S. Pratap Singh vs The State Of Punjab
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 80 of 1963
Decision Date: 02/09/1963
Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, S. K. Das, K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal, J. R. Mudholkar
In this matter the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 2 September 1963 in the case titled S Pratap Singh versus the State of Punjab, the opinion being authored by Justice N Rajagopala Ayyangar and joined by Justices Raghubar Dayal and J R Mudholkar. The petition was brought by S Pratap Singh against the State of Punjab and the decision is reported in 1964 AIR 72, 1964 SCR (4) 733 and cited in numerous subsequent reports, including R 1965 SC 596, R 1967 SC 295, R 1968 SC 147, R 1970 SC 214, R 1971 SC 530, R 1971 SC 1162, R 1972 SC 1004, R 1973 SC 157, R 1975 SC 550, R 1976 SC 1207, R 1976 SC 1737, RF 1977 SC 629, R 1979 SC 220, R 1982 SC 1043, R 1986 SC 3, R 1986 SC 872, RF 1991 SC 2160, and RF 1992 SC 604. The substantive legal framework involved the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952, particularly rules 3, 26(d), 8, and 15, together with the Constitution of India 1950, articles 19 and 23, and the question of the validity of rule 326(d). The appellant had been a civil surgeon employed by the State of Punjab, having entered the Punjab Civil Medical Service in 1947, and he was posted to Jullunder in 1956 where he served until he proceeded on leave preparatory to retirement in December 1960. His leave was formally sanctioned on 18 December 1960 and its approval was published in the Punjab Gazette on 27 January 1961. On 3 June 1961 the Governor of Punjab issued orders that immediately suspended the appellant and revoked his sanctioned leave, on the ground that the Government intended to institute a departmental enquiry against him under section 7 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952. In the same breath the Governor invoked rule 3.26(d) stating that a government servant who is suspended on a charge of misconduct shall not be permitted to retire upon reaching the compulsory retirement age but must remain in service until the enquiry is concluded and a final order is passed. Because the appellant attained the age of superannuation on 16 June 1961, the rule‑based order required that he continue in service beyond that date until the departmental enquiry was completed. The appellant asserted that he became aware of these orders only on 19 June 1961, although they had been published earlier in the Punjab Government Gazette Extraordinary dated 10 June 1961. Consequently, he filed a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Punjab, challenging the legality of the suspension, the revocation of his leave, his retention in service after superannuation, and the institution of the departmental enquiry.
The appellant filed a writ petition questioning the legality of several orders issued against him, including his suspension, the revocation of his previously granted leave, the direction that he remain in service beyond his normal superannuation date, and the initiation of a departmental enquiry. He raised, among other grounds, the contention that the service rules did not authorize the Governor to make the orders he challenged, and that the orders had been issued in bad faith at the instigation of the Chief Minister, who supervised the Health Department and who, according to the appellant, harboured personal hostility toward him because of certain past incidents and allegedly intended to exact personal vengeance through the impugned orders. The Court then examined the submissions and articulated its holdings. First, it observed that Rule 8.15 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules placed no temporal limitation on the authority’s power to revoke leave; the authority that initially granted leave retained discretion to cancel it even after the officer had actually commenced the leave period. Second, the Court held that the day on which a government servant begins leave in preparation for retirement could not be treated as the servant’s formal date of retirement, and accordingly an order suspending the servant during such preparatory leave was valid. Third, the Court noted that although the suspension and leave‑revocation orders dated 3 June 1961 were communicated to the appellant only after his retirement had technically occurred, the orders were deemed effective from the moment of their issuance because the appellant was on leave at that time; the decisions in Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 395) and State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh ([1961] 2 S.C.R. 371) were distinguished. Fourth, the Court found that the appellant possessed no absolute right to retire upon reaching the age of superannuation; any such right was subject to Rule 3.26(d), which applied to him because he was under suspension on misconduct charges on the day his compulsory retirement would have otherwise taken effect.
Continuing its analysis, the Court held that whenever a charge of misconduct is being investigated by the Government—whether through informal or formal procedures—the Government is competent to suspend the concerned servant and, if the circumstances of the case require, to invoke the provisions of Section 3.26(d). The Court further concluded that the provisions of Rule 3.26(d) did not infringe Articles 19 and 23 of the Constitution of India. Regarding evidentiary matters, the Court stated that a tape‑recorded conversation could be admitted as legal evidence for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of a person who claims to have participated in the conversation or of a person who alleges to have overheard it; the weight to be accorded to such evidence would depend on other factors that might be proved in the particular case, as explained by Justices Das, Subba Rao and Rajagopala Ayyangar. Finally, the Court observed that when an authority exercising a power bases its decision on a factor that it cannot properly consider, the exercise of that power would be invalid, emphasizing that an authority must not allow irrelevant considerations to influence its exercise of statutory powers.
In this passage the Court explained that an exercise of power is improper when the authority takes into account a factor that it is not authorized to consider. When the purposes sought to be achieved are a mixture of some that are relevant and some that are alien to the purpose, the difficulty is resolved by identifying the dominant purpose that actually impelled the action. Where the power itself is conditioned upon a particular purpose, the courts will invalidate the exercise of that power whenever it is proved that an irrelevant purpose entered the mind of the authority. The Court further observed that it is not an appellate forum for canvassing the correctness of a governmental order and it has no jurisdiction to substitute its own view as to the necessity or desirability of initiating disciplinary proceedings; the entire jurisdiction in that regard is vested in the Government. The only question that the Court may consider is whether the authority vested with the power paid attention to, or took into account, circumstances, events or matters wholly extraneous to the purpose for which the power was conferred, or whether the proceedings were initiated in bad faith to satisfy a private or personal grudge against the officer. If the act is in excess of the power granted or constitutes an abuse or misuse of power, the matter is capable of interference and rectification by the Court. It is also not correct to say that mala fides, understood as an improper motive, can be established only by direct evidence that must be discernible from the impugned order or from the notes in the file preceding that order. The Court held that where bad faith vitiates an order, the same can be deduced as a reasonable and inescapable inference from proved facts. Municipal Council of Sydney v. Cambell, [1925] A.C. 338, Short v. Poole Corporation [1926] 1 Ch. 66, Vatcher v. Paull, [1915] A.C. 372, Sadler v. Shefield Corporation, [19241] 1 Ch. 483, Earl Fitzwilliam v. Minister of T. & C. Planning, 119511 2 K. B. 284 and General Assembly of Free Church v. Overatoun, [1904] A.C. 515 were relied upon. Per Dayal and Mudholkar, J. On the facts, the dominant motive that induced the Government to act against the appellant was not to commence disciplinary proceedings for misconduct that it honestly believed he had committed, but to exact vengeance because the appellant had incurred the wrath of the Chief Minister and had brought disrepute on him; consequently the impugned orders were vitiated by mala fides, being motivated by an improper purpose outside the scope of the discretion conferred on the Government, and the orders revoking the leave granted, placing the appellant under suspension and directing an enquiry into the charges against him should be set aside. The judgment then raised the question whether the provision in Article 310(1) of the Constitution of India, which states that members of a Civil Service of a State hold office during the pleasure of the Governor, confers on the State Government the power to compel an officer to continue in service against his will, even after the age of superannuation, notwithstanding the service rules that might otherwise apply.
In this appeal, the Court recorded that the matter arose under the civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal number 80 of 1963. The appeal challenged a judgment and order dated 4 April 1962 of the Punjab High Court issued in Civil Writ number 961 of 1961. The appellant, a Civil Surgeon employed by the State Government, appeared in person before the Court. The Attorney General, C K Daphtary, was assisted by the Deputy Advocate‑General of Punjab, Mohinder Singh Punnu, and by B R G K Achar, who appeared for P D Menon, the respondent. The judgment was delivered on 2 September 1963 by Justices S K Das, K Subba Rao and N Rajagopala Ayyangar, the latter reading the opinion of the Court. A dissenting opinion authored by Justices Raghubar Dayal and J R Mudholkar was read by Justice Dayal.
The appeal was filed against the High Court’s dismissal of a petition that the appellant had brought under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition had been presented after the appellant obtained a certificate of fitness pursuant to Article 133(1)(c). The appellant had previously been granted leave in preparation for retirement. In June 1961 the State Government issued three orders: first, it revoked the leave that had been granted and recalled the appellant to duty; second, it placed the appellant under suspension pending the outcome of an inquiry into alleged misconduct; and third, it directed that a departmental inquiry be instituted against him. The appellant contested the legality of these orders in the petition, which the High Court rejected. Following the rejection, the appellant secured a certificate of fitness and consequently lodged the present appeal.
The Court noted that the appellant’s learned counsel, who argued the case personally, presented two principal grounds of challenge. The first ground asserted that each of the orders dated June 1961—(a) the recall from the previously granted leave, (b) the suspension pending inquiry, and (c) the initiation of the departmental inquiry—were illegal because they contravened the applicable Service Rules governing the appellant’s position. The second ground contended that, even if the orders were within the Government’s authority when the Service Rules were properly interpreted, they had been issued with malicious intent. According to the appellant, the orders were promulgated at the behest of the Chief Minister of Punjab, who harboured personal hostility toward the appellant owing to certain incidents and circumstances detailed by the appellant. The appellant further maintained that the motive behind the orders was the Chief Minister’s desire to exact personal vengeance against him.
In this case, the Court observed that the allegations against the Chief Minister suggested that he intended to exact personal vengeance on the appellant. The Court noted that the relevant service rules and their interpretation had already been discussed in the judgment of Dayal, J., and that it largely agreed with his conclusion that the orders challenged were within the authority of the Government. However, the Court clarified that this agreement did not mean it accepted every interpretation that Dayal, J. had placed on each of the various rules he examined. Likewise, the Court stated that it did not adopt the learned Attorney‑General’s submission on behalf of the respondent‑State that Article 310(1) of the Constitution, which provides that “members of a Civil Service of a State hold office during the pleasure of the Governor,” gave the State Government a power to force an officer to remain in service against his will, regardless of service rules that might apply after superannuation or after a fixed term had expired. The Court held that reading the phrase “the pleasure of the Governor” in such a way was plainly unwarranted and conflicted with the Court’s earlier decision in State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid (1). On the second ground of challenge, the Court said it was not necessary to scrutinise in detail the several rules that had been highlighted or to determine their proper construction. The Court then turned to the second submission raised before it, namely that the order had been passed mala fide and therefore could not be sustained. Before examining the specific allegations, the supporting evidence, and the inferences to be drawn, the Court found it appropriate to set out the legal principles governing this area. It explained that the statutory Service Rules vest the power to issue the impugned orders in the Government. The term “Government” is understood, in this context, to refer to the functionary within the State who holds the executive authority for the relevant field. While the Constitution vests the executive power of a State in the Governor, it requires the Governor to act on the aid and advice of his Ministers. In the matter before the Court, it was undisputed that the Chief Minister was the head of the Health Department where the appellant was employed, and consequently the Chief Minister, as the Minister in charge of that portfolio, initiated the proceedings, although the formal orders were issued by the Departmental Secretaries in the name of the Governor. For the purposes of the controversy, it was clear that the functional authority who acted and whose instructions led to the action against the appellant was the Chief Minister.
In this case the Court noted that if the Minister, who acted as the functional authority, acted with malice or bad faith, the resulting action would be legally defective. The Court observed that the Attorney‑General initially indicated an intention to argue that even if bad faith were proven against the Chief Minister the challenged orders could not be set aside. However, the Attorney‑General did not pursue that line of argument and instead sought to convince the Court that the evidence did not establish bad faith. The Court explained that accepting such an argument would imply that fraud or corruption, apart from bad faith, could never be examined by a court and would never invalidate an administrative order. The Court cited the observation of Lord Denning in Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley that no court judgment or ministerial order may stand if it has been obtained by fraud. In view of these considerations the Court decided that it was unnecessary to explore this point in greater depth. Turning to the second ground of attack on the orders, the Court identified two related aspects: first, the order might be ultra vires in the pure sense, and second, the order might breach the principle that every power vested in a public body must be exercised honestly, in good faith and reasonably, noting that these two concepts often overlap.
The Court then referred to several authorities to illustrate these principles. It cited Sir Lyman Duff in Municipal Council of Sydney v. Campbell, where the Court held that a municipal corporation authorized to acquire land for specified purposes could not use its power for other purposes and that the courts would intervene if it attempted to do so. The Court also quoted Lord Loreburn in Marquess of Clanricarde v. Congested Districts Board, stating that whether a body exercises its power for an ulterior purpose is a question of fact and that the party challenging the action must prove the existence of such an ulterior motive. Further, the Court mentioned the observations of Mr Justice Pollock in Short v. Poole Corporation, where it was noted that an authority created by statute must not exercise its statutory powers corruptly, such as under the influence of bribery or in bad faith, and that any attempt to do so would be null and void. The Court also referenced the remark of L.T. Warrington in the same case that no public body may act with corrupt motives, and that any action taken in bad faith would be ineffective. These authorities were presented to underline that an order issued by a public authority must be within the scope of its legal power and must be exercised with integrity, otherwise it may be set aside as ultra vires or as an abuse of power.
In the judgment, the Court explained that a public body could not be said to have statutory authority when it acted in bad faith or from corrupt motives, and that any action claimed to be that of the body but proved to have been carried out in bad faith or with corrupt motives would be deemed inoperative. The Court also noted that it was possible to demonstrate that a public body’s act, although performed in good faith and without any corrupt influence, was based on considerations that were completely irrelevant to the authority granted to it; such an act would likewise be outside the body’s power and therefore ineffective. The Court observed that it was difficult to identify any act that would be ultra vires on this ground when it was performed bona fide, referring to the discussion on pages ninety and ninety‑one of the cited material. The Court then recalled that Lord Parker had emphasized the first aspect of ultra vires in Vatcher v. Paull, citing page three hundred seventy‑eight of the report, where he described a power that was exercised for a purpose or with an intention that went beyond what the instrument creating the power allowed. In legal terms, the Court said, this situation represented a fraud on a power, even though no corrupt motive or bargain was alleged. Accordingly, the Court held that if an authority exercising a power considered, even sincerely and with the best intentions, a factor that it could not properly consider in deciding whether, how, or to what extent to exercise the power, the exercise would be improper. The Court added that sometimes courts faced situations where the purposes pursued were mixed—some relevant and some alien to the statutory purpose. In such cases, courts had sometimes resolved the difficulty by identifying the dominant purpose that drove the action; when the power itself was conditioned by a specific purpose, the courts had invalidated the exercise of the power if any irrelevant purpose was shown to have influenced the authority’s mind, citing Sadler v. Sheffield Corporation and Lord Denning’s observation in Earl Fitzwilliam etc. v. Minister of Town and Country Planning. The Court explained that this principle meant that if the dominant purpose was unlawful, the act itself was unlawful, and the presence of an additional lawful purpose did not cure the defect. The Court further observed that the two grounds of ultra vires and bad faith were often inseparably intertwined. Treating the matter as a question of ultra vires, the Court asked what the nature of the power was and whether it had been granted to achieve a definite object, which would condition the power by that purpose. Applying this analysis to the present case, the Court concluded that the power vested in the Government to pass the impugned orders was undeniably a governmental power.
In this case the Court observed that the power exercised by the Government was conferred for a defined public purpose, namely to safeguard probity and purity in the public services by permitting disciplinary penal action against members of the service who are suspected of misconduct. The Court held that the very nature of the power therefore disclosed its purpose. Consequently, the Court said that if that power were employed for an alien purpose, such as the minister seeking vengeance against an officer, the exercise would be mala fide and would amount to a colourable use of the power, which must be struck down by the Courts. The Court referred to the dictum of Lord Lindley in General Assembly of Free Church etc. v. Overtoun, where the learned Lord observed at page 695 that “there is a condition implied in this as well as in other instruments which create powers, namely, that the power shall be used bona fide for the purposes for which they are conferred.” The Court explained that any party seeking to invalidate or nullify an act or order must establish a charge of bad faith, abuse or misuse by the Government of its powers. While an indirect motive, personal ill‑will or bad faith cannot be deemed proved without clear evidence, the Court recognized the difficulty of proving a person’s state of mind and noted that the appellant bears the burden of proving such mala fide intent, as sometimes done in Edgington v. Fitzmaurice (2). The Court further cautioned that it is not an appellate forum to review the correctness of a governmental order or to substitute its own view on the necessity or desirability of initiating disciplinary proceedings, because the entire jurisdiction and discretion in that regard is vested by law in the Government. The only issue the Court may consider is whether the authority that holds the power has taken into account circumstances wholly extraneous to the purpose of the power or has initiated proceedings mala fide to satisfy a private or personal grudge against the officer. If the act exceeds the power granted or constitutes an abuse or misuse of that power, the matter is capable of interference and rectification by the Court.
The Court observed that whenever the exercise of a statutory power exceeds the bounds of that power, the matter becomes open to judicial interference and correction. Even if the authority accused of acting in bad faith denies any mala fides, rejects any suggestion of hidden motives, or insists that it did not consider any improper or irrelevant factors, the Court is nevertheless entitled to investigate the truth of those accusations and, if the allegations are proved, to grant appropriate relief to the party injured by the illegality or abuse of power. Before examining whether the appellant had demonstrated that the Government’s action was tainted by mala fides, the Court deemed it necessary to make certain preliminary observations. In assessing the evidence, the Court kept in mind the elevated position occupied by the Chief Minister in the State and recognized that accusations of a personal nature directed against such a dignitary must not be accepted lightly. The Court also recalled that claims of personal hostility are frequently made by individuals who are themselves subject to penal or quasi‑penal proceedings initiated by the same authority, and therefore it allowed full consideration of these circumstances while carefully weighing the evidence. The Court further noted that the differing opinions of two of its own members on this issue heightened its sense of responsibility to examine the material with particular care. It emphasized that the Constitution enshrines the rule of law and that Article 226 is intended to ensure that every authority in the State, including the Government, acts in good faith and within the limits of its jurisdiction. Accordingly, when the Court is convinced that an abuse or misuse of power has occurred and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is bound to provide justice to the aggrieved individual. With these considerations guiding its approach, the Court turned to the factual allegations presented in the writ petition filed by the appellant. The petition set out several specific grievances: first, the appellant was asked by the Chief Minister to perform an operation on the Chief Minister’s son, Surinder Singh, in April 1960, an operation which was duly carried out; thereafter the Chief Minister wanted his son to remain under the appellant’s care in Jullundur during recovery, but the son left the appellant’s residence, prompting the Chief Minister to accuse the appellant of negligence. Second, the Chief Minister and members of his family repeatedly requested the appellant to extend special favors to certain patients who were referred to him; the appellant complied with the initial requests, but when he later refused further demands, the Chief Minister turned hostile toward him. Third, the Chief Minister’s wife repeatedly asked the appellant to send medicines for her personal use, and the appellant complied by purchasing the medicines from the market and sending them to her.
In the factual background presented, the appellant explained that the Chief Minister’s wife had asked for medicines to be supplied from the hospital stores of Jullundur. The appellant complied with this request, but he purchased the medicines from the market rather than obtaining them from the hospital. Subsequently, the Chief Minister’s wife also requested expensive articles such as Singer sewing machines to be sent to her free of cost. The appellant complied with the initial request for the sewing machine, but he refused to satisfy any further similar demands. This refusal, according to the appellant, caused additional anger on the part of the Chief Minister.
The appellant further recounted that a man named Kirpa Singh, who was serving as the manager of an automobile business called National Motors in Jullundur and who was either directly or indirectly owned by Surinder—the son of the Chief Minister—was accommodated by the appellant in the appellant’s own residence. In addition to providing board, the appellant allowed Kirpa Singh to stay in his house for approximately seven months. Around April 1960, the appellant asked Kirpa Singh to secure alternative lodging and board. Kirpa Singh complied with this request, but the appellant said that this action created another source of irritation and anger for the Chief Minister.
The appellant asserted that the incidents described above occurred in April 1960 or thereabouts. He claimed that, as a result of the hostility that developed because of these incidents, he was in September 1960 accused of showing undue favour to Akali prisoners who were lodged at the District Jail in Jullundur. The appellant maintained that this allegation was false and that the accusation was subsequently not pursued.
The appellant also described that the Chief Minister had sought his assistance as an expert to advise the police officers who were conducting the prosecution in the case commonly referred to as the Karnal Murder case. The appellant gave the Chief Minister some assurance that the prosecution would succeed. However, the prosecution failed before the Sessions Judge, the State’s appeal was dismissed by the High Court of Punjab, and a later application for special leave was dismissed by this Court. The appellant stated that the Chief Minister became very angry because the assurance he had received turned out to be untrue, and the Chief Minister felt humiliated by the outcome.
Another matter involved a Dr. Dhillon, who was a Junior Medical Officer in the Punjab Medical Service and who had accompanied the Chief Minister as a medical attendant during the years 1956‑57. The appellant noted that, under the rules, the Chief Minister was not entitled to such medical attendance. A dispute arose concerning the salary payable to Dr. Dhillon for the forty‑five days he served with the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister asked the appellant to issue a false certificate regarding Dr. Dhillon’s services. The Chief Minister also complained that, even after several years, the salary for those forty‑five days had not been paid to Dr. Dhillon. The appellant refused to comply with the demand for a false certificate, which the appellant said was another source of irritation and hostility from the Chief Minister.
Finally, the appellant pleaded that, because of the series of incidents and the resulting displeasure of the Chief Minister, the Chief Minister was contemplating taking action against him, and that this perception of hostility formed the basis of his grievance.
According to the records, a complaint was lodged against the appellant on 29 October 1960 and was forwarded for investigation. The allegation stated that on 5 July 1960 the appellant had refused to examine a woman who arrived at the hospital holding an outdoor chit, and that the husband of that woman was compelled to pay a sum of sixteen rupees for the examination to be carried out at the appellant’s residence. On the ground that this complaint had been made, an order dated 6 December 1960 transferred the appellant from Jullundur to Amritsar. The appellant submitted that, in that State, transfers of officers were normally effected only during the months of March or April so as not to disrupt the education of their children, and therefore a transfer in December was unusual. He argued that the December transfer was intended to inconvenience and humiliate him and to deprive him of his practice in Jullundur. Realising the animosity of the Chief Minister and not wishing to remain in service for much longer, the appellant applied for leave preparatory to retirement. He was approaching the age of fifty‑five on 15 June 1961 and sought leave until that date. The government sanctioned the leave with effect from 18 December 1960, and the sanction was published in the Gazette on 27 January 1961. However, the impugned orders of 3 June 1961 revoked the sanctioned leave, placed the appellant under suspension, and ordered the commencement of an inquiry into the matter. Between the sanction of the leave in December 1960 and its revocation in June 1961, several events occurred that were later set out in the petition. It was evident that when the leave preparatory to retirement was approved, the government already possessed the complaint of 29 October 1960 concerning the alleged improper demand of sixteen rupees from a patient seeking treatment at the Jullundur hospital. That complaint related to the incident of July 1960 and apparently was not considered serious enough to justify denying the appellant’s leave. Subsequent to the approval of the leave, the weekly newspaper Blitz issued an edition on 15 January 1961 containing allegations directed against the Chief Minister. Many of those allegations corresponded to those that the appellant himself had raised in his petition and identified as the reasons for the Chief Minister’s hostility. Although the article did not mention the appellant by name, persons familiar with the circumstances could infer that the appellant was the individual from whom the Chief Minister had sought or obtained the alleged favours. The appellant contended that the Chief Minister, who was in Delhi at that time, must have become aware of the contents of the Blitz article.
It was asserted that the article could have been known to the Chief Minister as early as the thirteenth day of January 1961. The assertion was supported by the common understanding that copies of the weekly newspaper were obtainable in Delhi at least two days before the date printed on the issue. Because there was no affidavit placed on the record from the Chief Minister, the Court could not determine definitively whether the Chief Minister had actually read the article on that thirteenth day. On that same date, the Vigilance Inspector of Jullundur sent a written enquiry to the appellant. The communication asked whether the appellant, who at that time had travelled to Kanpur and, as he later recalled, was on leave, would be willing to return to Jullundur to clarify certain matters that had arisen under an inquiry ordered by the Punjab Government. The enquiry related to a complaint concerning the alleged improper receipt of sixteen rupees from a patient who had been admitted to the hospital for treatment in July of 1960. The Vigilance Inspector proceeded to make further inquiries of the appellant and inspected the hospital records during February 1961.
Subsequently, on the eighteenth day of March 1961, the appellant’s wife addressed a letter to the newspaper Blitz. In that letter she affirmed the allegations against the Chief Minister that had already been published in the issue dated fifteen January 1961. During the same month, the appellant’s wife distributed copies of those newspaper allegations to Members of Parliament and to other individuals. The appellant maintained that these actions provoked hostility on the part of the Chief Minister and that the orders issued in June 1961 were not genuine attempts to investigate his conduct. Rather, he contended, the orders were intended to harass and humiliate him as retaliation for his role in damaging the Chief Minister’s reputation through the disclosures. The Court observed earlier that if the appellant could demonstrate that the principal purpose of initiating the inquiry was not the service interest or the detection of any misconduct, but rather the dominant motive of harassment, humiliation and open defamation because the appellant had refused to accede to the demands of the Chief Minister or his family, then the orders would be founded on bad faith and would have to be set aside. The Court therefore indicated that it would first examine each of the allegations to determine whether they had been satisfactorily proved. Before continuing, the Court noted that personal allegations against the Chief Minister could be repelled in only two ways: first, if the allegations were entirely irrelevant and, even if true, would not provide any basis for granting relief to the appellant; and second, if the allegations were relevant, they could be countered by documentary or sworn evidence demonstrating their falsity, or, in the absence of such evidence, by the party accused denying them under oath.
It was observed that when allegations are not answered, the appellant cannot obtain any advantage from the respondents’ silence. The Court had already examined this issue and clarified that if the allegations were true and supported by admissible evidence, they could not be dismissed as irrelevant. The Court further explained that if the allegations were relevant, and not intrinsically improbable, they could be refuted by documentary proof or affidavits demonstrating their falsity. In the absence of such counter‑evidence, the only means to disprove the allegations would be for the party against whom they were made to deny them on oath.
In the present matter, serious allegations were levelled against the Chief Minister, and many of the matters involved facts that only the Chief Minister could know personally and therefore could only be denied by him. However, the response presented to the Court consisted of an affidavit from the Secretary to the Government in the Medical Department, who could rely solely on official records and not on personal knowledge of the alleged incidents involving the Chief Minister. Given these circumstances, the Court held that it would not be appropriate to disregard the appellant’s allegations, especially where they were supported by some documentary evidence and where no contradictory testimony had been offered by the individuals who alone could have contradicted them.
The Court kept in mind that both the Chief Minister and Mrs. Kairon were subjects of the allegations, yet neither had chosen to give sworn testimony to set out the facts as they saw them. Before proceeding to examine the specific allegations in detail, the Court noted the necessity of addressing the admissibility and evidentiary value of the tape‑recorded conversations submitted by the appellant as part of his supporting material. The learned judges of the High Court, without explicitly declaring the tapes inadmissible, effectively excluded them on the ground that tape recordings could be tampered with, a contention raised by the respondent State. The Court respectfully disagreed with this approach, observing that every document or piece of evidence can potentially be altered, but the possibility of tampering alone cannot serve as a basis for a court to deem evidence inadmissible or to refuse its consideration.
The parties had not argued before this Court that the tape recordings were inadmissible. The Court concluded that the issue of possible tampering would affect only the weight to be given to the recordings, not their admissibility. While a well‑founded suspicion—though not necessarily proof—of tampering could justify the Court in discarding the evidentiary value of a recording, the Court found no such basis in the present case and therefore declined to exclude the tape recordings on that ground.
The appellant relied on a series of tape‑recordings that he mentioned in his writ petition to support his claims about the substance of conversations that he alleged took place between himself, the Chief Minister and members of the Chief Minister’s family. Before the State could file its written statement, the State filed an application on 23 August 1961 requesting that the petitioner be ordered to place on record the transcriptions of those tape‑recordings, asserting that it could not give a full reply without inspecting the original records and hearing the renderings of the recordings referred to in the petition. On 3 November 1961 the Court issued an order directing that the petitioner, through his counsel, would play the tape‑recorder before the respondent within a fortnight, on a date that was convenient for both parties. Subsequently, on 14 December 1961 the State sought a modification of the November order, asking that the appellant be directed to play the tapes in the State counsel’s office and that the State be permitted to make fresh copies of the tapes so that an accurate reproduction would be available before the State filed its written statement. In those applications the State explicitly stated that the purpose of inspecting and re‑recording the tapes was to determine whether the voices heard on the recordings were indeed those of the persons purported to have spoken. The Court responded on 5 January 1962 by ordering the appellant to lodge the original tape‑recordings with the Court, to be sealed in the presence of both parties and kept under the custody of the Court Registrar, after the recordings had been played before the respondent on 11 January 1962 in the Registrar’s office. The State complied with the order, obtained re‑recorded copies of the tapes, and used those copies to verify the authenticity of the originals. Consequently, the State filed its written statement in February 1962 only after it possessed its own copies of the recordings, enabling it to confirm (a) whether the voice on each tape belonged to the person claimed, (b) whether any portions had been inserted or omitted, and (c) the overall integrity of the recordings.
It was noted that the State’s counter‑affidavit did not deny the authenticity of the tape‑recordings, nor did it claim that the voices captured on the tapes were different from the persons they were said to represent, and it made no allegation that any portion of the conversation had been omitted so as to alter its meaning. The only remark by the State concerned a vague reference to the tape‑record of a conversation between the Vigilance Inspector and the appellant, a point that the Court indicated would be addressed later. In view of this background and of the procedural history, the Court explained that the tape‑recorded conversations had to be examined carefully in order to assess their genuineness and to determine whether the appellant’s allegations could be sustained. The Court then proceeded to consider the plaintiff’s contentions in the order in which they appeared in the petition, as previously outlined. The first allegation concerned the alleged surgical operation on the Chief Minister’s son, Surinder Singh. Surinder had filed an affidavit in which he expressly denied that any operation had been performed on him, either by the appellant or by anyone else. No hospital records or other documentary evidence were produced to show that the appellant had carried out the operation that he claimed to have performed. The appellant explained the lack of such records by asserting that the nature of the disease required the operation to be conducted secretly, at the desire of the Chief Minister, and therefore it was performed not in the large city of Jullundur where the Minister’s family was well known, but in a rural dispensary situated about fifty miles from the chief minister’s headquarters. The learned Attorney General highlighted four principal weaknesses in the appellant’s version: first, that Surinder himself denied the operation; second, that no hospital documentation had been offered to support the claim; third, that the precise date of the operation had not been specified; and fourth, that the tape‑recorded conversation could not, on its own, prove that the appellant had performed the surgery. Because the appellant depended upon the tape‑recorded conversations to corroborate his assertion that he had carried out an operation on Surinder at the end of April 1960, the Court found it appropriate to examine those recordings first. Three recordings were identified as relevant to this issue, numbered 6, 2 and 11. Among them, recording number 2 was deemed the most significant; it captured a trunk‑telephone conversation between Mrs Kairon, the Chief Minister’s wife, and the appellant. The transcript of that conversation showed Mrs Kairon asking, “How is the young lad?”
In this case the Court examined three tape‑recorded conversations that the appellant relied on to support his claim that he had performed an operation on Surinder in late April 1960. The first conversation, identified as talk number 2, was recorded on 1 May 1960 and involved a trunk‑telephone call between Mrs Kairon, the wife of the Chief Minister, and the appellant. During that call Mrs Kairon asked whether the young patient was recovering, and the appellant responded that the dressing over the wound had already come off and that there was no longer any discharge. He further affirmed that the wound was not raw, that the patient could walk a little, and that there was no other ulcer inside. He concluded by stating that the patient was quite all right. The Court noted that the internal evidence of this tape indicated that the discussion took place on the stated date, 1 May 1960.
The second conversation, labelled talk number 6, was placed slightly earlier in time, toward the end of April 1960, and was also a trunk‑telephone conversation between Mrs Kairon and the appellant. The appellant explained that this call was necessitated because Surinder had left the Circuit House at Jullundur, where he was supposed to remain for convalescence, before he was fully healed. The appellant asserted that the doctor’s negligence in allowing the premature departure contributed to the displeasure of the Chief Minister. In this conversation Mrs Kairon asked whether the appellant had tested Surinder’s urine, to which he replied that the urine was quite all right. When she inquired about the timing of the test, he said it was done “that day.” The appellant emphasized that the phrase “that day” referred to the day on which the operation had been performed. Mrs Kairon then remarked that eight days had passed, and the appellant reiterated that the test had been conducted on the day Surinder arrived. The appellant further explained that Mrs Kairon’s questioning about Surinder’s presence arose from information she had received from other sources indicating that he had already left Jullundur.
The third conversation, also part of talk number 6, contained the appellant’s response to Mrs Kairon’s inquiry about Surinder’s whereabouts. The appellant said, “You see, he has tried to be clever with me,” and explained that Surinder had told him he would stay for three or four days. Mrs Kairon reported that Sardar Sahib had expressed disappointment, stating that he did not expect such conduct from the appellant. The appellant clarified that the objection was not directed at him personally but at the Circuit House, and that Surinder had booked a trunk call and become engaged elsewhere. The Court recorded these exchanges as part of the evidence the appellant used to argue that Surinder’s denial of the operation was false and that the appellant’s conduct had been appropriate under the circumstances.
In the proceeding, the Court examined the final tape‑recorded rendering, which was numbered eleven, and which purported to capture a trunk‑call conversation between Surinder and the appellant. The appellant relied on portions of this recording to support two assertions: first, that he had performed an operation on Surinder; and second, that Surinder had left his care without the appellant’s knowledge, thereby incurring the displeasure of Surinder’s parents. The relevant excerpt of the recording was set out as follows: “Surinder: Well Dr. Sahib. You better dictate to me the prescription of that triple dye. I want to apply it. Answer: When you come in the evening you can take it at that time. Surinder: No, I want to apply now, in the morning. Answer: Then you should have taken it yesterday and then left …………. Surinder: Alright, it was a mistake. Now you tell me. Dr. P. Singh: Otherwise it is alright now? Surinder: A little bit of stuff came out of it, sort of blood. Dr. P. Singh: It would be just a nominal sort of affair? Surinder: Yes please.” The Court noted that this passage related to the alleged operation. The recording then continued with a discussion about Surinder’s departure from the appellant’s care, in which the appellant said, “You went away, all on the quiet.” Surinder replied, “I had to come here.” The appellant asked, “Why? With me your understanding was that you will go only after showing me in the evening.” Surinder answered, “I will come to you in the evening.” The appellant then stated, “No, you will come today, but yesterday you went away without notice. We came to know of it only when the servant came and reported that the room is all vacant, and that Sardar Sahib has gone, giving a go by.” The Court then turned to the question of whether this recording established the truth of the appellant’s claim that he had operated on Surinder. The appellant’s case was challenged by Surinder’s affidavit, in which Surinder categorically denied that any operation had been performed on him by the appellant or by anyone else. Although Surinder did not deny that the voice heard in talk number eleven was his, he asserted that he was diabetic and that his urine had been examined by the appellant, a matter that corresponded with the content of talk number six between Mrs. Kairon and the appellant. Surinder’s affidavit did not specify that the urine examination mentioned in talk six was the same examination referred to in his own affidavit, but it did acknowledge that such an examination had taken place. The Court therefore had to reconcile the appellant’s reliance on the tape‑recorded conversations with Surinder’s sworn denial of any operation, while also considering Surinder’s acknowledgment of the appellant’s involvement in the urine test.
In this matter, the affidavit filed by Surinder did not regard the eleventh recorded conversation as material, and he offered no explanation for his remark in that conversation about “a little bit of the stuff coming out.” Surinder further stated that he had heard the tape‑records prepared from the recordings made by the petitioner and that, in his view, “the renderings are not intelligible and clear and are denied.” The Court found this characterisation unpersuasive, observing that if the recordings were truly unintelligible, it was unclear how they could be denied, and there was no indication why a conversation recorded by Surinder himself should be unintelligible to him. Regarding the recordings identified as numbers two and six, which purported to capture discussions between the appellant and Mrs Kairon, the Court noted the absence of any affidavit from Mrs Kairon contesting the authenticity of her voice or the substance of those talks. Surinder’s affidavit denies any conversation between the appellant and his mother concerning the supply of medicines and declares all the tape‑records produced by the petitioner to be forged; however, the alleged forgery could pertain only to the portion in which Mrs Kairon is heard requesting medicines. The Court questioned why, if the State was able to secure an affidavit from Surinder concerning the tape‑recorded conversations, it did not obtain a similar sworn statement from Mrs Kairon to confirm whether she had indeed spoken with the appellant as recorded and, if so, to point out any inaccuracies. In the absence of any sworn denial from Mrs Kairon that the recorded voices in talks two and six were not hers or that the recordings had been tampered with, the Court concluded that the recordings must be regarded as genuine and that the conversations they depict did occur. The next issue was whether the recordings demonstrated that the appellant performed the operation on Surinder. The Court held that the extracts from the tapes unmistakably indicated that Surinder had undergone an operation sometime before the beginning of May 1960, rendering his affidavit denial of any operation false and without evidentiary value. Assuming the operation did take place, and that the matters concerning the condition of his wound and any discharge were discussed in talks two and six between Mrs Kairon and the appellant and in talk eleven between Surinder and the appellant, the Court found, in the absence of any rational explanation from Mrs Kairon, that the appellant was the person who performed the operation. The Court then turned to the subsequent question of whether the operation had been entrusted to the appellant by the Chief Minister.
In determining whether the Chief Minister had authorised the appellant to carry out the operation, the Court examined the probabilities of the case together with the extracts taken from the tape‑recorded discussions numbered two and six. Those extracts, together with a reference to Sardar Saheb, suggested that the Chief Minister was indeed concerned about entrusting the operation to the appellant. The inference that the Chief Minister had played a role in the decision was reinforced by the fact that, despite the allegations contained in the affidavit, neither Mrs Kairon nor the Chief Minister had presented a sworn statement before the Court. In the absence of such testimony, the Court felt no hesitation in concluding that it was at the instance of the Chief Minister that the appellant undertook the operation on the Chief Minister’s son.
The Court then addressed a further point, namely whether the appellant’s conduct in allowing the son to leave Jullundur before full recovery could be proved by a statement recorded on tape that reflected the Chief Minister’s displeasure. The Court held that this portion of the tape was inadmissible for the purpose of establishing what the Chief Minister had told his wife; consequently, the Court could not find that the Chief Minister harboured hostility because of that incident. While the statement made by Mrs Kairon about what the Chief Minister allegedly told her was indeed hearsay and could not be admitted as a direct statement of the Chief Minister, the tape nevertheless demonstrated that Mrs Kairon herself was greatly displeased with the appellant. The purpose of invoking the Chief Minister’s name, the Court observed, was to emphasise the family’s overall dissatisfaction rather than to provide substantive evidence of the Chief Minister’s own words. Accordingly, the Court declined to accept the respondents’ technical objection to the secondary reception of the Chief Minister’s statement as giving them any advantage.
The Attorney‑General argued that the affidavits failed to specify the exact date and place of the operation, and that this omission reduced the value of the allegations. The Court disagreed, observing that the recorded conversations allowed a clear inference that the operation had been performed by the appellant toward the end of April 1960. In support of this inference, the Court referred to talk number two, in which the phrase “tomorrow” was understood to denote the second day of May, thereby anchoring the timing of the procedure. Finally, the Court considered the further allegation that the Chief Minister and members of his family had sought undue favours from the appellant, such as preferential medical certificates or special treatment for certain patients. The State denied this claim, but the Court noted that the denial carried little weight because no individuals capable of contradicting the appellant’s account had provided sworn testimony. Consequently, the Court indicated that this allegation must be examined in the light of the documentary evidence that had been relied upon, as the record showed.
The documents identified as Exhibits B‑1 through B‑19 were presented as written recommendations made by the Chief Minister, by two of his sons, by his brother, or by his sister. Each of these slips or chits introduced a particular patient to the appellant and requested that the patient receive proper attention or that a specific request be granted. The Court examined the content of these documents and found that none of them contained any suggestion that the appellant should act improperly, violate any rule, or do anything that was contrary to established procedures. The appellant submitted that, of the nineteen recommendations, only two – those set out in Exhibit B‑2 and Exhibit B‑5 – were not carried out. However, the record does not contain any specific allegation that the appellant deliberately refused to comply with these two particular requests, nor does it explain why compliance might have been lacking. Because of this lack of concrete evidence, the Court was unable to conclude that a genuine misunderstanding on the part of the appellant had been established. Nevertheless, the Court noted that because these slips were addressed directly to the appellant – some by the Chief Minister himself, others by his two sons, his brother, and his sister – they demonstrate that, at the dates on which the slips were written, the appellant was regarded as a close friend of the Chief Minister and enjoyed the confidence of the Chief Minister’s family.
The matter of alleged supplies to the Chief Minister’s family was then considered under two separate headings: first, the alleged supply of medicines at the request of Mrs. Kairon and other family members, and second, the alleged supply of two Singer sewing machines to Mrs. Kairon. The State denied both allegations, but the State could not produce any sworn testimony from the individuals who were in a position to contradict the appellant’s version. Regarding the medicines, the appellant asserted that the items had been sent by registered post, and he produced six postal receipts showing that registered packets or parcels had been dispatched to Sardarni Partap Singh Kairon between 1957 and 1959. The receipts indicated that postal charges of one to two rupees had been paid for each parcel. The existence of the receipts confirms that something was indeed sent and presumably received by Mrs. Kairon, although the respondent did not specify the contents of the parcels. Consequently, the Court found no basis to reject the appellant’s claim that the parcels contained medicines intended for the Chief Minister’s wife and family. Whether the medicines were purchased at the appellant’s own expense, as he claimed, or were taken from the hospital’s stores is irrelevant to the question before the Court. What is clear is that articles of some value were dispatched on several occasions over the three‑year period. Moreover, the tape‑recorded conversations cited by the appellant support his contention that he was asked to provide medicines and that he complied with those requests.
The Court noted that the third recorded conversation, identified as talk number three, took place in August 1959 between the appellant and Mrs Kairon. In that dialogue the appellant said, “I shall get the medicines delivered to you today.” Mrs Kairon replied that she also required “those tablets too and the mixture too.” The appellant asked what tablets were meant, and Mrs Kairon described them as “brown brown tablets” that were in bottles. The appellant then assured her that he would send those tablets straightaway and added that he would also send the injections. Mrs Kairon accepted his statement with a simple “Alright.” This exchange demonstrated a clear request from Mrs Kairon for specific medicines and a corresponding commitment by the appellant to supply them.
The Court then turned to the first recorded conversation, referred to as talk number one, which was said to be a trunk‑telephone exchange between the appellant and Mrs Kairon in March 1960. Although the precise date was not considered material for the present purpose, the content of the conversation was examined. Mrs Kairon began by stating that “the medicines have been received.” The appellant responded, “leave the question of arrival of medicines …” and asked Mrs Kairon to confirm that she had sent injections. Mrs Kairon affirmed that four injections had been sent. She then observed that the tablets had not yet been received, to which the appellant asked, “Which tablets?” Mrs Kairon identified them as “those capsules” and specifically as “those brown” tablets. The appellant replied that Mrs Kairon had not asked for those brown tablets, but Mrs Kairon said, “Well, does not matter.” The appellant concluded the exchange by stating, “I will do it now,” indicating a willingness to supply the items that had not previously been requested.
The third piece of evidence considered by the Court was the second recorded conversation, designated as talk number two, which occurred in May 1960. In this dialogue the appellant declared, “The medicines that you had asked for have arrived. When you come you take it.” Mrs Kairon instructed him to give the medicines to Raghbir Singh, who was identified as the General Manager of Roadways. The appellant then referred to the specific injections that Mrs Kairon had previously asked for, namely the B Complex injections, confirming that she had indeed requested them and that he now possessed them. This passage reinforced the pattern of Mrs Kairon’s requests and the appellant’s compliance.
Having examined these recorded talks together with the documentary evidence, the Court found that the tapes provided strong support for the appellant’s version of events. The Court observed that the only person who might have been able to contradict these statements – the individuals involved in the conversations – had offered no denial or explanation. Consequently, the Court was unable to assign any evidentiary weight to the affidavit of Surinder, in which he denied that any medicines had been requested or supplied. The appellant had also claimed that, as the demands for medicines increased, he refused further supplies, thereby incurring the displeasure of the Chief Minister. However, the Court noted that there was no positive evidence of any such refusal or of any resulting anger from the Chief Minister.
Despite the lack of direct evidence of a refusal, the Court pointed out that the postal receipts and the tape‑recorded conversations showed that, at least until 1959 and even up to April and May 1960, the appellant remained on the friendliest terms with the Chief Minister. The Court therefore questioned why there appeared to be a sudden change in the appellant’s attitude from around May 1960, and especially after January 1961. In light of this unexplained shift, the Court considered that the tape‑recorded evidence acquired further significance for understanding the relationship between the parties during the period in question.
The Court noted that the recorded conversations concerning the operation on Surinder Kairon and the article published in the Blitz, which had been referenced earlier, assumed crucial importance in the matter before it. The second portion of the inquiry related to the alleged supply of sewing machines. According to the Court, this part of the appellant’s case had been established beyond reasonable doubt by the documents identified as exhibits C‑7 through C‑10, each of which had been cited by Justice Dayal in his judgment. The Court fully concurred with Justice Dayal’s conclusion that the allegation concerning the sewing machines had been completely proved. The High Court had dismissed the appellant’s case on the basis of the affidavit filed by Mrs. Sodhi; however, the Court agreed with Justice Dayal that the affidavit did not account for the content of exhibits C‑8 or C‑10. Those exhibits demonstrated that a wooden case marked with the words “Singer Sewing Machine,” either stencilled or affixed with a label at the top, had been dispatched through the manager of the Punjab Roadways to Mrs. Kairon. The statements contained in the affidavits submitted by the Roadways manager, identified as Sri Pahwa, and by Om Prakash, a clerk of the Punjab Roadways, were found to be highly artificial. Apart from contradictions regarding the measurements and weight of the wooden box that they had supposedly transported, it was implausible that they could have noted or remembered such details without any written record. Moreover, they offered no explanation for the label or stencilling described in exhibit C‑9. In addition, tape‑recorded conversation number three between Mrs. Kairon and the appellant, which refers to the colour of the machine that was sent, made clear that the appellant’s account of having sent a machine to Mrs. Kairon was true. It was somewhat surprising that, although exhibits C‑7 to C‑10 had been annexed to the writ petition and the respondents possessed copies of the tape‑recorded conversations before filing their statements, they limited themselves to filing the affidavits of Sri Pahwa, Om Prakash and Mrs. Sodhi and refrained from presenting any testimony from Mrs. Kairon. The sewing‑machine incident, which occurred in July 1959, demonstrated that up to that date there existed complete friendliness between the Chief Minister and the appellant. The appellant’s further claim that Mrs. Kairon or other members of the Chief Minister’s family had demanded additional costly articles from him, and that his refusal to comply had angered the Chief Minister, was consequently rejected as an unsubstantiated embellishment. The next alleged source of hostility advanced by the appellant concerned the removal of Kirpa Singh, the manager of an automobile concern associated with the Chief Minister’s son Surinder, from the appellant’s house around March‑April 1960 after he had been allowed to stay for approximately seven months. Surinder had filed an affidavit denying his ownership of the automobile concern and also denying that Kirpa Singh had been provided board and lodging by the appellant at his father’s request; Kirpa Singh had filed a reciprocal affidavit to the same effect.
It was established that the appellant had provided board and lodging to Kirpa Singh at the request of his father, a fact also affirmed by an affidavit filed by Kirpa Singh. Two issues emerged as particularly significant. First, it was incontrovertible that Kirpa Singh enjoyed a close friendship with both the Chief Minister and the Chief Minister’s son. This relationship was highlighted by tape‑record No. 15, which purported to capture a conversation between Kirpa Singh and the appellant. An objection was raised that the evidential value of this recording should be diminished because the appellant had deliberately orchestrated the discussion for the purpose of recording it. The Court rejected this contention, holding that the manner of initiation did not impair the reliability of the conversation. Moreover, Kirpa Singh did not deny either the occurrence of the discussion or the accuracy of the recording in his affidavit; consequently, the substance of the recorded statements was accepted as established. The record also confirmed that Kirpa Singh acted as the manager of an automobile concern in Jullunder. However, both Surinder and Kirpa Singh, in their respective affidavits, deliberately omitted any identification of the actual owner of that concern, merely affirming that Surinder was not the proprietor. The Court regarded this omission as disingenuous and lacking candour. Additionally, it was admitted that Kirpa Singh had been given board and lodging at the appellant’s residence. No evidence was presented to suggest that Kirpa Singh’s friendship with the appellant extended beyond his association with the Chief Minister and his son, a point made clear by the content of tape‑record 15. Accordingly, the Court found no logical basis for concluding that the appellant had shouldered the expense and inconvenience of housing Kirpa Singh for reasons other than to accommodate the Chief Minister and his son. Secondly, it was established that Kirpa Singh vacated the appellant’s house at the end of March 1960 after having resided there since September 1959, as shown in Exhibit D‑1. This raised the question of whether the appellant’s decision to ask Kirpa Singh to leave was motivated by an unwillingness to continue hosting him. Considering the surrounding circumstances previously noted, including an emerging undercurrent of hostility associated with the Chief Minister around that period, the Court inclined to accept the appellant’s version that he deliberately sent Kirpa Singh away, rather than accepting Kirpa Singh’s claim of leaving of his own accord. If the appellant had indeed provided board and lodging to Kirpa Singh at the behest of the Chief Minister, it was reasonable to infer that the Chief Minister might have become displeased with the appellant for removing Kirpa Singh. The Court also recognized that other matters cited as contributing to the Chief Minister’s hostility—such as the appellant’s involvement in matters related to the Karnal murder case, referenced in talk No. 7 with the Chief Minister—were established, though these were deemed of minor importance and were not addressed in detail.
In the present matter, the Court observed that certain observations recorded earlier in the record were regarded as having only minor relevance, and therefore the Court chose not to examine them in detail. Instead, the Court preferred to proceed on the basis of the matters that had already been discussed. The Court then turned to the fact that, although a complaint had been received by the department on 29 October 1960 alleging that the appellant had improperly accepted a sum of Rs 16 from a patient in July 1960, the appellant was nevertheless granted leave preparatory to retirement effective from 18 December 1960. The Court explained that, at the time the leave was granted, the Government was unaware that formal charges should be framed against the appellant or that his retirement would have to be deferred in order to complete an inquiry into the alleged misconduct.
The Court further noted that all the Confidential Reports concerning the appellant that had been prepared before this period contained no adverse findings; neither his conduct nor his character had been criticised in any of those reports. It was only after the close of the year 1960 that an adverse remark was entered against the appellant for the period 1 April 1959 to 31 March 1960. This remark was communicated to the appellant only in late February 1961. The appellant contended that the adverse comment was a post‑factum addition, introduced long after the relevant year had ended in order to provide some justification for the charges that were later brought against him. The Court observed that the earlier mention of developing unfriendly feelings on the part of the Chief Minister from around April–May 1960 gave some support to the appellant’s suggestion of a motive for the delayed adverse observation.
The Court then considered the circumstance of an article that appeared in the newspaper Blitz on 15 January 1961. The Court regarded that publication as the point from which the action against the appellant began. On 13 January 1961, a Vigilance Officer had sent a communication to the appellant requesting an explanation in respect of certain charges that were then under inquiry. Subsequently, an order dated 3 June 1961 placed the appellant under suspension. That order referred to three separate inquiries—one dated 29 October 1960, a second dated 11 January 1961, and a third dated 17 April 1961—each date corresponding to a different complaint. The order indicated that investigations by the Vigilance Department had been undertaken into those complaints, but the Court pointed out that the legitimacy of both the inquiries and the action taken under the impugned order had been questioned. Moreover, the report of the Vigilance Inspector was not placed before the Court, preventing it from examining precisely what the complaints entailed and whether they coincided with the charges enumerated in the charge‑sheet against the appellant.
The Court emphasized that this issue must be assessed in light of the existence of a tape‑recorded conversation between the appellant and the Vigilance Inspector (tape‑record No 16). In that recorded discussion, the Inspector appeared to indicate that he himself did not accept the truth of the allegations that were being pursued against the appellant.
In the counter‑affidavit submitted by the State, it was recorded that the Vigilance Inspector, after having listened to a copy of the disputed tape‑recordings, reported that the recordings were unintelligible and therefore could not be compared with any written renderings. The Inspector further stated that the conversation, as reflected in the rendering, had taken place between himself and the petitioner, but that the petitioner had allegedly distorted the rendering to suit his own purposes. The Inspector did not file any separate affidavit, and the State offered no denial that the voice heard on the tape was indeed that of the Inspector. The tape‑recorded conversations had been translated, and the original recordings had been heard by both State officials and the Inspector. No justification was offered for the claim that the recordings were unintelligible. Consequently, there was no reason why the Court could not determine (a) whether any conversation had actually occurred, (b) if a conversation had taken place, what its exact meaning was, and (c) the specific ways in which the tape‑recording might have deviated from the truth through addition or omission. The recorded conversation, as acknowledged, appeared to indicate that the Vigilance Inspector did not accept the truth of the complaint. Although this observation might not be decisive in deciding the veracity of the complaint itself, the existence of that recorded exchange made it essential for the State to produce the Inspector’s report in order to counter the appellant’s allegation that the charges were fabricated to harass and humiliate him.
It was also observed that several of the charges subject to inquiry referred to events that occurred long before June 1961. For example, charge 2(b) alleged an illegal demand and receipt of a sum of one hundred rupees from a patient who had visited the hospital on 13 March 1957. Other charges had been raised earlier, subsequently dropped, or their falsity had been admitted on previous occasions, yet they were revived in the present inquiry purportedly to justify the investigation. The Court held that the action against the appellant was based on matters that had already been proven, as well as on the charges made against the Chief Minister in an article published in the Blitz. Accordingly, a detailed examination of whether those charges were true or merely invented was unnecessary. The facts demonstrated that up to March‑April 1960 the appellant enjoyed a very favorable relationship with the Chief Minister and his family. He habitually went out of his way to accommodate the Chief Minister and carry out his wishes, conduct that, given the appellant’s official position and rank, was hardly expected. It was suggested that his continued posting at Jullunder might have been a consequence of this behaviour.
It was observed that the appellant remained in the same posting without being transferred for four years because of a shortcoming on his part. From April 1960 onward, the Court noted a marked change in the attitude of the Chief Minister toward the appellant. The surgical operation performed on Surinder, the incidents that were connected with that operation, and the subsequent removal of Kirpa Singh were events that occurred during this period. Those events apparently caused the authorities to order the appellant’s transfer from Jullunder to Amritsar. After losing favour with the Chief Minister, the appellant apparently did not feel safe to remain in service, and therefore he applied for leave preparatory to retirement; that leave was subsequently granted. As soon as he learned that the leave had been granted, the appellant appears to have felt emboldened to disclose publicly the improper acts that he himself had carried out in order to please the Chief Minister and to curry his favour. The article that appeared in the Blitz newspaper was evidently inspired by the appellant. When the Chief Minister became aware of the article in mid‑January 1961, a series of stern actions followed. First, the Vigilance Inspector issued a communication on 13 January 1961. Second, an adverse report against the appellant for the year 1960 was issued in February 1961. Third, further charges were brought against him in April 1961, and those charges resulted in the issuance of the orders that are now being challenged. In the circumstances, the Court was satisfied that the dominant motive for the Government’s action was not a genuine disciplinary proceeding for misconduct that the Government honestly believed had been committed. Rather, the motive was to exact vengeance on the appellant for having incurred the Chief Minister’s wrath and for the discredit that the appellant’s allegations, made in the Blitz article dated 15 January 1961 and later reiterated by the appellant’s wife in another newspaper communication, had brought upon the Chief Minister. The Court found that, in large part, those allegations were true. Consequently, the Court held that the impugned orders were tainted by mala‑fides because they were motivated by an improper purpose that lay outside the scope of the power or discretion conferred on the Government. Accordingly, the Court set aside those orders. The appeal was allowed, the order dated 3 June 1961 revoking the leave and placing the appellant under suspension was set aside, and the order dated 29 June 1961 directing an inquiry into the charges was also set aside. Because the appellant did not establish that the orders were contrary to the Service Rules, the Court directed that no order as to costs be made, either in this proceeding or in the High Court. This appeal, issued on a certificate granted by the High Court of Punjab, was filed against the High Court’s order dismissing the appellant’s petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which sought to quash, by a writ of certiorari or other suitable directions, the Punjab Government orders that (i) suspended the appellant, (ii) revoked his leave, (iii) compelled him to continue in service after reaching the age of superannuation, and (iv) ordered a departmental enquiry against him.
In this matter the appellant, Sardar Partap Singh, had entered the Punjab Civil Medical Service, Class 1, in 1947 as a direct recruit on 21 August 1947. The record noted that his earlier employment in the Indian Medical Service from 1934 to 1939, his tenure in the Punjab Civil Medical Service from April 1940 to June 1941, and his temporary commission in the Indian Military Service up to the end of 1945 did not affect the conditions of his service after he became a member of the Punjab Civil Medical Service, Class 1. The appellant attained the Selection Grade of the Civil Medical Service, Class I, in January 1955 and was subsequently transferred to Jullunder where he served as Civil Surgeon from April 1956. He continued in that post until he applied for leave preparatory to retirement, which he took in December 1960. The leave was formally sanctioned on 18 December 1960 and the sanction was published in the Punjab Gazette on 27 January 1961.
On 3 June 1961 the Governor of Punjab issued an order that the appellant be suspended with immediate effect because the Government had resolved to institute a departmental enquiry against him under rule 7 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952. In the same order the Governor invoked rule 3.26(d) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, which were promulgated under the proviso to article 309 of the Constitution and had become operative on 1 April 1953. Although the High Court and the hearing referred to these rules as the “1959 rules” because they had been amended and re‑printed in that year, the judgment identified them simply as the 1959 rules. By invoking rule 3.26(d) the Governor directed that, since the appellant would reach the age of superannuation on 16 June 1961, he should be retained in service beyond that date until the departmental enquiry was completed.
The Governor’s orders were transmitted to the Director of Health Services, Punjab, by a letter from the Secretary to the Government in the Medical and Health Department, marked as Annexure J and dated 3 June 1961. The Director, in turn, communicated the orders to the appellant through a letter identified as Annexure 1, also dated 3 June 1961, which was dispatched under postal certificate. A copy of this letter together with its enclosures was sent to the appellant by registered post on 5 June 1961, and the registered envelope bore the notation “express delivery”. Copies of the same communication were also forwarded to the then Civil Surgeon of Jullunder and to the Accountant General, Punjab, for their information. Subsequently, on 10 June 1961, the Government issued notifications that the Governor had placed the appellant under suspension, fixed his headquarters at Chandigarh, revoked his preparatory leave with effect from 3 June 1961, and retained him in service until a final order could be made after the enquiry. These notifications were published in the Punjab Government Gazette Extraordinary dated 10 June 1961.
In July 1961 the Director, Health Services, Punjab forwarded to the appellant a letter dated 3 November 1961 together with a memorandum dated 29 June 1961, a statement of charges and a statement of allegations that had been received from the Secretary to the Government, Punjab, Vigilance Department; the accompanying letter invited the appellant to submit any explanation he might desire. The correspondence indicated that it was issued in relation to enquiry numbers 70, 3 and 27, which were dated 29 October 1960, 11 January 1961 and 17 April 1961 respectively and were directed against the appellant. By way of a writ petition the appellant contested the legality of several actions: the order of his suspension, the revocation of his leave preparatory to retirement, his retention in service beyond his superannuation date, and the initiation of the departmental enquiry. He raised the question of whether the Governor possessed the competence to issue those orders. The appellant further alleged that personal grievances had arisen between him and Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, the Chief Minister of Punjab, around 1960, and that the impugned orders were therefore issued mala fide, constituting an abuse of any power vested in the State of Punjab’s Ministry of Health and reflecting the Chief Minister’s desire to settle a grudge. The State of Punjab rebutted the allegation of mala‑fide intent, asserting that the Government was fully empowered under the service rules applicable to the appellant to issue the orders and that the appellant’s personal grievances bore no relation to the suspension, the cancellation of his leave preparatory to retirement, or any other action taken. The High Court accepted the State’s position, dismissed the appellant’s petition and, upon the appellant’s request, issued the required certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. The appellant’s challenge to the correctness of the orders was framed in two principal respects. First, he contended that the service rules did not confer authority on the Governor to pass the orders in question. Second, he asserted that the orders were issued mala fide because the Chief Minister, who headed the Health Department, harboured ill‑will toward him. The first ground was examined in detail, with particular emphasis on the argument that once leave has been sanctioned it cannot be revoked after the officer has actually proceeded on leave; at most the officer may be recalled to duty. In the appellant’s case no recall to a civil surgeon post had occurred. Rule 8.15 of the 1959 service rules provides that leave is not a matter of right and that, when public service exigencies demand, the authority empowered to grant leave retains discretion to refuse or to revoke any leave of any description. Consequently, the authority that granted the leave possesses the power to revoke it, and there is no limitation placed on the exercise of that power.
The Court explained that the power to revoke leave may be exercised at any time that is appropriate for the authority. Such revocation may be made before the officer who received the leave actually commences the period of leave, and it may also be made after the officer has already gone on leave. Revoking leave simply means that the authority cancels the leave that had previously been granted. The Court noted that the circumstances requiring the cancellation of leave may arise even after the officer has begun his leave, and the authority may still act to revoke it.
Regarding the applicability of Rule 8.3, the Court held that this rule was irrelevant to the question of revocation. Rule 8.3 concerns only the procedures for filing applications for leave and for granting leave, and does not address the substantive right of an officer to obtain leave or the authority’s power to grant, refuse, or revoke such leave. Similarly, the Court observed that Rule 8.42 deals exclusively with matters incidental to the recall of an officer from leave and does not limit the discretion of the authority to revoke leave. In fact, the Court clarified that the recall of an officer to duty must follow the revocation of the leave for the portion of the period that has not been utilized.
The Court then turned to the argument that a government servant who goes on leave preparatory to retirement ceases to hold any office and therefore cannot be suspended. The Court rejected this contention, stating that a servant remains in service until his service is terminated, and termination can occur only by dismissal, removal, or formal retirement. The date on which a servant commences leave preparatory to retirement cannot be treated as his retirement date.
The Court further addressed the claim that suspension is impossible while the servant is on such leave because suspension supposedly requires the cessation of work on a post that the servant no longer occupies. The Court explained that suspension during service simply means that the servant is not to be assigned any work for the duration of the suspension. If the servant was performing duties of a post before the suspension, the suspension order stops him from continuing those duties. If, at the time of suspension, the servant is already on leave and not performing any post, there is no actual cessation of work, but this does not render the suspension order ineffective. The Court emphasized that, during suspension or leave, the servant retains a lien on his permanent post under Rule 3.13, unless that lien is itself suspended or transferred pursuant to the relevant rules. Accordingly, the servant continues to have a legal right to his permanent position while under suspension or on leave. The Court cited the precedent set in Khem Chand v. Union of India to support this principle.
In this matter, the Court observed that the rule allowing a Government servant to be treated as suspended during the interval between the date a dismissal is issued and the date it is set aside had previously been upheld. The Court likened a suspension imposed in that interval to a suspension that occurs after the revocation of a period of leave. One of the arguments presented was that the order cancelling the leave should have been issued before the order of suspension, and because the suspension order was dated earlier, the order was claimed to be invalid. The Court disagreed with that position. It pointed out that both the notification of suspension and the notice of leave revocation were dated 3 June 1961, and that the suspension order carried an earlier serial number than the leave‑revocation order. The Court held that the sequence in which the two orders were issued did not affect their substantive validity, provided that the Governor possessed the authority to both suspend the appellant and to revoke his leave. The Court further explained that there is no requirement that such orders be issued in a particular chronological order.
The next issue raised concerned the alleged delay in communicating the June 3 orders to the appellant, who claimed that the notices reached him after his retirement and therefore could not be effective. The appellant was born on 16 June 1906, and his retirement was scheduled for 16 June 1961. According to his own testimony, the suspension notice arrived at his address on 19 June 1961, although it had been dispatched by the Director of Health Services, Punjab, on 3 June 1961. The envelope was addressed to the appellant’s Kanpur residence, an address that he had previously provided to the department. The Court noted that the appellant was apparently not present at the Kanpur address when the letter was first delivered, and that the correspondence was subsequently redirected, causing an undue delay before it reached him. The record did not contain sufficient information to determine the exact time of redirection or the reasons for the delay.
The Court further recorded that the Director of Health Services had not only sent the initial notice under ordinary post but had also followed up with a registered letter on 5 June. Because the government had not received any acknowledgment from the appellant confirming receipt of the suspension orders, it proceeded to publish the orders in the Punjab Government Gazette Extraordinary dated 10 June 1961, as reflected in the citation Punjab [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 229. Ordinarily, such notifications would be published in the regular Gazette, but the decision to use the Extraordinary Gazette was motivated by the Government’s belief, based on the appellant’s written statement, that the appellant was deliberately avoiding receipt of the notice. The Government was particularly anxious to ensure that the appellant became aware of the orders before his retirement on 16 June 1961. The appellant’s own petition indicated that newspapers also reported the Gazette Extraordinary notice on 15 June. The Court explained that, as a general rule, government orders take effect from the moment they are issued, unless there is a specific reason preventing their effectiveness.
The Court observed that a suspension order issued while the appellant was on leave could take effect from the instant it was issued, because the appellant was not performing any official duties during his leave. Had the appellant been performing his duties at the time, the suspension would have become operative only when the order actually reached him, and only from that moment could the appellant have complied by ceasing to work. Consequently, the Court held that it was irrelevant whether the publication of the orders in the Gazette Extraordinary gave the appellant sufficient notice of the various orders, or whether the letters conveying the orders reached him after his retirement date. In the present matter, the orders were deemed to have been effective from 3 June 1961, and their validity did not depend on the date on which the appellant was notified. The Court further stated that the decision reported in Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab (1) was not applicable to the appellant’s contention because that precedent did not involve a suspension. In that case, a government servant had appealed against his dismissal by the Revenue Secretary of the Pepsu Government to the State Government of Pepsu. The Revenue Minister expressed the view that, instead of dismissing the servant, he should be reinstated to his former post. After the merger of the State of Pepsu with the State of Punjab, the Revenue Minister’s remarks were never communicated to the servant. Following the merger, the Chief Minister of Punjab dismissed the appeal, and that dismissal was communicated to the servant. The Court in the earlier case held that the Revenue Minister’s remarks did not constitute an order of the State Government.
The Court quoted the earlier judgment, noting that for a pronouncement to amount to an order of the State Government, two conditions must be satisfied: the order must be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1) of Article 166, and it must be communicated. The Court further explained that the observations made in State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhadev Singh (1), which were cited in the present appeal, did not extend to the proposition that a final decision of the Council of Ministers becomes an order merely because the Rajpramukh issues an order on its behalf. The Court emphasized that an order must be communicated to the person affected before that person can be bound by it. Until such communication occurs, the matter remains open to reconsideration by the Council of Ministers, and the order remains only provisional in nature. The Court therefore concluded that the quoted observations applied only to the circumstances of the earlier case and could not be read as establishing a general rule for the present suspension order.
It was observed that in the two earlier cases referenced, the government had never issued a formal order whatsoever. In contrast, the orders that were challenged in the present matter were formally promulgated by the Governor in June 1961 and were subsequently printed in the extraordinary Gazette dated 10 June. Those pronouncements were therefore final orders. Although the Governor retained the power to issue later orders that could supersede the earlier ones, the mere possibility of such a later change was not regarded as the decisive factor for determining whether an order was effective. The appellant’s principal argument, however, centred on the claim that rule 3.26(d) of the 1959 rules did not apply to him, and that even if the rule were applicable, the circumstances of his case fell outside the scope of that provision.
The appellant entered government service in 1947 as a member of the Punjab Civil Medical Service, Class I. At the time of his appointment, the Punjab Civil Medical Services (Class I) Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1940, which are hereinafter referred to as the Medical Rules, were in force. Those rules had been framed by the Governor of Punjab exercising the authority conferred by clause (b) of sub‑section (1) and clause (b) of sub‑section (2) of section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Rule 13 of the Medical Rules provided that “In respect of leave, pension and other cognate matters not specifically mentioned in these rules, members of Service shall be governed by such general rules as may be framed in that regard by the Governor of the Punjab, under clause (b) of sub‑section (2) of section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935.” The Punjab Civil Services Rules were also issued by the Governor under the same statutory provision and became effective on 1 April 1941; consequently they were also in force when the appellant joined the service. Rule 3.26(d) was not contained in the 1940 rules. The later 1959 rules, which actually came into operation in 1953, did contain that provision. Rule 3.26(d) states: “A Government servant under suspension on a charge of misconduct shall not be required or permitted to retire on his reaching the date of compulsory retirement but should be retained in service until the enquiry into the charge is concluded and a final order is passed thereon.” The appellant contended that a rule dealing with the retirement of a government servant related to a matter cognate to pensions and therefore, under rule 13 of the Medical Rules, his retirement should be governed by the 1941 rules. The Court was of the opinion that retirement, whether on superannuation or otherwise, is not a matter cognate to pensions; pension follows retirement and is merely incidental to it. Accordingly, rule 13 of the Medical Rules does not control the appellant’s retirement. The provision that governs his retirement is rule 17 of the Medical Rules, which stipulates that “In all matters not expressly provided for in these rules, the members of the service shall be governed by such general rules as may have been or may hereafter be framed by Government and by the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935.”
In this case the Court observed that rule 3.26(d) governs the appellant’s retirement. The rule states that “in all matters not expressly provided for in these rules, the members of the service shall be governed by such general rules as may have been or may hereafter be framed by Government and by the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935.” From that language it follows that, with respect to retirement, the appellant is to be governed by any general rules that were in force when the Medical rules were issued or that may be issued subsequently by the Government. Accordingly, the most recent general rules relating to the retirement of Government servants will determine the appellant’s retirement, even if the Medical rules continue to govern his conditions of service. Consequently, rule 3.26(d) applies to the appellant. The appellant further contended that this rule is applicable only to a Government servant who is under suspension on a charge of misconduct after a formal departmental enquiry has been instituted to investigate the charge, and that because no charge had been formally framed and no departmental enquiry had been started before the appellant was suspended on 3 June 1961, the suspension could not be treated as an order under rule 3.26(d). The Court rejected that contention, holding that there is no justification for giving a restricted meaning to the word “charge” in this rule. The appellant also relied on rule 7 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952, hereinafter called the Punishment and Appeal Rules. Rule 7 provides that, without prejudice to the revisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, no order of dismissal, removal or reduction shall be passed against a person to whom these rules apply unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action. The rule further requires that the grounds for such action be reduced to definite charge or charges, communicated in writing to the person charged, and that the person be required within a reasonable time to state in writing whether he admits the truth of any or all of the charges, what explanation or defence he may have, and whether he wishes to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the authority empowered to dismiss, remove or reduce him so directs, an oral enquiry shall be held at which all evidence shall be heard as to such charges as are not admitted. The Court noted that this rule becomes operative only after a prima facie case is established against a Government servant and not at the stage of a preliminary investigation into accusations. However, the Court emphasized that this does not mean that suspension cannot be imposed before a formal charge is framed. Rule
In this case the Court examined Rule 3.26(d) and held that the provision has a general application, meaning that the expression “charge of misconduct” in the rule must not be confined narrowly to charges that have been formally framed, communicated to the concerned government servant and accompanied by a notice that a formal departmental enquiry has been launched. The appellant’s contention that the rule should be interpreted narrowly, relying on the final clause of the rule which reads “until the enquiry into the charge is concluded and a final order is passed thereon,” was rejected. The Court explained that the enquiry referred to in that clause is naturally the enquiry into the misconduct charges that have led to the servant’s suspension, and that the suspension will continue until a final order is issued on those charges. The wording of the final clause does not require the enquiry to be a formal departmental enquiry conducted under Rule 7 of the Punishment and Appeal Rules. The Court expressed the view that whenever any charge of misconduct is being investigated by the Government, whether the investigation is carried out informally or formally, the Government is competent to suspend the servant and may invoke Rule 3.26(d) if the circumstances of the case demand it. The appellant also argued that the servant’s suspension without first giving him an opportunity to explain the charges was improper because the suspension proceeding was of a quasi‑judicial character and therefore required the servant’s prior explanation. The Court distinguished the nature of the suspension order from the quasi‑judicial enquiry, observing that the order of suspension pending enquiry is essentially an administrative order, while the quasi‑judicial character lies in the subsequent enquiry into the misconduct charges. During that enquiry the rules require that the servant be allowed to comment on the charges, that oral evidence may be recorded in his presence, and that a finding be arrived at after such procedures, but none of these steps is a prerequisite for imposing a suspension before the enquiry commences. The Court explained that an authority may issue a suspension order when it receives a complaint of misconduct, is satisfied that the allegation is not frivolous, deems that an inquiry is necessary, and believes that suspension is required during the pendency of the inquiry. The Court also referred to Explanation I to Rule 2.2(b) of the 1959 Rules (Vol. II), which states that departmental proceedings are deemed to have been instituted when the charges are issued to the employee, or, if the employee has already been placed under suspension, from the date of that earlier suspension. This explanation supports the proposition that a suspension may be imposed even before the formal issue of charges. Finally, the Court noted that the decision in Bachhittar Singh’s case does not provide authority for the proposition that an initial suspension pending enquiry must be made only after the servant has been given an opportunity to explain the charges, and observed that the question raised by the appellant on this point was not a matter for consideration in the present case.
In this case, the Court also examined an additional contention raised by the appellant. The appellant argued that neither the 1941 rules nor the 1959 rules gave the Government authority to suspend a government servant before an enquiry was completed. According to the appellant, any suspension contemplated by those rules could only arise under rule 7.5 of the 1941 rules or under rules 7.5 and 7.6 of the 1959 rules. The appellant maintained that those particular rules did not confer upon the Government the power to impose suspension; instead, they merely identified certain periods in a servant’s service that could be deemed suspension or periods during which a suspension might be imposed because of the various exigencies mentioned in the rules. The appellant further asserted that none of the rules expressly provided a formal power of suspension. Consequently, the appellant relied on section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which, as noted in A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 395, vests the power to suspend a government servant in the appointing authority.
The appellant also made a substantial argument concerning the alleged inapplicability of rule 3.26(d) to his situation. He contended that, when his service was initially governed by the 1941 rules, he possessed a right to opt for retirement on superannuation. On that basis, he asserted that the later 1959 rules could not diminish that right, nor could they empower the Governor to retain him in service after his superannuation date without his consent. The appellant relied on rule 1.6 of the 1959 rules, which states that nothing in those rules shall deprive any person of any right or privilege to which he is entitled by or under any law or by the terms of his agreement. He also cited rule 5.28 of volume II of the 1941 rules, which reads: “A Government servant in Superior service who has attained the age of 55 years may, at his option, retire on a Superannuation pension.” According to the appellant, this provision granted him an unequivocal right to retire upon reaching the age of 55, and therefore he could not lawfully be retained in service after attaining that age without his consent. He further argued that the 1959 rules could not override this right, and consequently rule 3.26(d) could not be applied to him after he turned 55.
The Court observed that there is no rule in volume XI of the 1959 rules that corresponds to rule 5.28 of volume XI of the 1941 rules. The Court noted that rule 5.28 appears to have been cancelled in the later volume. Because the appellant’s retirement was, as already determined, governed by the 1959 rules and not by the 1941 rules, the Court held that any right, if it existed, under the 1941 rules could not be said to fall within the protection of rule 1.6 of the 1959 rules. Rule 1.6 preserves rights that a government servant is entitled to by law or by the terms of his agreement, but such protection applies only to rights that exist at the time the 1959 rules are in force. Since the 1941 rules no longer governed the appellant, the Court concluded that the alleged right to opt for retirement at age 55 did not survive under the 1959 regulatory scheme, and therefore rule 3.26(d) could be applied to his case.
The Court observed that the rights a Government servant possessed were those created by the law that was operative when the 1959 rules applied. Because the 1941 rules no longer governed the appellant, the Court held that he could not claim a statutory right to retire automatically upon reaching the age of fifty‑five. Rule 5.28, which appeared in Volume 11 of the 1941 rules dealing with pensions and provident fund, was therefore to be read as a provision that authorised the grant of superannuation pension to a Government servant who had elected to retire after attaining fifty‑five years of age, but only when the Government, exercising its power under rule 3.26 of Volume 1, required that officer to remain in service. The sequence of rules in Volume II supported this construction. The Court explained that Section 4 of Chapter V set out the regime for superannuation pension, with Part I covering the conditions of grant and Part II covering the procedure. Part I comprised three rules – 5.27, 5.28 and 5.29. Rule 5.27 stipulated that superannuation pension was payable to a Government servant in superior service who was either entitled or compelled to retire at a specified age. Rule 5.28 followed immediately under the heading “conditions of grant” and consequently meant that a pension could be awarded to a superior‑service officer who chose to retire after reaching the age of fifty‑five. The Court then considered the hypothetical that the appellant possessed a right to retire at fifty‑five under either Rule 5.28 or rule 3.26(a). It held that such a right was nevertheless subject to rule 3.26(d), which barred any Government servant who was under suspension on a charge of misconduct from retiring on the date of compulsory retirement. The appellant also argued that rule 3.26(d) should apply to officers whose “date of compulsory retirement” fell before the statutory superannuation date. The Court found no language in rule 3.26(d) or in note 3 to that rule that warranted interpreting the phrase to mean a date earlier than the actual superannuation date. Moreover, the State was not obligated to compel retirement at that age; retirement at fifty‑five was merely an option for the Government. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the expression “date of compulsory retirement” in rule 3.26(d) must be read as referring to the dates specified in the earlier clauses of rule 3.26, namely the age of fifty‑five or any other ages expressly mentioned therein.
In this case, the Court explained that clause (b) of rule 3.26 requires certain Government servants to retire at the age of sixty. Clause (c)(i) provides that certain officers must retire upon attaining the age of fifty‑five, but also authorises the Government, in particular circumstances, to require them to retire at the age of fifty. Consequently, the phrase “required to retire” refers to those officers whose situations fall within the earlier clauses of rule 3.26, and it may also apply to any Government servant whom any other rule mandates to retire in special situations. The breadth of the rule does not exclude its application to the cases covered by the earlier clauses of rule 3.26. The expression “permitted to retire” is understood to cover instances where a Government servant chooses to retire under rules that give him that option. The Court observed that the observations at page 579 of the case reported as The State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand M. Doshl do not support the appellant’s contention. The cited passage merely states that the question considered in that case could arise only when a rule fixes both a superannuation age and a compulsory retirement age, and the civil servant’s service ends between those two points. In that case, the issue was whether an order of compulsory retirement amounted to dismissal or removal. Accordingly, the Court held that the appellant did not possess an absolute right to retire upon reaching the superannuation age; any such right was subject to rule 3.26(d), which applied to him because he was under suspension on misconduct charges at the time of his compulsory retirement. The Court further noted that no question arises about the Government retaining a servant who retired at fifty‑five, because once the officer has retired the Government could only retain his services by re‑employment. In the present matter, the orders that suspended the appellant, revoked his leave, and retained him in service after his superannuation were issued before he reached the age of fifty‑five, and therefore the rule 3.26(d) was applicable. Finally, the Court rejected the contention that rule 3.26(d) infringed the appellant’s fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 23 of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that the rule merely acknowledges that the service the appellant voluntarily entered into continues under conditions laid down by the relevant rules, and any restriction it imposes on the alleged rights is a reasonable restriction in the public interest.
The Court observed that Rule 3.26(d) allowed a government servant’s service to continue in specified circumstances even after the servant had attained the age of superannuation. It further held that any limitation imposed by the rule on the alleged fundamental rights protected by clauses (f) and (g) of Article 19 constituted a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public. The Court explained that the duties that might be required of the servant after reaching the superannuation age, as contemplated by Rule 3.26(d), could not be described as ‘begar’ or ‘forced labour’ within the meaning of Article 23. It pointed out that the appellant was under suspension, performed no work, and therefore was not compelled to undertake any service. Even assuming that retaining a servant under Rule 3.26(d) fell within the expression ‘forced labour’, the Court noted that the rule would still be valid because Article 23(2) permits the State to impose compulsory service for public purposes. In the Court’s view, the retention served a public purpose, namely the efficient functioning of the service, by keeping the servant under governmental control until the departmental enquiry into the misconduct charge was completed and a final order was rendered.
The Court also addressed the contention that the charges framed against the appellant, if proven, might constitute criminal offences and thus should have led to criminal prosecution instead of departmental proceedings. It found no provision in the service rules or in general law that supported this contention, emphasizing that the Government alone decides the appropriate action for alleged misconduct. The Court clarified that such governmental discretion did not contravene Article 14, because the service rules applied uniformly to all similarly situated servants and were therefore non‑discriminatory. The Government was held to have the discretion, in each case, to consider the nature of the alleged misconduct and surrounding circumstances before deciding whether to institute criminal proceedings. Moreover, the Government retained the right to pursue departmental proceedings even after criminal proceedings, if any, were concluded. Consequently, the Court concluded that there was nothing unlawful in the Government’s initiation of departmental proceedings against the appellant. Finally, before examining the allegation that the impugned orders were passed mala fide, the Court considered the appellant’s general grievance that the Chief Minister, Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon, had not been made a party to the writ petition. The Court noted that the appellant had not originally impleaded the Chief Minister and had only sought to do so after the decision in R. P. Kapur v. Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon, where the Court allowed the application for impleading the Chief Minister as a respondent.
The High Court dismissed the application to implead the Chief Minister because the petition did not claim any relief against him. The order was not erroneous, since the sole ground for seeking his impleadment was to compel him to file an affidavit, a requirement that did not arise when he was not a party to the proceeding. In the proceedings below, several affidavits were filed on behalf of the respondent, namely those sworn by Mrs. Sodhi, Pahwa, Yog Raj, Om Prakash, Surendra Singh Kairon and Kirpa Singh. The appellant now argues that these affidavits should have been excluded because the written statement filed for the respondent made no reference to them. No objection of that kind was raised before the Court below, and the petition and the appellant’s affidavit containing allegations about these individuals were not accepted by the respondent. Consequently, it was not improper, irregular, or illegal for the State to obtain and file those affidavits. In fact, the State could have also secured affidavits from the Chief Minister, Mrs. Kairon, the Inspector‑General of Prisons and the Vigilance Inspector concerning the allegations directed at them. The appellant’s contention that the absence of such affidavits undermines the State’s case therefore lacks merit.
The appellant further contended that because the petition’s factual allegations were not specifically contradicted in the respondent’s written statement, and because the persons most competent to deny them had not done so, those allegations should be deemed established. This argument relates to allegations against the Chief Minister and his wife, as well as to matters arising from a tape‑recorded conversation that the appellant claimed to have had with the Inspector‑General of Prisons and the Vigilance Inspector. The appellant submitted a written rendering of that conversation. The individuals named in the rendering did not, through their own affidavits, deny having had the conversations alleged by the appellant, even though State officers, acting on the State’s application, were permitted to listen to the original tape and to prepare their own tape records of the appellant’s submissions. Those State‑prepared records were intended to enable the State to verify the appellant’s claim that the recorded talks involved the appellant and the persons mentioned. The lack of explicit denials in affidavits may lead the Court to accept the appellant’s version of the conversations, but such acceptance cannot by itself prove the statements attributed to other speakers. The tape‑recorded conversation can serve only as corroborative evidence of the appellant’s claim that the other persons made particular statements; it does not constitute direct or primary evidence of the content of those persons’ statements.
In this case, the High Court had declined to rely on the tape‑recorded conversations because such recordings might have been tampered with. The Court explained that a tape recording could serve only as corroborative evidence for a person who testified about what another speaker said, and it could not stand as direct or primary proof of the statements allegedly made by a third person. The record contained no allegation that the boy suffered any injury as a result of leaving the appellant’s residence before he had fully recovered. Moreover, the material presented from the alleged conversations between the appellant and the wife of the Chief Minister, identified as tape‑recorded talks numbered six and two made in April and May respectively, did not establish that the Chief Minister had asked the appellant to perform any operation. The Court observed that any statement attributed to the Chief Minister through his wife could not be taken as evidence of the Chief Minister’s own words, especially since Sardarni Pratap Singh Kairon had not been examined. Surendra, in his affidavit, denied that the appellant had performed any operation on him at the relevant time. Consequently, the Court found that it could not conclude that the Chief Minister had requested such a favour from the appellant, nor could it accept the proposition that, even if the appellant’s allegation were true, the Chief Minister became so annoyed by the appellant’s alleged actions—such as Surendra’s departure from Jullunder for a few days, whether from the appellant’s house or the Circuit House—that he broke all friendship, harboured a grudge, abused his official position, caused unjustified enquiries, and obtained the impugned orders.
The petition also alleged that the Chief Minister and members of his family had repeatedly recommended that the appellant provide undue favours within the scope of his official duties, and that when these demands became excessive, the appellant had expressed his inability to comply with what he described as extremely unreasonable requests. To support this claim, the appellant produced a series of nineteen documents labeled as the B‑series. The Court noted that none of these documents, taken individually, demonstrated that the appellant had been asked to act in a manner inconsistent with the proper performance of his official responsibilities. The contents of the documents merely showed that the writers—identified as the Chief Minister, his sons Surendra and Girendra, and his brother Jaswant Singh—had recommended certain individuals for medical treatment, hospital admission, or the issuance of medical certificates. The Court held that it could not be presumed that false certificates were required to be issued. The appellant had not specified how he might have acted improperly or the reasons for such conduct. The Court further observed that a personal friendship with the Chief Minister did not excuse a breach of duty. As a public servant occupying a responsible position, the appellant was expected to discharge his duties faithfully, and any failure to do so could not be justified merely on the basis of a friendly relationship.
In this case the Court observed that the appellant’s alleged weakness of character could be explained by his desire to stay in the good graces of the Chief Minister so that he might obtain benefits such as promotion, a posting at a desirable station, or protection from any adverse action if he were to act improperly while performing his official duties. The petition does not contain any information about how or when the Chief Minister and the appellant became friends. While it is possible for a Chief Minister to have a close working relationship with an efficient public servant, such a relationship does not automatically become a friendship. Consequently the explanation that the appellant gave preferential treatment to persons recommended by the Chief Minister and his relatives merely because of a friendship is not persuasive. Moreover, even if the appellant’s allegation that he showed undue favour were true, such favour would not necessarily antagonise the Chief Minister. The appellant has failed to specify which recommendations he ignored or the occasions on which he allegedly failed to comply. Because of this omission, the Court found that the allegation does not establish that the Chief Minister bore any personal grudge against the appellant. The petition also claims that the Chief Minister was displeased because the appellant stopped complying with unreasonable requests made by the Chief Minister’s family members for medicines and other expensive items. The petition does not identify the particular requests or the times at which the appellant refused them. The Court noted that, had the appellant complied with those requests, it would have placed him in the Chief Minister’s good graces and strengthened his relationship with the Minister’s circle. Nonetheless, the appellant denied that he ever supplied such medicines or articles. The Court therefore concluded that there was no clear evidence that the appellant’s conduct in this regard had caused the Chief Minister any grievance.
The Court then turned to the documentary and recorded evidence concerning the alleged supplies. Certain postal receipts filed by the appellant showed that parcels were sent to Mrs. Pratap Singh Kairon in July and October 1957, in March and September 1958, and in March 1959. The receipts, however, did not indicate that the parcels contained medicines. Nevertheless, tape‑recorded conversations numbered 1, 3 and 4 referred to requests for medicines and to the appellant’s supply of such medicines. It was also alleged that the appellant provided two expensive Singer sewing machines. Cash memos relating to the purchase of those two Singer machines by Sardar Bahadur Bagh Singh, the appellant’s father‑in‑law, were filed for July 1959 and October 1959. In July 1959 a wooden box was sent to Mrs. Kairon through a man named Pahwa, who at that time was the Traffic Manager of the Punjab Roadways in Amritsar. The appellant’s associate Om Prakash delivered the box from the appellant’s residence to Pahwa. Both Om Prakash and Pahwa later submitted affidavits describing the box as being too small to hold a Singer sewing machine. Contradictorily, Om Prakash’s receipt, identified as Annexure C.9, stated that he had received a box labelled “Singer Sewing Machine” from Dr Partap Singh. A tape‑recorded conversation dated August 1959 (talk no. 3) captured Mrs. Kairon’s remarks that she had received a machine she did not like because of its colour, and the appellant’s response that the price could be reduced under certain contingencies. The State’s position on these matters was then left to be addressed.
The State did not file any affidavit from Mrs Kairon to deny the statements recorded in the conversation. That conversation indicates that the appellant supplied a Singer sewing machine to Mrs Kairon and that a deduction could be made from the price under certain contingencies. There is no reason to reject the appellant’s claim that he supplied both the Singer sewing machine and medicines to her. Such supplies would have tended to win the appellant favour with the Chief Minister. The record contains no information about any specific requests for medicines or other articles that the appellant refused, nor does it show how any such refusal might have caused the Chief Minister to feel aggrieved. A further alleged source of grievance is said to have arisen in April 1960 when the appellant asked the Chief Minister’s friend, Kirpa Singh, who had been a guest of the appellant for about seven months, to leave the appellant’s house. Kirpa Singh was the manager of National Motors at Jullunder. The petition alleges that this firm was either directly or indirectly owned by Surendra Singh Kairon or a close relative, but the allegation is vague. Both Kirpa Singh and Surendra Singh denied that Surendra Singh had any interest in National Motors at Jullunder. Although Kirpa Singh did stay at the appellant’s house during the alleged period, his letter marked Exhibit D‑1 does not show any annoyance at having to leave the house after staying there from September 1959 to the end of March 1960; on the contrary, the letter expresses gratitude to the appellant. Consequently, there is no basis for the Chief Minister to feel annoyed or to bear a grudge against the appellant on the ground that Kirpa Singh ceased to be his guest after April 1960, even though Kirpa Singh was a friend of the Chief Minister and was accommodated at the appellant’s request, as reflected in tape‑recorded talk no 15. The other two alleged reasons for the Chief Minister’s grievance relate to events after April 1960. It is alleged that in September 1960 the Chief Minister sent a message through the Home Secretary of Punjab stating that he had been overly liberal toward the Akali prisoners in the District Jail. The respondent’s written statement says that the District Magistrate of Jullunder made such a complaint to the Home Secretary, who happened to be in Jullunder, and that the Home Secretary conveyed the complaint to the appellant at a meeting that also included the Inspector‑General of Prisons and the Collector. The matter was reportedly closed as a result of the discussions at that meeting. Reference is made to a tape‑recorded conversation between the appellant and the Inspector‑General of Prisons in November 1960, which suggests that exaggerated information had reached the Chief Minister.
The Court observed that the Chief Minister had directed the appellant to dispatch a message and that the Chief Minister expressed satisfaction after the Inspector General of Prisons clarified the situation to him. The Court held that a Chief Minister’s act of sending a message to an officer concerning a complaint received against that officer cannot be interpreted as evidence of personal ill‑will toward the officer, because such communication is a function of the Chief Minister’s official duties. The next matter considered by the Court was the allegation that the Chief Minister had extensively employed the appellant, off the record, in the Karnal Murder Case while that case was under appeal. In that case the Sessions Judge acquitted the accused in November 1959, and the High Court dismissed the Government’s appeal in May 1960. The appellant, according to the record, had made every effort to assist the prosecution by providing instructions on the medico‑legal aspects of the case and had assured the Chief Minister that the outcome would be favourable. This assurance was recorded in tape‑recorded talk no. 17 made in April 1960. The appellant further alleged that the High Court’s dismissal of the appeal and the subsequent rejection of the Government’s petition for special leave to the Supreme Court in October 1960 displeased the Chief Minister, who is said to have conveyed his displeasure to the appellant. The Court acknowledged that, under those circumstances, the Chief Minister might have spoken sarcastically to the appellant about the strong assurances he had given, but the Court found it difficult to conclude that such remarks amounted to hostility, especially given the appellant’s diligent work, undertaken at the Chief Minister’s request, in assisting the prosecution with the medico‑legal component of the case. It was also noted that the appellant did not claim that the Chief Minister had expressed his displeasure in May 1960, shortly after the High Court’s dismissal of the State appeal. Another alleged source of the Chief Minister’s displeasure was the appellant’s alleged inability to obey certain instructions conveyed by the Chief Minister in December 1956 concerning Dr Dhillon’s role as the Chief Minister’s medical attendant for several days. The precise nature of those instructions was not disclosed. The Court also observed that the record did not specify what part the appellant played in later developments involving the Accountant General of Punjab, which were said to have been unpalatable to the Chief Minister. An incident dated December 1957 was mentioned, but even if that incident were true, the Court found no indication that it had impaired the apparently amicable relationship between the Chief Minister and the appellant up to April 1960. After reviewing all the reasons presented by the appellant in his petition that the Chief Minister bore a grudge against him from May 1960 onward, the Court concluded that, either individually or taken together, those reasons failed to demonstrate any genuine grievance on the part of the Chief Minister. The Court identified the earliest specific incident that the appellant claimed had irritated the Chief Minister as occurring in the early days of April 1960, involving Kirpa Singh.
In this case the Court observed that Kirpa Singh had been instructed to leave his residence at the end of March 1960. The Court held that, because Kirpa Singh had sent a letter of thanks to the appellant, there was no basis for the Chief Minister to feel displeased with the appellant. This conclusion was reinforced by the fact that, at the end of April 1960, the Chief Minister secretly assigned the appellant the task of performing an important operation on his son Surendra, an assignment that could only have been made if the Chief Minister still enjoyed a favourable relationship with the appellant. The Court further held that the alleged failure of the appellant to keep Surendra Singh at his place after the operation could not have caused the Chief Minister any displeasure, since no adverse consequences resulted. This view was supported by the observation that the Chief Minister took no action against the appellant until the end of October, when a departmental enquiry was instituted. The Court noted that the incident in which Surendra left Jullunder for a few days before fully recovering did not create any animosity between the Chief Minister and the appellant. The Court also considered that the High Court of Punjab had dismissed the State appeal in the Karnal Murder case in May 1960, and that the appellant had assisted the prosecution at the appellate stage. Although the Chief Minister might have been dissatisfied with the dismissal, the Court found that such disappointment could not have generated the level of ill‑will necessary to justify the appellant’s transfer in October or the initiation of the enquiry. The recorded conversation in November 1960 between the appellant and the Inspector General of Prisons further indicated that the relationship between the appellant and the Chief Minister could not have been strained at that time; the appellant had consulted the Inspector General about the attitude of the District Magistrate, and the Inspector General had remarked that, in his opinion, the matter had been hushed up. The Court reasoned that if the relationship had been as hostile as alleged, the appellant would not have raised the issue of the District Magistrate’s attitude in that setting. The appellant also submitted various matters that he claimed demonstrated malice on the part of the Chief Minister, thereby supporting his allegation of personal grievance. Nevertheless, the Court examined the appellant’s transfer from Jullunder to Amritsar, which was ordered in December 1960. Jullunder, according to the appellant’s testimony, was a sought‑after posting for civil surgeons, and the appellant had remained there beyond the normal three‑year tenure. The Court concluded that the transfer could not be attributed to the Chief Minister’s malice, especially because a departmental enquiry had already been instituted against the appellant.
In this matter, the Court observed that the transfer of the appellant arose from a complaint concerning the performance of his duties, and that such a transfer was the most natural order that the head of a department could issue under those circumstances. The Court noted that, for the convenience of officers, transfers are ordinarily scheduled during the months of March and April, and are not normally made immediately before an officer’s retirement; however, the Court added that a transfer that occurs outside the usual period or that is executed shortly before retirement for purely administrative reasons cannot, by itself, be characterised as having been ordered with dishonest intent. The appellant’s brother‑in‑law, who was then serving as an officiating officer in the Provincial Civil Service, Executive Branch, was reverted to a lower cadre on 22 November 1960, an action that took place between the initiation of a departmental enquiry against the appellant and the issuance of the appellant’s transfer order. The appellant alleged that this reversion demonstrated a general ill‑will on the part of the Chief Minister toward him. In the written statement, it was further alleged that the brother‑in‑law’s reversion resulted from his own unsatisfactory conduct and work. The Court held that there was no material on the record showing that any proceeding had declared the reversion to be improper, and therefore the reversion could not be said to have been made mala fide. The Court also observed that the subsequent cancellation of the reversion orders, which occurred after the brother‑in‑law made a representation, did not, by itself, indicate that the original reversion had been dishonest. The appellant subsequently applied for leave in preparation for his retirement, and the Court recorded that such leave was granted, with the appellant commencing his leave sometime in December 1960. After this period, events unfolded that might have given the Chief Minister a reason to feel aggrieved with the appellant. On 14 January 1961, the newspaper Blitz published an article titled “Punjab’s latest scandal: The sewing machine of Kairon family”. The article alleged that the Civil Surgeon had supplied a sewing machine to the Chief Minister’s wife and that a Roadways Official had transported the machine. It further described the appellant as a henchman and handyman for members of the Chief Minister’s family, and it claimed that the Civil Surgeon had dispatched several parcels of medicines to the Chief Minister’s wife by registered post, allegedly using stock from the hospital. The article also reported that the Chief Minister’s son owned a garage in Jullunder, that the garage manager was boarding with the Civil Surgeon, and that recommendatory letters had been written to the doctor by the Chief Minister’s sons, sister‑in‑law and brother. Additionally, the article referred to an alleged affair involving Dr Dhillon. The Court recognised that, in view of these allegations, the Chief Minister could have perceived the article as being inspired by the appellant. Moreover, the appellant’s wife published a letter in the Blitz on 18 March 1961, in which she appeared to admit many of the allegations made in the earlier article, except for those matters that were unfavorable to her husband, and she disclosed that she had sent parcels of medicines to the Chief Minister’s wife by registered post and other means.
It was recorded that the Garage Manager lodged with the Chief Minister’s wife as required by her. Between January and March, a series of events occurred that led the appellant to believe that the Government was moving against him. On 17 January 1961, the appellant received a letter that had been dated 13 January 1961 from the Inspector of Vigilance of District Jullunder. The letter asked the appellant to specify the place and the date at which he could be contacted in order to obtain his viewpoint on matters that were relevant to an enquiry ordered by the Punjab Government. This enquiry had originally been instituted on 29 October 1960.
The appellant alleged that the Chief Minister might have seen a copy of the newspaper Blitz dated 14 January while in Delhi on 13 January 1961, and that, after seeing that copy, the Chief Minister had launched vindictive proceedings against the petitioner. He asserted that the Chief Minister had then used the machinery of Government in a malicious way to satisfy personal malice and a vendetta. The implication of the allegation was that, having become aware of the article published in the Blitz on 14 January, the Chief Minister had directed the Vigilance Inspector to issue the 13 January letter to the appellant in order to determine the place and date at which the appellant could be interrogated in connection with the enquiry.
The Court described this line of reasoning as far‑fetched. The enquiry had already been under way since 29 October, and it was therefore natural that the Vigilance Officer wrote the letter dated 13 January to the appellant in the ordinary course of that investigation. The Court noted that whatever views the Vigilance Inspector expressed about the various charges framed against the appellant in tape‑recorded talk no. 16 on 13 February 1961, even if they represented his genuine opinion, did not constitute evidence that the senior officers who had investigated the case shared the same view, nor did it demonstrate that the Government’s later formal framing of charges was motivated by malice.
The Court referred to the letter marked Annexure J, dated 3 June 1961, which stated that the evidence placed on record was sufficiently strong to justify serious action against the appellant. The Court held that any opinions expressed by the Vigilance Inspector, who had no authority to opine on the matter when he was tasked solely with obtaining an explanation or the appellant’s version of certain allegations, were not sufficient to cast suspicion on the statement contained in the June 3 letter.
Furthermore, the Court observed that, if the Chief Minister had indeed initiated the enquiry in October out of malice and had prompted the Vigilance Inspector on 13 January as a result of the article in the Blitz of 15 January 1961—assuming the Chief Minister had seen that copy in Delhi on 13 January—then the Chief Minister could have arranged for the early submission of the police report that would have established a case against the appellant. In that circumstance, the Chief Minister would have been able to take action against the appellant much earlier than the date of 3 June 1961, when special steps were required to ensure that the necessary legal
In this case, the Court observed that the action taken against the appellant was completed before his retirement, which occurred on 16 June 1961. The Court noted that if the Chief Minister had been motivated by personal malice, he could have handled the matters more readily and with a view to exacting vengeance against the appellant, who had apparently acted contrary to the Chief Minister’s wishes even after having complied with them for a considerable period. The record shows that in February 1961 the appellant received a copy of the remarks entered in his annual confidential file covering the period from 1 April 1959 to 31 March 1960. Those remarks stated that, professionally, the appellant was considered to be only of average ability, and that persistent complaints had been lodged about his greed and lack of integrity. The appellant did not appear to take any step in response to these adverse remarks until 29 June 1961, except that he inquired of the Director of Health Services about the time limit within which a representation could be made against such remarks.
On 29 June 1961 the appellant submitted a representation, although it was filed after the normal period for making a representation had passed. In that representation he argued that the observations attributed to Shri Kairon, the Chief Minister who was also overseeing the Health Department, did not constitute an honest opinion when considered in the context of certain facts on record, a few of which he outlined in his petition. The Court noted that the written statement indicated that the remarks were not made by the Chief Minister but by the Secretary of the Health Department, and that the exact date of their making was not known. The Court explained that the fact that the remarks were communicated in February 1961 did not necessarily mean they were recorded at that time, because annual remarks are ordinarily prepared some time after the close of the relevant year, based on inputs from departmental heads who submit their comments at their own pace. Even assuming the remarks were prepared in February 1961, the Court held that this timing alone could not demonstrate that they were made maliciously due to the Chief Minister’s ill‑will, since by that stage the various complaints against the appellant that had reached the enquiring officer would also have been known to the Government. According to the charge‑sheet filed against the appellant, the complaints chiefly concerned the years 1959 and 1960. The record further shows that tape‑recorded conversations between the appellant and the Chief Minister and his wife were broadcast at a press conference held on 29 March 1961 in Chandigarh, an event that prompted a motion for adjournment in the Punjab Legislative Assembly on the following day, 30 March. Subsequently, in April 1961, the appellant’s wife distributed a pamphlet titled “Acts of corruption by Shri Partap Sing Kairon and his family members” to Members of Parliament and other prominent individuals across the country. The Court observed that this action by the appellant’s wife would again have given the Chief Minister a further cause for grievance.
In this matter, the Court examined whether the actions of the appellant and his wife, which produced grievance against the Chief Minister between January and April 1961, could be said to have prompted the Government to suspend the appellant, revoke his leave, extend his service and commence a formal departmental enquiry for reasons of malice, or whether those measures were taken in the ordinary course of administration. The Court held that the steps taken against the appellant could not be characterized as having been taken in bad faith simply because the appellant and his wife behaved in a way that unquestionably gave rise to grievance against the Chief Minister. The record did not contain any material that explained why the appellant and his wife felt compelled to have an article printed in the Blitz on 14 January, to cause the appellant’s wife’s letter to appear in the Blitz in March 1961, and to circulate her pamphlets throughout the country. The Court further observed that it could not be said that the appellant and his wife pursued these actions with the noble purpose of exposing alleged misdeeds of the Chief Minister of Punjab so as to improve the administration of the State.
The Court noted that the appellant was still a government servant, although he was on leave in preparation for his retirement, which was scheduled for June 1961. Consequently, he remained bound by the discipline required of a public officer. Likewise, the conduct of his wife was expected to conform to the standards applicable to the spouse of a public servant. The Court could not accept the suggestion that the appellant was unaware of his wife’s activities. It found it inevitable that the appellant and his wife resorted to the press prematurely, even if they may have been motivated by a desire to bring about administrative improvement, in order to create a protective shield should the police investigation then under way result in formal charges and the initiation of a departmental enquiry. The design, the Court concluded, originated with the appellant and could not be imputed to the Chief Minister, who merely held responsibility for the Government’s orders as the Minister‑in‑charge of the department and head of the administration. The Court also addressed the contention that, on the basis of rule 8.19 of the 1941 rules, the Government ought to have refused the appellant’s leave in December 1960 if genuine complaints had been made and an investigation was proceeding. The Court explained that the leave in question was governed by the 1959 rules, and that rule 8.19 in those rules did not obligate the Government to deny leave to the appellant in December 1960. The rule states: “Leave shall not be granted to a Government servant whom”.
The Court observed that the rule applicable to the case stated that leave could not be granted to a government servant who had been decided to be dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired by a competent authority. Because no such decision had been taken by any competent authority at the time the leave was sought, the Government could not rely on rule 8.19 to refuse the leave. The Court further noted that even the version of the rule contained in the 1941 regulations did not empower the Government to deny leave on that basis. That 1941 rule provided that leave should not be granted to a servant who was to be dismissed or removed for misconduct or general inefficiency if the leave would postpone the date of dismissal or removal, or to a servant whose conduct was at that time forming, or was likely to form in the near future, the subject of a departmental enquiry. The Court emphasized that the provision was not mandatory but rather discretionary, leaving the Government free to either grant or deny leave according to its judgment. The police investigation into the complaint against the appellant was ongoing in December 1960, and it would have been unreasonable for the Government to form a definitive opinion on disciplinary action at that stage. Accordingly, the granting of leave to the appellant in 1960 does not demonstrate that the Government was unaware of any complaint, nor does it show that the subsequent departmental action was taken with malicious intent. The appellant also argued that, having sanctioned the leave, the Government could have avoided suspending him and revoking his leave by instead invoking rule 2.2(b) of the 1941 rules, which allows action if grave misconduct is established through departmental proceedings. The Court rejected that argument, stating that the mere selection of one permissible course of action over another does not prove that the Government acted in bad faith. Moreover, the Court explained that rule 2.2(b) could be applied only after a finding of grave misconduct, and the distinction between grave and simple misconduct was itself a matter of debate in the present facts. Consequently, the Court concluded that it was not established that the orders issued by the Governor were motivated by an ulterior purpose of harassing the appellant or damaging his reputation because of his public allegations against the Chief Minister. The Court therefore dismissed the appeal. In the final order, the Court noted that, in line with the majority opinion, the appeal was allowed, and that no order as to costs would be made against either party in either the Supreme Court or the High Court.
The Court indicated that the appeal was allowed, thereby granting the petitioner the relief that had been requested.