Raghubir Prosad Dudhewalla vs Chamanlal Mehra and Anr
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 44 of 1961
Decision Date: 10 May 1963
Coram: DAS GUPTA J.
In the matter titled Raghubir Prosad Dudhewalla versus Chamanlal Mehra and another, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the 10th of May, 1963. The case was listed as Criminal Appeal No. 44 of 1961 and was heard by a bench presided over by Justice Das Gupta. The petitioner, Raghubir Prosad Dudhewalla, was the appellant, while the respondents were Chamanlal Mehra and an additional party. The issues arose under the provisions of the Criminal Trial‑Witness giving false evidence‑Prosecution, if can be initiated, chapter of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), specifically sections 476, 477, 478 and 479A. The headnote recorded that the appellant had served as a prosecution witness in a trial that ultimately resulted in the acquittal of the respondents. Subsequent to that acquittal, an application was filed under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before a magistrate, seeking a complaint against the appellant and several other prosecution witnesses on the ground that they had allegedly given false evidence or fabricated evidence for use in the earlier proceedings. The magistrate, however, opined that section 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure constituted a complete bar to any such action against the appellant and the other witnesses, and consequently declined to lodge any complaint. On appeal, the Calcutta High Court set aside the magistrate’s order, directing that a complaint be filed against the appellant for offences punishable under sections 467 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, holding that section 479A did not apply to the facts of the present case. The Supreme Court affirmed that section 479A is limited to prosecutions for offences defined in section 193 and related provisions in Chapter XI, and that for all other offences sections 476, 477, 478 and 479 of the Code of Criminal Procedure remain effective even after the enactment of section 479A.
The appeal was taken by special leave from the judgment and order dated 16 September 1960 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 56 of 1958. Counsel for the appellant and the respondents were instructed, although their names are not reproduced here. The Court noted that the appellant had been examined as a witness for the prosecution before the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, in a case instituted by one Mayadas Khanna against the respondent Chamanlal Mehra and two other individuals under sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. That criminal proceeding concluded with the acquittal of the accused on 10 May 1957. On 28 June 1957, an application was presented to the same magistrate’s court under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The application alleged that the appellant, together with several other witnesses—including Mayadas Khanna, who had served as the complainant in the earlier case—had given false evidence, fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using it in the proceedings before the court, and had presented such false or fabricated evidence as genuine. The application further claimed that the witnesses had forged documents and used forged documents as genuine, thereby seeking an inquiry and, after such inquiry, a complaint against them to the Chief Presidency Magistrate for the offences committed by those acts.
The application asserted that the accused had presented a forged document as genuine and that each of the accused had abetted the others in the commission of those offences. It further prayed that, after a proper enquiry, a complaint be lodged with the Chief Presidency Magistrate against the accused for the offences purportedly committed. It appeared that the learned magistrate, Mr. Jahangir Kabir, who had originally disposed of the criminal case against Chamanlal Mehra, was no longer available to deal with the application filed under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the Chief Presidency Magistrate transferred the application to the file of Mr. J. M. Bir, a Presidency Magistrate, for disposal. For this purpose, the Chief Presidency Magistrate nominated Mr. Bir as the successor to the magistrate who had originally tried the case. Mr. Bir expressed the view that section 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure constituted a complete bar against any action being taken by him against the appellant and the other persons, who were merely witnesses on the side of the complainant in the criminal case. Acting on that view, he directed that a complaint be lodged only against Mayadas Khanna, the complainant, under sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, and he rejected the application insofar as it sought complaints against the remaining persons.
Chamanlal Mehra appealed against the magistrate’s refusal to make complaints against the other individuals. The Calcutta High Court held that section 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not apply to the offence of forging documents or to participation in a criminal conspiracy to commit forgery. The Court deemed it expedient, in the interests of justice, to make a complaint against the appellant for offences alleged under sections 467 and 467‑120B of the Indian Penal Code, offences which he appeared to have committed. Accordingly, the High Court set aside the magistrate’s order with respect to the appellant and directed that a complaint be entered against him. The correctness of the High Court’s view—that section 479A has no application to offences under sections 467 and 467‑120B and does not bar a complaint under section 476 against a witness for such offences—was subsequently challenged before this Court. For reference, the relevant portion of section 479A, inserted by the Amendment Act of 1955, states: “Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 476 to 479 inclusive, when any civil, revenue or criminal court is of opinion that any person appearing before it as a witness has intentionally given false evidence at any stage of the judicial proceedings or has intentionally fabricated false evidence for use at any stage of the judicial proceeding, and that, for the eradication of the evils of perjury and fabrication of false evidence and in the interests of justice, it is expedient that such witness should be prosecuted for the offence which appears to have been committed by him, the court shall, at the time of the delivery of the judgment or final order disposing of such proceeding, record…”
The Court explained that when it records a finding that a witness has intentionally given false evidence or fabricated evidence, it must set out the reasons for that finding, and it may, if it deems appropriate, after providing the witness an opportunity to be heard, prepare a written complaint. This complaint must be signed by the presiding officer of the Court, must describe the evidence that the Court considers false or fabricated, and must be forwarded to a first‑class Magistrate who has jurisdiction over the matter. The Court noted that judicial opinions differ on whether, in a case where a criminal court could have taken action under section 479A but failed to do so, a separate action can still be initiated under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court observed that this particular question does not arise for its consideration in the present matter. The issue before the Court, therefore, was whether, assuming that a criminal court had the power to act under section 479A for the offences of giving false evidence at any stage of a judicial proceeding or of intentionally fabricating false evidence for use at any stage, and assuming that the court chose not to act, it follows that no action may be taken under section 476 for those offences, and further, whether the same conclusion would extend to offences such as forgery or conspiracy to commit forgery. The Court found no justification for extending the bar to such other offences. It emphasized that the special procedure created by section 479A is intended solely for the prosecution of a witness who gives false evidence or fabricates false evidence at any stage of judicial proceedings. The provision contains no language that excludes the application of any other procedural mechanisms prescribed in the Code for offences other than those specified. Applying the principle that a special provision overrides a general one, the Court held that the scope of the special provision must be strictly construed to determine precisely how much of the field covered by the general provision is also covered by the special provision. In examining the special procedure under section 479A, the Court observed that the acts of intentionally giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence, as described in that section, correspond to offences punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code and the related sections in Chapter XI. Consequently, the Court concluded that section 479A deals exclusively with prosecutions under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code and the cognate sections of Chapter XI. The Court further stated that, had the legislature intended the special procedure to apply to offences other than those under section 193 and its cognate provisions, it would have expressed that intention in clear terms.
In this case, the Court observed that if the legislature had intended the special procedure contained in section 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure to apply to offences other than those listed in section 193 of the Indian Penal Code and the cognate sections in Chapter XI, the statutory language would have expressed that intention in clear terms. The Court found it unreasonable to interpret section 479A as covering a situation where a person who appears to have committed an offence under section 193 by giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence also appears to have committed a separate offence, such as forgery, solely for the purpose of fabricating the false evidence, and to allow a complaint for that additional offence to be made under section 479A. Consequently, the Court held that section 479A has no application to prosecutions for offences other than those punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code and the cognate sections in Chapter XI. The Court further clarified that the provisions of sections 476, 477, 478 and 479 of the Code of Criminal Procedure continue to apply to other offences even after the enactment of section 479A. The Court noted that the question of whether the High Court was correct in its view that the appellant appeared prima facie to have committed offences under section 467 and section 467/120B of the Indian Penal Code had not been argued before it, and therefore it expressed no opinion on that matter. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appeal be dismissed.