Sri Athmanathaswami Devasthanam vs K. Gopalaswami Aiyangar

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1961

Decision Date: 09 May 1963

Coram: Raghubar Dayal, J.R. Mudholkar

In this matter, the Supreme Court of India heard a petition filed on 9 May 1963 by Sri Athmanathaswami Devasthanam against K Gopalaswami Aiyangar. The judgment was authored by Justice Raghubar Dayal, who sat together with Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The case was cited as 1965 AIR 338 and 1964 SCR (3) 763. The statutory framework involved provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act 1927, specifically section 76, and the Madras Estates Land Act 1908, sections 3(15), 3(16) and 6, together with related provisions concerning ryoti lands, waste lands, cultivation, permanent right of occupancy and the conditions under which a lease may be deemed to exceed five years.

The factual background revealed that the lands belonging to the appellant temple had been let into the possession of the respondent in August 1944 by the trustee then in office. This letting occurred because the State authorities were urging the reclamation and cultivation of the land in support of the “Grow More Food” campaign launched by the Government during World War II. After the 1944 transaction, a new trustee succeeded to the trust and subsequently instituted suit against the respondent seeking damages for the use and occupation of the lands. The appellant’s claim rested on three grounds: first, that the lands were uncultivable waste lands and therefore not ryoti lands; second, that the 1944 letting was not binding on the present trustee because it had been effected without the prior permission of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board as required by section 76 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act 1927; and third, that, absent such sanction, the respondent was a trespasser.

The respondent advanced a three‑point defence. He asserted that the suit lands qualified as ryoti lands and that his entry into possession under the previous trustee conferred on him the status of a ryot pursuant to section 3(15) of the Madras Estates Land Act 1908, thereby also giving him a permanent right of occupancy under section 6 of the same Act. He further contended that the letting did not constitute an alienation of the land and therefore did not fall within the ambit of section 76 of the Endowments Act. Finally, he argued that because both the land and the occupier were ryoti, the suit could not be maintained in a civil court.

At first instance, the trial court decreed in favour of the appellant, granting the relief claimed. On appeal, the High Court examined the jurisdictional issue and concluded that the suit could be instituted only before the Revenue Court, not the civil court. Accordingly, the High Court set aside the trial court’s decree, ordered the return of the plaint to the appellant for presentation before the appropriate court, and dismissed the appellant’s cross‑objections concerning the trial court’s allowance of credit for certain payments made towards rent or damages payable by the respondent.

The evidence adduced during the proceedings disclosed that, although the lands involved were waste lands covered with shrubs, jungle and similar vegetation and had not been cultivated for a long period, they were brought under cultivation in connection with the wartime “Grow More Food” effort, and no material was shown to indicate that the reclamation was financially unprofitable. The record also established that the respondent satisfied the definition of a ryot under section 3(15) of the Madras Estates Land Act.

In the present case the lands that formed the subject of the suit were described as being covered with shrubs, jungle and similar vegetation and had remained uncultivated for a long period. The authorities later brought these lands under cultivation as part of the “Grow More Food” campaign that was launched by the Government. The evidence showed that the reclamation of the land was financially profitable and there was nothing to indicate otherwise. The Court also found that the respondent qualified as a ryot according to the definition contained in section 3(15) of the Madras Estates Land Act. In its holdings the Court first declared that the lands in dispute were ryoti lands within the meaning of section 3(16) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 because they were cultivable lands. The Court explained that land which can be brought under cultivation is deemed cultivable unless a specific statutory provision provides for a different classification in particular circumstances. The second point made by the Court was that the mere fact that section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act gave a permanent right of occupancy to a ryot upon admission to possession of ryoti land did not convert such letting into a lease of a term exceeding five years; consequently, the letting of the suit lands to the respondent did not require the sanction of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board. The third observation was that a suit for the recovery of damages and for ejectment could not be entertained by a civil court because, under section 189 of the Madras Estates Land Act, the respondent was a ryot within the meaning of the Act and the matter fell outside the jurisdiction of a civil court. The fourth and final finding was that the High Court had erred in dismissing the cross‑objections raised by the appellant, since after concluding that the civil court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, the High Court could not proceed to decide any issue on the merits. The judgment then set out the procedural posture: the appeal was filed under civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1961, arising from the judgment and decree dated 12 July 1956 of the Madras High Court in A.S. No. 7 of 1954. Counsel for the appellant and respondent were listed, and the judgment was delivered on 9 May 1963 by Justice Raghuvar Dayal. This appeal was entertained by way of a certificate granted by the High Court of Madras under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The appellant, identified as Sri Athmanathaswami Devasthanam of Avidayarkoil in Tanjore District and represented by the hereditary trustee Subrahmanya Pandara Sannadhi Atheena Karthar of Thiruvavaduthurai Atheenam, was the landholder of three villages. The Devasthanam sued the respondent for the recovery of a sum of Rs 11,415/8/6 as damages for the use and occupation of the suit lands for the fiscal years 1357 to 1360, the rate of damages being Rs 3/9/0 per acre per annum. The respondent had been let into possession of the land by a previous trustee of the Devasthanam in August 1944 when the State pressed for the reclamation and cultivation of the land under the “Grow More Food” campaign that was launched by the Government during the wartime period.

During the period of World War II the respondent was permitted to occupy a total of approximately seven hundred twenty‑seven acres that were situated in the three villages that formed the subject of the suit. The plaintiff asserted, among other points, that the lands in dispute were private iruvaram lands and therefore could not be classified as ryoti lands. Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that the arrangement by which the respondent obtained possession was not enforceable against the present trustee because the transaction had been carried out without first obtaining the approval required under section 76 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927 (eleventh of 1927). On the basis of this alleged lack of statutory sanction, the plaintiff maintained that the respondent’s occupation amounted to trespass.

The respondent advanced a contrary set of contentions. He claimed that the suit lands fell within the definition of ryoti lands and that, by virtue of being placed in possession by the former trustee, he had acquired the status of a ryot pursuant to section 3(15) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. He further asserted that the same provision, together with section 6 of that Act, conferred upon him permanent rights of occupancy over the lands. According to the respondent, the manner in which he was let into possession did not constitute an alienation of the trust property and consequently did not fall within the scope of section 76 of the Endowments Act.

In addition, the respondent pleaded that he was not in arrears of rent because he had paid all rent liability up to Fasli year 1356. He explained that there existed a genuine understanding that the Government would waive the realization of rent for as long as it waived its right to draw water from the cress, and that the Government had indeed waived that right through the end of Fasli year 1360. Accordingly, the respondent argued that he owed no rent for the period extending to the conclusion of that fiscal year. He also maintained that, because both the land and the occupant were classified as ryoti, the suit could not be properly instituted in a Civil Court.

Both the Trial Court and the High Court agreed that the lands in question were ryoti lands, but they differed on the legal nature of the transaction that allowed the respondent to take possession. The Trial Court held that the respondent’s occupancy resulted from an alienation by way of a permanent lease and, lacking the required consent of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board, deemed the lease invalid. Conversely, the High Court concluded that the transaction did not amount to an alienation of trust property, that no Board sanction was necessary, and therefore the letting to the respondent was valid.

The High Court also disagreed with the Trial Court’s view on jurisdiction. It held that a suit concerning ryoti land could be brought only before the Revenue Court and that the Civil Court lacked authority to entertain the action. Accordingly, the High Court set aside the decree previously entered by the Trial Court, ordered the return of the plaint to the plaintiff‑appellant for presentation before the appropriate court, and rejected the plaintiff‑appellant’s cross‑objection concerning the Trial Court’s credit of a one‑thousand‑rupee payment towards rent and damages owed by the respondent. The appellant has filed the present appeal against that order.

The appellant disputed the finding that the land in suit qualified as ryoti land, arguing that a portion of the land was tank land while the remainder was not cultivable, and therefore most of the land did not fall within the definition of “ryoti land” contained in section 3(16) of the Estates Land Act. The provision read: “Ryoti land means cultivable land in an estate other than private land but does not include – (a) beds and bunds of tanks and of supply, drainage surplus or irrigation channels; (b) threshing‑floor, cattle‑stands, village‑sites, and other lands situated in any estates which are set apart for the common use of the villagers; (c) lands granted on service tenure either free of rent or on favourable rates of rent if granted before the passing of this Act or free of rent if granted after that date, so long as the service tenure subsists.” The appellant had never, either in its plaint or at any stage before the trial court, alleged that any part of the disputed land consisted of tank beds, and consequently did not contend that such portion was excluded from the definition of ryoti land. The Court considered it inappropriate to permit a fresh factual contention at this advanced stage of the proceedings, even though some records of rights described portions of the land as “puramboke.” According to the plaint, the lands in dispute were uncultivable waste lands covered with shrubs, jungle and similar vegetation, and they had remained uncultivated for a long period. The Court observed that waste lands covered with shrubs or jungle could not be deemed uncultivable merely because they were presently unplanted or had not been cultivated for an extended time. Land that can be brought under cultivation is, by definition, cultivable land unless a specific provision of law declares otherwise in particular circumstances. While the appellant did not dispute this principle, it argued that land should not be classified as cultivable if it could be cultivated only after a large expenditure. The appellant cited the respondent’s claim that about three hundred thousand rupees had been spent to reclaim the land, but noted that aside from this statement there was no admissible evidence concerning the actual cost incurred to reclaim the more than seven hundred acres of land involved in the suit.

The Court also referred to a passage in the High Court’s judgment which observed: “Of course, there are some lands in an estate which are not cultivable at all like hill tops, permanently submerged lands, etc., and they will be incapable of being claimed as ryoti lands with occupancy rights by lessees for grazing, fishing etc.” The Court regarded this remark as a general observation rather than a finding specifically applicable to the lands in dispute. The appellant further noted that the land in suit was intended to be brought under cultivation as part of the Grow More Food Campaign and

In this case the Court observed that the land in dispute could be brought under cultivation without incurring any excessive outlay of money or labour. Although the cost of reclamation might have exceeded ordinary expenses because most of the labour had to be sourced from outside the estate and because tractors were required to work the extensive area within a limited period, the record does not demonstrate that the reclamation was financially unprofitable. Consequently the Court agreed with the lower courts that the land should be classified as cultivable land.

The appellant also challenged the finding that the respondent qualified as a ryot. Section 3 (15) of the Act defines a ryot as a person who holds ryoti land in an estate for agricultural purposes on the condition of paying to the landholder the rent that is legally due. The appellant argued that the respondent had claimed that no rent was payable and therefore could not be a ryot because he allegedly held the land without any obligation to pay rent. The Court found this contention to be factually incorrect because the respondent never made a definitive statement, either in his written statement or in his testimony, that he entirely disowned his liability to pay rent.

The Court examined several passages from the written statement. Those passages reveal a dispute over the amount of rent rather than a dispute over the existence of a rental obligation. Paragraph 4 of the written statement records that at the relevant time the actual cash rent had not been fixed, but the defendant had orally requested and was promised a remission of rent as long as the Government continued to remit water charges in the area, on the basis of concessional rent rates for several years, owing to the heavy reclamation expenses. Paragraph 7 states that the defendant never accepted the rate fixed by the trustee and repeatedly protested it. Paragraph 20 contains the defendant’s denial that he had agreed to a rate of Rs 319 per acre, asserting that he had consistently protested the rate that was arbitrarily and unilaterally fixed by the trustee, and that he would seek the Collector’s intervention to fix a fair rent if he were granted the patta to which he was legally entitled. The defendant further added that until a patta was issued, no rent should accrue.

Similarly, paragraph 26 declares that no rent had been agreed to by the defendant, that the rent originally fixed by the late trustee had subsequently been abandoned, and that, in the absence of an agreement or a rate fixed by the Collector, no claim for rent could be sustained. All these statements contradict the appellant’s submission that the respondent asserted a complete lack of liability to pay rent. In the respondent’s oral evidence he said that he did not agree to pay Rs 390 per acre because he considered it excessive, recalled a demand by the temple manager in 1949 for two faslis (Rs 6,000), and indicated that he had advised the manager to consult the Pandarasannidhi and that he would not pay any rent. He also referred to a demand issued by the Revenue Inspector in 1950, which was exhibited as Exhibit B‑21 and related to rent due for the kudikani lands.

In the record, the appellant relied on a statement that a patta would be issued to the respondent and that rent would not begin to accrue until such patta was granted. The same record later contained a passage from paragraph 26 which declared that the defendant had never agreed to any rent, that the rent originally fixed by the late trustee had subsequently been abandoned, and that, consequently, no claim for rent could be sustained until the rent was fixed either by agreement between the parties or by the Collector. The judgment noted that these passages directly contradicted the appellant’s contention that the respondent had asserted that he was not liable to pay rent. The respondent’s own deposition was also examined. In the deposition he stated that he had not agreed to pay Rs. 3/9/0 per acre because he considered the amount excessive. He recounted that in 1949 the temple manager had demanded two faslis, i.e., Rs. 6,000, and that he had advised the manager to consult the Pandarasannidhi and that he would not pay any rent. He further said that he could not recall whether he had sent another letter to the Pandarasannidhi on the same matter. He referred to a demand dated 1950, identified as Exhibit B‑21, which the Revenue Inspector had sent to him for rent alleged to be due on kudikani lands he possessed. He admitted that he had not paid the amount, but that he had corresponded with the Revenue Divisional Officer, and that thereafter no further communication was received. The judgment observed that, even taken together, these statements did not demonstrate that the respondent denied any liability to pay rent. Rather, each refusal to pay was explained on the basis of a dispute over the amount or the procedure for fixing the rent, not on the ground that no rent was due at all.

The judgment then turned to the documentary evidence that established the respondent’s liability. Exhibit A‑3 was an order issued by the Pandarasannidhi granting a patta to the respondent for land belonging to the Avadiyarkoil Temple. The order began with a clear condition that the applicant, identified as the respondent, must pay cash rent at rates that would be determined by the Pandarasannidhi. From this term the judgment inferred that the respondent was unquestionably liable to pay rent on the cultivated land. Consequently, the judgment found no merit in the appellant’s argument that the respondent could not be classified as a ryot within the meaning of the Act. The appellant next argued that the lease of the land to the respondent was invalid because, under s. 76 (1) of the Endowments Act, a lease exceeding five years required sanction by the Board (or the committee, in the case of other temples). s. 76 (1) provides that no exchange, sale, mortgage, or lease of immovable property belonging to a math or temple for a term exceeding five years shall be valid or operative unless the lease is necessary or beneficial to the institution and has been sanctioned by the appropriate authority. The judgment observed that the order granting the patta did not specify any duration for the grant. The appellant contended that, by virtue of s. 6 (1) of the applicable Act, the lease should be construed as extending beyond five years. The judgment, however, noted that the mere existence of a permanent right of occupancy under s. 6 (1) does not automatically transform the arrangement into a lease of more than five years, and therefore the appellant’s reliance on that provision required further examination.

In this case the Court observed that, under the Act, the respondent had obtained a permanent right of occupancy over the land he possessed. That permanent right of occupancy did not arise because of any term fixed in a lease, but rather because the Act confers such a right on any person who is admitted by a landholder to the possession of ryoti land. The Court explained that the simple admission of a ryot by a landholder to the possession of ryoti land immediately gives that ryot a permanent right of occupancy, as provided by section 6 of the Act. Even if the Pandarasannidhi had admitted the respondent to the ryoti land for a period of less than five years, the Court held that the respondent would still have acquired a permanent right of occupancy in his holding.

The Court went on to state its opinion that the mere fact that section 6 of the Act bestows a permanent right of occupancy on a person admitted to ryoti land does not make the letting of that land to the person equivalent to granting a lease for a term exceeding five years. Consequently, such a letting does not require prior sanction of the Board. The Court warned that if the opposite view were adopted, the result would be that the Pandarasannidhi would have to obtain Board approval for every proposed letting of any parcel of land, or would be unable to perform its ordinary duties as a trustee. The Court further observed that the provisions of section 76 of the Endowments Act could not have been intended to impose such a restriction on the Pandarasannidhi’s ordinary rights, and it would be unreasonable to expect that the combined operation of section 76 of the Endowments Act and section 6 of the Estates Land Act would altogether prohibit the Pandarasannidhi from letting any temple land.

Accordingly, the Court held that the letting of the land to the respondent did not amount to a lease for a term exceeding five years and therefore did not require the Board’s sanction. The Court declared that the letting was valid and legally effective. Finally, the Court noted that because the respondent was a ryot, a suit for recovery of rent and for ejectment could not be entertained by a civil court. Under section 189 of the Act, such suits fall within the jurisdiction of a revenue court. The Court quoted subsection (1) of section 189, which provides that a District Collector or a Collector hearing suits specified in Parts A and B of the Schedule, as well as the Board of Revenue or the Collector exercising appellate or revisional jurisdiction, shall hear and determine such suits as a revenue court, and that no civil court exercising original jurisdiction shall take cognizance of any dispute that could be brought before a revenue court. The Court therefore concluded that suits by a landholder to recover arrears of rent and to eject a ryot are triable by a Collector, as recorded in the entries at the relevant serial numbers.

The Court noted that the matters referred to in clauses 3 and 11 of Part A of the Schedule to the Act are suits that civil courts are statutorily prohibited from taking cognizance of, because the second paragraph of section 189(1) expressly excludes such suits from the original jurisdiction of civil courts. Consequently, the High Court was correct in holding that only a Revenue Court possessed the jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and that the appropriate consequence was to order the return of the plaint for presentation before the proper Revenue Court. The Court also considered the final argument raised, namely that when the civil court lacked jurisdiction over the suit, the High Court could not have entertained the cross‑objection raised by the appellant concerning the adjustment of a certain amount paid by the respondent. The Court agreed with that submission. It explained that a court which has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit is powerless to decide any substantive issue on the merits; its power is limited to determining the question of jurisdiction. Having concluded that it had no jurisdiction, the civil court was obliged simply to return the plaint, without addressing the merits. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, except to the extent that it affected the High Court’s order on the appellant’s cross‑objection. The order dismissing the cross‑objection was set aside, and the appellants were directed to pay the costs of the respondent throughout.