State of Uttar Pradesh vs Jogendra Singh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 301 of 1961

Decision Date: 4 March 1963

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah

The case titled State of Uttar Pradesh versus Jogendra Singh was decided on 4 March 1963 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, who was joined by Justices M. Hidayatullah and J. C. Shah. The parties were the State of Uttar Pradesh as petitioner and Jogendra Singh as respondent. The official citation of the decision is 1963 AIR 1618, and it also appears in the Supreme Court Reports as 1964 SCR (2) 197. Subsequent citator references include F 1977 SC 740 (10), F 1977 SC 1516 (2), and RF 1992 SC 320 (47). The dispute concerned the interpretation of the term “may” in Rule 4(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947, in the context of disciplinary proceedings against a public servant. The headnote summarised the factual background: Jogendra Singh had been appointed as a Naib Tehsildar in 1937. On 4 August 1952 he was suspended following complaints and the matter was referred to the Administrative Tribunal under the Rules. While the Tribunal’s inquiry was pending, further complaints were received, and the State communicated these to the Tribunal, indicating an intention to forward additional charges. The Tribunal, without waiting for the new charges, concluded its inquiry in August 1952 and exonerated Singh of the original charges. Subsequently, on 28 October 1956 Singh was again suspended, this time on the basis of the additional complaints. He submitted an explanation and requested that the inquiry be conducted by the Administrative Tribunal as prescribed by the Rules; the State rejected this request and directed the Commissioner to conduct disciplinary proceedings. The Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, entertained Singh’s writ petition and set aside the order that had directed the inquiry to be held under Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules. The principal question before the Supreme Court was whether the word “may” in sub‑rule 4(2) conferred discretion on the Governor, similar to the discretion indicated by “may” in sub‑rule 4(1), or whether “may” in sub‑rule 4(2) should be read as “shall” or “must”. The Court held that interpreting “may” in sub‑rule 4(2) in the same discretionary manner as in sub‑rule 4(1) would defeat the purpose of the rule. The plain and unambiguous intent of Rule 4(2) was to provide an option for gazetted government servants to request that the Governor refer their cases to the Tribunal. Consequently, Rule 4(2) imposes an obligation on the Governor to grant such a request. Because Singh’s request for referral to the Tribunal had not been granted, the Court concluded that the appeal must fail. The judgment was delivered under the civil appellate jurisdiction, being Civil Appeal No. 301 of 1961, which arose from the Allahabad High Court’s judgment and order dated 10 March 1960 in Special Appeal No. 40 of 1959. Counsel for the appellant were K. S. Hajela and C. P. Lal.

Counsel for the respondent, L. Gosain and Naunit Lal, appeared before the Court on 4 March 1963. The judgment concerning this appeal was delivered by Justice Gajendragadkar, who presided over the proceedings on the date of the hearing. The principal legal issue in the appeal concerned the interpretation of Rule 4 (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Rules. The factual background began with the appointment of Jogendra Singh as Naib Tehsildar by the State of Uttar Pradesh in 1937. On 4 August 1952, the State received complaints against Singh, leading to his suspension and the commencement of an inquiry into the allegations. Charges were subsequently framed against him and his matter was referred to the Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Rules for investigation. The Tribunal conducted an inquiry and, in August 1953, cleared Singh of the charges that had been framed. While the Tribunal’s inquiry was ongoing, the State obtained further complaints concerning Singh’s conduct and forwarded these additional allegations to the Tribunal, indicating an intention to submit the new charges for inquiry. The Tribunal, however, did not await the receipt of the new charges because the government directed it to continue with the existing charge, and the Tribunal consequently concluded its inquiry. As a result, Singh was again suspended on 28 October 1955, and the additional charges were formally framed and delivered to him on 29 October 1956. On 12 November 1956, Singh responded by submitting his explanation and requested that if the State wished to pursue an inquiry on the charges, the matter be referred to the Administrative Tribunal under the Rules. On 28 June 1958, the Deputy Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh Board of Revenue informed Singh that the State had assigned his case to the Commissioner of Gorakhpur Division, directing him to conduct disciplinary proceedings. The communication also stated that Singh’s request to have the charges investigated by the Administrative Tribunal was denied. Consequently, Singh filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court on 14 July 1958, seeking a writ, a direction, or any appropriate order to quash the disciplinary proceedings that the State intended to conduct. The petition further requested that the inquiry be held before the enquiring officer appointed under Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. The single judge hearing the petition held that, because Singh was a gazetted officer, the State was obligated to honor his request that the inquiry be conducted by the Administrative Tribunal established under the Rules. Accordingly, the judge allowed the writ petition and set aside the order directing the inquiry to proceed under Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules. The State appealed the judgment by invoking the provisions of the Letters Patent governing appeals from decisions of the High Court.

The appeal was placed before a Division Bench of the High Court, which affirmed the judgment of the single judge and dismissed the appellant’s challenge. After the dismissal, the appellant sought and secured a certificate from that High Court, and it is on the basis of that certificate that the matter reached the Supreme Court. Counsel for the appellant argued that the conclusions reached by the lower courts were not supported by a proper and reasonable interpretation of Rule 4(2) of the Civil Services Rules. The appellant’s position was that, under the law of Uttar Pradesh, the Governor possesses the authority to order that disciplinary proceedings against officers identified in Rule 4 be conducted before an administrative officer, but the Governor is not compelled to do so. The Governor may, if he chooses, direct that the enquiry be conducted under Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules and be handled by an appropriate authority appointed for that purpose. Accordingly, the decision as to whether the enquiry should be before the Administrative Tribunal or before another appropriate authority rests entirely within the Governor’s discretionary power. In contrast, the High Court held that, with respect to gazetted government servants, Rule 4(2) applies and, when read fairly, it obliges the Governor to accede to a request by a gazetted servant that the enquiry be conducted by the Administrative Tribunal. The precise issue before this Court, therefore, is to determine which of these two interpretations correctly reflects the effect of Rule 4(2). Rule 4 is drafted as follows: “4. (1) The Governor may refer to the Tribunal cases relating to an individual government servant or class of government servants or government servants in a particular area only in respect of matters involving: (a) corruption; (b) failure to discharge duties properly; (c) irremediable general inefficiency in a public servant of more than ten years’ standing; and (d) personal immorality. (2) The Governor may, in respect of a gazetted government servant on his own request, refer his case to the Tribunal in respect of matters referred to in sub‑rule (1).” It is evident that sub‑rule (1) grants the Governor discretion to refer cases fitting the categories listed in clauses (a) through (d) to the Tribunal for the classes of servants specified in the first part of that sub‑rule. In such instances, the concerned servant cannot claim a right to prevent the enquiry from being held before the Tribunal; the matter is to be decided solely by the Governor’s discretion. Moreover, gazetted government servants fall within the categories covered by sub‑rule (1); therefore, if sub‑rule (1) operated alone, gazetted servants would likewise have no entitlement to dictate the forum of their enquiry. The question, then, is whether sub‑rule (2) merely repeats the discretionary language of sub‑rule (1) or transforms it into a mandatory duty for the Governor to refer a gazetted servant’s case to the Tribunal upon request.

In this case, the Court observed that gazetted government servants cannot claim that an enquiry against them must not be held by a Tribunal. The Court then turned to rule 4(2), which specifically addresses gazetted government servants. Rule 4(2) provides these servants with the right to submit a request to the Governor for their case to be referred to the Tribunal when the matters fall within clauses (a) to (d) of sub‑rule (1). The Court framed the principal issue as whether the word “may” in rule 4(2) confers discretion on the Governor, as it does in rule 4(1), or whether the same word in rule 4(2) actually operates as “shall” or “must”. While it is generally accepted that “may” does not impose an obligation, the Court noted that the meaning of “may” can change depending on the context. When a statute couples a discretionary term with an obligation, the term “may” must be read as a command. The Court explained that legislatures sometimes use “may” out of respect for the stature of the authority that is to receive the power and duty. In the present circumstance, the Court held that the context determines the meaning. If “may” in rule 4(2) were given the same meaning as in rule 4(1), the purpose of rule 4(2) would be defeated. The Court pointed out that the Governor already possessed discretionary power to refer cases of gazetted servants to the Tribunal under rule 4(1). Therefore, rule 4(2) was introduced as a distinct provision to give gazetted servants an option to request that their cases be dealt with by a Tribunal. The Court described this provision as necessary and not redundant, because without it the special right for gazetted servants would be absent. The plain and unambiguous object of rule 4(2), the Court said, is to allow gazetted servants to ask the Governor to refer their cases to a Tribunal rather than to any other forum. The legislature presumably intended this because of the higher status of gazetted servants.

The Court then affirmed the reasoning of the High Court that rule 4(2) creates a mandatory obligation on the Governor to accede to a request submitted by a gazetted government servant for the referral of his case to the Tribunal as prescribed by the Rules. The Court observed that the respondent had indeed lodged such a request, but the Governor had failed to grant it. Because the statutory duty to refer the case had not been fulfilled, the High Court was justified in setting aside, or quashing, the proceedings that the appellant had proposed to pursue against the respondent through a mechanism other than a Tribunal. The Court expressed that there was no difficulty in accepting this conclusion. The Court further noted that the failure to refer the matter to the Tribunal was contrary to the clear legislative intent embodied in rule 4(2). By upholding the High Court’s decision, the Court reinforced the principle that statutory duties cannot be ignored by the Governor. Consequently, the Court held that the appeal was untenable and therefore must fail. In the final order, the Court directed that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. The dismissal of the appeal with costs reflects the Court’s view that the appellant’s challenge was without merit.