunal might have concluded that the respondent lacked such facilities, the three learned High Court judges, having considered the admissions and the material before them, found that the Tribunal had not decided that issue. Instead, the judges merely gave the Tribunal an additional opportunity to determine the appeal on its merits, and therefore it was not a suitable case for the Supreme Court to interfere with under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The Court noted that the first respondent possessed a fundamental right to engage in the transport business. The Motor Vehicles Act imposes reasonable restrictions on that right in the public interest. Section 47 of that Act requires the Regional Transport Authority, when evaluating an application for a stage‑carriage permit, to take into account, among other things, the general interests of the public. The Court observed that the fact that the first respondent either owned a separate workshop or, at a minimum, had the necessary repair and maintenance facilities at one of the termini of the route—specifically at Chidambaram—was unquestionably a factor that bore directly on the public‑interest considerations prescribed by the statute.

In this case the Court observed that the presence of a workshop or repair facility at one of the termini of a transport route is a factor that directly relates to the public‑interest consideration required under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Government’s marking system also acknowledges the importance of such facilities at either end of the route. The Court explained that if the first respondent had presented this circumstance to the authorities when seeking a permit and the authorities had either ignored it or failed to investigate it, the High Court would have had jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to set aside the authorities’ order. The High Court could have required the authorities to determine whether the respondent’s claim was true and, if it was true, to take it into account before granting a permit to any of the applicants. In that situation the High Court would not have been overturning the factual findings reached by the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of the material before it; rather, it would have been quashing the order because an important and material circumstance had been neglected or left uninvestigated. The Court further held that when a Tribunal disregards or fails to investigate a material circumstance raised by a claimant and then rules against that claimant, the finding is tainted by an error of law that is apparent on the face of the record.

The Court then turned to the specific facts of the present dispute. The State Transport Authority was evaluating competing applications from one hundred and seven persons for two permits, and it rendered its decision on 8 May 1957. The first respondent had filed his application for a permit on 11 July 1956 and, on the same day, had sent a letter to the Authority stating that “Chidambaram is one of the termini of this proposed route. A separate office and workshop are located at Chidambaram in order to maintain the service efficiently and without any breakdown or whatsoever.” None of the numerous applicants expressly denied the respondent’s claim that he possessed a separate office and workshop at Chidambaram. That claim was acknowledged before Justice Srinivasan, although the judge’s wording placed the concession slightly higher than the respondent had actually made. The appellant’s counsel did not retract this limited concession before the Division Bench. The only objection came from applicant No. 43‑D, identified as Kanniah Pillai, who in his application wrote: “The applicant Nos. 43, 57, 69, 78 and 81 are residents of Chidambaram but No. 57 is a fleet owner. Nos. 69 and 78 have no workshop. No. 81 is a new entrant. The rest all are far away from the headquarters having no workshop at Chidambaram.” Apart from this vague, implied denial by Kanniah Pillai, the record contains no indication that any other applicant contested the respondent’s claim. Consequently, the appellant never, at any stage of the proceedings, refuted the first respondent’s assertion that he maintained a workshop at Chidambaram. With this background, the Court proceeded to examine the order of the State Transport Authority.

In the order issued by the State Transport Authority, the Authority had disregarded the letter submitted by the first respondent in which he asserted that his workshop was situated at Chidambaram. Instead, the Authority incorporated an omnibus provision that characterised the first respondent and several other applicants as residents located either in the middle of the route or off the route altogether, and described them as not being as well positioned as an applicant who possessed facilities at one end of the route with all the necessary amenities. This language was effectively an implicit finding adverse to the first respondent, a finding which the first respondent protested on the ground that it was rendered in utter disregard of his explicit claim. The Appellate Tribunal, in its order disposing of the eighteen appeals before it, reiterated a similar conclusion. It observed that the first respondent, who had obtained the highest aggregate of marks—including those recorded in column 1 of the mark list—maintained his workshop and place of business at Cuddalore, a location that lay along the route, and not at either terminus of the route. That observation also ignored the first respondent’s claim that his workshop was located at Chidambaram, which was one of the termini, and ignored the fact that, apart from one applicant, the other respondents had not contested that claim. Accordingly, the High Court, after examining the material placed before it, held that both the State Transport Authority and the Appellate Tribunal had failed to take into account the specific claim made by the first respondent regarding his workshop at Chidambaram. On that basis, the High Court correctly set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal, directing that the Tribunal reconsider the first respondent’s claim. The Court found no flaw in the High Court’s reasoning and concluded that the High Court had not exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Mr Setalvad, however, argued that the Tribunal had in fact considered material that supported its finding. He relied upon an extract from a report prepared by the Regional Transport Authority of South Arcot and dated 31 January 1957. That report, which had been forwarded by the Regional Authority to the State Transport Authority, contained an entry under column 4, headed “possession of workshop or repair or maintenance facilities and its location,” stating that the first respondent was “maintaining a workshop at per G.O. at Cuddalore.” A subsequent report sent by the State Transport Authority to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal listed, under column 8 titled “Place of residence or principal place of business and the nearest distance,” the entry “Cuddalore – on the route” for the first respondent. The information in the State Transport Authority’s report appeared to have been derived from the earlier Regional Authority report. In addition, reliance was placed on a letter dated 10 January 1957, addressed by the first respondent to the Secretary of the State Transport Authority, in support of his contention that, even though on 11 July…

In 1956 the first respondent asserted that he maintained a workshop at Chidambaram, although that specific statement was absent from the letter dated 10 January 1957. A careful reading of the same letter, however, revealed that the respondent did acknowledge possessing the requisite sector and terminal qualifications. Relying on these documents, the appellant argued that material existed which could have enabled the Appellate Tribunal to reach the conclusion it actually adopted, namely that the first respondent possessed no workshop at either terminus of the route. The Court examined this contention in three respects. First, the Tribunal had not expressly cited any of the documents to support its finding that the respondent lacked a workshop at Chidambaram. Second, the appellant had not introduced these documents before Srinivasan J. or before the Division Bench to demonstrate that the Tribunal’s decision was based on them. Third, the letter from the respondent failed to bolster the claim that he had no workshop, and the two transport authority reports made no such statement either. Moreover, the officials who prepared the reports did not conduct any inquiry to verify whether the respondent actually operated a workshop at Chidambaram, despite his claim. Consequently, there was no evidential basis to contradict the respondent’s assertion, which explains why the appellant omitted the documents when appearing before the High Court in support of his argument that the State Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal possessed material indicating the absence of a workshop at Chidambaram. A review of the two orders showed that, amid a multitude of applications, the specific claim of the respondent had been entirely overlooked by both the Transport Authority and the Tribunal. This omission amounted to a finding rendered without any supporting evidence and in disregard of a particular claim presented before the Tribunal. Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court was correct in setting aside the Tribunal’s order.

The subsequent issue was whether the present case warranted interference under Article 136 of the Constitution, invoking the Supreme Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction. The Court noted that Srinivasan J. and, on appeal, the Division Bench, after considering the material placed before them and the concession made, concluded that the Tribunal had indeed ignored the respondent’s specific claim. The first respondent had achieved the highest tally of marks, and if his claim were proven, it would inevitably shift the decision in his favor. The material presented to the Supreme Court had not been relied upon by the appellant during the High Court proceedings. The High Court, recognising this deficiency, afforded the Tribunal an additional opportunity to re‑examine the respondent’s claim. Although the High Court ultimately quashed the Tribunal’s order, its judgment explicitly indicated that the Tribunal retained the authority to reconsider the matter. Furthermore, counsel for the first respondent conceded that further examination of the claim was appropriate, underscoring the Court’s view that the matter did not merit the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction to overturn the High Court’s decision.

The Court observed that the appellant possessed ample opportunity to demonstrate that the first respondent did not maintain a workshop at Chidambaram. Rather than proceeding on the direct and proper path to ascertain the truth, the appellant appeared to seek to prevent any further investigation that might reveal the factual circumstances. In the Court’s assessment, the matter did not warrant the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 to overturn the High Court’s order, as the appellant’s conduct did not create a sufficient ground for such intervention.

Consequently, the Court determined that the appeal could not succeed and therefore dismissed it, ordering that the costs of the first respondent be borne by the appellant. The Court’s final order, consistent with the majority’s view, declared that the appeal was allowed and that the writ petition filed by Respondent No 1 was dismissed. The order further required Respondent No 1 to pay the costs incurred by the appellant before this Court, while Respondents 2 and 3 were each directed to bear their own costs.