State of Madras vs Karumuthu Thiagarajan Chettiar

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 15 November, 1963

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, J.C. Shah, Raghubar Dayal

The State of Madras, represented by its officers, instituted proceedings against Karumuthu Thiagarajan Chettiar on 15 November 1963 before the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice J.C. Shah, with Justices A.K. Sarkar and Raghubar Dayal sitting on the bench. The respondent had purchased certain Inam lands located in the village of Siruvengai‑Peruvengai and consequently filed a suit challenging the authority of the State of Madras to issue notifications concerning that village under Act 30 of 1947. The crux of the dispute lay in whether Siruvengai‑Peruvengai qualified as an “estate” within the meaning of Clause (d) of Sub‑section (2) of Section 3 of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, which defines an estate as an “Inam village of which the grant had been made, confirmed or recognized by the Government.” The respondent argued that the village did not meet this definition, and he conceded that if his contention were correct the State could not lawfully issue the notification. The law, as settled, required that, except where the explanations to Clause (d) applied, the term “Inam village” must denote an entire village that had been granted as Inam; the explanations were not applicable to the present case.

The respondent advanced three separate arguments to establish that Siruvengai‑Peruvengai was not an estate within Section 3(2)(d). First, he claimed that the area in question was not a whole village but merely a portion of the larger village of Tirukkalapatti. Second, he asserted that the original Inam grant had not been made to a single grantee but to thirty‑two different individuals, thereby precluding the existence of a single grant covering the entire village of Siruvengai‑Peruvengai. Third, he contended that the Inam Commissioner had confirmed only a grant of half of the village, not the whole village as required by the statutory definition. The trial court rejected each of these contentions and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the High Court of Madras affirmed the trial court’s decision on the second contention but reversed it on the first and third, accepting the respondent’s arguments regarding the partial nature of the village and the limited grant. The State of Madras appealed this High Court judgment to the Supreme Court, maintaining that the High Court’s view on the first and third contentions was erroneous. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to consider the first contention, deeming the third contention correct: the government had indeed confirmed only a half‑village grant, which, if true, meant the appeal could not succeed. The Court further noted that the Inam Fair Register indicated that an Inam of certain lands in Siruvengai‑Peruvengai had been granted by one of the Pandya kings to Brahmins for subsistence, supporting the factual basis for the inquiry.

It was established that one half of the village of Siruvengai‑Peruvengai had been possessed by the zamindar of Shivganga, who held the land within his zamindari for roughly fifty years before the Inam settlement of 1865. The zamindar asserted that his possession did not arise from any Inam right but was simply part of his zamindari estate. During the settlement proceedings the zamindar’s claim was admitted, and the half of the village in question was recorded in the Jamabandi accounts as having always formed part of the zamindari. The remaining half of the village, by contrast, was occupied by several persons who claimed title under the Inam grant originally made by the Pandya Kings to certain Brahmins for subsistence. These occupants argued before the Inam Commissioner that the zamindar had arbitrarily resumed their half of the village about fifty years earlier. The Inam Commissioner, after consideration, confirmed as Inam only the half that was in the possession of the claimants, fixed a quit‑rent of Rs 53 on that portion, and directed that a title deed be issued. Although the Commissioner ordered the issuance of a title deed, no such deed was ever produced in the subsequent proceedings. The High Court judgment later recorded that the learned Government pleader admitted there was no confirmation of the other half of the original grant in the name of the zamindar.

Based on those facts, the High Court, relying on the precedent set in Srinivasa Ayyangar v. State of Madras, concluded that the grant of the whole village had not been confirmed and consequently the village could not be regarded as an “estate” within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d). The Supreme Court agreed with that finding, observing that the statutory definition of an “Inam village of which the grant has been … confirmed by the Government” must be read as requiring confirmation of the entire area covered by the original grant. The Court noted that it would be difficult to imagine a grant being confirmed without affirming the specific area that had been granted; confirming a grant necessarily entails confirming that a certain tract of land had previously been granted. Counsel for the State of Madras, citing observations of Justice Venkatarama Aiyar in Bhavanarayana v. Merugu Venkatadu, argued that confirmation relates only to the act of making the grant and not to the extent of the property. He contended that if the Government is satisfied that a grant is authentic and made by a proper authority, it must confirm the grant in its entirety, and that any resumption of a portion of land by the Government does not amount to a partial disaffirmance of the grant. The counsel urged that the definition in the Act requires confirmation of the original grant as a whole for the village to qualify as an estate under Section 3(2)(d).

Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act declares that a grant of an entire village made in the pre‑British period is to be treated as an estate even if the balance of the village’s land was not confirmed as Inam Land in the proceedings before the Inam Commissioner. An Inam village therefore qualifies as an “estate” within the meaning of that provision when the grant was made, confirmed or recognised by the Government, irrespective of any later partition of the village among the original grantees or their successors‑in‑title. In the present matter the grant was not originally made by the British Government; rather, it was a grant that was subsequently confirmed or recognised by that Government. The confirmation of a grant of a named village falls within Section 3(2)(d) where, before the grant, certain lands had been alienated by the proprietor, rendering him incapable of conveying the whole area of the village. This situation is expressly described in the Explanation added by the Madras Estates Land (Amendment) Act II of 1945. However, the addition of the Explanation has not eliminated the disputes that arise in cases where the Inam Commissioner issues more than one title deed for lands belonging to a village granted in Inam. Two principal categories of such cases have been identified. The first category comprises cases in which, after the original grant, the grantee alienated portions of the Inam land and, during the process of enfranchisement, the entire area of the granted land was confirmed, yet separate title deeds were issued to different persons in possession of distinct plots. The second category includes cases in which the confirmation made by the Inam Commissioner applied only to a part of the village originally granted, leaving the remainder unconfirmed for reasons such as resumption. In the decision of Viswanadham Bros. Guntur v. Subbaiya, AIR 1945 Mad 378, the original grant of an entire village as a Bhatavarthi Shrotriam Inam was followed by a sub‑grant of a portion of the Inam before settlement; at settlement the Inam Commissioner confirmed the minor Inam separately together with the confirmation of the rest of the Inam. Justice Kuppuswami Aiyar held that there was no confirmation of the grant of the Inam village. The principle articulated in that case was subsequently applied in Achyuta Ramayya v. Akkayya (1946) 2 Mad LJ (NRC) 19, Kankalata Ghantayya v. Hari Lakshmipathi 61 Mad LW 91 and Somasundaram v. State of Madras, all of which fall within the first category. Cases that fall within the second category include those where, after the grant of the whole village, the grantor resumed a one‑sixteenth share before the permanent settlement, and the Inam Commissioner confirmed only the remaining fifteen‑sixteenth share. In those situations the Court, relying on the principle from Viswanadham Bros., held that the confirmation did not extend to the entire village, because it was clearly limited to the portion that remained after resumption.

In the earlier classification of cases, an attempt was made to extend the first class of cases to those in which the Inam Commissioner issued two or more title deeds – one deed covering the named village that was granted and another deed relating to a grant that had been made before the named village was granted. The validity of that proposed extension was challenged before a special Bench. The facts in the case that was before the Bench were straightforward. After the proprietor had granted certain lands by three Bhatvrithi Inams, the proprietor thereafter granted the remaining lands as a named village. The Inam Commissioner subsequently issued a single title deed for the named village of Cherichintala and issued separate title deeds for each of the three Bhatvrithi Inams. It was argued that the lands comprising the village were not part of an estate because, according to the argument, there was no Inam village whose grant had been confirmed by the Government within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. In addressing that contention, Govinda Menon, J. observed that the decisive factor was that the Inam Commissioner should recognise or confirm the entire area of the original grant as an inam, even if the practical effect of that confirmation was the issue of different title deeds to different individuals. He emphasized that the number of title deeds issued was irrelevant; what mattered was that the entire area originally granted retained its character as an inam. While making that observation, Govinda Menon, J. stated that the Court was inclined to follow the view expressed by Subba Rao, J. and set out the following formula for determining the issue: first, ascertain whether the original grant was of the whole village; if that is established, the next question is whether the confirmation or recognition was of the entire grant or only a part of the grant. If the entire grant was confirmed or recognised, the method of confirmation, the issuance of separate title deeds, or the recognition by separate acts should not affect the result, because in every case the original grant of the whole village should be confirmed or recognised by the Government. Paragraph 10 of the judgment stressed that the Court was not called upon in Bhavnarayana’s case to consider a situation in which the Inam Commissioner, having held that there was a grant of the whole village, had confirmed only a portion of that village. Basheer Ahmedi Sayeed, J. observed that, having been conceded at the Bar that the original grant had been confirmed by the Inam Commissioner and that the requirements of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act regarding governmental confirmation or recognition had been satisfied, there was no merit in the contention that the Government had failed to confirm or recognise the entire village when the title deed was issued.

In the present matter, the State of Madras observed that a confirmation relates only to the act of granting and does not depend upon the size of the property involved. The Court noted that this view is only partly correct. As Justice Govinda Menon explained, when the entirety of a grant is confirmed—even if the confirmation is made through several separate title deeds—the original grant is considered to be confirmed. However, the Court stressed that the whole grant must be confirmed by one or more title deeds to achieve such a result. Justice Venkatarama Aiyar added that when the Government is satisfied that a grant was made by the appropriate authority and is valid, the Government must confirm it and cannot confirm only a portion while disaffirming the remainder. The Court further observed that an argument suggesting that, for the purpose of determining whether an Inam village whose grant has been confirmed constitutes an estate, one should look solely at the original conveyance while ignoring all subsequent dealings by the grantor or the confirming authority, is not acceptable. The Court found no provision in the relevant regulations or Government rules that forbids the Inam Commissioner from recognizing title to some Inam land holders while refusing to recognize the title of others. It held that the power of confirmation is an exercise of sovereign authority and, in the absence of a statutory duty, the Commissioner, acting as a representative of the sovereign, is not obligated to acknowledge the rights of every person possessing land originally granted as Inam. Consequently, when the Commissioner confirms a grant affecting only a part of a village for certain persons, that does not imply confirmation of the entire grant. While the Commissioner may recognize the title of an individual who holds a portion of the village originally granted as Inam, such recognition does not amount to confirmation of the village grant as a whole. Full confirmation of the village grant occurs only when the entire grant is recognized, whether in the name of a single person or a group of persons. The Court identified that the Inam Commissioner’s inquiry comprises at least two separate stages: first, determining the nature of the original grant; and second, deciding which area should be confirmed or recognized in favor of a claimant. In examining the first stage, the Commissioner is not yet confirming or recognizing the grant but merely establishing the basis for a subsequent order of confirmation or recognition. By assuming that a finding on the first stage automatically results in confirmation of the grant, the learned Judge eliminated the essential distinction between the two stages, a view the Court rejected.

In this case the Court observed that the observation made by Subba Rao, J. in Somasundaram’s case was substantially correct. The judgment cited Nistala Seshayya Bhukta v. Vasu Bageyya, which the State of Madras had relied upon, and noted that the case fell under explanation (3) of Section 3(2)(d). The present appeal was not concerned with that explanation, and therefore the Court did not apply the provision to the facts before it. In Nistala the court had dealt with a situation where a portion of the original pre‑British grant of an entire village had been resumed by the British Government. Only the remaining portion of the grant had been confirmed and that portion was the subject of the Inam confirmation. It was held that at the time of the Inam enquiry the village, minus the resumed portion, was regarded as the Inam village and that portion was confirmed. The decision also observed that because the whole area available for confirmation had been confirmed, the case fell within Clause (b) of Section 3(2). The Court explained that the present case was different, because nothing barred the Inam Commissioner from confirming, as part of the original grant, the lands that were in the possession of the zamindar of Shivganga. The entire village area remained available for confirmation, so the Commissioner could have confirmed the whole village as an Inam. Consequently, the Court stated that the Nistala decision provided no assistance to the present appeal because the factual circumstances were different. The Court then held that it had not been shown that any Inam grant of the village of Siruvengai‑Peruvengai had been confirmed by the Government. The lands in the portion of that village that had been confirmed as an Inam therefore could not be deemed an “estate” within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the Court ordered that the appellant should bear the costs of the proceedings. The dismissal meant that the relief sought by the appellant could not be granted and the status quo was maintained.