Shyamlal vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1962

Decision Date: 13 February, 1963

Coram: Syed Jaffer Imam, Raghubar Dayal, J.R. Mudholkar

In the matter titled Shyamlal versus State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on the thirteenth day of February, 1963, with the bench composed of Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, Justice Raghubar Dayal, and Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The case was recorded as a petition filed by Shyamlal against the State of Uttar Pradesh and was cited as 1963 AIR 1511 and 1964 SCR (2) 61. The factual scenario, as set out in the headnote, involved the appellant, who worked as a pointsman, harbouring a long‑standing grudge against a railway guard identified as C. While C was on duty as a guard on a train that was stationary at a platform, the appellant approached armed with a scythe, brandished the weapon in a threatening manner, declared his intention to cut C’s neck, and hurled abusive language at him. Subsequently, the appellant was tried and found guilty under section 121 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, on the ground that he had willfully obstructed a railway servant in the discharge of his duties. The appellant contested the conviction, arguing that the elements of the offence under section 121 were not satisfied. The Court, per the opinion of Justices Imam, Subba Rao, and Mudholkar, affirmed that the conviction was proper because the appellant’s act was motivated by malice born of his personal grudge and was therefore wilful within the meaning of the statutory provision. The Court further observed that C, although stationed on a train that was standing still, remained on duty and was required to perform a variety of responsibilities, and that the appellant’s conduct prevented C from discharging those duties. Justice Dayal, however, expressed a divergent view, holding that the appellant was not guilty of an offence under section 121 of the Indian Railways Act but rather of an offence punishable under section 506 of the Indian Penal Code. Justice Dayal explained that for a conviction under section 121 it must be established that the railway servant was actually obstructed “in the discharge of his duty,” and that the offence is completed only when the accused intends to prevent the servant from performing his duty and the act indeed results in such prevention. He noted that even threats of violence qualify as obstruction if the accused indicates that violence will be employed should the servant continue his duties. The Court referred to several precedents, including Empress v. Badam Singh (1883) 3 All. W. N. 197, Kishori Lal v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1925 All. 409, Bastable v. Little, 62 [1907] 1 K. B. 59, Betts v. Stevens, [1910] 1 K. B. 1, Nafar Sardar v. Emperor, (1932) I.L.R. 60 Cal. 149, and Emperor v. Tohfa, A.I.R. 1953 All. 759, all of which were cited in support of the reasoning. The judgment was recorded as a criminal appeal under jurisdiction No. 9 of 1962, brought by special leave against the judgment and order dated thirty June, 1961, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No. 971 of 1961. Counsel for the appellant were D. S. Golani and K. L. Mehta, while counsel for the respondent was C. P. Lal. The Court’s analysis consequently addressed the applicability of section 121 of the Indian Railways Act versus section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, examined the nature of the alleged obstruction, and ultimately rendered its decision on the basis of the statutory interpretation and the facts presented.

In this matter the judgment was delivered by Justices Imam, Subba Rao and Mudholkar, with Justice Imam delivering a separate opinion. The appellant, Shyamlal, had been found guilty by the Honorary Railway Bench Magistrate at the Tundla Bench in Agra, which exercised first‑class powers, for an offence punishable under section 121 of the Indian Railways Act. The magistrate imposed a penalty of sixty rupees and ordered that, should the fine not be paid, the appellant would be subjected to two months’ rigorous imprisonment. An appeal against that judgment was presented to the Additional Sessions Judge, also in Agra, and that appeal was dismissed, leaving the conviction and sentence intact. Subsequently, the appellant instituted Revision No. 971 of 1961 before the High Court at Allahabad; that revision was also turned down by Justice Brij Lal Gupta. After obtaining special leave to appeal from the Supreme Court, the appellant filed the present appeal.

At the material time Shyamlal was employed as a pointsman at Achhnera Railway Station. He harboured a long‑standing grievance against the second‑named witness, Hukam Chand Chaturvedi, who served as a Guard. The animosity dated back to 1955 when Hukam Chand objected to the appellant transporting a bed on a passenger train and later observed the appellant removing railway‑line sleepers from a carriage, a portion of which projected from the compartment. On that occasion Hukam Chand reported the matter, an act that resulted in Shyamlal’s transfer to another posting. The prosecution alleged that on 30 November 1959, at approximately 4 hours 50 minutes p.m., Hukam Chand was on duty as a Guard on the 20 Down train and was standing on the platform at Achhnera. At that moment the appellant emerged from behind a carriage, brandishing a scythe, and waved the implement in a threatening manner. He is said to have told Hukam Chand that he would cut his neck, and he hurled abusive language at the guard, thereby obstructing the guard’s performance of his duties. The prosecution’s case was narrated by the second‑named witness, and his testimony was fully corroborated by four independent witnesses—R. L. Pandey, Chanda Ram, Maharaj Dutt and Nisar—none of whom showed any hostility towards the appellant. After a careful review of this evidence, the Additional Sessions Judge in Agra concluded that the prosecution had proved its case: the appellant had indeed emerged from behind the carriage, had abused Hukam Chand, had waved the scythe in a menacing fashion and had shouted that he would cut the guard’s neck. Section 121 of the Indian Railways Act provides that any person who wilfully obstructs or impedes a railway servant in the discharge of his duty is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with a fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.

Counsel for the appellant contended that the prosecution had failed to demonstrate the specific duty that Hukam Chand was performing at the time of the alleged incident, and therefore argued that a conviction under section 121 could not stand. To support this submission the counsel cited several authorities, including Radha Kishan v. Emperor, Mohinder Singh v. The State, Jawand Mal v. The Crown, the matter of Baroda Kant Pramanik and Emperor v. Popatlal Bhaichand Shah, as well as Rules 113, 114, 115 and 137 made under the Indian Railways Act. The judge observed that the factual milieu of those precedents differed from the present case and consequently they did not influence the determination. From the facts set out, the court found that the appellant’s conduct was motivated by malice arising from past grievances, and that the act was undertaken voluntarily, satisfying the requirement of wilfulness under section 121.

In this case, the Court observed that the defence argued that because the prosecution had not established exactly what duty Hukam Chand was performing at the time, the appellant could not be convicted under section 121 of the Indian Railways Act. To support that argument, the counsel cited several earlier decisions, namely Radha Kishan v. Emperor (1), Mohinder Singh v. The State (2), Jawand Mal v. The Crown (3), In the matter of Baroda Kant Pramanik (4) and Emperor v. Popatlal Bhaichand Shah (5). The counsel also referred to Rules 113, 114, 115 and 137 that are contained in the Rules made under the Indian Railways Act. The Court noted, however, that the factual circumstances in each of those cited cases differed markedly from the facts of the present dispute and that the differences could be readily identified. Consequently, the Court held that those authorities did not have any persuasive effect on the present decision. The Court then turned to the material facts of the present case. It found that the alleged act was committed by the appellant himself and was motivated by personal animosity, because Hukam Chand had previously reprimanded the appellant for earlier lapses. The Court concluded that the act was therefore intentional and fell within the meaning of “wilful” in section 121 of the Indian Railways Act. Moreover, the Court observed that at the material time Hukam Chand was serving as the guard of train 20 Down, which was stationary on the platform. As a guard, Hukam Chand was required to perform a range of duties even while the train was not moving, such as supervising the loading of parcels into the luggage van and ensuring that no untoward incident occurred on the platform. The Court pointed out that for approximately fifteen minutes, during which the incident occurred, the appellant’s deliberate and intentional conduct prevented Hukam Chand from performing those duties. The Court emphasized that a guard’s duty is not confined to periods when the train is in motion; the duty continues while the train is standing at the platform. Accordingly, the Court expressed the opinion that the appellant had willfully created an obstruction to the discharge of a public duty by Hukam Chand in his capacity as a guard. The Court referred to Rules 93 to 103, which regulate the attendance, discipline and equipment of staff working on trains, and specifically noted Rule 95, which mandates that the guard be in charge of all matters affecting the stopping or movement of the train for traffic purposes. From this provision, the Court inferred that Hukam Chand remained on duty up to the moment he was to assume the guard’s responsibilities, and that the appellant’s conduct amounted to a wilful obstruction of that duty. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the conviction of the appellant under section 121 of the Indian Railways Act was proper and ordered the appeal to be dismissed. Justice Ragrubar Dayal added that, in his view, the appellant was not guilty of

The Court observed that the appellant was not guilty of the offence punishable under section 121 of the Indian Railways Act, but was guilty of the offence punishable under section 506 of the Penal Code. The factual findings concerning the appellant’s conduct at the relevant time were not open to challenge in this appeal by way of special leave. Consequently, the sole issue for determination was whether the appellant, by his conduct, had committed an offence under section 121 of the Act, which provides: “If a person wilfully obstructs or impedes any railway servant in the discharge of his duty he shall be punished with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees.” To prove the offence, it was necessary to establish two elements: first, that the appellant acted wilfully; and second, that his wilful action resulted in the obstruction or impediment of Hukam Chand while he was discharging his duty. The Court noted that the phrase “in the discharge of his duty” does not merely mean “when on duty.” Rather, the obstruction must have interfered with the actual performance of the specific duty that the railway servant was carrying out at that moment. The record, however, contained no indication of what Hukam Chand was doing at the relevant time, and therefore no evidence that he was engaged in any duty as a guard at that instant. The mere fact that the incident occurred on the platform roughly forty minutes before the train’s departure did not, by itself, establish that Hukam Chand was actively performing a guard’s duty. In this regard, the Magistrate had remarked: “there is not the least doubt that his conduct amounted to interference with the duties of the guard who was ready to go with the train and much of his time was wasted in writing complaints.” The Court found that this observation was not based on any specific findings regarding either the particular duties that were allegedly interfered with or the time spent in drafting complaints. The report submitted by Hukam Chand to the station master was brief and did not even mention the time of the incident, suggesting that the incident could not have taken a long duration. The learned Sessions Judge, in his judgment, had stated: “So far as the question of obstruction is concerned it may be noted that Shri Hukam Chand was on duty as a Guard on train 20 Down, which was then standing at the platform. As a guard he had to discharge multifarious duties at a time while the train was standing at the platform e.g., he had to look after the loading of the parcels in the luggage van and to see that nothing untoward happened at the platform. Thus during the time that the incident took place viz., for about fifteen minutes, he was obstructed from discharging his duty by this deliberate and wilful act on the part of the appellant.” The Court pointed out that even this statement did not identify any specific duty that Hukam Chand was performing at the moment of the alleged obstruction.

At the time of the incident, the deposition of Hukam Chand indicated that a luggage guard was present on the train, and that individual was identified as Ram Lakhan Pandey. The duty of a luggage guard was to supervise the loading of luggage, a responsibility that did not belong to Hukam Chand, who served as the train guard. The statement that the guard had to ensure that nothing untoward occurred on the platform was overly vague, and the conduct of Shyam Lal at the station did not interfere with any failure on the part of Hukam Chand to perform his duties. Hukam Chand could have approached the Senior Accounts Officer to lodge a complaint, and that officer could have issued appropriate orders or instructions if any problem arose on the platform. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Hukam Chand was indeed engaged in his duties at that moment, the pivotal issue was whether the accused’s actions amounted to a wilful obstruction of him while he was performing those duties. The appellant threatened Hukam Chand with a scythe and shouted abusive language at him. Such conduct was not intended to obstruct Hukam Chand in the discharge of his official responsibilities. The statutory provision requires that the wilfulness of the accused be directed toward the act of obstruction itself, not toward any other act. Generally, an intentional act is considered wilful, but an intention directed at a purpose other than impeding a railway servant does not constitute wilful obstruction of that servant. The appellant’s behavior was aimed at Hukam Chand personally rather than at preventing him from carrying out any official function. He was not threatened in order to stop him from performing his duties, and consequently the appellant could not be said to have wilfully obstructed Hukam Chand in the discharge of his duty. Hukam Chand’s reaction to the threat, including his decision to make complaints to the Senior Accounts Officer or to the Station Master, which momentarily kept him away from his routine guard duties, was irrelevant to determining the nature of the appellant’s wilful, that is, intentional act. The court then referred to earlier decisions that bear upon the present matter. In Empress v. Badant Singh, the execution of a sale deed by a judgment debtor was held not to constitute obstruction of the sale in execution, because the sale proceeded without impediment. Similarly, in the present case, the train departed as scheduled, and there was no basis to assume that Hukam Chand could not perform the necessary duties preceding the train’s departure. In Kishori Lal v. Emperor, the patwari’s refusal to allow the kanungo to inspect his books, and the patwari’s subsequent removal of those books, was examined in the context of obstruction under section 186 of the Indian Penal Code. The court’s analysis of those precedents helped shape the conclusion that the appellant’s conduct did not amount to a voluntary obstruction of a public servant in the performance of his public functions.

The Court noted that the conduct described in the earlier case was not deemed an offence under section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, which punishes voluntary obstruction of a public servant in the performance of public duties. In that case, the patwari’s actions prevented the Kanungo from carrying out his duties, yet the Court held that the patwari’s behaviour did not constitute a voluntary obstruction of the Kanungo in the discharge of his functions. The reasoning behind that finding was that, although the Kanungo intended to perform his duties, he was frustrated by the patwari’s interference; consequently, the scenario was not considered an obstruction of the Kanungo’s duties. The relevant authorities were cited as (1) (1883) 3 All. W.N. 197 and (2) A.I.R. 1925 All. 409.

The Court then referred to the judgment in Bastable v. Little (1). In that case, the accused had warned approaching automobiles that constables were measuring distances on the road and watching the traffic in order to determine whether the vehicles were traveling at an illegal speed. The Court held that the accused was not guilty of obstructing the constables while they were performing their duties, as defined by section 2 of the Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885. Lord Alverstone, C.J., observed that “the section points to something done in regard to the duty which the constable is performing.” Ridley J. added that for an offence under the section to arise, there must be interference with the constable himself by physical force or threats; the constable must be physically obstructed, or at the very least, force must be used to prevent him from acting.

The Court further examined the decision in Betts v. Stevens (2). In that matter, the accused performed the same type of warning as in Bastable v. Little, but the warning was given to vehicles that were actually traveling at an excessive speed at the time the warning was issued and were expected to cover the measured distance at that excessive speed. The Court held the accused guilty of the offence under section 2 of the Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885. Lord Alverstone, C.J., explained that a person who discovers a car breaking the law and warns the driver, thereby causing the car’s speed to reduce, prevents the police from ascertaining the speed and thus obstructs the police in the execution of their duty. He emphasized that the only evidence courts can rely on with confidence in such cases is the obstruction of the police in performing their duties. He further observed that this situation matched the case of Bastable v. Little and that a prior narrow interpretation of the word “obstruct” by Ridley J. needed to be reconsidered.

In the Court’s view, only physical obstruction or threats could fall within the statutory provision. However, the Court clarified that this does not mean that merely warning a passing vehicle – for example, telling the driver to be cautious because a police trap lies ahead – constitutes an obstruction of the police in the performance of their duty when there is no proof that the vehicle was exceeding the legal speed at the time the warning was given. The Court further explained that if it is established, as it was in the present case, that the vehicles were already violating the speed limit when the warning was issued, and that the act of giving the warning prevented the police from obtaining the sole evidence required for the prosecution, then such a warning does amount to obstruction. Darling, J., observed at page 8 that the appellant effectively advised the drivers of those cars, which were travelling at an unlawful speed, not to continue the unlawful act. He noted that if the advice were offered solely to halt the unlawful conduct and to ensure compliance with the law, there would be no obstruction of the police in gathering evidence beyond the point of the appellant’s intervention. The Court emphasized that the essence of the offence, in its judgment, lies in the intention with which the act is performed.

The Court indicated that it was unnecessary to determine the precise correctness of the view expressed in this case regarding the commission of the offence. The observations were cited to demonstrate that a necessary element of wilfully obstructing a public servant in the discharge of duties is the person’s actual intention to prevent the public servant from performing his duty. Moreover, the result of the act must be that the public servant is actually impeded and unable to carry out his function. Consequently, the Court held that an offence under section 121 of the Act is committed only when the accused performs an act with the intention of preventing the public servant from executing his duty, and the act indeed prevents such performance. The appellant also argued that mere threats of violence could not amount to obstruction of Hukam Chand in the discharge of his duty, asserting that the appellant only uttered threats and therefore did not commit an offence under section 121. The Court rejected this argument, stating that threats of violence can constitute obstruction of a public servant if the attitude of the person making the threats indicates a willingness to use violence should the public servant persist in performing his duty, and that such an attitude approves of the use of force to impede the servant’s function.

The Court began by recalling the observations of Costello, J., in Nafar Sardar v. Emperor (1) and noting that those observations had been approved in Emperor v. Tohfa (2), where the factual situation was alike. In the case of Nafar Sardar v. Emperor (1), a naib nazir who had been authorised to execute a decree for the attachment of the accused’s moveable property entered the accused’s house with the purpose of attaching the moveables. A number of persons assembled, and some of those persons, including the accused, declared that they would kill or break the head of anyone who entered the house to effect the attachment. Because of this hostile attitude, the attachment could not be carried out. In holding the accused guilty of the offence under section 186 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Costello, J., explained that “no doubt, in some instances, mere threats may not of themselves be sufficient. The real question is whether the action or attitude on the part of the persons alleged to have obstructed a public servant in the performance of his functions was of such a nature as to obstruct, that is to say, to stand in the way so as to prevent him in carrying out the duties which he had to discharge. Where it is solely a matter of threats, they must be of such a nature as to affect the public servant concerned as to cause him to abstain from proceeding with the execution of his duties. It seems to me obvious that threats of violence, made in such a way as to prevent a public servant from carrying out his duty, would easily amount to an obstruction of the public servant, particularly if such threats are coupled with an aggressive or menacing attitude on the part of the persons uttering the threats and still more so if they are accompanied by the flourishing or even the exhibition of some kind of weapon capable of inflicting physical injury. Threats made by a person holding an offensive weapon in his hand must be taken to be just as much an obstruction as that caused by a person actually blocking a gateway or handling a public servant in a manner calculated to prevent him from executing his duty.” Applying this reasoning to the facts of the present matter, the Court observed that the appellant’s conduct in threatening Hukam Chand, the guard at the station, did not constitute an offence under section 121 of the Act. However, the same conduct satisfied the elements of an offence under section 506 of the Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, the Court altered the appellant’s conviction from an offence under section 121 of the Act to an offence under section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, affirmed the fine of Rs 60, and stipulated that failure to pay the fine would result in rigorous imprisonment for two months. The appeal was dismissed.