State Of Assam and Another vs Bimal Kumar Pandit

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 832 of 1962

Decision Date: 12 February 1963

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah

The case titled State of Assam and another versus Bimal Kumar Pandit was decided on twelve February 1963 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice P B Gajendragadkar and was delivered by a five‑judge bench consisting of Justices P B Gajendragadkar, K N Wanchoo, M Hidayatullah, K C Das Gupta and J C Shah. The official citation appears as 1963 AIR 1612 and 1964 SCR (2) 1, with related citations recorded as RF 1964 SC 364 (15), R 1964 SC 506 (7) and R 1977 SC 567 (16‑18). The matter concerned a government servant who had been suspended and subsequently faced a demotion, raising the question of what constitutes a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The issues also explored the contents required in a second notice when the Government either accepts, rejects or partially accepts the findings of an enquiry officer, the necessity of stating the Government’s conclusions in that notice, and the function of the enquiry officer under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.

The respondent, who held the position of Extra Assistant Commissioner, was charge‑sheeted and submitted an elaborate explanation in response to all the accusations. An enquiry was conducted by the Commissioner, who afterwards submitted a report. Although the Commissioner found lapses in the respondent’s conduct, he concluded that those lapses did not seriously impair the respondent’s honesty or integrity, and therefore recommended withholding three increments from the respondent’s salary as a just remedy. Following the enquiry, the appellant issued a second notice to the respondent, asking him to provide an explanation and indicating that a penalty of removal from service might be imposed. The respondent replied, and the Governor of Assam, after reviewing the explanation, ordered the respondent’s demotion. The respondent challenged the demotion by filing a writ petition in the High Court. The High Court allowed the petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the appellant not to implement the demotion. In reaching that decision, the High Court held that the second notice failed to clearly state that the Government had accepted the enquiry officer’s findings; consequently, the respondent could not ascertain the grounds on which the Government had provisionally decided to impose removal. The Court further observed that a notice must demonstrate that the dismissing authority has considered the enquiry officer’s report and has accepted its conclusions against the respondent. The notice must expressly convey the dismissing authority’s conclusions and the reasons for reaching them, because without such communication the respondent cannot make an adequate or effective representation. Since the impugned notice lacked a specific affirmation that the dismissing authority had accepted the enquiry officer’s findings and offered no reasons for the proposed action, the notice was held to be contrary to the statutory provisions governing such disciplinary procedures.

In this appeal, the appellant obtained special leave to approach the Court. The Court held that the High Court had erred in concluding that the order of demotion passed against the respondent was invalid because the respondent had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to show cause as required by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The Court explained that a public officer against whom disciplinary proceedings are contemplated is entitled to two distinct opportunities. First, an enquiry must be held, and it must be conducted in accordance with the rules prescribed for that purpose and in conformity with the requirements of natural justice. When the enquiry officer submits his report, the authority that intends to dismiss or demote must consider that report and decide whether it accepts the conclusions reached therein. If the report contains findings adverse to the public officer and the dismissing authority agrees with those findings, a second notice must be issued. In issuing the second notice, the dismissing authority must arrive at a tentative or provisional conclusion regarding the officer’s guilt and the punishment that would meet the ends of justice. In response to this notice, the public officer is entitled to show cause not only against the action proposed to be taken against him but also against the validity or correctness of the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and provisionally accepted by the dismissing authority. If the dismissing authority differs from the findings recorded in the enquiry report, its provisional conclusions must be specified in the second notice. If the dismissing authority accepts the adverse findings but departs from some or all of the findings that are favorable to the officer and proceeds to specify the nature of the action on its own conclusions, those conclusions must be briefly indicated in the notice. Where the dismissing authority issues a notice after accepting the enquiry report in its entirety, it is not essential for the notice to state expressly that the report has been accepted, although the Court considered it desirable. The failure to make such a statement does not contravene the provisions of Article 311(2). With respect to the functions of the enquiry officer, the Court noted that unless a rule or statutory provision provides otherwise, the officer is not required to specify the punishment that may be imposed on the delinquent officer. The officer’s task is limited to conducting an enquiry into the charges and reporting his conclusions and findings on those charges. Occasionally an enquiry officer may indicate the nature of the action that could be taken against the delinquent officer, but such an indication ordinarily lies outside the scope of the enquiry. The Court cited A.N. D’Silva v. Union of India [1962] in support of these observations.

The Court listed several authorities that were cited earlier in the proceeding, namely Supplement 1 of the Supreme Court Reports at page 968, the case of High Commissioner of India versus I M Lal reported in the 1945 Federal Court Reports at page 103, the decision in Khem Chand versus Union of India reported in the 1958 Supreme Court Reports at page 1080, The State of Orissa versus Govindadas Pahda, criminal appeal No. 412 of 1958 dated 10 December 1958, the case of State of Andhra versus T Ramayya Suri reported in the 1957 Andhra Reports at page 370, Bimal Charan Mitra versus State of Orissa reported in the 1957 Orissa Reports at page 184, Krishan Gopal Mukherjee versus The State reported in the 1960 Orissa Reports at page 37, and State of Bombay versus Gajnan Mahadev Baldev reported in the 1954 Bombay Reports at page 351. All of these authorities were noted as being referred to in the matter. The judgment proceeded under the civil appellate jurisdiction, addressing Civil Appeal No. 832 of 1962. The appeal had been granted by special leave from a judgment and decree dated 22 January 1962 issued by the Assam High Court in Gauhati, which was decided under Civil Rule No. 369 of 1961. Counsel for the appellant comprised M C Setalvad and Naunit Lal, while counsel for the respondent comprised N C Chatterjee and D N Mukherjee. The judgment was pronounced on 12 February 1963 and was delivered by Justice Gajendragadkar.

The Court observed that the appeal, which had been entertained by special leave, presented a concise question concerning the scope and effect of the provisions contained in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The factual backdrop of the question was explained as follows: the respondent, Bimal Kumar Pandit, held the position of Extra‑Assistant Commissioner in Shillong while being in the service of the first appellant, the State of Assam. On 11 December 1959, the second appellant, who was the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, served a charge‑sheet upon the respondent. The charge‑sheet enumerated eleven specific allegations and required the respondent to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service or otherwise punished in accordance with Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules read with Article 311 of the Constitution. The notice also conveyed that the Governor of Assam had authorized the Commissioner of Plains Division, Assam, to conduct an enquiry and to report the findings to the second appellant.

Subsequently, on 13 January 1960, the respondent submitted a detailed explanation addressing each of the eleven charges. The Commissioner of Plains Division then conducted an enquiry, examined the evidence presented, and prepared a report dated 12 April 1960. In that report, the enquiry officer concluded that six of the eleven charges had not been proved. Of the remaining five charges, two charges—identified as numbers 7 and 10—were found to be fully established, while charges numbered 1, 2 and 4 were deemed to be partially established. The officer added that, although the lapses proved did not raise serious doubt about the officer’s honesty and integrity, the evidence regarding charges 1 and 2 demonstrated his inexperience, and the evidence concerning charges 2 and 4 indicated his irresponsibility. The report further stated that, given the circumstances, only the two fully established charges, numbers 7 and 10, warranted consideration for the purpose of imposing punishment. The enquiry officer concluded the report by recommending that, in view of the limited scope of the charges proved and considering the respondent’s age and experience, withholding three increments from his salary would satisfy the ends of justice in this case.

After the enquiry report was received, the second appellant issued a second notice to the respondent on 1 June 1960. That notice referred to the disciplinary proceedings that had been conducted against the respondent and informed him that, in accordance with clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, he was required to submit any explanation as to why a penalty of removal from service should not be imposed upon him. The notice also mentioned that a copy of the enquiring officer’s report was enclosed, and it directed the respondent to file his explanation through the Commissioner of the Plains Division, Assam, on or before 18 June 1960. The respondent complied with this requirement, but he filed his explanation on 21 June 1960, addressing the charges that the enquiring officer had held proved. Upon consideration of the respondent’s explanation, the Governor of Assam decided to reduce the respondent’s rank. The respondent, who was on probation in the Assam Civil Service, Class I, was permanently demoted to Assam Civil Service Class II, with the reduction taking effect from the date on which he assumed the lower rank. The Governor further ordered that the respondent would continue to serve on probation in the Class II service for a period of two years, and that his appointment could be terminated if his work and conduct were not satisfactory. Accordingly, the respondent was required to draw his salary at the minimum rate of the pay scale for Assam Civil Service Class II, and his seniority in the cadre was to be fixed from the date of his joining. This order was dated 8 July 1961. The respondent challenged the validity of that order by filing a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Assam on 24 August 1961. He argued, among other points, that he had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to show cause before a penalty under Article 311 (2) was imposed, and he contended that the violation of Article 311 (2) rendered the order illegal. Although the respondent raised several other contentions, the High Court dismissed all of them except his principal argument under Article 311 (2), which the Court accepted. Consequently, the High Court allowed the writ petition and issued a mandamus directing the appellants not to give effect to the order dated 8 July 1961. The appellants have now approached this Court by way of special leave in order to challenge that mandamus. The Court has previously referred to the second notice that was served on the respondent pursuant to Article 311 (2). The respondent’s claim, which the High Court upheld, was that the first appellant’s notice failed to state clearly that it had accepted the findings of the enquiring officer; because this unequivocal acceptance was absent, the respondent could not determine on what basis the appellant had provisionally decided to impose the penalty of removal from service.

The High Court held that a notice issued under article 311 (2) must demonstrate that the dismissing authority had actually considered the findings of the enquiring officer and had accepted those findings against the delinquent officer. In other words, the notice was required to set out, in clear terms, the conclusions reached by the dismissing authority because without such express communication the delinquent officer could not make an adequate or effective representation. The Court further explained that when recording those conclusions, the dismissing authority also needed to disclose the reasons on which those conclusions were based. Since the impugned notice failed to contain a specific statement that the dismissing authority had accepted the enquiring officer’s findings and, apart from that, offered no grounds or reasons for the proposed action against the respondent, the Court concluded that the notice contravened the requirements of article 311 (2). Consequently, the notice was held to be void.

Counsel for the appellants argued that the High Court had misinterpreted the scope and effect of article 311 (2). The counsel noted that article 311 (1) provides, inter alia, that no person covered by that sub‑article shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one by which he was appointed, and emphasized that the present appeal did not concern that provision. The counsel then restated article 311 (2), which bars dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank of a public officer specified in article 311 (1) until the officer has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action. It was observed that it is now well settled that a public officer against whom disciplinary proceedings are contemplated is entitled to two opportunities before any disciplinary action is finally imposed. The first opportunity arises during an enquiry conducted in accordance with the prescribed rules and the principles of natural justice; at that stage the officer may cross‑examine the evidence and present his own evidence. After the enquiry, the enquiring officer submits a report, and the dismissing authority must consider the report and decide whether to accept its conclusions. If the report’s findings are adverse to the officer and the dismissing authority agrees with them, a second opportunity arises in which the officer may again show cause, this time against the proposed disciplinary action. In issuing the second notice, the dismissing authority naturally has to come to a tentative or

In this case the dismissing authority was required to reach a provisional conclusion concerning both the guilt of the public officer and the appropriate punishment that would satisfy the requirements of justice in his particular situation, and only after forming these provisional conclusions on the two matters did the dismissing authority issue the second notice. There was no doubt that, upon receipt of that notice, the public officer was entitled to show cause not merely against the disciplinary action that was proposed to be taken against him but also against the validity or correctness of the findings recorded by the enquiring officer and provisionally accepted by the dismissing authority. In other words, the second opportunity afforded to the public officer enabled him to address the entire spectrum of the case, to plead that no case had been established against him for any disciplinary action, and, if he could not establish his innocence, to argue that the disciplinary action that was being proposed was either unduly severe or was not warranted at all. This position was not contested. The High Court appeared to hold that, in order to ensure that the public officer had a reasonable opportunity, the dismissing authority must set out its conclusions on the findings recorded by the enquiring officer and must also specify the reasons supporting those conclusions. According to that view, the fact that a copy of the enquiry report was sent to the delinquent officer together with a notice indicating the nature of the proposed action did not satisfy the requirement of Article 311(2), because without an explicit statement of its provisional conclusions the dismissing authority would not have shown that it had applied its mind and arrived at provisional findings on both the officer’s guilt and the punishment his misconduct deserved. It was conceded that it would be desirable for the dismissing authority to state in the second notice that it concurred with the enquiring officer’s conclusions before issuing the notice under Article 311(2). However, the question that required determination was whether the failure of the dismissing authority to expressly state that it had accepted the enquiring officer’s findings against the delinquent officer created a defect in the proceedings sufficient to render the final order invalid. The Court was not prepared to answer that question in the affirmative. The Court observed that it would be clear to the delinquent officer that the issuance of a notice indicating the dismissing authority’s provisional conclusions about the punishment to be imposed on him necessarily implied that the findings recorded against him by the enquiring officer had been accepted by the dismissing authority; otherwise the notice under Article 311(2) would have no sense or purpose. Moreover, the Court added that the affidavit filed by appellant No 2 clearly demonstrated that, prior to the service of the impugned notice, the Government had accepted the findings of the enquiring officer, which meant that the Government agreed with the enquiring officer on both sets of findings. Consequently, the Court concluded that the omission of an explicit statement of acceptance of the enquiry report did not deprive the public officer of a reasonable opportunity under Article 311(2), and that the second notice, as issued, was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of natural justice.

In the case before the Court, the record showed that the Government had formally accepted the findings of the enquiring officer, which meant that the Government agreed with the officer on both sets of findings that had been recorded. Consequently, the Court did not consider the omission of an explicit statement that the dismissing authority had accepted those findings to be sufficient grounds for concluding that the notice issued under Article 311 (2) failed to provide a reasonable opportunity to the delinquent officer. When the notice was received, it would have been clear to the respondent that the findings recorded by the enquiring officer had been accepted by the appellants, and therefore the Court could not accept the proposition that the respondent was denied a reasonable opportunity as required by Article 311 (2). The Court further observed that, should the dismissing authority diverge from the findings recorded in the enquiry report, the provisional conclusions of the authority must be set out in the second notice. For example, if the report contains findings that favor the delinquent officer but the authority disagrees and nevertheless proceeds to issue a notice under Article 311 (2), the authority must expressly state that it departs from the report’s findings and must specify the nature of the action it proposes to take. Without such an explicit statement, the issuance of the notice would be untenable. There may also be situations where the enquiry report includes findings both in favor of and against the delinquent officer; the present case presented exactly such a mixture. If the dismissing authority accepts all the adverse findings but differs on the favorable ones and bases its proposed action on its own conclusions, those provisional conclusions must be briefly indicated in the notice. In these circumstances, the action contemplated would rest not only on the adverse findings but also on the authority’s view that the charges not proved by the enquiring officer are, in the authority’s opinion, proved. To afford the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to show cause under Article 311 (2), it is essential that the notice set out the authority’s provisional conclusions in such mixed‑finding cases. However, where the dismissing authority proceeds to issue the notice after accepting the enquiry report in its entirety, it is not essential, though it may be desirable, for the authority to state explicitly that it has accepted the report; the Court did not find that the language of Article 311 (2) required such a statement, especially since a copy of the enquiry report had been enclosed with the notice, enabling the respondent to understand that the action proposed was based on the authority’s acceptance of the officer’s conclusions. Nevertheless, the Court noted that the dismissing authority had purported to proceed to issue the notice against the delinquent officer after accepting

In this case, the Court observed that when the entire enquiry report is accepted, the dismissing authority is not compelled to state expressly that it has accepted the report. The Court noted that, although it is advisable for the authority to include such a statement, the language of Article 311(2) does not require it, and therefore the absence of such a statement does not violate Article 311(2). The Court further pointed out that a copy of the enquiry report had been attached to the notice, and that a reasonable person reading the notice would understand that the proposed action was based on the authority’s acceptance of the enquiry officer’s conclusions in full. Counsel for the respondent argued that the authorities must have issued the notice after concluding that some findings recorded in favour of the respondent were incorrect. He relied on the fact that the enquiry report suggested that withholding three increments would achieve justice, whereas the notice indicated removal from service. The Court acknowledged that the ultimate sanction imposed was less severe, namely demotion to Class II Service, and that the respondent’s counsel inferred that the authorities must have considered the unproven charges to be proven. While recognising the ingenuity of this argument, the Court refused to accept it. Citing the decision in A. N. D’Silva v. Union of India, the Court held that, in the absence of specific rules or statutory provisions, the enquiry officer is not required to specify the punishment that may follow. The officer’s duty is limited to conducting an enquiry into the charges and preparing a report setting out his findings and conclusions. Occasionally an officer may suggest a possible action, but such a suggestion lies outside the scope of the enquiry. Consequently, the Court held that the recommendation made by the enquiry officer in the present matter could not be given great weight. Moreover, the Court observed that the relevant rules clearly justified the punishment imposed on the respondent on the basis of the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, and therefore it would be futile to argue that the authorities could not have imposed the punishment without differing from the officer’s conclusions on the charges he had held not proved.

The Court observed that the appellants had disagreed with the enquiring officer’s conclusions on the charges that the officer had held to be unproved; consequently, the appellants could not lawfully consider imposing the prescribed punishment on the respondent. Accordingly, the Court rejected the contention that the very proposal of action demonstrated that the appellants had not accepted the findings recorded by the enquiring officer in favour of the respondent. The Court then turned to the authorities cited by counsel for the respondent. In the case of The High Commissioner of India v. I. M. Lal, the Federal Court examined the scope and effect of section 240(3) of the Constitution Act of 1935. The majority of that Court held that the requirement of section 240(3) was not merely to notify the person of the proposed action but also to set out the grounds on which the authority proposed that action, and thereafter to afford the person reasonable time to make representations against both the proposed action and the grounds upon which it was based. Counsel for the respondent argued that this decision required the notice served on a delinquent officer to expressly state the grounds for the specific action proposed, stressing that the judgment expressly required the dismissing authority to provide reasons in support of the Section. The Court found this argument unsupported, noting that the Federal Court’s observations were made in a context where “grounds” referred to the findings or conclusions reached by the enquiring officer. The Court further quoted a later passage of the Federal Court decision, which clarified that the requirement of section 240(3) mandates that, in every case where an enquiry results in a definite proposal of dismissal or reduction in rank, the officer concerned must be informed, either in full or in an adequately summarized form, of the enquiry’s results and the enquiring officer’s findings, and must be given an opportunity to show cause why he should not suffer the proposed dismissal or reduction. This statement makes clear that the Federal Court held the dismissing authority must convey to the delinquent officer the enquiring officer’s findings, either completely or in summary, and must also specify the nature of the action proposed. In other words, the officer must be aware of the findings recorded against him and must be given a chance to challenge those findings.

In the present matter, the Court explained that the notice required under Article 311(2) must set out the grounds, reasons, or findings that the enquiring officer recorded, rather than merely stating why the dismissing authority accepts the officer’s report. Consequently, the Court held that the argument advanced by Mr Chatterjee, which relied on the Federal Court’s decision in M Lal’s case to support the view of the High Court, was not justified. The Court recalled the ruling in Khem Chand v Union of India, where it was held that the “reasonable opportunity” contemplated by Article 311(2) includes an internal chance for the government servant to make a representation on why the proposed punishment should not be imposed. Such a representation can be made only after the competent authority, having received the enquiry report, has applied its mind to the seriousness of the charges, tentatively proposed one of the three punishments, and communicated that proposal to the servant. The Court affirmed that after receiving the report, the appropriate authority must indeed consider whether to accept the findings and then provisionally decide what action, if any, should follow. However, the Court stressed that this does not create a constitutional duty for the authority, in every case, to expressly state in the notice that it has accepted the adverse findings before indicating the nature of the proposed action. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the precedent set in Khem Chand does not back Mr Chatterjee’s contention.

The Court then turned to the decision in State of Orissa v Govindadas Panda, observing that a similar order issued by the Orissa Government had been upheld. In that case, the notice issued under Article 311(2) did not expressly declare that the State Government had accepted the findings of the enquiring officer, nor did it specifically identify the exact punishment to be imposed. The Orissa High Court had struck down the dismissal order on the ground that the notice was defective and that the provisions of Article 311(2) had been violated. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s decision, holding that, in the circumstances, it must have been obvious to the respondent that the proposed punishment was removal from service and that the respondent was therefore called upon to show cause against that punishment. The Court therefore found that the State of Orissa decision was contrary to Mr Chatterjee’s argument. Nonetheless, the Court noted that some judgments appear to lend support to Mr Chatterjee’s position and indicated that those decisions would need to be examined, referring for example to Civil Appeal No 412/1958 decided on 10 December 1958, where the Andhra Pradesh High Court had expressed a view on the requirements of Article 311(2).

In the earlier decision, the Court observed that the notice issued to the respondent indicated that the State had accepted the recommendation of the Administrative Tribunal and therefore required the respondent to show cause why he should be removed from service. The notice did not explicitly label the contemplated punishment as dismissal; rather, it referred to removal from service, which is a distinct sanction. By a reasonable reading of the notice, it follows that the appellant, that is the State, agreed with the Tribunal’s suggestion and invited the respondent to explain why the proposed removal should not be carried out. The Court further noted that the Tribunal had indeed recommended removal rather than dismissal, and it held that the notice, although not using the word “dismissal,” must be understood as referring to removal from service as the intended action against the government servant. Consequently, the Court concluded that the decision of the State was contrary to the argument advanced by Mr Chatterjee.

There are, however, certain decisions that appear to support Mr Chatterjee’s contentions and therefore merit examination. In Civil Appeal No 412 of 1958 decided on 10 December 1958, the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the case of The State of Andhra v. T Ramayya Suri, held that under Article 311 (2) the authority issuing a show‑cause notice must specify not only the punishment proposed but also the reasons for arriving at that conclusion. The Court cautioned that this observation should not be taken to create a blanket rule obligating every authority to set out its own grounds for any specific action against a delinquent civil servant. In the particular case before the Andhra High Court, the Government had disagreed with the Tribunal on the third charge and had formed its own conclusion, which differed from the Tribunal’s finding. Because the Government’s contrary conclusion influenced the decision to propose a particular action, the Court considered it necessary for the notice to disclose the Government’s conclusion on that third charge so that the servant could understand the basis of the proposal and have an opportunity to contest it. This does not, however, require the notice to include the Government’s detailed reasons or grounds supporting its conclusion; rather, it is sufficient to communicate the finding or conclusion that weighed on the Government’s mind. In a later decision, Bimal Charan Mitra v. State of Orissa, the Orissa High Court held that serving the copy of the findings of the punishing authority on the public servant is mandatory, and that merely serving the report of the enquiring officer—when the notice does not indicate that the punishing authority accepts those findings—does not satisfy the substantive requirements of Article 311 (2). The Court regarded the view that the authority must also serve the punishing authority’s findings as an erroneous interpretation of the statutory provision.

The Court noted that the service of a copy of the findings of the punishing authority on the public servant is mandatory, and that serving only the report of the enquiring officer, when the notice does not indicate that the authority competent to punish agrees with those findings, cannot satisfy the requirements of Article 311 (2). The Court referred to earlier authorities, namely A.I.R. 1957 Andh. 370 and A.I.R. 1957 Orissa 184, which seemed to suggest that, in a notice issued under Article 311 (2), the appropriate authority must not only serve the enquiry officer’s report but also provide the findings of the punishing authority, treating this as a mandatory requirement of the provision. The Court held that this interpretation was erroneous.

The Court further examined a decision of the Orissa High Court in Krishan Gopal Mukherjee v. The State (A.I.R. 1960 Orissa 37) and observed that the view expressed in that case did not support the proposition that the notice must expressly state that the appropriate authority accepts the enquiry officer’s findings and must give reasons for the proposed action. The Court clarified that the earlier observation by the Chief Justice in the Bombay High Court case State of Bombay v. Gajanan Mahadev Badley (A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 351) was correctly understood to mean that, under Article 311 (2), the State must call upon the servant to show cause not only against the quantum of punishment but also against the decision of the departmental enquiry when that decision forms the ground for the proposed action. However, the Court read that observation in conjunction with the concluding language of the Orissa High Court decision and concluded that the requirement was limited to communicating the findings recorded in the enquiry report, which constitute the ground on which the Government proposes to act.

Consequently, the Court held that the High Court was in error when it concluded that the order of demotion passed against the respondent was invalid because the respondent had not been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause under Article 311 (2). The Court therefore allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s order and dismissing the respondent’s writ petition. No order as to costs was made.

Having examined the material placed before it, the Court concluded that the appellant’s case succeeded and therefore it set aside the order that had been issued by the High Court. By setting aside that order, the Court effectively nullified the decision that had previously been made and restored the position that existed before the High Court’s intervention. The Court further held that the writ petition filed by the respondent could not stand, and it accordingly dismissed that petition so that the relief sought by the respondent was not granted. In addition, the Court expressly stated that it would make no order as to costs, meaning that each party would bear its own legal expenses without any award of costs to either side. This absence of a costs order was a discretionary choice that did not affect the substantive outcome of the appeal. The final disposition recorded by the Court was that the appeal was allowed, confirming that the earlier order of the High Court was reversed, the respondent’s writ petition was dismissed, and no costs were awarded. The Court’s direction thus resulted in the complete reversal of the lower court’s order and left the parties to continue without any additional cost liability.