P.J. Ratnam vs D. Kanikaram And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 321 of 1962

Decision Date: 10 April 1963

Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.C. Shah

In the matter titled P.J. Ratnam versus D. Kanikaram and others, a judgment was delivered on the tenth day of April, 1963 by the Supreme Court of India. The decision was authored by Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, who sat with Justices Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and J. C. Shah. The parties to the proceeding were identified as the petitioner, P.J. Ratnam, and the respondents, D. Kanikaram together with other defendants. The case is reported in the 1964 volume of the All India Reporter at page 244 and also in the 1964 Supplement to the Criminal Reports, third series, page 1. The subject matter concerned professional misconduct of an advocate, specifically an allegation of misappropriation of a client’s money, and examined the procedural distinction between disciplinary proceedings under the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879 (sections 12 and 13) and criminal proceedings. References were also made to the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, section 10(2), which governs the suspension of legal practitioners.

The factual background revealed that the respondents and an additional plaintiff, identified as Kagga Veeraiah, initiated a suit seeking possession of certain land, retaining the petitioner as their legal representative. The original suit was dismissed, prompting an appeal to a Subordinate Judge. While the appeal was pending, the court ordered that the proceeds from the standing crops on the disputed land, amounting to Rs. 1,600, be deposited with the court. The appellate court later allowed the plaintiff’s appeal, after which the defendants filed a second appeal in the High Court. During the pendency of that appeal, the plaintiff successfully applied to withdraw the deposited amount, providing security in the form of immovable property. Subsequently, a petition concerning the issuance of a cheque was entertained, resulting in the issuance of a cheque for Rs. 1,452 ¼ in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner, who was also an advocate, admitted that he had received and subsequently encashed the cheque on behalf of his clients, who were entitled to the sum. The High Court eventually allowed the second appeal, dismissing the plaintiff’s suit and obliging the plaintiffs to refund the defendants. The plaintiffs then issued a written demand to the petitioner for the proceeds of the cheque that he had cashed but had not transferred to them. In response, the petitioner claimed that he had transferred the amount to the plaintiffs, citing a receipt that appeared among the case papers returned to them. The respondents filed a complaint under sections 12 and 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, leading to a request for the advocate’s explanation and an order directing the District Judge to conduct an inquiry and forward a report to the High Court. The District Judge’s report concluded that the petitioner’s case was not implausible and that he was entitled to the benefit of doubt. The matter was then heard by a bench of three High Court judges, who found the petitioner guilty of professional misconduct and imposed a five‑year suspension from legal practice. Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the Bar Council had not been consulted before the matter was referred to the District Judge, that the complaint lacked proper signatures and verification as required by High Court rules, that the substantive charge of misappropriation should have been pursued through criminal prosecution rather than disciplinary action under the Bar Councils Act, that procedural irregularities existed in the conduct of the case, and that the admission by one plaintiff, Kagga Veeraiah, that he and others had received the proceeds of the cheque, rendered the High Court’s finding of the petitioner’s failure to pay over the money erroneous. The Court proceeded to address these submissions.

In this appeal the advocate‑petitioner argued that several defects tainted the proceedings brought against him. First, he contended that the Bar Council had not been consulted before the matter was referred to the District Judge under section 10(2) of the Bar Councils Act, and that this omission invalidated the entire process. Second, he maintained that the complaint filed by the respondents was not signed by them nor verified in accordance with the procedural rules of the High Court, thereby rendering it defective. Third, he submitted that, because the substantive allegation concerned the alleged misappropriation of money belonging to his clients, the High Court should have left the aggrieved parties to pursue a criminal prosecution rather than invoking section 10 of the Bar Councils Act to discipline him as a practitioner. Fourth, he alleged that there was a procedural irregularity in the manner in which the case against him was conducted. Fifth, he pointed out that one of the plaintiffs, Mr Kagga Veeraiah, had admitted in his testimony that he and other individuals had received the proceeds of the cheque that the advocate‑petitioner had cashed, and therefore argued that the High Court was plainly wrong in finding that he had failed to pay over the money to his clients. The Court addressed each of these submissions in turn. Regarding the first submission, the Court observed that the absence of an explicit statement in the order referring the matter to the District Judge that the Bar Council had been consulted did not, by itself, defeat the presumption of regularity that attaches to official and judicial actions. The burden of proving any irregularity lay with the party alleging it, and because the appellant had not raised this objection before the High Court, even when he applied for a certificate, the Supreme Court declined to entertain the contention, describing it as a question of fact that required proof which had not been offered.

The Court then turned to the second contention and held that the complaint petition had indeed been signed by the respondents and was properly verified, satisfying the requirements of the High Court’s rules. Moreover, even assuming a verification defect, the Court noted that the High Court possessed competence to initiate the proceedings suo motu under section 10(2) of the Bar Councils Act, and therefore the argument was without merit. On the third point, the Court distinguished between misconduct that directly involves a lawyer’s duty to a client and other types of misconduct. It explained that when the alleged misconduct relates to the practitioner’s relationship with a client, the disciplinary tribunal is correctly empowered to treat the matter as professional misconduct without forcing the complainant to resort to criminal proceedings. Applying that principle to the present facts, the Court concluded that the High Court was fully justified in proceeding against the advocate‑petitioner under section 10 of the Bar Councils Act. The Court cited the authorities of Chandi Charan Mitter, a Pleader, In re. (1920) I.L.R. 47 Cal. 1115 and Emperor v. Satish Chandra Singha, (1927) I.L.R. 54 Cal. 721, which were distinguished, and referred to Stephens v. Hills, [1842] 152 E.R. 368, in support of its reasoning. The fourth submission, claiming prejudice arising from the mode in which the inquiry was conducted, was dismissed because the record showed no evidence that the District Judge or the High Court had acted in a manner that disadvantaged the appellant. Finally, on the fifth submission, the Court affirmed that the High Court had correctly characterised the testimony of Mr Kagga Veeraiah as lacking truth, and therefore the appellant could not rely on that witness’s admission to prove that the plaintiffs had received the cheque proceeds. In view of the seriousness of the alleged offence, the Court found no justification for reducing the period of suspension and consequently dismissed the appeal, ordering that the suspension remain in force.

In the proceedings, the Court observed that the complaint against the appellant had been lodged either before the District Judge or before the High Court, and the record contained no indication that the appellant suffered any prejudice as a result. The Court further held that the testimony of Kagga Veeraiah had been properly described by the High Court as lacking truth, and consequently the appellant could not rely on any statement of that witness to prove that the plaintiffs had actually received the sum in question. Considering the seriousness of the professional misconduct alleged, the Court found no basis for lessening the period of suspension imposed on the appellant. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

The matter was placed before the Civil Appellate Division under Civil Appeal No. 321 of 1962, which had been granted special leave to be heard by this Court. The appeal challenged the judgment and order dated 4 August 1959 pronounced by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Referred Case No. 29 of 1957. Counsel M. Rajagopalan and K. R. Choudhri appeared on behalf of the appellant, while the respondent failed to appear at the hearing held on 10 April. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Justice Ayyangar. The appellant, an advocate, had been found guilty of professional misconduct by the High Court and consequently had been ordered to remain suspended from legal practice for a period of five years. The factual background of the misconduct charge was as follows: The three respondents before this Court together with another individual, Kagga Veeraiah, were the plaintiffs in Miscellaneous Suit No. 432 of 1951 pending before the District Munsiff of Guntur, wherein they sought possession of certain lands. The appellant acted as counsel for these plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed the suit, and an appeal was filed to the Subordinate Judge of Guntur. While the appeal was pending, the trial court directed that the crops standing on the disputed land be sold and the proceeds be deposited with the court. Accordingly, a sum of approximately Rs 1,600 was deposited with the court on 19 December 1951. The Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiffs. The defendants, who were unsuccessful in the suit, subsequently filed a second appeal before the High Court. During the pendency of that second appeal, the plaintiffs applied for permission to withdraw the amount that had been deposited. Interim orders of the court granted them liberty to withdraw the sum, provided they furnished security in the form of immovable property. After the security was furnished, the withdrawal was ordered. A cheque petition numbered E.A. 250 of 1952 was filed and allowed, resulting in the issuance of a cheque in favor of the appellant for Rs 1,452 ¼, representing the balance remaining after deduction of court fees and other charges. It was admitted that the appellant cashed this cheque on 23 April 1953. The appellant did not contest that he had cashed the cheque on behalf of his clients, nor that the clients were entitled to receive that amount, and the charge of professional misconduct stemmed from his failure to pass on the proceeds despite the allegation that he had claimed to have done so. The charge of professional misconduct against the appellant was that the advocate had not made this payment in spite of.

In this case, the Court noted that the appellant had been accused of demanding payment from his clients while, at the same time, falsely representing that he had already paid the amount to them. To summarize the sequence of events that gave rise to the present proceedings, the second appeal that had been filed before the High Court was finally disposed of in August 1955. By the judgment of that Court the appeal was allowed and the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed. Consequently, the plaintiffs were required to refund the sum that they had earlier received from the defendants in the suit. On 8 February 1956 the plaintiffs issued a written demand to the appellant, alleging that although the cheque had been cashed by him, the proceeds of that cheque had not been handed over to the plaintiffs. The appellant responded to this notice on 14 April 1956, asserting that he had indeed paid the sum to the plaintiffs and that a receipt confirming such payment was in the bundle of case‑papers that had been returned to them. Before the appellant’s reply was even received, the three respondents before this Court lodged a complaint under sections 12 and 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, alleging that the money had not been paid and charging the appellant, who was an advocate, with professional misconduct in respect of that non‑payment. The complaint also prayed for an enquiry into his conduct. Because the appellant was an advocate, the complaint was treated as one made under section 10(2) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926. An explanation from the advocate was therefore demanded, and the District Judge of Guntur was directed to conduct an inquiry into the allegations of professional misconduct and to forward his report to the High Court. The District Judge subsequently held an elaborate inquiry, examined the evidence, and submitted a report stating that the appellant’s explanation was not unbelievable and that, on that basis, he was entitled to the benefit of doubt. The report was then placed before the High Court for consideration. The High Court observed that certain material witnesses had not been examined, accepted that submission, and ordered the District Judge to summon and examine those witnesses. The required witnesses were accordingly called, their testimony was recorded, and the complete evidence was sent back to the High Court.

After receipt of the full evidence, the matter was heard by a bench of three High Court judges. The judges held that the charge against the appellant – namely that he had failed to pay over the amount of the cheque to his clients – was clearly established. Accordingly, they found the appellant guilty of professional misconduct and imposed the punishment of suspension from practice, as previously indicated. The appellant then applied for special leave to appeal to this Court under article 136 of the Constitution, seeking to challenge the correctness of those findings, and this application brought the matter before the Supreme Court. Before addressing the substantive issues, the Court expressed its intention to outline the nature of its jurisdiction in such matters and to set out, in broad terms, the principles that would guide its analysis. The Court observed that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in cases of professional misconduct is neither civil nor criminal in nature.

In this matter the Court explained that the power exercised by the High Court in cases of professional misconduct was neither civil nor criminal as those terms were used in Articles 133 and 134 of the Constitution. The Court described the jurisdiction as having two aspects. First, it was a jurisdiction over an officer of the Court, whereby an advocate owed a duty to the Court in addition to his duty to his clients. Second, it was a statutory power that carried with it a duty imposed on the Court by section 10 of the Bar Councils Act. That duty required the Court to maintain the highest standards of professional integrity so that the Bar could provide expert legal services to the public at large and to litigants in particular. By doing so the Bar could fulfil its principal function of cooperating with the judiciary in the administration of justice according to law. The statute placed this delicate and responsible task in the High Court, making the High Court primarily responsible for ensuring that it was carried out. Consequently the Supreme Court expressed a strong reluctance to interfere with the orders of High Courts in this field, except in exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances included the presence of a question of principle, a finding that the principles of natural justice had been violated, or an indication that a miscarriage of justice had occurred. When none of these factors were present, the Court indicated that it did not normally allow the evidence on record to be re‑examined or reassessed, nor did it entertain a fresh determination of whether that evidence should be accepted. Accordingly, the factual findings recorded by the High Court were not open to review, and the Supreme Court would limit its consideration to whether, based on those findings, the charge of professional misconduct was properly established.

The appellant’s counsel advanced several grounds in support of the appeal, but the Court indicated that none of those grounds warranted detailed consideration. The first ground claimed that the Bar Council had not been consulted before the case was referred to the District Judge for inquiry and report, and that this omission invalidated the entire proceeding against the appellant. The Court noted that section 10(2) of the Indian Bar Councils Act provides that, upon receipt of a complaint by any court, the Bar Council, or any other person alleging misconduct by an advocate, the High Court must either refer the matter to the Bar Council or, after consulting the Bar Council, refer it to a District Judge, and may also refer the matter on its own motion if it has reason to believe the advocate is guilty. The appellant’s argument was that a referral to a District Judge could not be made unless the statutory condition of consulting the Bar Council had been satisfied. The Court stated that it was not necessary to decide in this case whether that consultation provision was mandatory, but it would assume that it was so. The Court further observed that the appellant had not raised any objection to the validity of the proceedings at any earlier stage, either before the High Court or when seeking a fitness certificate under Article 133(1)(c). Since the question of whether a consultation had taken place was a factual issue, and no evidence of such an objection had been presented, the Court was not inclined to entertain it. Moreover, the absence of an explicit statement in the order referring the matter to the District Judge that the Bar Council had been consulted was not decisive on the point.

The Court observed that, although the statute did not expressly state whether the requirement of consulting the Bar Council was mandatory, it would assume the provision to be mandatory for the purpose of its analysis. The Court noted that no objection concerning the validity of the proceedings on the ground of lack of such consultation had been raised at any stage before the appellate Tribunal. It further explained that the existence or non‑existence of a consultation was a factual issue; consequently, if the matter had been raised before the High Court, the record would have indicated whether a consultation had taken place and, if not, the reasons for its omission. Even when the appellant sought a certificate of fitness under Article 133(1)(c), the objection was not advanced as a basis for challenging the legality of the proceedings. In view of these circumstances, the Court declined to entertain the objection, describing it as a pure question of fact. The Court also held that the order referring the matter to a District Judge under section 10(2) did not contain an explicit statement that the Bar Council had been consulted, but that such omission was not decisive. A presumption of regularity attached to official and judicial acts, and the burden of proving any irregularity rested on the party challenging that presumption.

The Court then turned to the contention that the complaint filed by the respondents, on which action was taken against the appellant, had not been signed by them nor verified as required by the High Court’s rules. It characterized this objection as extremely frivolous. The appellant had argued before the High Court that there were differences between the signatures of the three respondents appearing on the petition they submitted and those appearing on the plaint in the earlier proceeding, O.S. 432 of 1951, and that such discrepancies suggested that the true authors of the petition were persons hostile to the appellant. The learned judges of the High Court rejected this line of argument, stating, “For one thing, we are unable to find any such dissimilarity. Even so, that has not much of a bearing on the question whether the respondent (appellant) had discharged the burden viz., of proving that he had made the payment to the petitioners. This argument would have had some force if the petitioners had not given evidence against the respondent. Further, no such suggestion was put to any of the plaintiffs.” Accordingly, the Court held that the claim of signature dissimilarity did not establish that the respondents were not the actual complainants. Regarding the verification of the complaint, the Court noted that the three respondents initially filed a petition on 6 March 1956 before the District Judge, but the petition lacked the attestation of a gazetted officer or other authority required by the applicable rules; this defect was later remedied by a subsequent filing.

In this case the petitioners filed a fresh petition before the District Judge on 16 April 1956. After signing the petition they inserted a verification clause that read, “We do hereby state that the facts stated above are true to the best of our knowledge, information and belief,” and then signed the document a second time. Thus the three petitioners placed three separate signatures on the petition: one when they signed the petition itself, a second when they signed the verification, and a third when they affirmed the verification before the District Judge. The District Judge, present on the same day, attested each of those signatures and recorded that the petitioners appeared before him on 16 April 1956, that he obtained their signatures in his presence, and that he himself attested to those signatures. When the complaint was forwarded to the High Court on 18 April 1956, the learned District Judge included this statement in the record. Consequently there is clear evidence that the same individuals who signed the petition also signed the verification and the subsequent affirmation, and that the District Judge correctly identified the parties and verified their signatures. Counsel did not allege any error on the part of the District Judge regarding the identity of the parties or the authenticity of the three signatures. Because of these circumstances the Court held that the objection raised by counsel was wholly frivolous. Moreover, since the High Court is empowered to initiate proceedings suo motu under section 10(2) of the Bar Councils Act, the point raised by counsel was judged to be completely without merit.

The next argument advanced by counsel was that the substantive charge against the appellant amounted to misappropriation of money belonging to clients, and therefore the High Court should have left the complainants to pursue a criminal prosecution rather than proceeding under section 10 of the Bar Councils Act. In support of this submission counsel relied on two reported decisions of the Calcutta High Court, namely Chandi Charan Mitter, a Pleader, In re (1920) I.L.R. 47 Cal. 1115 and Emperor v. Satish Chandra Singha (1927) I.L.R. 54 Cal. 721. The Court observed that the present matter does not require an exhaustive review of those authorities nor a definitive formulation of the principles that guide a court’s discretion when a complaint is made under section 10. It was sufficient to note that the purpose of a proceeding for professional misconduct is entirely distinct from the purpose of a criminal trial. Proceedings under the Bar Councils Act and similar statutes exist to safeguard the highest standards of professional conduct at the bar; although they carry a penal character, they are designed primarily for disciplinary purposes and to prevent an individual whose conduct renders him unfit from continuing to practice. Such disciplinary jurisdiction is not exercised as an aid to criminal law. By contrast, criminal proceedings aim to enforce the law of the land and to punish offenders. The Court further explained that a conviction arising from a criminal prosecution may later serve as a basis for a disciplinary proceeding under the Bar Councils Act, whereas an acquittal or discharge in a criminal trial would not automatically trigger a reinvestigation of the same facts for professional misconduct. Because the objectives of the two types of proceedings differ, the decision to proceed under section 10 rests on the discretion of the court rather than on a mandatory rule of law.

The Court explained that the purpose of a proceeding under the Bar Councils Act is to determine whether a lawyer has behaved in such a manner that he is no longer fit to remain a member of an honourable and responsible profession. That jurisdiction is exercised independently of criminal law; the only question for the tribunal is whether the practitioner’s conduct disqualifies him from practising. By contrast, criminal proceedings exist to enforce the law of the land and to secure punishment for an offender. The Court observed that, where a criminal prosecution is launched concerning the same subject matter as the professional complaint and the practitioner is subsequently convicted, that conviction may serve as a basis for a later proceeding under the Bar Councils Act. Conversely, if the criminal court acquits or discharges the practitioner on the merits, the factual findings of that trial will not be reopened for the purpose of framing a charge of professional misconduct on the very same facts. Thus, because the objectives of the two types of proceedings differ, there is no rigid rule of law dictating the sequence in which they must be pursued. Instead, the decision as to whether the Court should immediately inquire into the allegation of professional misconduct or defer to the complainant to pursue a criminal prosecution rests on the discretion of the Court, taking into account the particular facts of each case.

The Court noted that the appellant’s counsel had not argued that the Court was incompetent or beyond its jurisdiction to commence an enquiry when the alleged misconduct also constitutes an offence under ordinary criminal law. Neither of the authorities relied upon by the appellant imposed such a limitation, and consequently they offered little assistance in the present matter. The Court found it appropriate to extract the head‑note from the report of Chandi Charan Mitter, which states that where the alleged misconduct has no direct connection with the pleader’s practical and immediate relation to the court, a criminal trial and conviction should ordinarily precede any order of disbarment. In that case, the charge concerned matters unrelated to the lawyer’s relationship with his clients or the court, and the Court correctly waited for the outcome of the criminal prosecution before initiating professional misconduct proceedings. The present case, however, is fundamentally different. In Emperor v. Satish Chandra Singha, the practitioner was accused of forging court records by inserting words into an original plaint—an act detached from his duty to a client. By contrast, the misconduct charged in the current matter is intimately connected with, and arises directly from, the duty owed by the advocate to his client. This distinction underscores that the Court’s discretion to proceed with an inquiry into professional misconduct is properly exercised when the alleged conduct is closely tied to the practitioner’s responsibilities toward his client, rather than being a generic criminal offence unrelated to the practice of law.

In discussing the proper scope of a court’s discretion to initiate an inquiry into an advocate’s professional misconduct, the judgment referred to observations made by Lord Abinger in the cases reported at (1) 1920 I.L.R. 47 Cal. 1115 and (2) 1927 I.L.R. 54 Cal. 721, which dealt with professional misconduct against an attorney in England. The learned judge explained that when an attorney commits an act that is punishable on its own but does not arise from the cause in which the attorney is professionally engaged, the court should not treat that act as a ground for removal from the roll. Instead, the court should leave the aggrieved party to obtain a remedy through criminal prosecution. This passage underscores a clear distinction between misconduct that is directly linked to the practitioner’s duty toward his client and misconduct that is unrelated to such duties. In cases that fall within the former category, the court may properly exercise its discretion to treat the allegation as professional misconduct without forcing the complainant to pursue a separate criminal action.

Applying that principle to the facts before the Court, it was noted that the appellant had received money belonging to his client during the course of a suit in which he was acting as counsel, and the charge against him was the failure to return that money. Accordingly, the Court found that the High Court was fully justified in proceeding against the appellant under section 10 of the Bar Councils Act. The learned counsel for the appellant then raised a procedural objection, arguing that certain evidence on behalf of the respondents was admitted after the appellant had completed his own examination, thereby allowing the respondents an opportunity to fill any gaps in their case. The Court rejected this objection, observing that no allegation of prejudice was made either before the District Judge who conducted the inquiry or before the High Court when the district judge’s report was considered. After reviewing the record, the Court concluded that there was no basis for any claim that the order in which witnesses were examined had caused prejudice to the appellant. The judgment also recorded that one of the plaintiffs, identified as Kagga Veeraiah, had admitted in his evidence before the District Judge that he and other persons had received the proceeds of the cheque that the appellant had cashed. In light of that admission, the Court held that the High Court’s finding that the appellant had failed to pay the money to his clients was not erroneous.

The Court noted that the appellant was alleged to have failed to pay the money owed to his clients. To understand this allegation and the response to it, the Court set out several facts. The suit identified as O.S. 432 of 1951 involved four plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 1, 2 and 3 were the complainants and are now before the Court as respondents 1 to 3. The fourth plaintiff was a man named Kagga Veeraiah. The appellant argued that the money had been paid to all four plaintiffs at a time when the four of them were present together. The complainants countered that Kagga Veeraiah had died in 1957, and therefore could not have received the payment. In view of this contention, the appellant claimed that a living person who asserted he was Kagga Veeraiah was produced before the District Judge and was recorded as court witness No. 7. That witness stated that he had seen the money handed to the plaintiffs in his presence; if that statement and his identity were accepted, the appellant’s defence would have succeeded.

The complainants maintained that the person examined as court witness No. 7 was an impersonator. To establish the death of the real Kagga Veeraiah, the complainants produced an extract from his death certificate. The Court also drew attention to another proceeding, O.S. 732 of 1955, in which Kagga Veeraiah was a party and a memo had been filed stating that he was dead. The witness explained that the memo was filed because he was unavailable. The witness was then subjected to intense cross‑examination concerning his identity, the particulars of the parties, and other details relating to the subject‑matter of O.S. 432 of 1951. His answers were found to be highly unsatisfactory. After reviewing all the evidence, the learned Judges of the High Court recorded two alternative findings. First, they concluded that it was more probable that the person examined as court witness 7 was not Kagga Veeraiah but an impersonator. Second, even if the witness truly were Kagga Veeraiah, his testimony could not be accepted because it lacked even a modicum of truth and therefore had to be rejected.

Counsel for the appellant submitted that the thumb impression of the witness on his deposition before the District Judge, recorded as court witness 7, had been compared with the thumb impression of the fourth plaintiff in O.S. 432 of 1951, and that such a comparison should have led the Court to accept the witness’s identity as Kagga Veeraiah. The Court found it unnecessary to pursue this argument or the detailed evidence related to it, because there was no basis for interfering with the High Court’s assessment of the witness’s credibility, independent of the question of whether Kagga Veeraiah was dead and, if he was not, whether court witness 7 was indeed Kagga Veeraiah.

The High Court judges examined the credibility of the witness’s deposition while setting aside the separate issue of whether Kagga Veeraiah was deceased or, if alive, whether the individual identified as C.W. 7 was in fact Kagga Veeraiah. The admissions made by that witness together with his evident ignorance of the proceedings in the suit caused the judges to deem him a witness of untruth. Accordingly, the learned judges characterised his testimony as completely lacking even a modicum of truth. Consequently, the appellant could not rely on any statement made by the witness as proof that the plaintiffs had received the sum which the witness admittedly held. Counsel further urged that the five‑year suspension imposed on the appellant was excessively severe and that the period should be reduced, even if the charge against the appellant was established. The Court expressed surprise at counsel’s willingness to make such a bold submission on behalf of the appellant. The appellant had obtained a considerable sum of money that belonged to his clients, and, according to the High Court’s finding, he failed to return that money when it was demanded. Not satisfied with the failure to repay, the appellant advanced a false defence alleging payment and even attempted to sustain that defence by suborning witnesses. In view of these circumstances, even if the High Court judges had removed the appellant’s name from the roll of advocates, such a penalty would have been appropriate given the gravity of the offence. Accordingly, the order now under appeal, if it contains any error, does so only by being too lenient, and there is no justification for the relief sought on behalf of the appellant. For these reasons, the appeal was dismissed in its entirety by the Court.