State of Andhra Pradesh vs Gundugola Venkata Suryanarayana Garu

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 483 of 1961

Decision Date: 12 September, 1963

Coram: J.C. Shah, A.K. Sarkar, Raghubar Dayal

In this matter, the Supreme Court considered an appeal filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh against Gundugola Venkata Suryanarayana Garu. The appeal was decided on 12 September 1963. The judgment was authored by Justice J.C. Shah and the bench was comprised of Justices J.C. Shah, A.K. Sarkar and Raghubar Dayal. The citation of the case appears as 1965 AIR 11 and 1964 SCR (4) 945, with a later reference in 1969 SC1256 (7). The legal provisions in issue were Section 80 of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code, the definition of “estate” under Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and the applicability of the Madras Estates Rent Reduction Act, 1947.

The factual backdrop involved the Government of Madras applying the 1947 Rent Reduction Act to agricultural lands situated in the village of Mallinadhapuram. The Government based its action on the premise that the original grant covered the whole village and therefore qualified as an estate within the meaning of the 1908 Act. Gundugola Venkata Suryanarayana Garu and another individual served a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the Government, challenging the notification and requesting that the Government refrain from implementing it. Although two persons gave the notice, only the respondent, Mr. Garu, instituted the suit. The trial court held that the original grant did not encompass the entire village and that the Government had not formally recognised such a grant; consequently the lands did not fall within the definition of “estate” and the Rent Reduction Act was held inapplicable. The trial court also dismissed the suit on the ground that the notice had been served by two persons while the suit had been filed by only one. The Andhra Pradesh High Court affirmed the trial court’s finding on the nature of the grant but disagreed with the dismissal, holding that the notice was not defective and that the suit was a valid representative suit because permission under Order 1, Rule 8 of the CPC had been obtained. The High Court therefore granted the relief sought by the respondent, prompting the State to appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the suit was not liable to be dismissed. It observed that, in the circumstances of the case, no illegality arose merely because the notice was served by two persons while the suit was filed by only one. The Court explained that the right to institute a representative suit may be exercised by one or more persons who share a common interest, and that such a suit may proceed when the Court grants permission to the representative plaintiff. The fact that another individual joined the plaintiff in serving the notice but did not join the suit was not sufficient to render the suit defective. The Court further clarified that permission of the Court is required for instituting a representative suit, not for serving the notice, and that the Civil Procedure Code contains no provision for seeking permission to serve a notice upon the Government or a public servant. Finally, the Court affirmed that the lands in dispute did not constitute an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and therefore the Madras Estates Rent Reduction Act, 1947 could not be applied to them. The Court cited precedents such as Vellavan Chettiar and others v. The Government of the Province of Madras and Government of the Province of Bombay v. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia. In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed and the order of the High Court granting relief to the respondent was set aside.

It was held that the fact that another individual had assisted the plaintiff in serving the notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but had not joined the plaintiff as a party to the suit, could not by itself render the suit defective. The Court explained that a representative suit remains valid even when the person who serves the notice is not the same person who ultimately files the suit, provided that the procedural requirements for a representative action have been satisfied.

The Court further clarified that permission of the court is required only for the institution of a representative suit and not for the service of a notice. It observed that the Code of Civil Procedure contains no provision for a court to grant permission to a party that wishes to serve a notice upon the Government or any public servant. Consequently, the requirement of court permission does not extend to the act of giving notice; it is limited to the filing of the representative suit itself.

In addition, the Court examined the nature of the lands that were the subject of the dispute. It concluded that the lands in question did not constitute an “estate” within the meaning of section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. Because the lands were not an estate as defined by that statute, the Madras Rent Reduction Act, 1947 was held not to be applicable to them. The Court supported this conclusion by referring to earlier authorities, namely Vellavan Chettiar and others v. The Government of the Province of Madras and another (L.R. 74 I.A. 223) and Government of the Province of Bombay v. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia and others (L.R. 76 I.A. 85).

The judgment concerned Civil Appeal No. 483 of 1961, which was an appeal from the decree dated 1 April 1959 pronounced by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal Suit No. 583 of 1954. The appeal was filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh against the order that had granted relief to the respondent, G.V. Suryanarayana Garu. Counsel for the appellant were K. Bhimashankaram, B.R.G.K. Achar and R.N. Sachthey, and the judgment was delivered on 12 September 1963 by Justice Shah.

Two principal questions were identified for determination. The first question asked whether the suit filed by G.V. Suryanarayana Garu against the State of Madras should be dismissed on the ground that the persons who served the notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 were not the same as the person who instituted the suit. The second question concerned whether the lands identified by title deed No. 279 at Mallinadhapuram qualified as an “estate” within the meaning of section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908.

The factual background disclosed that on 11 January 1950 the Government of Madras issued an order applying the provisions of the Madras Estates Rent Reduction Act, 30 of 1947 to the lands of the village Mallinadhapuram. The Government asserted that the grant covered the entire village, thereby constituting an estate under the definition in section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and consequently sought to prevent the Inamdars from collecting either contractual or customary rent from tenants occupying those lands.

The respondents, G.V. Suryanarayana Garu and Prabha Yegneswara Sastri, together held two and three‑thirds out of the eight vrittis that made up the inam. They served a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure upon the Government of the State of Madras. In that notice they set out that the cause of action for a prospective suit arose from the notification dated 11 January 1950, which had been published in the Fort St. George Gazette on 16 May 1950, and from subsequent instances where officers of the Government of Madras attempted to interfere with the collection of rents due from tenants. The notice demanded that the Government withdraw the notification, desist from collecting rent at reduced rates, and refrain from any interference with the rights of the Inamdars in Mallinadhapuram. It further warned that failure to comply would result in the filing of a suit to establish the rights claimed by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff asserted that the Inamdars of Mallinadhapuram possessed ownership rights over the land and warned the Government that, should the Government ignore the notice, a suit would be filed to enforce those rights against the State of Madras. The notice identified the plaintiff and Prabha Yegneswara Sastri by stating their names, descriptions and places of residence. The Government of Madras did not withdraw the notification, and consequently G. V. Suryanarayana Garu, acting for himself and on behalf of all the Inamdars of Mallinadhapuram, instituted Suit No. 45 of 1953 before the Sub‑ordinate Judge at Srikakulam. The suit sought a declaration that the agraharam of Thungathampara, also known as Mallinadhapuram and covered by Trial Deed No. 279, was not an “estate” within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, and that Notification No. 2970 of the Government, published on page 1399 of the Fort St. George Gazette under the Madras Estates Rent Reduction Act XXX of 1947, together with any subsequent proceedings, were therefore void, illegal and ultra‑vires.

The State of Madras argued that the original grant to the ancestors of the Inamdars had been made in favour of the whole village and of a specifically named village that had been enfranchised under Title Deed No. 279. On that basis, the State contended that the village qualified as an estate as defined by Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act and also under Madras Act XXX of 1947, rendering the plaintiff’s claim untenable. The State further maintained that the notice served by the plaintiff under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was “right valid and proper in law.”

The Trial Court examined the facts and concluded that the original inam grant did not encompass the entire village and that the grant had never been confirmed or recognised by the Government of the Province of Madras. Accordingly, the Court held that, within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, the land could not be described as an “estate,” and consequently the Madras Rent Reduction Act of 1947 did not apply to it. Nevertheless, the Court dismissed the suit because the notice served by the plaintiff and Prabha Yegneswara Sastri was “invalid and defective” since the suit had been filed solely by the plaintiff without proper representation of all Inamdars.

On appeal, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Guntur, which was the appropriate forum after the formation of the State of Andhra, reversed the Trial Court’s decree. The High Court agreed with the Trial Court that the grant was not of an entire or named village, but it held that the representative suit filed by the plaintiff on behalf of all the Inamdars, with the Court’s permission under Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was not defective. Accordingly, the High Court granted the relief claimed in the plaint. The matter under appeal concerned land covered by Trial Deed No. 279. It was uncontested that in Hijri year 1143, the then Raja of Parlakimidi, Veera Pratapa, had granted the land as a hereditary inam.

Rudranarayana Deo had originally granted, as a hereditary inam, certain lands to a person named Nagulakonda Shivaramdas for his maintenance. Over time, those lands were subdivided through partitions and alienations into eight separate parcels known as vrittis, and the initial grant document could not be produced. In 1860, while the Zamindari estate was being administered by the Court of Wards, a survey was carried out under the block survey system, and the agraharam and the jeroyiti villages within the Zamindari were demarcated and measured in distinct blocks. The District Collector, after examining the situation, advised the Court of Wards that no claim to land that was still uncleared and untitled should be permitted until a clear grant supported such a claim, and that any actual encroachments existing up to the date of demarcation should fall within the jurisdiction of the Inam Commissioner. The Court of Wards accepted the Collector’s recommendation on 25 September 1861. When the principal lands were later enfranchised, the Inam Commissioner dealt only with the cultivated portions and issued title deeds to the Inamdars, expressly excluding jungle or cultivable waste that lay within the demarcated limits defined by the 1860 Block Survey. Acting on behalf of the Zamindar, the Court of Wards asserted before the Inam Commissioner that the waste and banjar lands that were not under cultivation should be treated as exclusive and reserved areas of the Zamindari. In the Inam Commissioner’s investigations, the whole area shown in the block survey of the inam land was not granted title; certain banjar lands that were left out of enfranchisement were classified as Samasthanam jeroyiti, and since the 1860 Block Survey the Samasthanam had derived agricultural income from those excluded lands. The Zamindar subsequently obtained a separate demarcation of the banjar lands. An application filed by Nagulakota Jaggiah seeking a patta for fifteen acres of banjar land was presented to the Estate Manager, and a jeroyiti patta dated 13 February 1864 for a portion covered by block No. 23 supported the recognition of the Zamindar’s right over the village’s banjar lands. The Inam Fair Register, extracted as Ext. A‑1, contains a remark stating: “It appears that there was formerly a mokhasa in this estate which was known by the name of Tungatampara in the vicinity of the Agrahar. Under settlement and is that of Chorlangi and Gatta, that as the mokhasa fell into decay half a century ago and as the above agraharamdars complained to the Zamindar Dugaraju that they are destitute of the sources of irrigation he formed a tank, including the lands of the mokhasa with head of it and ruled that 2/5 of the water should run to the fields of the Agraharamdars of Chorlangi, 2/5 to Gatta and 1/5 to the agraharam in question. As the tank was formed only half a century ago or subsequent to the permanent settlement, the right to it vests with the Zamindar and if any of the lands formed to have been brought under plough it will be liable to…”.

The Court noted that the phrase “full assessment” demonstrated that the Zamindar had undertaken the construction of the tank and that his ownership of the tank had been formally acknowledged. It further observed that the Assistant Inam Commissioner, as recorded in the Inam Fair Register, had, by a letter dated 30 November 1865, recommended that only 149 acres‑59 cents of land be confirmed, rather than the whole area of the village. That recommendation was subsequently accepted by the Inam Commissioner in his final order. The Court found that no document in Exhibit A‑1 supported the claim that the original grant comprised the entire village. Instead, the Court inferred that the grant covered only a portion of the village. This inference was substantiated by the Zamindar’s actions and dealings with the waste and banjar lands, by the recognition of his title to the tank, and by the fact that only a part of the total area had been confirmed. The Court emphasized that additional documentary evidence reinforced this view.

Exhibit A‑3, which consisted of correspondence from 1864 to 1866 concerning the banjar lands, showed that during the enfranchisement proceedings those lands had been separated and that a “jeroyiti patta” had been issued for the banjar lands by the Zamindari Manager. Likewise, Exhibits A‑4 through A‑8 demonstrated that the Inam Commissioner had not addressed the jungle land and hillocks in his final order dated 30 November 1865, and that the Zamindar had claimed those lands as his own. Exhibit A‑9, a note submitted by the Diwan of the Estate, recorded that the excluded banjar in Block No. 23 of Mallinadhapuram agraharam had not been surveyed in the 1860 survey; it had been surveyed separately and subsequently incorporated into the village of Gulumuru. Exhibit A‑10, the block survey list, indicated that the total extent of the village was 325 acres‑92 cents, of which 110 acres‑00 cents were listed as belonging to the Zamindar as his banjar and poramboke lands, for which he had issued jeroyiti pattas. Exhibits A‑13 to A‑20 further confirmed that the banjar lands had been granted on jeroyiti pattas by the Parlakimidi estate and were not regarded as part of the inam. The Court concluded that the cumulative evidence clearly established that the grant did not encompass the entire village, and therefore the Trial Court and the High Court were correct in rejecting the State’s case.

The Court then turned to the notice that had been served on the Government of Madras. In that notice, the plaintiff, together with Prabha Yegneswara Sastri, claimed title to twenty‑three vrittis out of eight vrittis that constituted the inam lands in Mallinadhapuram. The notice detailed the proceedings of the Inam Commissioner and advanced several grounds. Firstly, it argued that the land confirmed by Inam Title Deed No. 279 did not constitute an estate within the meaning of section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. Secondly, it contended that the State Government had acted illegally in applying the provisions of the Madras Estates Rent Reduction Act. The notice concluded with a statement that it was being sent to the Government to request that the Government refrain from taking any step or proceeding under the Rent Reduction Act, and that failure to comply would compel the plaintiffs to initiate legal proceedings in a civil court to protect their rights under the Inam Title Deed No. 279 of Mallinadhapuram.

In the notice addressed to the Government of the State of Madras, two individuals requested that the Government refrain from taking any step or proceeding under the Rent Reduction Act. They stated that, if the Government persisted, their clients would be compelled to commence civil litigation on behalf of the Inamdari in order to protect their rights. The notice further demanded that the Government be restrained from any action that would interfere with the clients’ entitlement to receive the ordinary and customary rents that were lawfully due to the Inamdars pursuant to customary contracts. It also asserted that any interference with the owners’ right of ownership and possession over the lands described in Inam Title Deed No. 279 of Mallinadhapuram must be prohibited. Moreover, the notice called upon the Government to withdraw the Gazette notification dated 16 May 1950 and to cease attempting to collect rent at reduced rates from tenants and cultivators in Mallinadhapuram, as well as to desist from any intrusion upon the ownership rights of the agraharam in the same locality. The authors of the notice warned that failure to comply would result in a suit filed in a civil court by the Inamdars to establish their rights and to obtain appropriate relief against the State of Madras.

Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as relevant to this appeal, prescribed that no suit against the Government could be instituted until a period of two months had elapsed after a written notice had been delivered to, or left at, the office of the appropriate authority. The notice had to specify the cause of action, the name, description and residence of the plaintiff, and the relief claimed. In the present case, the notice was addressed to the Government of Madras by the two named persons, and it sought to raise a grievance on behalf of all Inamdars who were aggrieved by the issuance of the notification under the Madras Act XXX of 1947. The recitals of the notice, reproduced verbatim earlier, along with the relief clause, demonstrated that the cause of action, the identities and residences of the persons who gave the notice, and the relief sought were all clearly set out. The subsequent suit was filed more than two months after the date on which the notice was served. Although the suit was filed by only one of the two original notice‑givers, the Court permitted it under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a representative suit on behalf of all the Inamdars who were affected by the order.

The purpose of the notice requirement in Section 80 was to afford the Government or the concerned public servant an opportunity to reconsider its legal position and, where appropriate, to settle the claim without resort to litigation. The provision was mandatory and required strict construction; non‑compliance with its terms would ordinarily lead to dismissal of the suit. Nevertheless, the Court recognised that the notice must be interpreted reasonably and that minor defects should not be allowed to become a barrier to a legitimate claim.

The Court explained that when it examined whether the mandatory provisions of the statute were satisfied, it had to address four specific inquiries. First, it needed to determine whether the plaintiff’s name, description and residence were stated so that the authorities could identify the person who had served the notice. Second, it had to verify that the cause of action and the relief claimed were described with enough particularity. Third, it required confirmation that the notice, in writing, had been delivered to or left at the office of the appropriate authority named in the provision. Fourth, it needed to see that the suit was instituted within two months after the notice was served and that the plaint contained a statement that such notice had indeed been delivered or left. While interpreting the notice, the Court could not disregard the legislative purpose, which was to give the Government or the public servant a chance to reconsider his legal position. Accordingly, if a reasonable reading showed that the plaintiff had supplied the information mandated by the statute, any minor or incidental defects could be ignored. In the present case, the notice had been served by the plaintiff together with Yegneswara Sastri. They had lodged a grievance against a notification issued by the Government of Madras on 16 May 1950. The grievance was not a personal one of the two individuals who served the notice; it represented the interests of all the Inamdars or agrahamdars. The relief sought by the suit was likewise not confined to the personal claims of the two servants. The notice set out the cause of action in favour of all the Inamdars, and it was not disputed that it also specified the relief that could be claimed by all the Inamdars or on their behalf if the requisition was not complied with. Although only the plaintiff filed the suit, he did so with the permission of the Court under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allowed him to sue for and on behalf of all the Inamdars. Consequently, the requirements concerning the cause of action, the name, description and residence of the plaintiff, and the relief claimed were satisfied in the notice. The sole deviation from the notice was that while two persons had served the notice under section 80 informing the Government that proceedings would be commenced in default of compliance, only one of them instituted the suit. The Court held that this deviation did not constitute a defect that would bring the case within the ambit of section 80. The right to bring a representative action may be exercised by one or more persons sharing a common interest, but it can be exercised only with the Court’s permission. If the Court authorises a single person to institute such a representative action and that person has served the notice, the fact that another individual assisted in serving the notice but did not join the suit is not a sufficient ground to deem the suit defective.

In this case the Court explained that when permission was granted to a single individual to commence a representative action, and that individual had served the notice required by s. 80, the fact that another person had joined him in serving the notice but had not become a plaintiff did not, in the Court’s view, constitute a sufficient ground for declaring the suit defective. Counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh argued that a person seeking to file a suit in a representative capacity must first obtain the sanction of all interested persons on whose behalf the suit is proposed, and that, when the suit is directed against the Government or a public officer, the notice must also contain the names, descriptions and places of residence of every person to be represented. The Court held that there was nothing in s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure or in O.1 r. 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure that supported this contention, and that O.1 r. 8 itself indicated the opposite. According to the Court, the only condition for a person to file a suit in a representative capacity on behalf of many persons sharing the same interest is the permission of the Court. The provision that the Court must, at the plaintiff’s expense, give notice of the institution of the suit to all persons having the same interest, together with the power of the Court to entertain an application from any person on whose behalf the suit is instituted, shows that no prior sanction or authority of the interested persons is required before the suit is instituted. Moreover, s. 80 does not stipulate that a notice of a proposed representative suit may be served only after expressly obtaining the authority of the persons to be represented. Section 80 requires that the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff be set out in the notice, not those of the persons he seeks to represent. A suit filed with permission to sue for and on behalf of numerous persons having the same interest under O.1 r. 8 remains a suit filed by the person who is permitted to sue as the plaintiff; the persons represented by him do not become plaintiffs by virtue of the permission. Those other persons are bound by any decree because they are represented by the plaintiff, not because they are parties to the suit, unless the Court expressly orders that they be impleaded. In the present case G. V. Suryanarayana Garu had served the notice under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and had also instituted the suit, and the plaint complied with the requirements of s. 80.

The Court observed that the plaint satisfied the requirements of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact that Yegneswara Sastri had participated in serving the notice, yet had not applied for the Court’s permission, did not render the plaint or the subsequent proceedings defective. The Court further held that the principles derived from the two Privy Council decisions—Vellayan Chettiar and others v. The Government of the Province of Madras and another (1) and Government of the Province of Bombay v. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia and others (2)—which were relied upon by counsel for the State, were inapplicable to the matter before it.

In the Vellayan Chettiar case (1) the notice was issued by a single plaintiff who identified his name, description, residence and the relief claimed, and the suit was subsequently instituted by that plaintiff together with another person. The Privy Council remarked that the plain meaning of section 80 requires identity between the person who issues the notice and the person who brings the suit, referring to Venkata Rangiah Appa Rao v. Secretary of State, I.L.R. 54 Mad. 416 and, on appeal, A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 389. The Council warned that accepting any other view would create an unjustified implication or exception. In that case two persons sought a declaration that certain lands belonged to them and an order setting aside the decision of the Appellate Survey Officer. Only one of the two had served the notice. Their right to the relief was personal, arising from their title to the land. The Privy Council held that without a proper notice the suit could not be instituted under section 80, for to allow otherwise would admit an unwarranted exception.

In the Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia case (2), two trustees of a trust served a notice in October 1933 on the Government of Bombay under section 80, indicating their intention to sue the Government for the stated cause of action and relief. One trustee died before the plaint was filed, and two new trustees were appointed in his place. The surviving trustee and the two new trustees later filed the suit that gave rise to the appeal decided by the Privy Council. No notice had been served on the Government on behalf of the two new trustees. The Privy Council accepted the High Court’s view that when three plaintiffs are involved, the names and addresses of all of them must be included in the notice. Their Lords observed that the provisions of section 80 are imperative and must be strictly complied with before a suit can be validly commenced.

In the earlier authorities, the judgment said that a notice valid in law had been served on the Government. In the present case, it was not alleged that any notice on behalf of plaintiffs identified as 2 and 3 had been served on the Government before the suit was filed. Both of the cited cases involved suits instituted by two or more persons, but not every plaintiff had complied with the statutory notice requirement. In contrast, the present case involved a single individual who instituted the suit and who had, in fact, served the required notice. That individual had informed the Government, through the notice, that a cause of action had arisen in favour of the Inamdars and that legal proceedings would be commenced on their behalf for the relief described in the notice. The cause of action set out in the notice remained unchanged in the plaint, and no claim was made that the relief pleaded differed from the relief described in the notice. The sole difference between the notice and the plaint was that the notice had been issued by two persons indicating that an action would be started against the Government on behalf of the Inamdars, whereas the suit itself was instituted by one person, but with the Court’s permission, on behalf of the Inamdars, asserting the same cause of action and seeking the same relief. Counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh argued that, where a suit against the State is to be instituted after giving notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff must first obtain the Court’s permission before serving the notice. The appellate body found that argument to be without merit. It held that permission from the Court is required for instituting a representative suit, not for serving the statutory notice. The Code contains no provision for granting permission to a party who wishes to serve a notice upon the Government or a public servant. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. Because the respondent had not appeared before the appellate body, no order as to costs was made, and the appeal was dismissed.