Prabitra Kumar Bannerji vs The State Of West Bengal

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Petition No. 42 of 1960

Decision Date: 7 October 1963

Coram: J.C. Shah, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah

In the matter titled Prabitra Kumar Bannerji versus The State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the seventh day of October, 1963. The judgment was authored by Justice C. Shah, who sat on a bench that also included Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K. N. Wanchoo and Justice M. Hidayatullah. The petitioner in the case was Prabitra Kumar Bannerji and the respondent was the State of West Bengal.

The case arose from a dispute concerning the allocation of separate rooms within the premises of the Calcutta High Court. The High Court had designated distinct spaces for three categories of legal professionals: a Bar Library Club reserved for barristers, a Bar Association for advocates other than barristers, and an Incorporated Law Society for attorneys. The petitioners, who were advocates of the Calcutta High Court and generally practiced on its Original Side, had been called to the English Bar but had not completed a twelve‑month period of reading in the chambers of a practising barrister either in England or in Calcutta, as required by the rules governing the Original Side. Nevertheless, they applied for membership of the Bar Library Club, and their applications were denied. Their subsequent representation to the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court was also rejected.

Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners filed an application before this Court. The Supreme Court consequently issued a writ against the State of West Bengal and the Chief Justice. Later, the Joint Secretaries of the Bar Library Club were added as parties to the proceedings, and the Bar Association intervened. The intervention broadened the original petition, transforming it into a claim seeking the abolition of the exclusive nature of the Bar Library Club in favour of all other advocates. The Bar Association’s representation to the Chief Justice stated that no separate space should be allotted to the group of advocates who styled themselves as barristers but who actually practised as advocates, because such separate accommodation violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The Association demanded that there be a single Bar Association for all advocates practising in the High Court and that the rooms presently occupied by the Bar Library Club be allocated to this unified Association.

While the matter was pending before this Court, the Bar Library Club amended its rules to admit all advocates who undertook only to plead and not to act. The Attorney‑General, appearing on behalf of the Club, assured the Court that there would be no discrimination and that any advocate who undertook not to act would be eligible for admission to the Club. The Joint Secretaries representing the Bar Library Club agreed to this altered position. The Court observed that this change represented a substantial improvement over the previous arrangement and that no further improvement could be expected in the present proceedings.

The Court observed that the Bar Library Club had promised that there would be no discrimination and that every advocate who undertook not to act would be eligible for admission to the club. This promise was accepted by the Joint Secretaries who represented the Bar Library Club. The Court noted that this change represented a substantial improvement over the previous arrangement and that nothing better could be expected in the present proceedings. In view of the historical development of the three categories of members of the Calcutta High Court Bar – (i) those who only pleaded, (ii) those who both pleaded and acted, and (iii) those who only acted – the Court held that the classification was not unreasonable and that providing separate accommodation to each category did not amount to a denial of equality before the law. Since the Bar Library Club had agreed to amend its rules so that they corresponded precisely with the first category, admission to the club would be governed by rules common to all lawyers who wished to plead only. Consequently, the Court found no reason to interfere with the separate grant of accommodation by the court to the three sections. The Court further ruled that, should the Bar Library Club fail to fulfil the undertaking it gave, it would be the duty of the Chief Justice to formulate any necessary rules to ensure that the purpose for which the accommodation was granted is carried out and that no violation of equality occurs. The matter was the original jurisdiction of Petition No. 42 of 1960 filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the petitioners and the intervener appeared on behalf of the petitioners; counsel for respondents 1 and 2 appeared for the State of West Bengal and the Chief Justice; counsel for respondent 3 appeared for the third respondent; and counsel for respondent 4 appeared for the fourth respondent. The judgment was delivered on 7 October 1963 by the Chief Justice. The petition arose from a long‑standing dispute between two sections of the Calcutta High Court Bar. The four petitioners were advocates enrolled in the Calcutta High Court between 1948 and 1952 and claimed the right to appear and plead in both the original and appellate jurisdictions of the Court. The respondents were the State of West Bengal, represented by the Chief Secretary, and the Chief Justice of the Court. The petitioners mainly practised in the original jurisdiction. In 1956 they were called to the English Bar by the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple in the Michaelmas Term. Afterward the petitioners notified the Registrar of the Original Side of the Court, requesting that the register of advocates practising on the Original side be corrected by inserting the title “Barrister‑at‑Law” after their names.

The petitioners began their careers as advocates of the Calcutta High Court and later sought to have the title “Barrister” added to their names. They argued that they were entitled to this additional qualification even though they had not completed a twelve‑month period of reading in the chambers of a practising barrister either in England or in Calcutta, a requirement prescribed by the rules governing the Original side of the Court. The Court’s rules, as explained by the petitioners, recognised three distinct categories of advocates practising before it. The first category consisted of barristers who had fulfilled the requirement of reading for not less than twelve months in the chambers of a practising barrister either in England or in Calcutta. The second category comprised barristers who had not undergone such a period of reading. The third category included any person who possessed a recognised university Bachelor’s degree in Law and who had obtained the qualification to practise on the Original side of the Court after satisfying the necessary tests.

According to the petitioners, the High Court kept two separate registers of advocates entitled to appear and plead on the Original side. Register “list 1” contained the names of advocates who were enrolled on the basis of being Barristers‑at‑Law, whereas “list 11” recorded the names of advocates who were not Barristers‑at‑Law. The petitioners contended that, because they were already duly qualified to practice and had been enrolled as advocates of the Court, they should not be required to undergo the additional reading requirement in order to be placed on list 1. In their view, the classification set out by the Court’s rules made further reading unnecessary for their admission to that list.

The physical premises of the Court included a portion of the building allocated for the use of its advocates. This portion was itself divided into two separate areas. One area was occupied by the Bar Library Club, which was composed exclusively of advocates listed in list 1. The other area was occupied by the Bar Association, which comprised advocates who were not members of list 1. Although the petitioners succeeded in having the word “Barrister” added to their names, they were not admitted to the Bar Library Club, an institution described as having an exclusive character. The petitioners asserted that this exclusion created a disability for them because litigants and solicitors generally preferred to engage an advocate who was a barrister and a member of the Club.

The petitioners’ application for membership in the Bar Library Club was not entertained, and consequently they were barred from accessing the portion of the Court building that was exclusively occupied by the advocates of list 1. Seeking remedy, the petitioners together with another advocate made representations to the Chief Justice of the Court, requesting that they be afforded equal advantage and the same accommodation facilities that were available to the members of the Bar Library Club. In response to these representations, the petitioners were informed by the Secretary to the Chief Justice that…

In response to the petitioners’ request, the Secretary to the Hon’ble Chief Justice explained that the Court had provided free accommodation in various parts of the Court building for the different categories of legal professionals, specifically for Barristers, for advocates who are not Barristers, and for attorneys who are authorised to practise in the Court, and that this accommodation was not intended for the use of any Club. The same communication further observed that because the petitioners had not occupied the chambers of a Barrister for a period of one year, they were not eligible to use the rooms that had been allotted to Barristers of that class. The petitioners subsequently made additional representations to the Hon’ble Chief Justice, but those efforts did not produce any tangible result. It also appears that a suit had been instituted in the City Civil Court and was still pending in 1960, although that suit was later withdrawn; the suit concerned rights of accommodation similar to those asserted by the petitioners, even though the petitioners were not parties to that litigation. In February 1960, the Secretary to the Hon’ble Chief Justice informed the petitioners that the Chief Justice was unable to act on their grievance because of the existence of the pending suit. The petitioners’ grievance is set out in paragraphs 36 and 37 of their petition and reads in part as follows: “The exclusive use of a large portion of the said space and the reference to or of the Advocates who are members of the said Club as members of the English Bar and/or reference to them as counsel and to the other Advocates as Advocates has generally given an impression that Advocates who are members of the said Club are a superior class of Advocates than the Advocates who are members of the Indian Bar. Since your petitioners are not members of the said Club, you, petitioners, are generally included in the latter category. 1 SCI/64--4 Your petitioners state that due to the discrimination exercised and the non‑availability of equal opportunities to your petitioners as hereinbefore stated your petitioners have been and are being greatly prejudiced in their profession. The provisions made in the rules for original side of the said Court and for Barristers are ultra vires the Indian Bar Council’s Act and/or amount to discrimination.” From this passage, the essence of the petitioners’ complaint is that they allege the State has denied them equality before the law. The petitioners further state that they have made demands for justice from the respondents, which have not been granted, and therefore they seek a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to permit the petitioners to use and benefit from the space in the Court that is currently occupied by the Bar Library Club, and to cease any discrimination or differentiation between the various categories of Advocates enrolled in the Court and entitled to practise on its Original side. The Court subsequently directed that a rule be issued and also allowed the petitioners liberty to make the necessary application.

In order to bring the Bar Library Club into the proceedings as a respondent, the Registrar of the Court filed an affidavit that was executed under the direction of the second respondent, namely the Chief Justice of the Court. The affidavit set out the material facts concerning the accommodation arrangements that are maintained inside the High Court building. According to the affidavit, the building contains separate accommodation that is earmarked for three distinct categories of legal practitioners: first, for Barristers who practice as advocates of the Court after being enrolled under the Original side rules of the Court; second, for Advocates who are enrolled directly by the High Court; and third, for Attorneys who perform legal work for the Court. The affidavit then traced the historical origin of the privilege of occupying particular rooms within the Court premises. It observed that the provision of free accommodation in the former Supreme Court building was originally introduced in the year 1825 for Barristers then practising before that Court, and that the same privilege has been perpetuated in the present High Court building. The Barristers’ professional body is identified as the Bar Library Club. The body representing the other Advocates is called the Bar Association, while the body representing the Attorneys is the Incorporated Law Society. Each of these three professional groups is responsible for managing the accommodation that has been allotted to them. The accommodation is intended solely for bona‑fide professional business. All three categories of practitioners—Barristers, Advocates and Attorneys—hold licences to occupy the premises rent‑free; the cost of any structural additions or alterations is borne by the Government, whereas the licensees are required to install and maintain the electrical fittings at their own expense. The affidavit further explained that, as a matter of law, the High Court building has always been placed at the disposal of the Honourable Chief Justice and the Honourable Judges for the purpose of administering justice, and that the allocation of space within the building is a matter entirely within the jurisdiction of the Court. This allocation is subject to the condition that no part of the premises may be used for any purpose other than bona‑fide activities related to the work of the Court. Regarding a representation made by the petitioner to the Chief Justice, the affidavit recorded that the Chief Justice examined the matter and entered a minute of the deliberation. The relevant excerpt of that minute stated that individuals recently called to the English Bar under consolidated regulation No. 43 are not entitled to practice in this Court as Barristers. Under the Court’s Rules, a Barrister of England or Northern Ireland becomes qualified to practice in this Court as a Barrister‑Advocate only after completing a twelve‑month reading period in the chambers of a Barrister either in London or in Calcutta, and subsequently enrolling as an Advocate. Consequently, Advocates who have recently been called to the English Bar under regulation 43 but who have not completed the requisite one‑year reading period are not permitted to use the rooms allotted to Barristers, as they are not recognised as Barristers‑Advocates for that purpose.

It was recorded that persons who had recently been called to the English Bar under consolidated regulation No 43 and who had neither completed a twelve‑month reading period in the Chambers of a Barrister nor been enrolled as Advocates after such reading were permitted to practice in the Court, including the Original Side, only on the basis of their status as Advocates of the Appellate Side; they were not entitled to practice as Barristers and consequently they could not occupy the rooms that were allotted to Barristers for use as Barristers. The affidavit further stated that additional representations had been made to the Hon ble Chief Justice, but the Chief Justice deemed it inappropriate to issue any administrative order on those representations because a suit was pending. That suit, filed in the City Civil Court at Calcutta as Title Suit No 339 of 1958, had been granted leave under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a declaration that all Advocates were entitled to use the rooms in the High Court building that were then being used by the Barristers. Pursuant to the leave granted, Shri Dipak Kumar Sen and Shri Mathura Nath Banerjee, who were joint secretaries of the Bar Library Club of the Court and were added as respondents 3 and 4, filed an affidavit in response to the petitioners’ claim. In that affidavit they asserted that they were not public servants and therefore no writ could lie against them, against any other member of the Bar Library Club, or against the Club itself for any act they had performed. They denied the petitioners’ claim to membership of the Club and to use of the rooms that were in the possession of the Club. The affidavit described the Bar Library Club as a private proprietary association of members governed by its own rules, and consequently held that the actions of its members or of the Club were not amenable to any writ. It was further contended that the Hon ble Chief Justice was likewise not subject to a writ for the actions complained of, because the Chief Justice had merely discharged his administrative duties and those actions were not justiciable. In the same vein, it was argued that the first respondent, the State of West Bengal, could not be subjected to a writ because the State had performed only executive, not judicial, functions in permitting certain accommodation in the High Court building to be used by members of the Bar Library Club. The history of the Club’s establishment was then set out. By a resolution of the Bar Library Club passed on 14 June 1957 and confirmed on 14 February 1958, the members of the Club decided that Advocates of the Calcutta High Court who were called to the Bar under regulation 43 should not be admitted as members of the Bar Library Club.

In the affidavit filed under the directions of the Honorable Chief Justice, it was asserted that the statement indicating that accommodation had been granted to barristers practising in the Calcutta High Court was inaccurate; the true circumstance, according to the affidavit, was that the accommodation had been provided to the members of the Bar Library Club. The affidavit further claimed that the premises allotted to each of the three associations – the Bar Library Club, the Bar Association and the Incorporated Law Society – were used and controlled by the respective associations solely for the benefit of their own members, and that persons who were not members of a particular association could not claim any legal right to occupy the accommodation designated for that association. Responding to the allegation that the petitioners had been denied equality before the law, it was argued that the High Court orders governing the manner in which accommodation was allotted to the different associations were based on a reasonable classification of legal practitioners and therefore did not constitute discrimination. It was also submitted that the Bar Library Club possessed complete discretion in admitting its members, that no individual possessed a legal right to demand membership in the Club, and that, because the petitioners were not members of the Club, they had no legal entitlement to use the accommodation allocated to it. Finally, it was contended that the petition was defective because it failed to join, first, the Honorable Judges of the High Court and, second, the members of the Bar Library Club who were not already impleaded as respondents 3 and 4. On the basis of these pleadings and additional affidavits filed on behalf of certain petitioners and certain respondents, the matter was placed before a Constitution Bench of this Court, presided over by Justice Gajendragadkar, on 16 April 1962. The Court issued the following order: the petitioner’s counsel, Mr A V Viswanatha Sastri, wished to raise the larger question of the constitutionality of the allotment of rooms to different sections of the Bar in the Calcutta High Court; the Court considered it desirable that the petitioners first approach the learned Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court and present to him their case that the room allotment violated Article 14 of the Constitution and that the barristers forming the Bar Library Club could not be treated as a separate branch of the legal profession; because this aspect had not been raised before the Chief Justice, the petitioners were directed to seek redress from the Chief Justice before proceeding further in this Court; consequently, the petition was adjourned for three months to permit the petitioners to move the Chief Justice on the matter. In compliance with that order, the petitioners filed a further representation to the Honorable Chief Justice of the Court on 11 May 1962, stating that…

In this matter, the petitioners contended that every lawyer who is enrolled in the Court and has the authority to appear and plead on the Original side should be treated alike, without any distinction or discrimination. Accordingly, they asserted that all such advocates are entitled to use the space that has been allotted to and is presently occupied by the Bar Library Club within a portion of the Court building.

The petitioners also set out the earlier history of their representations addressed to successive Chief Justices of the Court. They emphasized that the practice of allocating separate premises to Barristers—who, in their view, are not capable of practising as such—violates the guarantee of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. On that basis, they prayed to the Hon’ble Chief Justice that, being members of the Court bar, they should be permitted to occupy the said space currently used by the Bar Library Club and its members, and that equal rights and privileges necessary for the exercise of their profession should be accorded to them.

Separately, the Bar Association of the Court dispatched a letter dated 22 May 1962, conveying to the Hon’ble Chief Justice grievances that were framed in terms similar to those raised by the petitioners. In response, the Secretary to the Hon’ble Chief Justice issued a reply on 21 June 1962. That reply expressed the view that it would be highly desirable for the Bar Library Club and the Bar Association to merge, and that the rooms in the High Court building presently allocated to the Bar Library Club and the Bar Association should cease to be occupied exclusively by either body. Instead, the correspondence proposed that the rooms be opened to all members of both Associations, on terms and conditions to be mutually agreed upon by the two bodies. The Secretary further stated that he would take great pleasure in witnessing the two Associations combine into a single entity and share the allotted rooms jointly from 1 July, the commencement of the Centenary celebrations of the Calcutta High Court. A copy of this reply was also forwarded to the petitioners as a response to their representation.

It appears, however, that the two segments of the legal profession—represented respectively by the Bar Library Club and the Bar Association—were unable to reach agreement on the terms envisaged in the Secretary’s letter. The proposed amalgamation and the effort to settle mutually acceptable conditions consequently failed. Following this impasse, the Bar Association proceeded to file an application for intervention in this Court on behalf of its members. That application, lodged in July 1962, was granted by the Court on 27 September 1962. The application for intervention was accompanied by the correspondence that had taken place between earlier Chief Justices and the Association.

It is noteworthy that the scope of the Bar Association’s representation is considerably broader than the specific grievance that the petitioners sought to raise before this Court. The Association’s submission, as extracted from its representation to the Chief Justice, explicitly demanded that no separate space be allotted to the group of advocates who style themselves as Barristers but who, in practice, function as ordinary advocates. The Association argued that such allocation of distinct rooms to the Bar Library Club contravenes Article 14 of the Constitution, and it called for a unified Bar Association for all advocates practising in the High Court, with the rooms currently occupied by the Bar Library Club being transferred to that unified body.

The Bar Association’s representation asserted that individuals who styled themselves as Barristers but actually practiced as Advocates should not receive separate accommodation from other Advocates, invoking Article 14 of the Constitution. The Association pleaded for justice and requested that their grievance be remedied by creating a single Bar Association for all Advocates practicing before the High Court. It further asked that the rooms presently occupied by the Bar Library Club be allotted to that unified Association.

An affidavit was filed on behalf of respondents three and four responding to the petitioners’ additional affidavits and the allowed application for intervention. The affidavit stated that accommodation inside the Court building had been provided for three distinct categories of lawyers. The first category comprised Banister‑Advocates, who were not entitled to act and who only plead on either the Original or the Appellate side. The second category consisted of Attorneys, who were authorized to act solely on the Original side of the proceedings. The third category included Non‑Barrister Advocates, who both acted and pleaded and who were members of the Bar Association. The affidavit further explained that the space occupied by the Bar Library Club functioned exclusively as a library and reading room, enabling its members to prepare for the cases in which they were engaged. It added that the inner study room of the Club required silence and was reserved solely for Club members for study purposes. The other rooms of the Bar Library Club were accessible to every member of the legal profession without restriction. A crucial statement in the affidavit indicated that, because of a recent controversy over admitting Non‑Barrister Advocates to the Club, the Club had adopted a resolution on March 2, 1962, to amend its rules. The amendment permitted any legal professional who did not act as an Attorney to become a Club member, provided that he confined his practice to pleading only. Pursuant to this amendment, three Advocates who were not Barristers had recently been admitted as members of the Club, and further applications for membership had been received. Finally, the affidavit disclosed how rooms in the Court premises had been allocated among the three groups of lawyers. Attorneys who only act on the Original side of the proceedings were assigned two rooms within the Court building. The Bar Library Club, whose membership is confined to advocates who plead but do not act, was allotted four rooms. The Bar Association, whose members are entitled both to act and to plead, received six rooms in the premises of the Court.

The Court observed that the Bar Association and the Bar Library Club had been allotted a total of six rooms within the Court premises for both pleading and acting. In addition to the statements made in their affidavit, respondents three and four presented several further points in response to the original petition and to the petition filed by the intervenors. They argued that the original petitioners, who are members of the Bar Association, do not possess any fundamental right that can be enforced by a writ under article 32 of the Constitution, and consequently they lack a cause of action. The respondents also highlighted that the position taken by the original petitioners is inconsistent with the position taken by the intervenors. The original petitioners seek permission to use and occupy the accommodation that has been allotted to the Bar Library Club, claiming a preference over the space occupied by the Bar Association. In contrast, the intervenors, in their representation to the chief justice, argued that no preferential accommodation should be given to the Club and that the two wings of the Bar should be merged into a single entity. Further, the respondents contended that all the wings of the legal profession are merely licensees of the Court with respect to the accommodation assigned to each of them, and therefore none of the associations can claim any legal or fundamental right over that accommodation. They also suggested that the division of the Court premises into three separate portions can be justified as a reasonable classification, taking into account the nature of the work performed by each wing in the discharge of its duties. The Court noted that the present condition of the Bar of the Calcutta High Court, with its three distinct sections, is the result of a long historical process that began roughly two hundred years ago, shortly after the grant of the Diwani to the East India Company in 1765. When the Supreme Court was first established in Calcutta, most of the pleading work was handled by English barristers, while the work of acting was largely performed by attorneys or firms of attorneys, most of whom were British. Even before the Calcutta High Court was created in 1862, the Bar Library Club had been formed in 1825 and the Court had granted members of the English Bar accommodation within the Court precincts. After the High Court was established, this arrangement continued and the three sections of the Bar that functioned in the High Court were each allotted separate accommodation. The Bar Library Club retained its own accommodation separate from that allotted to the vakils, as they were then known, until the Indian Bar Councils Act (XXXVIII of 1926) was passed. The Court further noted that the British administration, which introduced its own legal system in India, had accorded members of the English Bar who practiced on the original side or even on the appellate side of the High Court a higher status with respect to seniority.

In that period a Vakil who had served on the appellate side of the High Court for as many as fifty years was still considered junior to a Barrister who possessed only a single year of standing. This disparity prompted a movement seeking a single, unified bar in which the right of audience would be determined solely by seniority, without regard to whether a practitioner was an English‑trained Barrister or a Vakil holding a law degree from a recognised Indian university. The movement culminated in the enactment of the Indian Bar Councils Act (XXXVIII of 1926). On the original side of the Court, the ability of advocates to practise had largely depended on the goodwill of the Attorneys or the firms of Attorneys, a group that over time shed its exclusively British character and came to be composed principally of Indian members, as did the members of the English Bar. The passage of the Indian Bar Councils Act of 1926, together with the Advocates Act (XXV of 1961), eliminated many of the distinctions between Advocates who were not Barristers and those who were Barristers, and removed most of the restrictions that had prevented the former class from appearing on the original side. Nevertheless, entrenched interests remained resistant to change, and the present litigation arose from a conflict between those who wished to preserve those vested privileges and those who sought to abolish them. The petition originally filed in this Court alleged that, despite having been called to the English Bar, certain advocates were denied admission to the Bar Library Club and therefore were denied the exclusive privileges enjoyed by its members. In contrast, members of the Bar Association, who later intervened in the dispute, argued for the abolition of such exclusivity and claimed that all persons entitled to be called Advocates should enjoy the same rights. Successive Chief Justices, beginning with the late Sir Trevor Harris, expressed sympathy for the goal of unifying all classes of Advocates into a single organisation on an equal footing, but consistently noted that such unification could be achieved only through mutual agreement between the two sections of Advocates. The incumbent Chief Justice reiterated this view in a letter dated 21 June 1962, stating that the Court would welcome the merger of the two Associations into a single body occupying the jointly allotted rooms from 1 July 1962, the date originally scheduled for the Court’s centenary celebrations, a fitting occasion for the consummation of the desired unification of the entire Bar. However, circumstances did not prove favourable to that outcome, illustrating that the legacy of the past and the institutional structures introduced during the British period could not be entirely erased.

The Court observed that the past cannot be completely erased and that many parts of the legal system introduced during the British era must continue, whether for better or for worse. The continuity of the third segment of the profession, the Attorneys, has added to the complexity of the situation. Although opinions differ sharply on whether this old institution, imported from England, should be retained, the reality is that a substantial number of litigants appearing before the Original side of the Court still employ the services of Attorneys, and those who have cultivated goodwill with that class naturally enjoy an advantage. Consequently, the Court noted that, apart from the Attorneys, there exist two distinct sections of Advocates practising at the Bar of the Court. The first consists of members of the Bar Library Club who plead only and do not act, while the second consists of members of the Bar Association who both plead and act, although many within that group also plead only. In addition, the Attorneys act exclusively. It is the prerogative of litigants, through their attorneys, to retain as their pleading advocates any members of the Bar they choose. Therefore, it is not entirely correct to claim that membership of the Club alone determines who is selected to plead a case. Litigants naturally seek the best possible outcome for their cause and are presumed to act in their own best interests. Accordingly, what has occurred in the Bombay High Court over the past fifty years may also occur in this Court if the Bar Association is able to produce advocates of appropriate calibre. Viewing the matter from the standpoint of both the public litigants and practising lawyers, the Court considered that the best interests of the Court would be served by recognising the necessity of three categories of legal practitioners: (i) those who only plead, (ii) those who both plead and act, and (iii) those who only act. With that objective, and at the Court’s suggestion, the members of the Bar Library Club acknowledged the need to amend their rules to admit advocates who would plead only, irrespective of whether they were Barristers. Accordingly, they informed the Court that they had effected the necessary amendments. The principal amendment involved Rule 1, which was deleted and replaced with the following wording: “The Bar Library Club shall consist of: (a) Barristers of England or Ireland, or members of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland after passing the examination or examinations prescribed by the authorities in England, Ireland or Scotland, as the case may be, who are enrolled Advocates of the Calcutta High Court; (b) Other Advocates of the Calcutta High Court, who are entitled to practise on the Original side of the Calcutta High Court under the rules at the time, as determined from time to time by the Committee of the Club, hereinafter referred to as ‘the members’.”

The Court explained that rule 1 of the Club now provides for two categories of members: (a) Advocates who are enrolled with the Calcutta High Court, and (b) other Advocates of the Calcutta High Court who are entitled to practice on the Original side of that Court under the rules then in force, as may be determined from time to time by the Club’s Committee. Rule 25 was subsequently amended by inserting after the phrase “purposes of the Club” the additional words: “and determine from time to time, having regard to the accommodation in the Club, the number of Advocates mentioned in Rule 1(b) who may be admitted as members of the Club.” The petitioners and interveners pointed out that, even with the amendment to rule 1 read together with the new provision in rule 25, the Club retained the power to restrict its membership. The learned Solicitor‑General, appearing for the Bar Library Club, informed the Court that the contested additions to rule 25 would be withdrawn, thereby assuring the petitioners that no discrimination would occur in admissions and that each application would be considered on its merits. The Court noted that only those Advocates who expressly undertake not to act as counsel would be eligible for membership under this arrangement. This agreement, reached with the respondents representing the Club, was described as a substantial improvement over the earlier situation and the Court expressed satisfaction that no better outcome could have been achieved through the present proceedings. The Court emphasized that it had not approached the matter in a strictly legalistic manner, but had been guided principally by considerations of public good, meaning that the Court should have reliable and willing assistance from the Bar. It was hoped that this step would lead to further progress in relations among the various sections of the Bar, fostering a unified profession that upholds its historic traditions for the benefit of the legal community and litigants. Consequently, the Court observed that three distinct sections of the Bar exist in the Court: those who only plead, those who both plead and act, and those who only act. The Court found this classification reasonable in view of the historical background already discussed. Accordingly, providing separate accommodation for these three sections does not constitute a denial of equality before the law.

The Bar Library Club had previously informed the Court that it would amend its rules so that the Club would align precisely with the first section of the Bar, meaning that only lawyers who solely plead would be admitted under rules common to all such practitioners. Because the Club’s proposed amendment would make its admission procedures identical to those already applicable to the first section, the Court found no justification for altering the accommodation that had been provided by the Court for each of the three recognized sections of the Bar. The Court also expressed confidence that the Chief Justice would supervise the implementation of the undertaking given by the Bar Library Club and would ensure that the promised changes were effected. Furthermore, the Court noted that, should the Bar Library Club fail to fulfil its undertaking, the Chief Justice would be expected to cause the framing of necessary and appropriate rules. Those rules would be intended to achieve the purpose for which the accommodation was made available to all three sections of the Bar, and they would be applied in a manner that would prevent any denial of equality before the law and would guarantee that the accommodation continued to serve the three identified sections. In light of these considerations, the Court concluded that the petition did not succeed and therefore dismissed it. The Court ordered that each party bear its own costs, and the petition was formally dismissed.