Rajabhai Abdul Rehman Munshi vs Vasudev Dhanjlbhai Mody
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 692 of 1962
Decision Date: 1 May 1963
Coram: J.C. Shah, A.K. Sarkar, M. Hidayatullah
Rajabhai Abdul Rehman Munshi versus Vasudev Dhanjlbhai Mody was decided on 1 May 1963 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice J.C. Shah and the bench comprised Justice J.C. Shah, Justice A.K. Sarkar and Justice M. Hidayatullah. The parties are identified as petitioner Rajabhai Abdul Rehman Munshi and respondent Vasudev Dhanjlbhai Mody. The citation for the decision appears as 1964 AIR 345 and 1964 SCR (3) 480, with subsequent citations recorded as R 1969 SC 1273 (3), F 1973 SC 2056 (15), R 1974 SC 950 (7) and R 1978 SC 765 (10). The matter concerned the revocation of a special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, alleged false statements in the special leave petition, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The factual backdrop involved a tenancy dispute that began with a suit filed in 1954. On 1 October 1954 the tenant deposited the sum of Rs 400 in the Court. That deposit remained in the Court’s custody until 19 January 1957, when the tenant withdrew the amount. Meanwhile, the landlord instituted a fresh suit for ejectment in September 1955. On 10 January 1957 the tenant reiterated the existence of the Rs 400 deposit but, after nine days, again withdrew the money. The trial court, on 26 February 1957, dismissed the ejectment suit on the basis that the required rent amount had already been deposited by the tenant in Court. The lower appellate court, however, reversed that finding, holding that the Rs 400 was insufficient because it had already been withdrawn, and consequently ordered ejectment. The landlord then filed a revision petition before the High Court, asserting that the Rs 400 remained on deposit and was therefore at the landlord’s disposal. Although the High Court accepted that the money was indeed in deposit, it declined to interfere with the lower court’s order and dismissed the revision petition.
The tenant subsequently filed a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. In that petition the tenant quoted an extensive extract from the High Court’s judgment concerning the Rs 400 deposit and urged that the High Court had correctly concluded that, since there was no record of the tenant’s withdrawal of the sum, the tenant was not in arrears of rent. The Supreme Court granted special leave to appeal based on the submissions made in that petition.
The Supreme Court thereafter held that the special leave granted must be vacated. The Court found that the leave had been obtained by the appellant through a deliberate concealment of material facts. Specifically, the petitioner had failed to disclose that the original Rs 400 deposit had been withdrawn after being placed in Court, and had intentionally sought to create the impression that the High Court’s finding on the withdrawal was correct. The Court concluded that such a material misstatement warranted the revocation of the special leave.
Justice Sarkar and Justice Shah observed that the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary. They emphasized that such jurisdiction is exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases where a substantial question of law requires determination or where the Court’s interference is necessary to remedy a serious injustice. They further noted that a party approaching the Court under Article 136 must do so with clean hands; any attempt to mislead the Court by false statements or by withholding material information that would affect the Court’s exercise of discretion may justify the Court in refusing to entertain the petition or, if leave has already been granted, in revoking it.
The Court explained that a party invoking the extraordinary discretion granted under Article 136 must approach the jurisdiction with clean hands. If the party attempts to overreach, mislead the Court, make false statements, or withhold material information that could affect the decision, the Court is justified in refusing to exercise its discretion or, if it has already exercised the discretion, in revoking the leave to appeal even at the hearing stage, as observed by Justice Hidayatullah.
Justice Hidayatullah further observed that the powers available to this Court under Article 136 are not comparable to an ordinary appeal. These powers are intended to permit the Court to intervene only where an irreparable injury has occurred because of a miscarriage of justice, a gross neglect of law or procedure, or where no other adequate remedy exists. Accordingly, the provision is not meant to provide relief in a simple dispute such as a rent default arising from the withdrawal of a court‑deposited sum that cannot be proven on the record.
The Court emphasized that the present matter did not involve a mere factual error or a bona‑fide mistake of judgment. Instead, the appellant acted disingenuously by constructing a point of law on a hypothetical factual foundation, a foundation that, if truthfully disclosed, would leave no room for any legal debate. By deliberately misleading the Court, the appellant induced the grant of special leave in a case that did not merit such relief, and therefore the Court concluded that the special leave should be recalled.
The Court cited the authority of Har Narain v. Badri Das, reported in 1964 2 S.C.R. 203, and the decision in S.B. Shetty v. Phirozeshah Nursservanji Colobawalla and Another, Civil Appeal No. 155 of 1963 decided on 5 April 1963, to support its reasoning that the Court must not be misled by false representations when exercising its discretionary jurisdiction.
The judgment concerned Civil Appeal No. 692 of 1962, which sought special leave to appeal a decree dated 20 January 1960 of the Bombay High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 139 of 1958. Counsel for the appellant included J.P. Mehta, Aziz Mushabber Ahmadi, J.B. Dadachanji, O.C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, while counsel for the respondent was Vithal B. Patel together with N. Shroff.
Justice Shah, delivering the principal judgment, stated that the special leave to appeal granted by this Court must be vacated because it had been obtained by the appellant without disclosing all material facts. He noted that Rajabhai Munshi, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, had been a tenant of Vasudev Mody, hereinafter called the plaintiff, since 1935 for a parcel of land situated in Ahmedabad. The original annual rent was Rs. 411, which the parties later agreed to increase to Rs. 851 per annum.
In 1948 the plaintiff filed suit number 2014 of 1952 before the Court of Small Causes, invoking section 28 of the Bombay Rents and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, and seeking ejectment because the defendant had defaulted in paying rent. The defendant countered that the rent stipulated in the tenancy agreement exceeded the standard rent that he was legally required to pay. The Trial Court examined the parties' contentions, calculated the appropriate standard rent as Rs. 446 per annum, and concluded that the defendant had not been in default, thereby dismissing the plaintiff’s suit. The plaintiff appealed this dismissal by filing Appeal number 450 of 1953 before the District Court at Ahmedabad. On 1 October 1954 the defendant deposited Rs. 400 in the District Court, naming the plaintiff as the creditor of that amount. The plaintiff did not pursue the appeal, and consequently the sum of Rs. 400 remained lodged in the court as unclaimed credit to the plaintiff. Subsequently, the plaintiff instituted a second proceeding, identified as Suit number 3434 of 1955, alleging that the defendant had incurred fresh defaults in rent payment. Between 22 November 1955 and 16 January 1957 the defendant made periodic deposits in court totaling Rs. 2,126 and 8 annas toward the rent claimed and the costs of the suit. By an order dated 26 February 1957, the learned Trial Judge held that, when the earlier Rs. 400 credit from Appeal 450 of 1953 was taken into account, the defendant had in total deposited Rs. 2,526 and 8 annas. The judge concluded that this amount satisfied both the alleged rent arrears and the costs of the suit, and consequently, in view of section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Act 57 of 1947, no decree of ejectment could be issued. The plaintiff appealed this decision, and the Extra Assistant Judge of Ahmedabad reversed the trial court’s decree. The appellate judge reasoned that the defendant had failed to deposit the full amount of rent due and the costs required by section 12(3)(b), and therefore a decree of ejectment should be granted against the defendant. In calculating the amount due, the appellate judge excluded the Rs. 400 that had been deposited in Appeal 450 of 1953 on 1 October 1954, holding that the defendant had withdrawn that sum before the trial court rendered its order. The defendant challenged the ejectment decree by invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay. Before the High Court, counsel for the defendant argued that the appellate court’s finding that the Rs. 400 had been withdrawn was unsupported by any evidence. The High Court accepted this argument, but nonetheless dismissed the defendant’s petition on the ground that the matter did not fall strictly within section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Act 57 of 1947.
In this matter the High Court concluded that, under section 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay Act 57 of 1947, it possessed authority to deny the landlord relief because, in view of the tenant’s conduct, the tenant had forfeited any discretionary relief that might otherwise have been available. The High Court’s finding was challenged, and a petition for special leave to appeal to this Court was subsequently granted. Section 12 (1) of the same Act provides that a landlord may not recover possession of premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the standard rent and any permitted increases, and observes and performs the other tenancy conditions to the extent that they are consistent with the Act. Section 12 (3) (b) adds that in any other case no decree for eviction shall be issued if, on the first day of hearing or on any later date fixed by the Court, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the rent and permitted increases then due and continues to do so regularly until the suit is finally decided, and also pays the costs of the suit as directed. Both parties agreed that the claim presented by the plaintiff fell within the description “in any other case.” The High Court, however, assumed that even when the tenant had not deposited the rent and permitted increases on the first day of hearing, the Court could, in exercise of its discretion, refuse to grant an eviction decree to the landlord provided that the tenant later paid all arrears of rent and the costs of the suit into Court before final disposal of the suit. This assumption raised a nuanced question regarding the proper interpretation of section 12 (3) (b). The resolution of that question depended on whether the High Court’s conclusion that the defendant had deposited the rent due and the suit costs before the decree of the trial court was correct. The appellate court had recorded that the tenant had not deposited the rent due nor the costs of the suit, and therefore the tenant could not escape the consequences of his default. In assessing the amounts deposited, the learned judge excluded the sum of Rs 400 deposited in Appeal No. 450 of 1953 because that amount had been withdrawn by the defendant on 19 January 1957. All parties accepted that the Rs 400 deposited in Appeal No. 450 of 1953 was indeed withdrawn by the defendant prior to the trial court’s decree, a fact that the defendant’s counsel acknowledged.
The Court noted that the fact was supported by a certified extract taken from the file of the District Court. At the hearing before the High Court, the counsel for the defendant pleaded that the finding of the Extra Assistant Judge, which held that the amount of Rs 400 was withdrawn before the decree of the Trial Court, was not supported by any evidence. The Court was prepared to hold that the counsel had not been instructed about the withdrawal, that he made no attempt to mislead the Court, and that no blame should be attached to him for this omission. Nevertheless, the Court found that the defendant himself was guilty of withholding information both from the Court and from his own counsel. In the petition for special leave, which was sworn by the defendant, a deliberate attempt was made not merely to conceal from the Court the fact that the Rs 400 originally deposited by the defendant had been withdrawn, but also to create the impression that the High Court’s finding on the withdrawal was correct and that the Extra Assistant Judge’s finding was wrong. The defendant further argued that, because the amounts he had deposited included the Rs 400, he was entitled to the protection of sub‑sections (1) and (3)(b) of section 12. A simple reading of paragraphs 14, 19, 20, 23 and 25 of the petition for special leave left no doubt that this was the objective of the defendant.
The petition asserted that the defendant’s case fell strictly within the terms of section 12(3)(b) and that the High Court was in error in holding that it possessed any discretion to refuse relief after the defendant had complied with the deposit requirements of that subsection. The petition was sworn by the defendant, who affirmed that the facts stated in paragraphs 1 to 32 were true to his knowledge and that the submissions therein were believed by him to be true. He further declared that the petition concealed nothing false or untrue. In his affidavit the defendant also affirmed that he had instructed counsel in the lower courts and was instructing counsel in the present Court with respect to the special leave petition. The Court observed that the High Court’s finding on a factual issue, which the defendant knew to be erroneous, was used as the foundation for a claim that a substantial question of law of general or public importance existed. The Court noted that if the High Court had not been persuaded to adopt its view on the deposit of Rs 400, no further question would have survived, and none appeared to have been raised. Counsel for the plaintiff urged that this Court would not have granted special leave to appeal if the defendant had informed the Court that the amount of Rs 400 which was represented to be lying
In the present matter, the Court observed that the sum claimed to be due to the plaintiff was not actually available at the time the decree was passed by the Trial Court. The Court explained that, because the true facts showed that the question relating to the interpretation of section 12(3)(b) would not have arisen, the issue could not be properly determined on the merits. Consequently, the special leave that had been granted was said to have been obtained by deliberately misleading the Court on a matter of material importance, and the Court therefore held that the special leave should be revoked.
The Court then set out the constitutional framework governing appeals to this Court in civil matters. It noted that the Constitution confers a limited right of appeal to this Court on civil litigants. Specifically, where the amount or value of the subject‑matter in dispute before the Court of first instance, and consequently before this Court on appeal, is not less than Rs 20,000, or where the judgment, decree or final order directly or indirectly involves a claim or question concerning property of at least that value, and where a Division Bench of the High Court has rendered a judgment, decree or final order that does not affirm the decision of the lower court, the aggrieved party is entitled as of right to file an appeal. In addition, the Court explained that an appeal may also be entertained in civil disputes if the High Court issues a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) declaring the case fit for appeal, or if leave is granted under Article 136 of the Constitution.
The Court pointed out that, in the present case, the High Court had not issued a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) because, in its view, the constitutional prohibition contained in clause (3) of Article 133 prevented such a certificate from being granted. The Court emphasised that the jurisdiction exercised under Article 133 is discretionary, to be used sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances where a substantial question of law requires determination or where the Court’s interference is necessary to remedy a serious injustice.
The judgment further stressed that any party invoking this discretionary jurisdiction must approach the Court with clean hands. If the Court discovers that the party has attempted to overreach, mislead, or withhold material information that is relevant to the exercise of discretion, the Court is justified in refusing to exercise its discretion. Moreover, if discretion has already been exercised, the Court may revoke the leave to appeal even during the hearing of the appeal.
To illustrate this principle, the Court referred to the decision in Har Narain v. Badri Das (1964) 2 S.C.R. 203, where Justice Gajendragadkar, speaking for the Court, warned that applicants for special leave must take great care not to make statements that are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In that case, the Court revoked the leave because the appellant had submitted false and misleading statements in the petition for leave, which the Court characterised as deliberate misrepresentations of fact. The Court’s satisfaction that the appellant intentionally made these inaccurate statements led to the revocation of the special leave. The Court then indicated that a similar approach was taken in another case that was brought before this Court.
In the matter of S. R. Shetty v. Phirozeshah Nursservanji Colabawalla, the appellant, in his petition for special leave, asserted that the property involved was valued at more than Rs 20,000. In reality, the same property had been valued at only Rs 500 in a separate proceeding. When the Court revoked the leave, it observed that the appellant had deliberately inflated the valuation to obtain special leave. The Court stated that it was convinced the true value, as acknowledged by the appellant, was Rs 500 and that, had the Court been aware of this true figure, it would not have granted special leave. Consequently, the Court could not condone the appellant’s intentional attempt to mislead the Court on this material issue.
Counsel for the defendant admitted that an amount of Rs 400, which had been deposited on 1 October 1954, was withdrawn by the defendant before the trial‑court judgment. Counsel, however, argued that the defendant had not directed his High Court advocate to raise the issue of the Rs 400’s availability to the plaintiff; the advocate raised the contention independently, and the High Court approved it. Counsel further submitted that a party seeking special leave may limit his submissions to what appears on the record and that, in the present case, the defendant accurately set out the High Court’s finding and based his argument on that finding. Implicit in this submission was the suggestion that a party might mislead a lower or subordinate Court and later approach this Court while withholding material information that, had it been disclosed, would have seriously affected the party’s right to obtain special leave. The Court emphasized that its jurisdiction is discretionary and that it is not bound to grant special leave merely because it is requested. A party who, knowing or believing that the true facts would prevent the grant of special leave, withholds that information and persuades the Court to grant leave commits conduct that forfeits any claim to the exercise of discretion in his favour. It is the applicant’s duty to disclose facts that may reasonably influence the Court’s discretionary powers. Any attempt to conceal material information justifies revoking the order obtained from this Court. The Court could not agree with counsel for the defendant that the duty of an applicant for special leave is fulfilled merely by summarising the judgments of the lower Courts and
In this case the applicant sought relief on the basis that the lower courts’ findings were correct, even though, in his own view, those findings could not be sustained and had been recorded because the lower courts had been misled by representations for which the applicant was either directly or indirectly responsible. The Court found that the petition filed before it was misleading, and therefore revoked the special leave to appeal. The Court ordered that the appellant should pay the costs of the appeal to the respondent. Justice Hidayatullah agreed that the special leave should be recalled. Since this was the second matter considered in a short period, the Court took the opportunity to remark on the background. The appellant was the tenant and the respondent was the landlord. A key issue was whether the tenant was in default of rent and of a special revenue tax payable by him. The litigation between the parties had extended over many years. The landlord had been compelled to file ejectment suits on the ground that the tenant had failed to pay rent, and the tenant had never paid rent except when compelled by the courts. In earlier proceedings the tenant had succeeded by making last‑minute deposits of rent and costs, thereby taking advantage of the Bombay Act LVII of 1947. One such suit filed by the landlord was identified as Suit No. 2014 of 1952. During the appeal from the decree in that suit, the tenant deposited Rs 400 on 1 October 1954 in the appellate court and sent a notice to the landlord about this deposit. That deposit remained in the court until it was withdrawn on 19 January 1957, an important date. The present eviction suit was filed on 8 September 1955, alleging that the tenant was in arrears dating from 9 June 1953. On 10 January 1957 the tenant gave a statement concerning the deposit and questioned the landlord about the notice, but before the case concluded he withdrew the deposit. The learned judge of the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad, held that the landlord had sub‑let the premises and further held that a deposit of Rs 2126 ⅛ made by the tenant in that court was sufficient to cover the arrears; together with the withdrawn deposit of Rs 400, the total amounted to Rs 2516 ⅛, and the suit was dismissed on 26 February 1957. In the landlord’s appeal, the accounts for the period from 9 June 1953 to 26 February 1957 were recomputed, and it was pointed out that the tenant had withdrawn the Rs 400 deposit. The appellate judgment considered this fact, held the tenant to be in arrears and ordered his eviction. The tenant then filed a revision application in the High Court, contending that because the Rs 400 was still deposited and available to the landlord, he could not be held in default. His counsel argued that the record contained no evidence that the amount had been withdrawn.
In the appeal before the High Court, the judges held that they possessed discretion in the matter but concluded that the tenant, by his own conduct over the years, had forfeited any right to consideration. Consequently, the revision application filed by the tenant was dismissed. The tenant subsequently applied for special leave to appeal the High Court’s order. In that petition he reproduced a lengthy excerpt from the High Court’s judgment in which the lower court discussed the deposit, and he then asserted: “The petitioner submits that the High Court was correct in concluding that, because there was nothing on the record to show that the petitioner had withdrawn the sum of Rs 400 deposited by him in the earlier appeal, the petitioner was not in arrears of rent and had paid the costs at the date of the judgment.” This claim was supported by an affidavit in which the tenant declared that the facts set out in the petition were true and that nothing was concealed. While the facts pleaded in the petition were indeed as stated, there was an additional fact known to the tenant: that he had actually withdrawn the amount of Rs 400 on 19 January 1957, which meant that he was already in default before the first‑instance court delivered its judgment on 26 February 1957. That fact, however, was never proved on the record of the case; it was only mentioned in the judgment of the appeal court. The petition for special leave made no reference to this withdrawal. Whether the High Court was correct in relying solely on the record, or whether it should have considered the appeal‑court observation—perhaps by requiring an affidavit—was not a question the Court chose to decide, and no opinion was expressed on that point. The situation is different in the present proceedings. The tenant’s petition for special leave highlighted the High Court’s finding that there was no proof of withdrawal and urged the Court to exercise the discretion it said it possessed in his favour. Yet the tenant concealed the very fact that, before the first‑instance decision, he had withdrawn the Rs 400 and therefore was already in arrears. By doing so, he relied on a fictional deposit that, in reality, no longer existed. While ordinary litigation often turns on whether the evidence on record suffices, the Court emphasizes that a party seeking relief under Article 136 of the Constitution must act with complete candour. The powers under Article 136 are not a general right of appeal; they are intended to correct miscarriages of justice that cause irreparable injury and for which no other adequate remedy is available. They are not meant to provide relief in a case where a party defaults on rent because he withdrew a deposit that, although not proved on the record, was actually withdrawn. Had the petition disclosed the appeal‑court’s finding that the amount had been taken out, it is unlikely that the Court would have granted special leave to entertain a question of discretion. The matter was therefore carefully considered and held not to be a mere error of fact or a benign mistake in judgment, but a fundamentally different issue.
In describing the scope of Article 136 of the Constitution, the Court observed that the power conferred by that provision was not a routine avenue of appeal. Rather, the provision permitted the Supreme Court to intervene only where an irreparable injury resulted from a miscarriage of justice, which in turn arose from a gross neglect of law, a procedural defect, or some other serious failure, and where no other adequate remedy was available. The Court further explained that Article 136 was not intended to provide relief in situations such as the present case, where a tenant alleged default in paying rent because he had withdrawn a deposit that was supposedly lodged with the Court, yet the record did not demonstrate that any withdrawal had actually taken place. The Court noted that, had the petition correctly disclosed that the appellate court’s decision was based on the finding that the amount had been taken out, it would have been difficult to imagine the Court granting special leave merely to revisit a question of discretion. After careful consideration, the Court held that the present matter did not involve a simple mis‑statement of fact nor a bona‑fide error of judgment that might, in certain circumstances, be characterised as a minor fault. Instead, the Court described the conduct as disingenuous, because the appellant had constructed a legal issue upon a hypothetical set of facts which, if truthfully presented, would have left no basis for legal debate. By thereby misleading the Court, the appellant had induced the grant of special leave in a case that did not merit such relief. Consequently, the Court ordered that the special leave be withdrawn, that the appellant bear the costs of the appeal, and that the special leave previously granted be revoked.