State of Andhra Pradesh vs S. Sree Rama Rao

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 626 of 1961

Decision Date: 10 April, 1963

Coram: J.C. Shah, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In the matter titled State of Andhra Pradesh versus S. Sree Rama Rao, the decision was rendered on 10 April 1963 by a Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of Justice J.C. Shah, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, who served as Chief Justice, and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The case is reported in the 1963 volume of the All India Reporter at page 1723 and also appears in the 1964 volume of the Supreme Court Reports at page 25, with subsequent citations in several later reports. The petition challenged an order of dismissal issued against a Sub‑Inspector of Police who was in charge of a police station, invoking the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India concerning writ jurisdiction of the High Court over disciplinary actions taken against public servants.

The factual backdrop disclosed that a person designated as D, suspected of having committed an offence, was apprehended by the village Munsif and subsequently delivered to the police station where the Sub‑Inspector, S. Sree Rama Rao, was stationed. The Sub‑Inspector refused to execute a written acknowledgment of receipt of D and failed to make any entry concerning D in the station diary. Consequently, D remained confined within the police station for several days without being presented before a Magistrate. A departmental inquiry was initiated against the Sub‑Inspector on the ground of reprehensible conduct for the alleged wrongful confinement of D. The Sub‑Inspector contended that D had never been handed over to him because D escaped while en route to the police station. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, who conducted the inquiry, found the Sub‑Inspector guilty of the charge. Following this, the Deputy Inspector‑General of Police issued a show‑cause notice, and after considering the Sub‑Inspector’s explanation, ordered his dismissal from service. On appeal, the Inspector‑General of Police altered the dismissal to removal from service. The Sub‑Inspector then filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the validity of the removal order. The High Court set aside both the dismissal and removal orders, holding that it possessed the jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with the departmental authority’s decision.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the orders of a departmental authority in the manner adopted by the High Court. The Court observed that the High Court’s view—that the rule applicable in criminal trials, which requires proof of an offence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the court, must be applied to departmental inquiries and that failure to apply such a rule would permit the High Court to set aside the departmental order under Article 226—was erroneous. The Court explained that the High Court does not sit as an appellate court over the decision of the authority conducting a departmental enquiry; its role is limited to ascertaining whether the enquiry was conducted by a competent authority, whether it followed the prescribed procedure, and whether the principles of natural justice were observed. Where the authority has accepted evidence that can reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not within the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 to re‑evaluate the evidence or to reach an independent finding. In the present case, the Court found that the departmental proceedings were regular, no rules of natural justice were violated, the conclusions drawn were supported by the evidence, and the Sub‑Inspector had been afforded ample opportunity to examine his witnesses. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the conclusions of the punishing authority were not open to challenge before the High Court.

The Court explained that the power conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution did not include the authority to re‑examine the evidence and to reach an independent conclusion on that evidence. It held that when a departmental enquiry has been conducted properly, the High Court could not reassess the adequacy or reliability of the material that had been placed before the disciplinary authority. Accordingly, the Court observed that in the present matter the departmental proceedings had been regular, that no rule of natural justice had been breached, that the findings of the disciplinary authority were supported by the evidence, and that the respondent had been given sufficient opportunity to cross‑examine the witnesses presented against him. On that basis the Court concluded that the determinations of the punishing authority were not amenable to scrutiny by the High Court.

The judgment was recorded under the civil appellate jurisdiction in Civil Appeal No 626 of 1961. The appeal was taken by special leave from the order dated 18 November 1959 issued by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No 922 of 1956. Counsel for the appellants and counsel for the respondent were instructed, and the judgment was delivered on 10 April 1963 by Justice Shah. The facts leading to the appeal were set out in detail. On 10 March 1955 the Deputy Inspector General of Police, State of Andhra, issued an order dismissing the respondent, who then held the rank of sub‑inspector of police on probation, from service. The respondent appealed this dismissal to the Inspector General of Police, who modified the order to removal from service. Subsequently, the respondent filed a petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or direction that would set aside the Inspector General’s order dated 24 September 1955 and the Deputy Inspector General’s order dated 10 March 1955, together with any further relief the Court deemed appropriate. The High Court granted the petition and quashed both orders. The present appeal was filed against that decision, having obtained special leave.

The Court then turned to the background of the departmental proceedings that culminated in the respondent’s removal. At the relevant time the respondent was in charge of the Kodur police station in Visakhapatnam District. On 18 February 1954 a complaint of house‑breaking and theft was lodged at that station and was formally recorded on 19 February 1954. The report of the Village Munsif of Vechalam identified a man named Durgalu, who was then at large, as the suspected offender. Durgalu was subsequently apprehended by the Village Munsif of Kalogotla on 5 March 1954 and was handed over to the Village Munsif of Vechalam. The latter transferred Durgalu to the Kodur police station accompanied by village assistants identified as V. Polayya, Vechalapu Simhachalam, Kodamanchali Simhachalam and Koduru Sumudram. According to the State’s case, Durgalu was delivered to the respondent on the night of 5 March 1954; however, the respondent did not execute any written acknowledgment of receipt, nor did he make any entry in the station diary, and Durgalu remained confined in the police station from that night onward.

According to the record, Durgalu was placed in police custody on the night of 5 March 1954 without any order from a Magistrate directing his remand. On 7 March 1954 the respondent, who was then in charge of the Kodur police station, handed over the station’s charge to a head constable and proceeded on casual leave to Kakinada for a period of five days, returning on 12 March 1954. While the respondent was away, constables arrested a man named Reddy Simhachalam and brought him to the police station on the evening of 7 March 1954. The State alleged that the three constables identified as numbers 1199, 363 and 662 tortured Reddy Simhachalam, causing him to lose consciousness. The body of Reddy Simhachalam was discovered floating in a well near the police station on the morning of 9 March 1954, and the Revenue Divisional Officer of Narsipatnam initiated an enquiry into the circumstances of his death. During that enquiry Durgalu gave a statement that he had personally witnessed the three constables torturing Reddy Simhachalam inside the police station. On the basis of that statement the three constables were charged before the Sub‑Magistrate at Chodavaram with offences under sections 304(2) and 201 read with section 114 of the Indian Penal Code for causing the death of Reddy Simhachalam by torture and for causing the disappearance of evidence relating to his death. Subsequently, before the Sub‑Magistrate, Durgalu withdrew his earlier testimony, asserting that his claim of being an eyewitness was false and that he had been induced by the police to make the statement. He further alleged that he had escaped from the custody of the village servants before reaching the Kodur police station on 5 March 1954 and that he was rearrested on 8 March 1954. Holding that the sole eyewitness had turned hostile, the Sub‑Magistrate discharged the three constables, finding that there was no direct evidence on which even a prima facie case could be established against them.

The Sessions Judge of Visakhapatnam, acting on his own initiative, called for the record of the Sub‑Magistrate’s proceedings. After reviewing the material, the Sessions Judge concluded that the evidence demonstrated that Durgalu had indeed been arrested on 5 March 1954, taken to the Kodur police station, and wrongfully confined there from that date. The judge held that Durgalu’s earlier claim before the Sub‑Magistrate—that he had escaped from custody on 5 March 1954 and remained in his native village of Vechalam—could not be believed. In May 1954 a departmental enquiry was instituted against the respondent. The amended charge in the disciplinary proceedings alleged that the respondent had engaged in reprehensible conduct by wrongfully confining a K.D. named Chandana Durgalu, accused in Criminal Case No. 17/54, at the Kodur police station from the night of 5 March 1954 to 7 March 1954 while he was on five‑day casual leave. The accompanying “statement of facts” detailed that Durgalu had been apprehended by the Village Munsif of Kaligotla, handed over to the Village Munsif of Vechalam, and then sent with a written report and the assistance of village servants to the Kodur police station at about midnight on the same night. It further recorded that the respondent refused to acknowledge receipt of Durgalu, failed to make any entry in the station diary, and continued to hold Durgalu in the police station until 7 March 1954, when he departed on leave. The statement concluded that this conduct was grave and reprehensible, thereby forming the basis of the disciplinary charge.

The statement of facts recorded that the Munsif of Kaligotla delivered Durgalu to the Village Munsif of Vechalam, who then, with the assistance of village servants, forwarded Durgalu along with a written report to the respondent at Kodur Police Station at approximately midnight on the same night. The Village Munsif demanded that the respondent acknowledge receipt of the report, but the respondent refused to give such acknowledgment and failed to mention any of these circumstances in the station’s official records, thereby keeping Durgalu confined in the police station until 7 March 1954, when the respondent proceeded on a five‑day casual leave.

The statement of facts concluded that this conduct was grave and reprehensible, forming the basis of the charge against the respondent. In his explanation, the respondent asserted that Durgalu was never handed over to him on 5 March 1954, nor at any time before the respondent’s casual leave began on 7 March 1954. He further claimed that, upon taking leave, he entrusted the charge of the police station to the head constable, instructing the constable to trace Durgalu and to take appropriate action.

The Deputy Superintendent of Police conducted the departmental enquiry and submitted a report on 27 October 1954. The report set out the testimony of witnesses examined on behalf of the State and the respondent, and it summarized the conclusion by stating that the evidence presented by the State established a strong case against the respondent. The report affirmed that Durgalu was arrested on 5 March 1954, that the Village Munsif sent him to Vechalam, and that Vechalam, accompanied by village servants, delivered Durgalu to the Kodur police station, where the respondent received him on the night of 5 March 1954. The report rejected the respondent’s claim that Durgalu escaped after the initial arrest and was re‑arrested on 8 March 1954, declaring that narrative false.

Concluding its findings, the report observed that all the established facts demonstrated beyond doubt that Durgalu had been arrested on the 5th of March, yet it added that if the learned Court were to accept the retracted statement of Durgalu as the “sacred truth,” the delinquent might obtain a benefit of doubt. The competent authority, after reviewing the enquiry report, recorded a provisional conclusion that the respondent deserved dismissal for the charges proven by the report. A copy of the enquiry officer’s report was forwarded to the respondent, and he was invited to submit a representation against the proposed action.

The respondent submitted his representation, which was then examined by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Northern Range, Waltair. That officer referred to the State’s witness testimony regarding the arrest of Durgalu on 5 March 1954 and his subsequent handover to the respondent on the same day, and he observed that the evidence…

In the departmental inquiry, the officer who examined the evidence rejected the claim that Durgalu, after having been arrested on 5 March 1954, escaped and was subsequently re‑arrested on 8 March 1954. The officer held that the charge laid against the respondent was serious, that the evidence presented had sufficiently proved the charge, and that the only appropriate punishment was dismissal from the police force. On appeal, the Inspector General of Police accepted the testimony of the State witnesses who asserted that they had handed Durgalu over to the respondent on 5 March 1954. The Inspector General concluded that the respondent had “betrayed gross dishonesty and lack of character” by falsifying the official record and by omitting to note what he had done and what had happened in the police station, thereby proving himself thoroughly dishonest and untrustworthy. He further found that the respondent was unfit to occupy the responsible post of Sub‑Inspector of Police, that his service record as a probationary Sub‑Inspector was generally unsatisfactory, and that he had acquired a reputation for inefficiency, lack of interest in work, and weakness in dealing with his subordinates—attributes that, in the Inspector General’s view, militated against his becoming a useful Sub‑Inspector. Taking the respondent’s young age and inexperience into account, the Inspector General reduced the order of dismissal to an order of removal from service. The departmental proceeding then turned on a single factual question: whether Durgalu had indeed been arrested on 5 March 1954 and subsequently delivered to the respondent at the Kodur police station on the night of that same date. There was no dispute that Durgalu had been arrested on 5 March 1954 and that the Village Munsif, Vechalam, had escorted him, together with a report, to the Kodur police station. The only point of contention was whether Durgalu had been handed over to the respondent on 5 March 1954 as alleged by the State witnesses. Both the Deputy Inspector General of Police, who had originally passed the dismissal order, and the Inspector General of Police, who confirmed it on appeal, had accepted the State’s version of the facts. However, the High Court declined to adopt that view. In doing so, the High Court assumed a jurisdiction that it did not possess. The Court observed that the departmental conclusions were vitiated because the Enquiry Officer had considered the evidence of the State witnesses and the evidence of the respondent’s witnesses separately, and because the Deputy Inspector General and the Inspector General, in recording their orders, had failed to refer to the entire body of evidence presented before the Enquiry Officer. The Court further held that the officials had not appreciated the full significance of the rule on the onus of proof, which requires that all essential material necessary to establish a charge rest upon the party seeking to prove it, and mandates that the two sets of evidence be examined together rather than in isolation.

In determining whether the evidence presented for establishing the charge has proved the charge, the court must first examine that evidence and then consider the defence evidence to assess whether the conclusions drawn are unjustified. The preferred method, described as the golden thread of criminal law, requires that the law and the entire body of evidence be examined. This examination is intended to determine the extent to which the liability of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court observed that ordinarily the factual findings of a body or tribunal in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution are accepted by the High Court, but that general rule does not apply when an important principle of jurisprudence is ignored in reaching those findings. However, that general rule does not apply when an important principle of jurisprudence is ignored in reaching those findings. The Court noted that the fundamental rule that a person may be punished only after the whole evidence has been considered and the person is found liable beyond reasonable doubt had not been followed. Consequently, the conclusions of the departmental authorities were vitiated. The High Court further held that the orders of the departmental authorities were vitiated for two additional reasons. First, the Enquiry Officer refused to summon and examine two defence witnesses despite a request to do so. Second, no charge was framed against the respondent for ‘falsifying the record by omitting to write what he had done or what happened in the police station.’ Consequently, the respondent was not given an opportunity to meet such a charge, which violated the principles of natural justice. The Court stated that no authority supports the view that, when determining whether a public officer is guilty of the alleged misconduct, the criminal‑law rule requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt must be applied. The Court further held that if that rule is not applied, a petition under Article 226 is competent to declare the departmental enquiry order invalid. The Court clarified that a proceeding under Article 226 is not an appeal from the decision of the departmental enquiry authority. Rather, its purpose is to determine whether the enquiry was conducted by a competent authority, followed the prescribed procedure, and observed the rules of natural justice. When evidence accepted by the enquiry authority can reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty of the charge, the High Court in a writ petition under Article 226 cannot re‑evaluate that evidence. It also cannot reach an independent factual finding on that evidence. The Court affirmed that interference is permissible only where the departmental authority has acted contrary to natural justice, violated statutory procedure, allowed extraneous considerations, or arrived at a conclusion that is wholly arbitrary and capricious.

In this case, the Court explained that a High Court may interfere with departmental proceedings only when the authorities conduct the inquiry in a way that breaches the rules of natural justice, contravenes the statutory provisions that prescribe the method of inquiry, or allow considerations that are unrelated to the evidence and merits of the case to affect the decision. The Court also stated that a High Court may intervene if the conclusion reached by the departmental authority is so obviously arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at it, or on any similar ground. However, the Court emphasized that, provided the inquiry is otherwise properly conducted, the departmental authorities remain the exclusive judges of fact. When the authorities base their findings on lawful evidence, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence cannot be re‑examined by a High Court in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court noted that the Enquiry Officer had accepted the testimony of State witnesses that Durgalu had been handed over to the respondent on 5 March 1954. The Enquiry Officer also made an observation, expressed in a tone that appeared somewhat sarcastic, that the respondent might enjoy a benefit of doubt if the Magistrate’s judgment were treated as “sacred truth.” The Court held that this remark did not create any doubt about the Enquiry Officer’s conclusion. Moreover, the Enquiry Officer stated that a Magistrate’s judgment in a criminal trial against a public servant does not automatically bind a departmental inquiry against the same servant. The Court found that this statement did not constitute any error on the part of the Enquiry Officer.

The Court further observed that the first ground on which the High Court had interfered with the order of the punishing authorities was wholly untenable. The two additional grounds relied upon by the High Court—namely the claim that the enquiry authorities had refused to summon and examine the respondent’s witnesses and that the respondent had been held guilty of a charge without having received notice—were also found to be without merit. The record showed that the respondent had sought to call police constables numbered 178, 506 and 569 in order to demonstrate that Durgalu was not in the lock‑up until 8 March 1954. Police constable 506 was examined as a witness for the respondent, but the Enquiry Officer did not accept his testimony. The other two constables were neither summoned nor examined. The record further indicated that on 20 September 1954 the respondent had promised to produce the witnesses he had cited in his defence. At the hearing on 26 September 1954, the respondent examined three witnesses and was given another opportunity to produce any remaining defence witnesses. On 27 September 1954 police constable 506 was again examined, after which the respondent expressed that he did not wish to examine any further witnesses. The Enquiry Officer’s report contained a note stating that the respondent’s defence witnesses had been examined and that all requested documents had been produced and exhibited. The Court concluded that there was no basis for the High Court’s interference on the cited grounds.

The respondent signed the document, acknowledging that the recital contained therein was correct. He did not raise any objection in the representation he made before the Deputy Inspector General of Police when a notice was issued requiring him to show cause why he should not be punished. In the memorandum of appeal addressed to the Inspector General of Police, the respondent submitted that it was the duty of the Enquiry Officer to summon the police witnesses, and that the officer had failed to do so. He also contended that the statement he had signed applied only to private witnesses and not to police witnesses. The Court observed that the endorsement made by the Enquiry Officer could not be interpreted in that limited manner; it expressly referred to all witnesses called by the respondent. The record showed no application by the respondent for the summoning of the police witnesses, and the Enquiry Officer, contrary to the procedural rules, declined to summon them. In view of this evidence, the Court was of the view that after the examination of police constable No. 506, the respondent no longer desired to examine the two other police constables, Nos. 178 and 569, whom he had originally intended to call. It was further urged that the findings recorded did not relate to the charge that the respondent was required to answer. The charge alleged that the respondent had wrongfully confined Durgalu in the police station from 5 March 1954 to 7 March 1954. The statement of facts annexed to the charge‑sheet expressly stated that the respondent had not entered in any police‑station diary that Durgalu had been handed over to him on 5 March 1954. The charge and the accompanying “statement of facts” formed a single document on the basis of which proceedings were instituted against the respondent, and the Court held that it would be unreasonable to assert that, because the statement of facts informed the respondent of his failure to record the hand‑over, the ground of reprehensible conduct was omitted from the charge, thereby vitiating the enquiry. No objection was recorded before either the Deputy Inspector General or the Inspector General of Police that the charge was infirm for that reason, nor was any claim made that such an infirmity had prejudiced the respondent in the enquiry. The respondent had full notice of the charge, had examined witnesses in support of his defence, and had made several argumentative representations before the Deputy Inspector General, the Inspector General of Police, and the Government of Andhra Pradesh. The Court concluded that the departmental proceedings were regular and were not invalidated by any breach of natural‑justice rules. Moreover, the conclusions reached by the departmental officers were fully supported by the evidence before them, and the High Court possessed no jurisdiction to set aside the order.

In this matter the Court rejected the contention that the appeal should be dismissed on the basis that “the approach to the evidence was not consistent with the approach in a criminal case,” and it also rejected any suggestion that the High Court, if faced with the same evidence, would inevitably have reached a different conclusion. The Court observed that the respondent had been given full notice of the charge that was lodged against him and, after receiving that notice, he was afforded sufficient opportunity to call and examine his own witnesses in support of his defence. Because the respondent had been allowed to investigate the evidence and to present his case, the finding recorded by the authority that imposed punishment could not be reopened for fresh debate, and the question of whether the respondent should be removed from service could not be revisited before the High Court. Accordingly, the Court held that the appeal was properly allowed, that the order previously issued by the High Court must be set aside, and that the petition filed by the respondent was dismissed. The Court further directed that no order regarding costs should be made in these proceedings, while affirming that the cost order previously pronounced by the High Court would remain in force. In sum, the appeal was allowed and the High Court’s judgment was overturned.