Nandeshwar Prasad And Another vs The State Of U. P. And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 166 and 167 of 1962

Decision Date: 26 April 1963

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.C. Das Gupta

In the case titled Nandeshwar Prasad and Another versus the State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, the judgment was delivered on 26 April 1963 by a Bench comprising Justice K.N. Wanchoo, Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar and Justice K.C. Das Gupta. The petitioners, identified as Nandeshwar Prasad and another, challenged actions taken by the State of Uttar Pradesh and other respondents. The official citation of the decision is recorded as 1964 AIR 1217 and 1964 SCR (3) 425, with further references noted in the citator as R 1965 SC1017 (9) F, 1965 SC1763 (4,5) F, 1973 SC 689 (20) R, and 1973 SC1150 (7). The matters before the Court concerned land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, specifically sections 4, 5, 5A, 6, 9, 17(1) and 17(4), as well as provisions of the Kanpur Urban Area Development Act of 1945, namely sections 71 and 114.

The factual background presented in the appeals, designated as Civil Appeals No. 166 of 1962 and No. 167 of 1962, was essentially the same. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 167 of 1962 owned parcels of land located in the city of Kanpur, which were occupied by a mill and associated godowns; no portion of the land was classified as waste or cultivable. In 1932 the Government of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification establishing Scheme No. XX of the Improvement Trust, Kanpur, an entity later replaced by the Development Board, Kanpur, pursuant to the Kanpur Urban Area Development Act, 1945. In 1955 the Housing Department of the Uttar Pradesh Government promoted a scheme for constructing industrial tenements, part of which related to the area containing the disputed land. Subsequently, in 1956, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, declaring that the plots in question were required for the construction of tenements under the subsidized industrial housing scheme of the Government as well as for general improvement and the Street Scheme No. XX of the Board. Following this, a notification under section 6 of the same Act was issued, stating that due to the urgency of the case, the Governor, invoking sub‑sections (1) and (1‑A) of section 17, directed the Collector of Kanpur that, despite the absence of an award under section 2, possession could be taken on the expiry of the notice mentioned in section 9(1). A subsequent notice under section 9 declared that possession of the land would be taken within fifteen days. The appellant then filed a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court, raising two principal points of contention. The first point argued that because the acquisition was intended for Scheme No. XX of the Board, action had to be taken in accordance with section 114 of the Kanpur Act and its schedule, and that the failure to do so rendered the acquisition proceedings invalid. The second point asserted that the Governor could not issue a notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act without first taking action under section 5A of that Act. The High Court dismissed both arguments and rejected the writ petition, leading to the present appeal, which was filed with a certificate from the High Court. The matters before this Supreme Court were the same questions that had been raised before the High Court. The Court held that section 114 of the Kanpur Act becomes applicable only when the Board proceeds to acquire land pursuant to its powers under section 71, and that the acquisition proceedings must then be conducted under the Land Acquisition Act as modified by section 114.

In the writ petition the petitioner raised two principal objections. The first objection asserted that because the acquisition was intended for Scheme No. XX of the Board, the procedure prescribed by section 114 of the Kanpur Act and its schedule had to be followed, and since no such action had been taken, the acquisition proceedings were invalid. The second objection argued that the Governor could not issue a notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act without first complying with the requirements of section 5A of the same Act.

The High Court rejected both submissions and consequently dismissed the writ petition. The appellant then filed the present appeal, supported by a certificate issued by the High Court. Before this Court the same questions that had been presented to the High Court were again raised.

The Court held that section 114 of the Kanpur Act became relevant only when the Board itself exercised its power to acquire land under section 71; in such a case the acquisition process must be conducted under the Land Acquisition Act as modified by section 114 and the accompanying schedule. However, in the present matter the acquisition was undertaken by the Government pursuant to the Land Acquisition Act for public purposes, even though the ultimate purpose related to the Board’s scheme. Accordingly, the Kanpur Act was inapplicable, and the Government proceeded solely under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.

The Court observed that the text of the Land Acquisition Act made it clear that compliance with section 5A was a prerequisite before a notification could be issued under section 6. Even when the Government issued a direction under section 17(1), it was not necessary for it to also issue a direction under section 17(4). If only a direction under section 17(1) was made, the procedure required by section 5A still had to be observed before a notification under section 6 could be issued. It became necessary to take action under section 5A and to prepare a report only when the Government also made a declaration under section 17(4).

The Court further explained that an order under section 17(1) or section 17(4) could be made only with respect to waste or arable land, and not with respect to land that was occupied by buildings. Section 17(1) and section 17(4) were independent of each other, as were section 17(1‑A) and section 17(4); consequently, an order under section 17(1‑A) did not necessarily require a corresponding order under section 17(4). The Court emphasized that the right to raise objections under section 5A was a substantial right whenever a person’s property faced the threat of acquisition, and that right could not be overridden merely because section 17(1‑A) referred to section 17(1). Section 17(1‑A) merely indicated the circumstances and conditions under which possession could be taken, and it did not empower the State Government to state in a notification under section 4 that the procedure under section 5A would be omitted. Such a provision in the notification was beyond the State Government’s authority, and consequently the notification issued under section 6, which had been made without observing the requirements of section 5A, was invalid.

In the present case the Court observed that the State Government could not, within the notification issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, state that proceedings contemplated under section 5‑A would not be instituted. Such a clause, the Court held, exceeded the statutory authority of the State Government, and consequently the subsequent notification issued under section 6, which had been made without first invoking the procedure prescribed in section 5‑A, was invalid and had to be set aside. The judgment was delivered in the Civil Appeals numbered 166 and 167 of 1962, which were appeals from the decree dated 25 October 1957 rendered by the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeals numbered 140 and 139 of 1957. Counsel for the appellants in Appeal 166 included J B Goyal, while counsel for the appellants in Appeal 167 comprised C B Agarwala and P C Agarwala. Counsel for the first respondent in both appeals was K S Hajela together with C P Lal, and counsel for the second respondent in both appeals was also C P Lal. The judgment was pronounced on 26 April 1963 and was authored by Justice Wanchoo. The Court noted that the two appeals, which were issued on certificates granted by the Allahabad High Court, raised identical legal questions and therefore would be considered together. For brevity the Court recounted the factual background of Appeal 167, since the factual matrix of Appeal 166 was the same except for the identity of the lands in dispute, although both parcels lay in the same locality of the city of Kanpur. In Appeal 167 the appellant, Deoki Nandan, held a lease over two plots situated in Anwarganj, Bans Mandi, Kanpur, the lease having been executed for a term of ninety‑nine years commencing in 1943. On those plots stood the Om Cotton Ginning and Oil Mill together with substantial permanent godowns; two‑thirds of the area was occupied by buildings while the remaining one‑third comprised open land that had been paved with bricks. No portion of the land qualified as waste or arable. The Court further noted that in February 1932 the Government of Uttar Pradesh had, by way of notification, sanctioned a scheme identified as Pechbagh Dalelpurwa Scheme No XX of the Improvement Trust Kanpur. The Improvement Trust Kanpur had subsequently been superseded by the Development Board Kanpur established under the Kanpur Urban Area Development Act No VI of 1945, which repealed the Uttar Pradesh Town Improvement Act No III of 1920 insofar as it applied to Kanpur. The fate of Scheme No XX after 1932 was not fully documented, but it appeared that the scheme had not been completely implemented. Later, in 1955, the Housing Department of the Uttar Pradesh Government introduced a subsidised industrial housing scheme that was to be executed in four phases; the present appeal concerned the fourth phase. For this phase the Government of India had authorised a sum exceeding two crore rupees, and the plan envisaged the construction of 6 973 tenements, of which 1 368 were to be located in the Ahata on the Hamirpur road. The lands that were the subject of the dispute lay within this locality, and the relevant decision had been taken by the Uttar Pradesh Government in May 1955. On 6 January 1956 the Governor of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (No I of 1894) declaring that the two disputed plots were required for the construction of tenements under the fourth phase of the subsidised industrial housing scheme, as well as for a general improvement and street scheme designated as Scheme No XX of the Board. This was followed by a further notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 31 January 1956, which indicated that, owing to the urgency of the case, the Governor, invoking sub‑sections (1) and (1‑A) of section 17, directed that the collector of Kanpur could proceed even though no award under section 11 had yet been made, provided that the stipulated conditions were satisfied.

In the area known as Ahata on the Hamirpur road, the portion of the housing plan that is being examined concerns the lands that are the subject of the present dispute. The Government of Uttar Pradesh made the relevant decision concerning this part of the scheme in May 1955. Following that decision, on 6 January 1956, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, declaring that the two disputed plots were needed for the construction of tenements in the fourth phase of the subsidised industrial housing scheme that the State Government was sponsoring, and also for the general improvement and street work identified as scheme No XX of the Development Board. Subsequently, on 31 January 1956, a further notification was issued under section 6 of the same Act. That second notification stated that, because the matter was urgent, the Governor was pleased, pursuant to sub‑sections (1) and (I‑A) of section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, to direct the Collector of Kanpur that, although no award under section 11 had yet been made, the Collector might, after the expiry of the period prescribed in section 9(1), take possession of the land, buildings and structures described in the schedule for public purposes. In compliance with the provisions of section 9, the Collector served a notice on 10 February 1956 indicating that possession would be taken fifteen days after the notice, that is, on 25 February 1956. Upon receiving this notice, Deoki Nandan, the appellant, lodged objections before the Collector on 21 February 1956. Two days later, on 23 February 1956, he filed a writ petition in the High Court, which gave rise to the present appeal. The writ petition advanced two principal submissions on behalf of the appellant. First, it was contended that because the acquisition was undertaken for scheme No XX of the Board, the authorities were required to act in accordance with section 114 of the Kanpur Act and the accompanying schedule; the failure to follow that procedure, it was argued, rendered the acquisition proceedings invalid. Second, it was asserted that the Governor could not lawfully issue the notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act without first complying with the requirements of section 5‑A, which mandates the preparation of a report. It was undisputed that no action under section 5‑A had been taken and no such report had been filed. The learned single judge who heard the petition dismissed it. He held, on the first point, that the Kanpur Act was not applicable to the case, and on the second point, that section 17(4) was applicable, thereby removing the necessity of complying with section 5‑A before issuing the section 6 notification. An appeal against that decision was then heard by a Division Bench of the High Court, which affirmed the single judge’s conclusions and dismissed the appeal.

In this appeal, the appellate court had earlier granted a certificate of appeal, which is why the matter is before the Supreme Court. The same two questions that were argued before the High Court are again presented, the first contending that because the land was to be acquired for scheme No. XX of the Board, the acquisition process should have been conducted under the Kanpur Act, and that the failure to do so renders the entire proceedings void, including the notifications issued under sections 4 and 6. The second question asserts that section 17(4) does not apply to the present facts and that a notification under section 6 cannot be issued unless the requirements of section 5‑A have been satisfied, a condition the appellant admits was not fulfilled, rendering the section 6 notification invalid even if the section 4 notification were valid. Turning to the first point, the appellant relies principally on section 114 of the Kanpur Act, which provides: “Modification of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – For the purpose of the acquisition of land for the Board under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – (a) the said Act shall be subject to the modification specified in the Schedule to this Act; (b) the award of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the award of the Court under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.” The appellant also refers to section 108, which authorises the constitution of a tribunal, and to section 109, which states that the tribunal shall perform the functions of the Court with respect to acquisition of land for the Board under the 1894 Act. Further reliance is placed on section 71(1), which permits the Board, with prior sanction of the State Government, to acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as modified by the Kanpur Act, for any purpose of the Act. The argument advanced is that whenever land is to be acquired for the purposes of the Board, the procedure prescribed in Chapter VII of the Kanpur Act must be followed, because Chapter VII outlines various development schemes and the method for formulating such schemes. Since it is not disputed that no such procedure was carried out with respect to scheme No. XX, the appellant contends that section 114 becomes operative and that the acquisition must proceed under the modified provisions of the Land Acquisition Act even when the Government is the acquiring authority. Emphasis is placed on the words “acquisition of land for the Board” in section 114, and the appellant submits that whenever land is acquired for the Board, the action can only be taken under that provision, irrespective of whether the acquisition is effected by the Government.

The Court examined the contention that the acquisition of land under the Kanpur Act must be treated as an acquisition by the Government for the Board because the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act were modified by the Kanpur Act. It rejected this contention as untenable. The Court noted that Chapter VII of the Kanpur Act lays down a comprehensive scheme for various development projects and the procedure for finalising such schemes. Once a scheme is finalised under Chapter VII, Section 70 empowers the Board either to purchase the land required for the scheme or to take the land on lease. In the alternative, Section 71 provides that, with the prior sanction of the State Government, the Board may acquire land pursuant to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as modified by the Kanpur Act. The Court observed that it is only when the Board exercises the power conferred by Section 71 that Section 114 becomes applicable, and the acquisition proceedings must then be conducted under the Land Acquisition Act as amended by Section 114 together with the accompanying schedule. While it is true that Section 114 refers to “acquisition of land for the Board,” the argument that this phrase limits the provision to acquisitions carried out by the Government on behalf of the Board was dismissed as incorrect.

The Court explained that Section 71 itself expressly authorises the Board to acquire land under the modified Land Acquisition Act, and such acquisition is undertaken for the purposes of the Board as contemplated by the Act. Consequently, whenever the Board acts under Section 71, the acquisition is deemed to be “for the Board.” Section 71 also refers to a modification of the Land Acquisition Act, but the nature of that modification is not set out within Section 71. To ascertain the modification, one must refer to Section 114, which merely indicates the specific alterations mentioned in the schedule. Therefore, the presence of the words “acquisition of land for the Board” in Section 114 does not imply that the acquisition is performed by the Government for the Board; rather, it confirms that the Board’s own acquisition under Section 71 is subject to the modifications prescribed in Section 114. The Court further pointed out that the structure of the Kanpur Act demonstrates that the Board first prepares a scheme under Chapter VII, then, with the State Government’s prior sanction, may acquire land for itself under Section 71, at which point Section 114 applies. In this context, Section 109, which outlines the duties of the tribunal, becomes relevant, as the tribunal is the authority that oversees the acquisition proceedings when the Board acquires land pursuant to Section 71 of the Kanpur Act.

The Court observed that section 109 of the Kanpur Act employed the same expression “acquisition of land for the Board” that appears in the Land Acquisition Act. Because the acquisition contemplated in section 109 is also for the Board, the Court found no doubt that the legislative scheme required the Board to first act under Chapter VII and thereafter decide to acquire land under section 71. If the Board makes such a decision, the Court held that section 114 becomes operative, incorporating the modifications to the Land Acquisition Act that are listed in the schedule. The schedule contains two specific modifications: it replaces the notification prescribed in section 4 with the notification provided in section 53 of Chapter VII, and it substitutes the notification in section 6 with the notification specified in section 60 of Chapter VI. The Court noted that Chapter VII, section 11, section 14 and the other provisions of Chapter XI dealing with these modifications, together with the schedule, constitute a single integrated scheme whereby the Board acquires land for its own purposes, but only after obtaining prior sanction from the Government. However, the Court explained that where the acquisition, as in the present case, is carried out by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act for a public purpose, even if that purpose coincides with the Board’s objectives, the Kanpur Act does not apply at all. Consequently, the Government proceeds solely under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court therefore rejected the appellants’ argument that non‑compliance with the Kanpur Act rendered the acquisition proceedings invalid.

The Court then turned to the second matter raised by the appellants and summarised the procedural scheme laid down in the Land Acquisition Act. According to that scheme, acquisition proceedings commence with a preliminary notification issued under section 4, in which the Government declares that land in a specified locality is required or is likely to be required for a public purpose. Following that notification, the Act confers on a duly appointed officer, together with his servants and workmen, the authority either generally or specially delegated by the Government to enter the locality, to survey the land, to take levels, to dig or bore into the sub‑soil, and to carry out all other acts necessary to determine whether the land is suitable for the intended purpose. The officer is also empowered to demarcate the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken. Section 5‑A then provides that any person who has an interest in land that has been notified under section 4 may, within thirty days of the issuance of that notification, lodge an objection to the proposed acquisition. Such an objection must be submitted in writing to the Collector, who is required to afford the objector a reasonable opportunity to be heard. After hearing all objections and, if deemed necessary, conducting further inquiries, the Collector is mandated to forward the entire case record and his recommendations to the Government for a final decision.

The Court explained that after the Collector receives the objections, he must forward to the Government the complete record of the proceedings he conducted, together with a report that sets out his recommendations on those objections. The Government’s decision on the objections, as expressed in that report, is final and binding. Subsequently, under section 6, the appropriate Government may, after being satisfied that the report—if any—prepared under section 5‑A supports the need for acquisition, issue a declaration that the specified land is required for a public purpose and publish that declaration in the Official Gazette. Once such a declaration is made, the Collector is required to issue an order for acquisition of the land. The land is then demarcated, measured and, where necessary, planned in accordance with section 8, and notice is served under section 9 to all persons who have an interest in the land. Thereafter, the Collector conducts an inquiry under section II and makes an award. After the award, the Collector has the authority, under section 16, to take possession of the land, at which point the land vests absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.

The Court further observed that the scheme makes clear that compliance with the provisions of section 5‑A is a prerequisite before a notification under section 6 can be issued. From the moment a preliminary notification is issued under section 4, the Government‑authorized officer may enter the land to survey it and to carry out any other necessary acts to determine whether the land is suitable for the intended purpose; such entry itself serves as sufficient notice to interested parties, who may then object. If objections are filed, the Collector evaluates them and includes his recommendations on those objections in the report sent to the Government. If no objections are filed, the Collector reports the absence of objections, after which the Government proceeds to issue a notification under section 6. In either scenario, the Collector must either submit a report with his recommendations on any objections or inform the Government that no objections were received, and only thereafter is the Government empowered to issue a notification under section 6. The Court noted that this is the normal procedure to be followed before a section 6 notification is issued. However, an exception exists under section 17, which explains the inclusion of the words “if any” after “considering the report” in section 6. When action is taken under section 17(4), the requirement to follow the procedure in section 5‑A is dispensed with, and a notification under section 6 may be issued without a report from the Collector under section 5‑A. The appeals presently before the Court concerned sections 17(1) and 17(4), which were then read in full.

In the present judgment the Court explained that section 17(1) empowers the appropriate Government to direct the Collector, even though no award has been made under section 11, to take possession of any waste or arable land required for a public purpose or for a company, and that once possession is taken such land shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. The provision is quoted as follows: “fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub‑section (1), take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a company, such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.” The Court noted that when action is taken under section 17(1) the taking of possession and the vesting, which are normally provided for in section 16 after the award under section 11, are accelerated and may occur fifteen days after the notice under section 9 is published. The Court then turned to section 17(4), which states: “In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub‑section (1) or sub‑section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under section 4, subsection (1).” It was observed that section 17(4) allows the Government, when it considers that the land falls within the scope of sub‑section (1) or (2), to dispense with the requirements of section 5A and to make a declaration under section 6 at any time after the notification under section 4(1). The Court emphasized that a direction under section 17(4) is not a legal necessity merely because a direction under section 17(1) has been issued. If the Government issues only a direction under section 17(1), the procedural requirements of section 5A must still be complied with before a notification under section 6 can be issued. Once those requirements are fulfilled and the notification under section 6 is made, the Collector obtains the authority to take possession of the land after the notice under section 9, without waiting for the award, and the land then vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Only when the Government also makes a declaration under section 17(4) does the requirement to follow the procedure in section 5A and to produce a report under that section become unnecessary. The Court observed that, although in practice an order under section 17(1) is often accompanied by an order under section 17(4), the law does not compel such a dual order. Finally, the Court pointed out that under the Land Acquisition Act an order under either section 17(1) or section 17(4) can be made only with respect to waste or arable land and cannot be made with respect to land that is not waste or arable.

The judgment noted that the provisions of section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act originally permitted the power of possession only over land that was waste or arable and on which no buildings stood. The Court then turned to section 17(I‑A), which was inserted into section 17 by the Land Acquisition (U. P. Amendment) Act, No. XXII of 1954. Section 6 of that Amendment Act states: “After sub‑section (1) of section 17 of the Principal Act (i.e., the Land Acquisition Act) the following shall be inserted as a new sub‑section (I‑A): (I‑A) The power to take possession under sub‑section (1) may also be exercised in the case of other than waste or arable land, where the land is acquired for or in connection with sanitary improvements of any kind or planned development.” The Court observed that it was not contested that the land involved in the present matter was required for planned development, and consequently sub‑section (I‑A) as added by the Uttar Pradesh Amendment applied to the case. The appellants, however, argued that sub‑section (I‑A) merely conferred a power to take possession of non‑waste, non‑arable land when such land was acquired for sanitary improvements or planned development, and that the reference to sub‑section (1) in sub‑section (I‑A) served only to import the circumstances and timing in which that power could be exercised. They further contended that section 17(4) had not been amended by the Uttar Pradesh Act to incorporate the new sub‑section (I‑A), and therefore section 17(4) continued to apply solely to waste or arable land. The Court acknowledged that this argument possessed merit because the Uttar Pradesh amendment did not alter sub‑section (1), and consequently, when section 17(4) speaks of land to which sub‑section (1) applies, it still refers exclusively to waste or arable land. While it is correct that sub‑section (I‑A) extends the power of possession to land other than waste or arable, the Court held that this extension does not automatically cause section 17(4) to become applicable to such land. In the Court’s view, the mention of sub‑section (1) within sub‑section (I‑A) signifies only that the power to take possession of non‑waste, non‑arable land may be exercised under the same circumstances and at the same time as it could be exercised over waste or arable land under sub‑section (1), and nothing beyond that. Consequently, sub‑section (I‑A) functions merely to accelerate the taking of possession that would otherwise occur after an award, without altering the substantive scope of section 17(4).

In this case, the Court observed that the provision allowing possession after an award under section 11 applies only to land that is waste or arable, and only under the circumstances and conditions specified in sub‑section (1). The Court noted that sub‑section (I‑A), which was introduced by the Uttar Pradesh legislature, does not amend sub‑section (1) to bring land other than waste or arable within its scope. Consequently, because sub‑section (4) was not amended by the legislature to include the new sub‑section (I‑A), sub‑section (4) continues to apply solely to waste or arable land as mentioned in the unchanged sub‑section (1). The Court reiterated that the law does not require an order under section 17(4) to be made whenever an order under section 17(1) is made. In the same way, an order under sub‑section (I‑A) does not automatically trigger an order under section 17(4). Sections 17(1) and 17(4) are independent; an order issued under one does not compel the issuance of an order under the other. By the same reasoning, sub‑section (I‑A) must be regarded as independent of section 17(4), and a decree under sub‑section (I‑A) does not oblige the State to pass a decree under section 17(4). The Court therefore concluded that, if the legislature had intended sub‑section (4) to apply to cases covered by sub‑section (I‑A), it had failed to express that intention in the statute. Sub‑section (I‑A) was inserted as a separate provision, without any amendment to either sub‑section (1) or sub‑section (4), and without any additional clause that would extend sub‑section (4) to situations falling under sub‑section (I‑A). As a result, sub‑section (4) cannot be read as applicable to sub‑section (I‑A). The Court emphasized that the right to raise objections under section 5‑A is a substantial right when a person’s property faces acquisition, and that this right cannot be dispensed with merely because sub‑section (I‑A) refers to sub‑section (1). The reference to sub‑section (1) in sub‑section (I‑A) was intended only to indicate the circumstances and conditions for taking possession, and not to alter the substantive scope of sub‑section (1). The legislature used this reference as a drafting economy; otherwise sub‑section (I‑A) would have been worded in full as follows: “In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no award has been made, may, after fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub‑section (1), take possession of any land other than waste or arable land for public purposes where the land is acquired for or in connection with sanitary improvements of any kind or planned development.” The Court observed that even if sub‑section (I‑A) had been drafted in that longer form, it would not have been possible to argue that sub‑section (4) of section 17 also covered cases under sub‑section (I‑A). Accordingly, the Court could not accept any implication that sub‑section (4) automatically applied to sub‑section (I‑A).

Because the legislature had employed particular wording in sub‑section (I‑A) merely for the purpose of brevity, it could not be concluded that the amendment altered either sub‑section (1) or sub‑section (4). The Court observed that, in the absence of any amendment to sub‑section (1) or sub‑section (4) and without any distinct provision being inserted in section 17 that would extend the operation of sub‑section (4) to the newly created sub‑section (I‑A), there was no authority granted to the State Government to apply sub‑section (4) to a case that fell under sub‑section (I‑A) simply because sub‑section (I‑A) had been introduced in its present form within section 17. Consequently, the Court was of the opinion that the State Government did not have the power to declare, in the notification made under section 4, that the proceedings contemplated under section 5‑A would not be taken. That portion of the notification under section 4 was therefore held to be beyond the constitutional powers of the State Government. As a result, the notification issued under section 6, which had been promulgated without first carrying out the action required by section 5‑A, was also declared invalid. Accordingly, the appeals were allowed, and the Court set aside both the notification under section 6 and the specific clause of the notification under section 4 that stated that, by the Governor’s pleasure, the provisions of section 5‑A would not apply under sub‑section (4) of section 17. The remaining parts of the notification under section 4 were held to remain in force, and the Government retained the discretion to proceed with the acquisition after satisfying the requirements of section 5‑A and subsequently issuing a notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In the circumstances, the Court felt that the appellants should now be afforded an opportunity under section 5‑A, even though the statutory period for filing objections under that section had long since expired, because the Government had previously misinterpreted the law by treating objections raised before the Collector after the issuance of notices under section 9 as objections under section 5‑A. The Court ordered that the respondents pay the costs of this Court to the appellants, including one set of hearing fees, and affirmed that the appeals were allowed.