State of Rajasthan vs Ram Saran
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: supreme-court
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 453 of 1962
Decision Date: 10 April, 1963
Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.C. Shah
The judgment titled “State of Rajasthan versus Ram Saran” was delivered on 10 April 1963 by a Bench of the Supreme Court of India consisting of Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and Justice J. C. Shah. The case is reported in 1964 AIR 1361 and 1964 SCR (2) 982. It arose under the provisions of the Police Act 1861 (V of 1861), sections 2 and 12, and the States Reorganisation Act 1956 (37 of 1956), sections 115, 116 and 117. The civil appeal is numbered 453 of 1962 and was filed by the State of Rajasthan against the respondent, Ram Saran.
Ram Saran was, at the material time, an officiating Sub‑Inspector of Police in the former Ajmer police force. Following the merger of Ajmer into the State of Rajasthan effected by the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, the respondent was appointed to the same officiating Sub‑Inspector post in Rajasthan. On 6 April 1957 the State Government ordered that he be reverted to his substantive rank of Head Constable. The respondent contested this reversion before the High Court.
The respondent advanced three principal contentions. First, he argued that the standing orders of the Ajmer Police Force, which he claimed were incorporated into his conditions of service, guaranteed him a right not to be reverted except according to the strict order of seniority. Second, he maintained that the reversion constituted an alteration of his conditions of service, an act which the State Government could not lawfully carry out without the prior sanction of the Central Government pursuant to section 115 (7) of the States Reorganisation Act. Third, he pleaded that a direction issued by the Central Government under section 117 of the same Act made the right to retain an officiating post without reversion a condition of his service.
The Court examined the nature of the standing orders and held that they were merely administrative instructions issued by the Inspector‑General of Police under section 12 of the Police Act, 1861. Such instructions did not rise to the level of conditions of service, which could be framed only by the State Government. Consequently, even if the order of reversion were inconsistent with the standing orders, it could not be deemed a violation of the respondent’s conditions of service.
Further, the Court observed that there is no condition of service stipulating that a holder of an officiating post is immune from reversion to his substantive post. Accordingly, the order of reversion did not amount to an alteration of conditions of service within the meaning of section 115 (7) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. The Court also found no evidence of any Central Government direction under section 117 that limited the State’s power to revert an officer from an officiating position.
Conversely, the Court noted that the State Government retained a specific power, under section II 6 (2) of the Police Act, to issue “any order affecting the continuance” of an officer in an officiating post or office. This power had not been curtailed by any Central Government direction. The Court therefore concluded that an officer does not possess a legal right to remain indefinitely in an officiating post and cannot claim protection from reversion except for proper reasons.
The judgment cited the earlier decision of Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, (1958) S.C.R. 828, as persuasive authority. In the final order, the Court held that the State Government’s action in reverting the respondent to his substantive rank was lawful and that no violation of the respondent’s conditions of service occurred.
In this matter, the Court considered an order dated 18 November 1960 issued by the Rajasthan High Court in D‑B Civil Writ No 264 of 1959. The appellant, the State of Rajasthan, was represented by counsel, while the respondent, Ram Saran, was represented by counsel for the respondent. The judgment was pronounced on 10 April 1963 and delivered by Justice Ayyangar. The State of Rajasthan filed the appeal under a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Rajasthan pursuant to article 133 (1)(c) of the Constitution, seeking to set aside a decision of the High Court that had allowed a petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution by the respondent.
Ram Saran had been appointed a Constable in the Ajmer district police force in 1947. Two years later, in 1949, he was promoted to the rank of Head Constable and his appointment to that rank was confirmed. On 29 June 1956, he received an appointment to officiate as a Sub‑Inspector. At that time, the State Reorganisation Act XXXVII of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) came into force on 1 November 1956. The Act provided that the former State of Ajmer would be merged with the State of Rajasthan, and consequently Ram Saran was transferred to the Rajasthan State Police Service. To give effect to the merger, a formal order appointing him as an officiating Sub‑Inspector in the Rajasthan police force was issued on the same day, 1 November 1956.
Subsequently, on 6 April 1957, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ajmer Range, issued an order reverting Ram Saran to his substantive post of Head Constable in the District Police Force. The respondent was dissatisfied with that order. He contended that the order was not a routine posting because, on that date, there were other officers holding the rank of officiating Sub‑Inspector who were junior to him and who continued to occupy those posts. He argued that his reversion amounted to a supersession of his rights. After making representations to the authorities without success, he filed a petition on 22 July 1959 under article 226 of the Constitution, seeking to quash the reversion order dated 6 April 1957 and to obtain a direction that he be restored to the rank of officiating Sub‑Inspector in accordance with his seniority. The State, the Inspector‑General of Police, and the Deputy Inspector‑General of Police were impleaded as respondents to the petition.
The High Court allowed the petition principally on the ground that the order of reversion violated the provisions of section 115 of the Act. The present appeal challenges the correctness of that decision. In order to appreciate the arguments raised, it is necessary to refer briefly to the statutory provisions on which the High Court’s judgment was based.
In this case the Court observed that the principal foundation of the High Court’s judgment lay in the statutory provisions set out in sections 115 to 117 of the Act, which are contained in Part X identified by the heading “Provisions as to Services”. The Court therefore reproduced those provisions in full for consideration. Section 115 reads as follows: “115. (1). Every person who immediately before the appointed day is serving in connection with the affairs of the Union under the administrative control of the Lieutenant Governor or Chief Commissioner in any of the existing States of Ajmer, Bhopal, Coorg, Kutch and Vindhya Pradesh, or is serving in connection with the affairs of any of the existing States of Mysore, Punjab, Patiala and East Punjab States Union and Saurashtra shall, as from that‑day, be deemed to have been allotted to serve in connection with the affairs of the successor State to that existing State. (5) The Central Government may by order establish one or more Advisory Committees for the purpose of assisting it in regard to‑ (a) the division and integration of the services among the new States and the States of Andhra Pradesh and Madras; and (b) the ensuring of fair and equitable treatment to all persons affected by the provisions of this section and the proper consideration of any representations made by such persons. (6) The foregoing provisions of this section shall not apply in relation to any person to whom the provisions of section 114 apply‑ (7) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect after the appointed day the operation of the provisions of Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution in relation to the determination of the conditions of service of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the Union or any State: Provided that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person referred to in sub‑section (1) or sub‑section (2) shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government.” Section 116 continues: “116. (1). Every person who immediately before the appointed day is holding or discharging the duties of any post or office in connection with the affairs… … of an existing State in any area…… shall be deemed as from that day to have been duly appointed to such post or office by the Government of, or other appropriate authority in, such State, or by the Central Government or other appropriate authority in such Part C State, as the case may be. (2). Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a competent authority, after the appointed day, from passing in relation to any such person any order affecting his continuance in such post or office.” Finally, section 117 provides: “117. The Central Government may at any time before or after the appointed day give such directions to any State Government as may appear to it to be necessary for the purpose of giving effect to the foregoing provisions of this part and the State Government shall comply with such directions.” After setting out these statutory excerpts, the Court indicated that before analysing them it would be expedient to set aside one particular matter.
It was observed that no suggestion had been made that the order of reversion represented a disciplinary punishment amounting to a reduction in rank and thereby attracting the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution. The respondent articulated three principal grievances before the Court. First, the respondent contended that the calculation of seniority for purposes of promotion and reversion was not carried out on the basis of a single, State‑wide seniority list. Instead, the seniority was determined separately for the Ajmer region and for the remaining parts of Rajasthan. Consequently, officers such as the respondent were being superseded by junior officers solely because the latter were posted in a different region. The petition referred in a vague manner to the maintenance of such regional seniority lists as being violative of the equality guarantee contained in Article 14. Second, the respondent argued that the reversion from the officiating post of Sub‑Inspector to the substantive post of Head Constable constituted an alteration in the conditions of his service. He claimed that the State Government lacked the authority to effect such a change without the sanction of the Central Government under section 115(7) of the Act, and that, moreover, a direction issued by the Central Government under section 117 of the Act had already established the right to retain an officiating post without being subjected to reversion as a condition of service. Third, even if section 115 alone did not constitute a condition of service, the respondent asserted that there existed a guaranteed right not to be reverted except in strict accordance with the order of junior‑seniority prescribed by the Standing Orders of the Police Force, which formed part of his conditions of service. He maintained that the reversion therefore violated section 115(7) of the Act. The Court found it appropriate to address these contentions in reverse order, beginning with the interpretation and legal effect of the Standing Order that had been relied upon by both the High Court judges and the counsel for the respondent.
The Court identified two distinct questions concerning the Standing Order. The first question concerned the proper interpretation of the provision, while the second question examined whether the provision would, in law, amount to a condition of service. The specific Standing Order in issue was numbered 46, issued by the Inspector General of Police, Ajmer, and dated 20 October 1949. The provision relied upon was paragraph 4(b) of that Order, which reads: “An officer who has secured officiating promotion on the basis of his place on the approved list should normally be considered for promotion earlier provided that he maintains an appropriate standard. If he fails to do so he …” The Court noted that this paragraph dealt with the criteria for considering an officer for confirmation of his promotion, rather than prescribing the order in which officers holding officiating posts could be reverted. Accordingly, the Court observed that, on its face, the language of the provision did not create a binding rule governing reversion, and therefore did not constitute a condition of service that could be invoked to prevent the respondent’s reversion.
The provision states that an officer who has obtained officiating promotion based on his position on the approved list should normally be considered for confirmation earlier, provided he maintains an appropriate standard. It adds that if the officer fails to maintain the standard, he may be reverted or his confirmation may be postponed. However, the provision also says that the officer should not be denied his claim to confirmation merely because another officer promoted later performed better. From this wording, the Court observed that the clause governs the order in which officers holding officiating posts may be considered for confirmation, not the sequence in which reversions must occur. Consequently, the literal language of the clause does not render the challenged reversion a breach of its terms. Even assuming that the spirit or purpose of the rule also intended to prescribe the order of reversions, the Court noted that the next question is whether the rule possesses any legal force as a condition of service. The effectiveness of the rule depends on whether the Standing Orders were issued by a competent authority under a statutory power to prescribe conditions of service. If the orders were merely administrative instructions issued by the Inspector General of Police for guiding his subordinates, they could not alter service conditions fixed by statute or competent statutory rules, nor could they create enforceable legal rights that a court could enforce for non‑observance.
To determine whether the Standing Orders had a statutory basis, the respondent relied upon sections 12 and 2 of the Police Act (V of 1861) as authorising the Inspector‑General of Police to issue such orders. Section 12, in the material words, permits the Inspector‑General, subject to State Government approval, to frame orders and rules that he deems expedient with respect to the organisation, classification and distribution of the police force, the residence of its members, and the particular services to be performed. The Court held that the orders and rules contemplated by this section relate only to organisational matters and do not extend to the determination of service conditions of recruited officers; the term “organisation” cannot be read to include conditions of service. Turning to section 2, the relevant part provides that, subject to the Act, the pay and all other conditions of service of members of the subordinate ranks shall be determined by the State Government. This provision makes clear that it is the State Government, not the Inspector‑General, that has the authority to frame rules regulating service conditions. Accordingly, the Standing Orders issued by the Inspector‑General under section 12 lack the statutory power to set conditions of service, and therefore cannot be treated as legally enforceable service conditions.
The Court observed that the Standing Orders relied upon by the respondent were not issued by the State Government, but were claimed to have been made solely under the authority of the Inspector General of Police. An argument was presented that the State Government might have delegated its rule‑making power to the Inspector General; however, the Court noted that such delegation is impossible without an explicit statutory provision. The respondent also pointed out that the Standing Orders were issued in October 1949, when the Constitution was not in force but section 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935 applied. The Court held that this circumstance did not benefit the respondent because section 243 merely provided that the conditions of service of subordinate police ranks would be determined by the Acts relating to those forces. Consequently, the matter returned to the provisions of section 2 of the Police Act, which vest the authority to frame conditions of service in the State Government, not in the Inspector General of Police. Accordingly, the Court concluded, with due respect to the learned High Court judges, that they erred in treating Standing Order 46 as a condition of service that had been violated by the order of reversion challenged in the respondent’s writ petition.
Setting aside Standing Order 46, the Court turned to sections 115 to 117 of the Act. The respondent had been in the service of Ajmer State as an officiating Sub‑Inspector of Police on the appointed day of 1 November 1956. By virtue of section 115(1), he was deemed to have been allocated to serve in connection with the affairs of Rajasthan State, and a formal appointment order dated the same day confirmed his position as an officiating Sub‑Inspector of Police. The Court found it unnecessary to examine sub‑section 5 of section 115, as it did not affect the outcome, despite its reference by counsel for the respondent. The decisive issue, the Court held, lay in the proviso to sub‑section 7, which guaranteed that the conditions of service in force before the appointed day could not be altered to the respondent’s disadvantage without prior approval of the Central Government. The question therefore was whether any condition of service applicable to an officer holding an officiating post required that he not be reverted to his substantive post.
Before addressing that question, the Court noted the relevance of sections 117 and 116(2). Section 117 was considered first because, if the Central Government issued a direction concerning a class of officers that was necessary for giving effect to this part of the Act, the State Government would be obligated to implement that direction, and the nature of such a direction—whether it constituted a condition of service—might fall outside judicial determination. The Court therefore indicated that the analysis of the proviso to sub‑section 7 must proceed in the context of these other statutory provisions.
In that letter, the author first referred to the proviso to sub‑section (7) of section 115 of the Act. The proviso stipulated that conditions of service applicable to persons described in sub‑section (1) could not be varied to their disadvantage except with the prior approval of the Central Government. After that reference, the letter inserted a paragraph dealing with officiating pay, which read as follows in the document: “2. (ii) officiating Pay When an officer had officiated continuously on a particular scale of pay or would have officiated on that scale but for his officiating appointment to a post on a higher scale or proceeding on leave or deputation for a minimum period of three years immediately before November 1, 1956, the pay on which he had so officiated should be protected as if it were pay and scale drawn in a substantive capacity.” The letter organized its subject matter into several parts, and the above paragraph appeared under the heading ‘Pay’. The direction was said to be contained in a letter dated March 27, 1957, which was addressed to the Chief Secretary of the Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur. The heading of the letter read ‘Protection of Service Conditions to be Afforded to State Service Personnel’, reflecting the Ministry’s intent to safeguard such conditions. The learned judges of the High Court had held that a Central Government direction existed, and that finding formed part of the basis on which they granted relief to the respondent. Counsel for the respondent vigorously advanced this argument before the Court, insisting that the alleged direction formed a binding condition of service for officers holding officiating appointments.
The respondent did not argue that the clause related to the question of reversion to a substantive post, thereby avoiding any direct reliance on that issue. Nor did it claim that it entitled him to the benefit because he had not served as Sub‑Inspector for three years prior to November 1, 1956. The argument advanced was that because officers holding merely officiating posts had been mentioned in the directive, the right to continue in that post became a service condition. Consequently, the argument asserted that no reversion could be ordered without the prior sanction of the Central Government. The Court found that the language of the direction could not be read as conferring a blanket prohibition on reversion without Central Government approval. The Court acknowledged that the clause might protect the pay of certain officers under section 117 of the Act. However, the Court held that beyond the protection of pay, the State Government’s authority was not intended to be curtailed by the proviso to sub‑section (7) of section 115.
In fact, the provisions of sub‑section (2) of section 116 expressly save the authority of a competent official to issue any order that affects the continuation of a person in a particular post or office. The remaining issue therefore concerns whether the right to occupy an officiating post constitutes a legal right and whether that right can be characterized as a condition of service that prevents a reversal to a substantive post except for proper reasons. The Court expressed the view that this matter has already been settled by its earlier decision in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (1). In that case, as in the present matter, an officer who had been appointed to an officiating position in Class II Service as an Assistant Superintendent of Railway Telegraphs was subsequently reverted to his substantive Class III appointment.
The principal question before the Court in the earlier case was whether the order of reversion was a punitive measure that would invoke the constitutional safeguard contained in Article 311(2). In addition, the Court had to examine whether an officer occupying an officiating post possessed any legal right to remain in that post. The citation of the case appears in the 1958 volume of the Supreme Court Reports at page 828. Chief Justice Das, speaking for the majority, observed: “The petitioner before us was appointed to a higher post on an officiating basis............... He had no right to continue in that post and under the general law the implied term of such appointment was that it was terminable at any time on reasonable notice by Government and therefore his reduction did not operate as a forfeiture of any right and cannot be described as reduction in rank by way of punishment.” The Court also referred to its own judgment in State of Bombay v. P. A. Abraham for further support.
If an officer does not possess a legal right to remain in an officiating post, the situation appears to be a condition of his service that permits the administration, for legitimate reasons, to revert him to his substantive position. Consequently, the Court found no basis for the argument that a mere reversion to a substantive post infringes upon the conditions of service. Accordingly, the Court reiterated that the proviso to sub‑section (7) of section 115, which the High Court had emphasized, offers no assistance to the respondent.
The reasoning outlined above formed the foundation of the High Court’s decision to allow the petition. The Court found that the High Court’s conclusion was erroneous and therefore allowed the present appeal. The Court then turned to the first of the points previously outlined, which the counsel for the respondent had vigorously emphasized. The respondent claimed that his petition alleged a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution because the selection of officers for promotion was not based on seniority of the officers, as set out in Civil Appeal 59 of 1961 (not yet reported) decided on 12 December 1961.
The petition alleged that the promotion and seniority of police officers were determined on a region‑wise basis rather than on a State‑wide basis, and that this method formed the core of the grievance. In support of this allegation, the petitioner drew the Court’s attention to section 2 of the Police Act 1861, which provides: “The entire police‑establishment under a State Government shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be one police‑force, and shall be formally enrolled; and shall consist of such number of officers and men, and shall be constituted in such manner as shall from time to time be ordered by the State Government.” The petitioner further pointed out that, in the counter‑affidavit filed by the State, the division of the State into regions and the consequent determination of seniority and promotion on a region‑wise footing, as distinguished from a State‑wide footing, were justified on the ground of administrative convenience. The learned judges, while addressing this aspect, made a brief observation that the system of region‑wise promotion appeared to generate inequality and hardship. However, the Court noted that the respondent’s plea on this point was articulated in a very vague manner, seeming primarily to buttress the principal allegations already advanced, rather than presenting an independent and distinct ground for challenging the constitutional validity of the promotion scheme.
Because the pleadings did not contain the specific facts and details necessary to either support or reject the contention, the Court could not decide the issue on the present record. Recognising this, counsel for the respondent urged that the matter be remitted to the High Court for a detailed examination of the alleged violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and of the constitutional validity of the region‑wise seniority lists prepared for promotion and reversion, allowing the parties to adduce further evidence. After careful consideration, the Court concluded that, as the pleadings stand, the question could not be satisfactorily determined. To investigate a claim of discrimination and an alleged breach of Article 14, both parties would need to file amended pleadings that focus on numerous details, an exercise that would essentially constitute filing a fresh petition. Accordingly, the Court advised that the respondent may freely challenge the impugned order on these additional grounds by filing a new petition that sets out the required allegations and facts, giving the State an opportunity to respond. In view of this reasoning, the Court refrained from remitting the matter to the High Court.
In the matter before it, the Court decided not to remit the case back to the High Court for further consideration of the point that had been raised. The Court noted that it had previously examined whether the alleged discrimination and breach of Article 14 could be fairly decided on the pleadings as they stood, and concluded that a proper investigation would require both parties to file amended pleadings, which would amount to the filing of a new petition. Accordingly, the Court found it appropriate to resolve the present appeal on the existing record rather than to send the case to the High Court for reconsideration. The Court then held that the appeal was to be allowed. As a result, the order previously issued by the High Court was set aside, and the writ petition filed by the respondent was dismissed. The Court further observed that this dismissal was made without prejudice to the respondent’s right to institute a fresh petition concerning the issue that had been referred to earlier. In other words, the respondent retained the freedom to file a new petition setting out the necessary allegations and facts, while the State would be afforded an opportunity to respond to such a petition. The Court expressly declined to make any order as to costs, stating that no justification existed for awarding costs to either side in the circumstances of this case. For these reasons, the appeal was allowed.