State of Uttar Pradesh vs Bhagwant Kishore Joshi

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 171 of 1961

Decision Date: 17 April 1963

Coram: Subba Rao, Dayal, Mudholkar

The case titled State of Uttar Pradesh versus Bhagwant Kishore Joshi was decided by the Supreme Court of India on the seventeenth day of April, 1963. The bench that heard the matter consisted of Justices Subbarao, K. Dayal, Raghubar, Mudholkar and J.R. The judgment is reported in the 1964 All India Reporter at page 221 and in the 1964 Supreme Court Reporter (Third Series) at page 71, and it has been cited in several subsequent decisions, including R. 1968 SC 1292, E&R 1970 SC 1396, R. 1984 SC 718, RF 1991 SC 1260 and AFR 1992 SC 604. The statutory provisions relevant to the dispute were section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947 (the Act) together with sections 4(1), 154 and 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

The respondent, Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, was employed as a booking clerk. He was alleged to have committed a criminal breach of trust involving the amount of forty‑nine thousand one hundred rupees. Upon receipt of this information, the Superintendent of Police directed a Sub‑Inspector, identified as M, to conduct an enquiry. M verified the allegations by examining the pertinent railway records and, on the basis of the material collected, submitted a report. This initial stage of investigation was carried out without first obtaining an order from a first‑class Magistrate, which is a requirement imposed by section 5A of the Act. Subsequently, M obtained the necessary permission from a first‑class Magistrate as prescribed by the Act and proceeded with further investigation, after which a charge‑sheet was filed. The respondent was tried before a Special Judge and was convicted under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The respondent appealed the conviction, and the High Court set aside the conviction. The High Court’s principal ground for doing so was that the initial stage of investigation conducted by M, being without the Magistrate’s order, contravened section 5A of the Act and that this breach had seriously prejudiced the accused. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the first stage of investigation fell within the meaning of “investigation” under section 4(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court observed that M, through the report, had received detailed information about the alleged offence, had proceeded to the place of the alleged offence, had ascertained the relevant facts by scrutinising the railway records and had submitted his findings. These steps, the Court held, constituted an investigation within the meaning of section 4(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore the failure to obtain prior Magistrate approval was a breach of section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court further noted that M later corrected the procedural defect by obtaining the required Magistrate’s permission, thereby effectively conducting a fresh, or de novo, investigation into the matter.

The Court emphasized that the Code of Criminal Procedure must be strictly complied with, but observed that the accused had not suffered any prejudice as a result of the illegality committed by the police during the initial stage of investigation. It held that an accused’s conviction could not be set aside merely because of some irregularity or illegality in the investigative process; rather, there must be a sufficient link—either established or inferred—between the conviction and the alleged irregularity. To support this proposition, the Court relied on the authority of H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. State at Delhi, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1150, and also referred to In re Nanumuri Anandayya, A.I.R. 1915 Mad. 312, In re Rangarajulu, A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 368, and The State Kerala v. M., Samuel I.L.R. 1960 Kerala 783. Justice Mudholkar further explained that, upon close examination, no defect or irregularity could be found in the conduct of the first stage of investigation. He clarified that, in substance, investigation means the collection of evidence relating to the commission of an offence for the purpose of establishing an accusation against the offender. He added that a police officer is permitted to conduct a preliminary enquiry to ascertain the correctness of the information received, and such a preliminary enquiry does not amount to the collection of evidence and therefore cannot be characterised as an investigation. This view was again supported by the earlier citation of H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. State of Delhi, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1150.

The appeal arose under criminal appellate jurisdiction as Criminal Appeal No. 171 of 1961, filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated 30 January 1960 of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, in Criminal Appeal No. 643 of 1960. Counsel for the appellant included R.L. Mehta, G.C. Mathur and C.P. Lal, while counsel for the respondent was T.R. Bhasin. The appeal was heard on 17 April 1963. The judgment of Justices Subba Rao and Dayal was delivered by Subba Rao J., and Justice Mudholkar rendered a separate judgment. Subba Rao J. noted that the appeal by special leave challenged the High Court’s decision to set aside the conviction of the Special Judge (West), Lucknow, who had convicted the respondent and sentenced him to one year’s rigorous imprisonment under section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, No. II of 1947. The prosecution’s case was summarised as follows: the respondent, employed as a booking clerk at Saharanpur during 1955‑56, was alleged to have committed a breach of trust involving a sum of Rs. 49,110 between 22 October 1955 and 26 May 1956. On the basis of these allegations, the accused was tried before the Special Judge on charges under section 5 (1) (c) read with section 5 (2) of the Act. The Special Judge examined a voluminous record comprising 124 documents and the testimony of 20 witnesses. The accused admitted that he had received the amounts specified by the prosecution but contended that he lacked dishonest intention and that any shortfall was the result of inadvertence and oversight. After considering the entire evidence, the Special Judge concluded that the prosecution had established that the accused had misappropriated the amounts entrusted to him as a public servant, and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as recorded.

The accused asserted before the Special Judge that the inquiry into the case had been carried out by Sub‑Inspector Mathur, who, according to the applicable law, lacked the authority to investigate because he ranked below a Deputy Superintendent, and therefore the trial should be considered void. The Special Judge examined the claim and concluded that Sub‑Inspector Mathur had not undertaken any investigative activity before securing the required permission from the appropriate authority. Moreover, the Judge observed that even assuming an investigation had been conducted, the record did not demonstrate that the accused suffered any prejudice as a result of that inquiry. Accordingly, the Special Judge found the accused guilty and imposed the sentence previously described. The accused appealed this judgment, and the High Court set aside the conviction. The High Court based its decision principally on the finding that Sub‑Inspector Mathur had initiated an “investigation” prior to obtaining the permission of the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Lucknow, and that such an act breached the provisions of the Act, thereby causing serious prejudice to the accused. In addition, the High Court remarked, without extensive analysis, that it was inclined to believe the prosecution had failed to eliminate the reasonable possibility that the defence of the accused might be correct. For these reasons, the High Court nullified the conviction and ordered an acquittal. The State, dissatisfied with that outcome, filed the present appeal against the High Court’s judgment. The sole question presented to this Court was whether the High Court was correct in acquitting the accused on the ground that the investigation undertaken by Sub‑Inspector Mathur before obtaining the Magistrate’s permission vitiated the entire trial.

Counsel for the State argued that Sub‑Inspector Mathur had merely conducted a preliminary enquiry to verify the veracity of the information received, and only after securing the requisite permission from the Magistrate did he proceed with a full investigation of the alleged offence; consequently, there was neither illegality nor irregularity in the investigative process. The State’s counsel further maintained that the High Court erred in setting aside the conviction without first assessing whether any alleged irregularity, if it existed, had actually prejudiced the accused. Conversely, counsel for the accused contended that the investigation had been carried out in flagrant disregard of the safeguards prescribed by the Legislature, and therefore the Court should, without requiring additional proof, presume that the accused had suffered prejudice. Before adjudicating these competing arguments, it is necessary to recapitulate the alleged irregularity in the prosecution’s investigative conduct. On 26 April 1956, A.N. Khanna, who served as the Railway Sectional Officer of the Special Police Establishment in Lucknow, dispatched a report to the Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment. In that report, Khanna stated that he had received information from a source indicating that the accused habitually misappropriated Government funds, enumerated seven specific instances of such misappropriation, and warned that a proper investigation would likely uncover many additional cases of illicit appropriation.

Mathur, who was a Sub‑Inspector of Police in the Special Police Establishment, testified that after receiving the report from the Railway Sectional Officer, the Superintendent of Police directed him to conduct an enquiry. Acting on that direction, Mathur examined the railway records, verified that the information contained in the report was accurate, and prepared a written report based on his findings. On 8 October 1956, after submitting this report, Mathur applied to the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) of Lucknow seeking formal permission to investigate the matter further. The magistrate granted the permission on 19 October 1956. Subsequent to receiving the magistrate’s approval, Mathur proceeded with a more extensive investigation. He seized relevant documents, recorded statements from witnesses, and, after completing these investigative steps, filed a charge‑sheet against the accused. The sequence of events therefore comprised an initial enquiry ordered by the superintendent, a verification of the allegations, a request for judicial sanction, the granting of that sanction, and the performance of investigative actions culminating in the filing of charges.

The central issue that arose was whether the enquiry conducted by Mathur before obtaining the magistrate’s permission qualified as “investigation” within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 of the Code prescribes the manner in which an officer in charge of a police station must record information, whether oral or written, concerning the commission of a cognizable offence. Section 156 authorises such an officer to investigate any cognizable offence specified therein. Although in ordinary practice investigation follows the receipt of information, the law does not require the receipt of information as a prerequisite for investigation. Section 157, which outlines the procedure for investigation, permits the commencement of such inquiry either on the basis of information or otherwise. Hence the provisions make clear that a police‑station officer may initiate an investigation without waiting for external information. Moreover, Section 4(1) defines “investigation” as encompassing all proceedings under the Code for the collection of evidence carried out by a police‑officer or by any person, other than a magistrate, who has been authorised by a magistrate to do so. The Supreme Court, in H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi, described the investigative process prescribed under Chapter XIV of the Code as involving (i) proceeding to the spot, (ii) ascertaining the facts and circumstances of the case, (iii) discovering and arresting the suspected offender, (iv) collecting evidence, which includes examination of persons—including the accused—and reduction of statements to writing if the officer deems it fit, as well as searching places and seizing items necessary for the investigation and for production at trial, and (v) forming an opinion on whether the material gathered establishes a case to present the accused before a magistrate for trial, and, if so, filing a charge‑sheet under Section 173. The question therefore required determination as to whether Mathur’s actions prior to receiving the magistrate’s sanction satisfied the foregoing description of investigation under Section 4 of the Code.

In the evidence, Exhibit P‑113 of the Act shows that Khanna, who held the position of Railway Sectional Officer, obtained information from a source that the accused habitually misappropriated Government funds by failing to account for the proceeds of sales of blank paper and other tickets. The document further indicates that the information supplied to Khanna was not vague; rather, it contained specific details describing the acts of misappropriation that the accused had allegedly committed. On 26 April 1956, Khanna forwarded a report of this information to the Superintendent of Police of the Special Police Establishment in Lucknow, and in that report he warned that a proper inquiry could uncover many additional instances of misappropriation. After receiving Khanna’s report, the Superintendent assigned the matter to Mathur, who was a Sub‑Inspector of Police in the Special Police Establishment, Lucknow. In the capacity of witness PW‑20, Mathur narrated the steps he had taken following the receipt of Khanna’s report. He first verified the allegations contained in Khanna’s information, then, after obtaining permission from the Station Master, he inspected the relevant railway records and found that the information proved to be correct. Relying on the material he collected, Mathur submitted a report to his superiors; however, the report did not contain the full details of the enquiry, and no case diary was prepared in relation to the investigation. Moreover, the report itself is absent from the record. Consequently, it may be inferred that the Sub‑Inspector performed no more than the actions he described in his testimony. Nevertheless, the police officer had received detailed information concerning the alleged offence, including all necessary particulars; he proceeded to the place alleged to be the scene of the offence, ascertained the relevant facts by examining the railway records, and thereafter submitted a report of those acts. The Court held that these steps amount to an investigation as defined by section 4(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as explained in earlier judgments of this Court. The authorities cited by counsel for the State, who argued that no investigation had taken place, were considered misplaced. In the decision In re Nanumuri Anandayya, a division bench of the Madras High Court held that an informal enquiry based on a vague telegram did not constitute an investigation within the meaning of section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Likewise, in In re Rangarajulu, Justice Ramaswami of the Madras High Court identified three stages that a police officer must pass in a conspiracy case: first, hearing something of public security interest that puts him on alert; second, making discreet enquiries, taking soundings, and setting up informants, which represents a stage of “qui vive” or lookout; and third, gathering sufficient information that enables the officer to act on a definite matter, at which point the first information is recorded and the formal investigation commences. This graphic description underscores the Court’s view that the actions of the Sub‑Inspector satisfy the criteria of an investigation.

These stages merely restate the principle that vague information or an irresponsible rumor does not, by itself, constitute “information” as defined in section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor does it provide a basis for an investigation under section 157 of that Code. In The State of Kerala v. M.J. Samuel (1), a full bench of the Kerala High Court observed that “it can be stated as a general principle that it is not every piece of information however vague, indefinite and unauthenticated it may be that should be recorded as the First Information for the sole reason that such information was the first, in point of time, to be received by the police regarding the commission of an offence.” The same bench clarified that the determination of whether a statement qualifies as a First Information Report is a question of fact and must be decided based on the particular circumstances of each case. While those decisions were rendered in the context of deciding whether an item of information satisfies the requirements of section 154, they are of limited relevance to the issue of whether a police officer, in a given case, has conducted an investigation of a cognizable offence within the meaning of section 157. That enquiry depends on the nature of the information received and on the steps taken by the officer to ascertain the truth of the information and to detect the crime. In the present matter, the information relayed to the police was clear and precise. Acting upon that information, the Sub‑Inspector proceeded to the spot, examined the allegations, and carried out several crucial steps aimed at detecting the offence. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Sub‑Inspector had indeed investigated the offence prior to obtaining the requisite magistrate’s permission. Section 5A of the Act states: “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, no police officer below the rank—(c) elsewhere—of a Deputy Superintendent of Police shall investigate any offence punishable under section 161, section 165, or section 165A of the Indian Penal Code or under sub‑section (2) of section 5 of this Act, without the order of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class, as the case may be, or make any arrest therefore without a warrant.” It is evident from this provision that an officer who is junior to the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police cannot investigate an offence covered by the Act without first obtaining an order from a Magistrate of the First Class. The scope and rationale of this provision, together with related provisions, were examined by this Court in The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali (1), where it was noted that section 5A was inserted into the Act by

The Court noted that Section 5A of the Act had been inserted by Act 59 of 1952 with the purpose of protecting public servants against harassment and victimisation, as reported in the 1959 supplementary law reports at page 201. It further observed that the statutory safeguards provided in the Act were intended to be strictly observed because they were enacted in the public interest and served as a guarantee against frivolous and vexatious prosecutions. The Court explained the rationale for the rule, quoting the discussion at page 208: “While in the case of an officer of assured status and rank, the legislature was prepared to believe him implicitly, it prescribed an additional guarantee in the case of police officers below that rank, namely, the previous order of a presidency magistrate or a magistrate of the first class, as the case may be. The magistrate’s status gives assurance to the bona‑fide of the investigation.”

Having set out the statutory framework, the Court turned to the facts of the present matter. It observed that, contrary to the clear express provisions of the statute, the Sub‑Inspector had begun investigating the alleged offence committed by a public servant without first obtaining the order of a First Class magistrate. The Court expressed its hope that investigations under the Act would be conducted in strict compliance with its provisions, but it recorded that in the present case the police officer realised his duty only after having made an initial enquiry. He subsequently sought to rectify the defect. After verifying the railway records in light of the information he had received, he registered the case and, on 8 October 1956, applied to the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Lucknow, for permission to investigate the offence. In that application he stated that no Deputy Superintendent of Police was posted for the Lucknow branch of the Special Police Establishment. The Superintendent of Police, in forwarding the application, endorsed this statement and further explained that he was occupied with supervising other important cases and with administrative duties. On 19 October 1956, the magistrate, relying on the facts set out in the application, granted the Sub‑Inspector the necessary permission to investigate.

Following the grant of permission, the Sub‑Inspector conducted a detailed investigation. He recorded statements of witnesses, seized the relevant documents, obtained further investigation where necessary through other branches of the Special Police Establishment, and subsequently submitted a charge‑sheet. The Court noted that, after obtaining the magistrate’s order, the Sub‑Inspector essentially commenced a fresh investigation that conformed with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that no submission was made pointing to any defect or contravention of the Code in the investigation after the permission had been given. The investigation concluded, and the accused was tried before the Special Judge. The prosecution examined twenty witnesses and produced one hundred twenty‑four exhibits, while the defence examined three witnesses. After a careful consideration of the entire evidence, the Special Judge concluded that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the accused. In these circumstances, the Court posed the question whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the conviction on the ground that the first stage of the investigation had been carried out contrary to the provisions of the Act.

In this case, the counsel for the respondent argued that a consistent disregard of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure during an investigation must, in almost every circumstance, prejudice the accused at trial. The counsel explained that allowing a police officer of rank below Deputy Superintendent of Police to conduct an investigation without the statutory safeguards would enable the officer to obtain information, obtain the required permission of the Magistrate, and then tailor the investigation to achieve a predetermined result or to implement a personal scheme. While acknowledging that such a practice, if it exists, must be condemned, the counsel queried whether a breach of the salutary provisions of the Act in the investigation alone would invalidate the trial. The counsel warned that adopting the broad proposition advanced by the learned counsel would amount to disregarding section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and would entail ignoring a substantial body of compelling evidence merely because of police dereliction of duty. The essential question, according to the counsel, was not whether the police had ignored the provisions of the Act while investigating, but whether the accused had suffered prejudice in his defence because of that disregard. Consequently, the accused must be able to raise a reasonable doubt that the prosecution evidence had been manipulated or shaped as a result of the investigative irregularity, or that the irregularity had prevented him from presenting his defence or adducing supporting evidence. However, where the prosecution evidence was held to be true and the accused was given a full opportunity to participate in the proceedings, the conviction could not be set aside solely on the basis of some irregularity or illegality in the investigation; there needed to be a sufficient nexus, either established or inferred, between the conviction and the investigative irregularity. The Court observed that, as previously noted, the trial had been fair and the evidence convincing, and that the earlier defect had been remedied by conducting a practically new investigation in strict compliance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the Court could not conclude that the accused had been prejudiced by the illegality committed by the police in the first stage of the investigation. The High Court had set aside the conviction on the ground that the first stage of the investigation breached the mandatory safeguards of the Act, but it had failed to consider whether that breach actually caused prejudice to the accused at trial. In doing so, the High Court had ignored the requirement of section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court first considered the requirements of section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After a careful review of the entire record, the Court concluded that the alleged procedural defect had not caused any prejudice to the accused. It observed that the accused had received a fair trial and had been afforded the opportunity to fully present his case. Consequently, the Court set aside the order of the High Court, upheld the conviction of the respondent under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and imposed a sentence of one year of rigorous imprisonment.

Justice Mudholkar, having examined the judgment prepared by Subba Rao, agreed that the appeal should be allowed and that the respondent, who had been employed as a booking clerk at Saharanpur during the relevant period, should be convicted and sentenced as previously proposed. He also affirmed the principle that a mere irregularity in the investigative process does not, by itself, warrant the setting aside of a conviction unless the court is satisfied that such irregularity has actually prejudiced the accused. While concurring with the overall conclusion, Justice Mudholkar expressed some difficulty in accepting the finding that a defect or irregularity in the investigation had occurred in this case. To address that point, he limited his discussion to those facts that directly bore on the question, noting that a full recitation of all facts was unnecessary because they were already detailed in the judgment of his senior colleague. The Court noted that the investigation was initiated after the Railway Sectional Officer of the Special Police Establishment in Lucknow received a tip from an undisclosed source indicating that the respondent habitually misappropriated government funds. Acting on that information, the Superintendent of Police of the Special Police Establishment directed Sub‑Inspector Mathur to verify the allegation. Sub‑Inspector Mathur proceeded to Saharanpur railway station, obtained permission from the appropriate authority, examined certain railway records, and submitted a report to his superior stating that the allegations appeared to be substantiated. Following this, he secured permission from the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) of Lucknow to investigate the matter under section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act and thereafter carried out the investigation. The High Court had held that Mathur’s actions prior to obtaining the formal permission constituted an investigation prohibited by section 5A, thereby vitiating the entire investigation and rendering the respondent’s conviction and sentence unsustainable. Justice Mudholkar referred to the decision in H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi, wherein the Supreme Court described the investigation process under the Code of Criminal Procedure as generally comprising (1) proceeding to the spot, (2) ascertaining the facts and circumstances, (3) discovering and arresting the suspected offender, and (4) collecting evidence relating to the commission of the offence, among other steps. He observed that the Court had not declared that undertaking merely one or two of these steps automatically amounted to a complete investigation, emphasizing that the essence of investigation lies in gathering evidence pertinent to the offence. Accordingly, Justice Mudholkar concluded that the actions taken by Sub‑Inspector Mathur fell within the permissible investigative scope and did not, in themselves, constitute a prohibited investigation under section 5A.

The Court explained that the steps enumerated in the cited definition of investigation include, first, the examination of various persons, including the accused, and, if the officer considers it appropriate, the reduction of their statements to writing; second, the search of places and the seizure of items deemed necessary for the investigation and intended to be produced at trial; third, the formation of an opinion, based on the material collected, as to whether there exists sufficient basis to present the accused before a Magistrate for trial; and fourth, the filing of a charge‑sheet under section 173 where such steps are deemed necessary.

The Court observed, however, that it has not been held that the performance of merely one or two of the enumerated steps automatically constitutes an investigation. In substance, investigation means the collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence. For that purpose, the investigating officer is authorized to question persons whom he believes can shed light on the offence, to question the suspect, and to reduce the statements obtained from those persons to writing. The officer is also empowered to search the place where the offence allegedly occurred and to search other locations with the objective of seizing articles connected with the offence.

The Court noted that, in order to carry out these duties, the officer must proceed to the spot where the offence was committed and must undertake various other necessary actions. Nevertheless, the essential aim of investigation is to bring the offence to the offender, and the core responsibilities of the investigating officer therefore include, apart from arresting the offender, the collection of all material required to establish the accusation against the offender.

The Court further clarified that merely making some preliminary enquiries after receiving information from an anonymous or unreliable source, for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of that information, does not amount to the collection of evidence and therefore cannot be characterized as investigation. In the absence of any express or implicit prohibition in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court expressed the opinion that a police officer may conduct preliminary enquiries before formally registering an offence and before undertaking a full‑scale investigation.

The Court recognized that section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act was enacted to prevent harassment of government servants. Accordingly, the Court noted that, with that purpose in mind, investigation without prior permission of a Magistrate is not permitted to be carried out by any officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. However, where a police officer conducts only limited preliminary enquiries, does not arrest or question an accused, and merely makes discreet enquiries or reviews documents without preparing notes, the Court found it difficult to envisage how such conduct could cause any harassment or embarrassment to the suspect or accused. Consequently, the Court questioned how the purpose of section 5A could be defeated when no harassment to the accused results from the officer’s actions.

In examining the question whether section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act applied to the conduct of the officer identified as Mathur, the Court carefully considered the factual material placed before it. The Court observed that the actions attributed to Mathur did not rise to the level of a formal investigation as understood under the statutory scheme. Because the conduct was deemed to be far short of an investigation, the Court concluded that the requirements of section 5A were not satisfied and consequently that no breach of that provision occurred. The Court further noted that the curative provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are intended to be invoked only where an irregularity or procedural defect has been established. Since the Court found no irregularity in Mathur’s conduct, it held that there was no occasion to resort to those curative mechanisms. Accordingly, the Court found no justification for setting aside the order that had been the subject of the appeal. On the basis of these findings, the Court allowed the appeal, thereby affirming the lower decision. The Court emphasized that its conclusion rested entirely on the evidence and submissions placed before it and did not rely on any conjecture.