Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar vs Roop Singh Rathore and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal Nos. 30 and 31 of 1963

Decision Date: 7 May 1963

Coram: S.K. Das, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Raghubar Dayal, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.R. Mudholkar

In this case the Supreme Court of India rendered a judgment on 7 May 1963 concerning a dispute over the election of the appellant to the House of the People in the third general elections held in February 1962. The matter was titled Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar versus Roop Singh Rathore and others, and it was decided by a bench comprising S. K. Das, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Raghubar Dayal, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and J. R. Mudholkar. The judgment was reported in 1964 AIR 1545 and 1964 SCR (3) 573, and it is cited in later reports such as R 1970 SC 765, R 1971 SC 342, RF 1974 SC 1185, F 1984 SC 305 and R 1991 SC 1557. The legal issue arose from two election petitions filed by two electors of the constituency from which the appellant was elected, seeking to set aside his election. One of the petitioners, identified as B, had his nomination paper rejected by the returning officer and was not a contesting candidate. The appellant, who was a respondent to the petitions, raised several preliminary objections on the ground of maintainability. He argued that B had been improperly impleaded as a respondent in violation of section 82 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, that the service of a copy of the petition on the appellant did not comply with section 81(3) because the copy was not a true copy of the original filed with the Election Commission, and that the petition failed to meet the requirements of section 83 in that it was not verified as prescribed and the accompanying affidavit concerning corrupt practices was neither properly made nor in the prescribed form. The Court examined each contention in turn. It held that where all persons required to be joined under section 82 were correctly joined as respondents, the addition of a person who was not a necessary party did not constitute a breach of that section. Regarding the term “copy” in section 81(3), the Court explained that the word does not demand an absolutely exact replica but rather a copy so accurate that no reasonable person could be misled by any variation from the original. The Court further observed that a defect in the verification of an election petition as required by section 83(1)(c) does not attract the consequences of section 90 and therefore is not fatal to the petition’s maintainability. Finally, the Court concluded that a defect in the affidavit accompanying the petition does not, by itself, provide sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

In this matter the Court explained that the test for a copy to be considered true was whether any variation from the original could mislead an ordinary person; this principle was taken from In re Hewer, Ex parte Kahan, (1882) 21 Ch. D. 871. The Court further held that a defect in the verification of an election petition, as required by section 83(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, did not attract the operation of section 90(3) and therefore was not fatal to the maintainability of the petition. Additionally, the Court observed that a defect in the accompanying affidavit was not a sufficient ground on which to dismiss the petition.

The judgment concerned civil appeals numbered 30 and 31 of 1963, filed by special leave against the order dated 31 August 1962 of the Rajasthan High Court in DB Civil Writ Petitions 376 and 377 of 1962. Counsel for the appellant appeared in both appeals, while counsel for respondent No 2 appeared in each appeal as well, and an intervener was also represented. The judgment was delivered on 7 May 1963 by Justice S. K. Das. These two appeals were heard together because they raised common questions of law and fact, and the decision rendered would apply to both.

The appellant, Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar, had been elected to the Lok Sabha in the third general elections held in February 1962 from the Jhunjhunu parliamentary constituency in Rajasthan. Two election petitions were filed seeking to set aside his election. The first petition was filed by Ridmal Singh, who claimed to be an elector in the constituency, and the second petition was filed by Balji, also an elector, whose nomination paper had been rejected by the returning officer. The Court clarified that it would not consider the substantive grounds of these petitions, numbered 269 of 1962 and 295 of 1962 respectively, because the petitions had not yet been tried on their merits.

On 6 July 1962 the appellant, being one of the respondents to the two petitions, filed two applications raising preliminary objections to the maintainability of the petitions. The Election Tribunal considered these objections and, by orders dated 13 August 1962, dismissed them. Consequently, the appellant instituted two writ petitions in the Rajasthan High Court, praying that the Tribunal’s orders of 13 August 1962 and the subsequent orders issued on 14 August 1962 be set aside and that the Tribunal be directed to dismiss the election petitions on the basis that they failed to comply with mandatory provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

In the present proceedings the appellant asked that the orders dated 14 August 1962, which had dismissed the two election petitions, be set aside and that the Election Tribunal be directed to dismiss those petitions on the principal ground that they failed to comply with certain mandatory provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The High Court of Rajasthan rejected the appellant’s two writ petitions on 31 August 1962. After that rejection the appellant applied for special leave to the Supreme Court, obtained such leave, and consequently filed the present appeals. The appellant now relies on several specific grounds to contend that the two election petitions should have been held non‑maintainable and dismissed by the Election Tribunal. With respect to Election Petition No. 269 of 1962 the appellant raised three distinct objections. First, the appellant argued that the petition violated the mandatory requirements of section 82 of the Act because the individual identified as Ballu or Balji, whose nomination paper had been rejected and who was not a contesting candidate, had been improperly impleaded as respondent No. 7. Section 82 obliges that when a petition seeks, in addition to declaring the election of the returned candidate void, a declaration that the petitioner or another candidate has been duly elected, every contesting candidate must be made a party to the petition. Since Balji was not a contesting candidate, his inclusion as a respondent was alleged to be contrary to section 82. Second, the appellant contended that the petition failed to satisfy the provisions of section 81(3) because the copy of the election petition that had been served on the appellant was not a true copy of the original filed before the Election Commission, nor was it properly attested as a true copy by the signature of the petitioner who filed the petition. Third, the appellant maintained that the petition breached section 83, asserting that the affidavit concerning corrupt practices that accompanied the petition was neither properly made nor executed in the form prescribed by the statute. Regarding Petition No. 295 of 1962 the appellant set out three further grounds. The first ground was that, at the time of its presentation to the Election Commission, the petition was not accompanied by true copies as required by section 81(3); the original petition’s schedule footnote referred to four enclosures, but the copy served on the appellant omitted those enclosures. The second ground was that the petition was not duly verified because the verification clause did not state the date and place of verification, a defect that rendered the verification insufficient. The third ground was that the copy of the treasury receipt showing the deposit of Rs 2,000 in favour of the Election Commission was not enclosed with the copy of the petition served on the appellant, and additionally the copy of the order dated 22 January 1962, by which the returning officer had rejected the petitioner’s nomination, was neither signed nor verified by the petitioner. These grounds form the basis of the appellant’s claim that the election petitions should have been dismissed for non‑compliance with the statutory requirements.

It was observed that the copy of the petition served on the appellant did not contain a proof of the deposit of Rs 2000 /- made in favour of the Election Commission, nor did it include a copy of the order dated 22 January 1962 in which the returning officer had rejected the petitioner’s nomination paper, a copy that was neither signed nor verified by the petitioner. The Court then referred to several provisions of the Act, as they existed at the relevant time, which were pertinent to the preliminary objections raised. Section 79(b) defines the term “candidate” in Parts VI, VII and VIII to mean, unless the context requires otherwise, a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election, and such a person is deemed to have been a candidate from the moment, when an election is imminent, he begins to hold himself out as a prospective candidate. Section 80 provides that no election may be called into question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of Part VI. Section 81, in essence, states that an election petition challenging any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds enumerated in sub‑section (1) of sections 100 and 101 to the Election Commission by any candidate at the election or by any elector within forty‑five days from the date of election of the returned candidate. The crucial sub‑section (3) of section 81 requires that every election petition be accompanied by as many copies as there are respondents mentioned in the petition, plus one additional copy for the Election Commission, and that each copy be attested by the petitioner under his own signature as a true copy of the petition. Section 82 specifies who shall be parties to the petition, stipulating that a petitioner must join as respondents either all the contesting candidates other than the petitioner when a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void and that the petitioner or another candidate has been duly elected is claimed, or, where no such further declaration is claimed, all the returned candidates, and additionally any other candidate against whom allegations of corrupt practice are made. Section 83 prescribes the contents of the petition, and the proviso to sub‑section (1) of that section provides that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition must also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form supporting the allegation and setting out its particulars. Finally, Section 85 declares that if the provisions of sections 81, 82 or 117 have not been complied with, the Election Commission shall dismiss the petition.

Section 86 provides that if a petition is not dismissed under section 85, the Election Commission must publish a copy of the petition in the Official Gazette, serve a copy by post on each respondent, and thereafter refer the petition to an Election Tribunal for trial. The provisions contained in sections 87, 88 and 89 deal with matters that are not directly relevant to the present adjudication and are therefore omitted from detailed discussion. Section 90 then sets out the procedure that the Election Tribunal must follow. Sub‑section (1) of section 90 states that, subject to the Act and any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the Tribunal as nearly as possible in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the trial of suits. Sub‑section (3) of section 90 provides that the Tribunal shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of section 81 or section 82, even if the petition has not been dismissed by the Election Commission under section 85. An explanatory note clarifies that an order of the Tribunal dismissing a petition under this sub‑section shall be deemed to be an order made under clause (a) of section 98. Sub‑section (4) of section 90 allows any candidate who is not already a respondent to apply to the Tribunal within fourteen days from the commencement of the trial, and, subject to the provisions of section 119, to be joined as a respondent. Sub‑section (6) requires that every election petition be tried as expeditiously as possible and that the Tribunal endeavour to conclude the trial within six months from the date of publication of the petition’s copy in the Official Gazette under sub‑section (1) of section 86.

The Court then turned to consider the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the appellant, particularly the objection concerning the joinder of Ballu or Balji to election petition No. 269/1962. The appellant’s counsel argued that the provisions of section 82 of the Act are mandatory and that any failure to comply with those provisions is fatal, obligating the Tribunal to dismiss an election petition that does not comply with section 82. To support this contention, the counsel relied on sub‑section (3) of section 90. Further, the counsel submitted that, in view of the mandatory nature of section 82 and the directive in sub‑section (3) of section 90, the Election Tribunal is not entitled to apply the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure and treat a non‑joinder or a mis‑joinder as a non‑fatal defect.

In this case the Court examined whether the petition was maintainable on the ground that the provisions of section 82 of the Act had not been complied with. The argument presented by counsel for the appellant rested on the claim that, because section 82 required the joining of certain parties, any failure to follow that requirement made the petition non‑maintainable and therefore subject to dismissal under subsection (3) of section 90. The appellant’s counsel argued that if the basis of the claim—that there was non‑compliance with section 82—failed, then the entire argument would disappear. The Court noted that it was admitted that the individual named Ballu or Balji was not a “contest‑ing candidate” within the meaning of section 82 because his nomination paper had been rejected. It was also admitted that every candidate who was required to be joined under section 82 had indeed been joined as a respondent to the petition. Consequently, the situation that actually occurred was that all parties who were necessary to be joined under section 82 had been joined, and in addition Ballu or Balji had been joined despite not being required. The question thus presented was whether this excess joinder amounted to a breach or contravention of section 82. Counsel for the appellant sought to read section 82 as if it limited the respondents to only those expressly named, effectively adding the words “and no others.” The Court found no justification for such a construction. Agreeing with the High Court, it held that when all necessary parties have been properly joined, the inclusion of an additional person who is not a necessary party does not constitute a violation of section 82, and therefore the petition could not be dismissed under subsection (3) of section 90 on that basis. The Tribunal, however, retained the power to strike out the name of any party who was not required to be joined under section 82. The Court distinguished the opposite scenario, where a required party is omitted, which was not the case here. Accordingly, the appellant’s counsel had failed to establish the foundational premise of his argument. The Court therefore found it unnecessary to consider further the legal consequences of a supposed contravention of section 82. It noted that counsel for the respondents relied on the earlier decision in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh, where the Court had held that, at that time, section 82 was not mandatory. That provision then read: “A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition all the candidates who were duly nominated at the election other than himself if he was so nominated.” Sub‑section (4) of section 90 then allowed the tribunal, notwithstanding anything in section 85, to dismiss a petition that did not comply with sections 81, 83, or 85. The Court acknowledged this precedent but observed that the law had since changed, and thus the earlier decision was not determinative of the present issue.

There has been a change in the law since the earlier decision. Section 82 has been re‑drafted, and subsection three of section 90 now provides that the tribunal shall dismiss an election petition that fails to comply with the provisions of section 81 or section 82, even if the Election Commission has not dismissed the petition under section 85. Consequently, the Court did not consider the earlier judgment in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh to be determinative of the present issue. The Court also indicated that further discussion of that earlier case was unnecessary because it had already concluded that, in the present matters, there was no breach of section 82. Having resolved that point, the Court turned to the second issue, but first it noted certain defects in the verification of Election Petition No. 269 of 1962 that had been brought to the Tribunal’s attention.

One defect concerned the verification language. The verification declared that certain paragraphs were true to the petitioner’s personal knowledge, while other paragraphs were verified as true on the basis of advice and information received from legal and other sources. However, the verification did not expressly state that the petitioner believed the advice and information to be true. The Election Tribunal held that this defect fell within clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 83 and could be remedied in accordance with the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Tribunal further observed that the defect did not trigger subsection three of section 90, because that subsection does not list non‑compliance with section 83 as a ground for dismissal. The Court agreed with the Tribunal’s view. The Court also explained that subsection (4) of section 90, as originally enacted, referred to sections 81, 83 and 117, allowing dismissal for non‑compliance with any of those sections notwithstanding section 85. Section 90 was amended by Act 27 of 1956, after which subsection 3 mandated dismissal for non‑compliance with sections 81, 82 or 117, regardless of any dismissal by the Election Commission under section 85. A subsequent amendment by Act 40 of 1961 retained the present wording of subsection 3, which had already been quoted earlier in the judgment. Reading the relevant provisions in Part VI of the Act, the Court found it impossible to accept the contention that a defect in verification, capable of being corrected under the Code of Civil Procedure, would render the petition untenable.

The Court observed that a defect in the verification, which must be carried out in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for verification of pleadings as required by clause (c) of sub‑section (1) of section 83, rendered the petition untenable. The appellant argued that the copy of the petition served on him was not a true copy within the meaning of the mandatory provisions of subsection (3) of section 81 of the Act. According to the appellant, a failure to comply with subsection (3) of section 81 attracted subsection (3) of section 90, which obliges the Tribunal to dismiss an election petition that does not meet the requirements of subsection (3) of section 81. Relying on the decision in Sri Babu Ran v. Shrimati Prasanni [1959] S.C.R. 1408, the appellant contended that when a statute mandates a particular act to be performed in a specific way and provides that non‑compliance leads to a definite consequence, it would be unreasonable to accept any alternative consequence, and that the requirement must be strictly complied with without resorting to the doctrine of substantial compliance. The Court first examined the defects claimed in the copy of the petition served on the appellant. It was admitted that the first part of subsection (3) of section 81 had been complied with, namely that the election petition was accompanied by as many copies as there were respondents, and an additional copy for the Election Commission. The latter part of the subsection requires that “every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition.” The appellant’s grievance was that this requirement was not fulfilled because (1) the copy served on him did not bear the petitioner’s signature at the foot of the petition although the original did, and (2) the verification in the served copy omitted reference to paragraph 14‑g (ii), which relates to averments stated to be true to the personal knowledge of the petitioner. Concerning the first alleged defect, the Election Tribunal held that each page of the copy served on the appellant was attested as a true copy by the petitioner’s signature and that a fresh signature below the word “petitioner” was unnecessary. Regarding the second alleged defect, the Tribunal apparently regarded the omission as a mere oversight that did not mislead anyone because the body of the petition fully detailed the averments.

In this case the Court observed that the Election Tribunal, although it did not state the conclusion in explicit terms, had implicitly held that the omission of a reference to paragraph 14‑g (ii) in the verification attached to the copy served on the appellant amounted merely to an oversight. The Tribunal reasoned that such an omission did not mislead any party because the main body of the petition contained the complete details of the averments, thereby rendering the error harmless. The High Court concurred with this assessment, holding that the defect did not rise to a level of non‑compliance with sub‑section (3) of section 81. The present Court agreed with both the High Court and the Election Tribunal that the first alleged defect was, in fact, not a defect at all. It noted that every page of the copy served on the appellant bore an attestation that it was a true copy and that this attestation was signed by the petitioner. Consequently, the Court found that a fresh signature placed below the word “petitioner” was unnecessary, because sub‑section (3) of section 81 merely required that the copy be attested by the petitioner under his own signature, a requirement that had been satisfied.

Turning to the second alleged defect, the Court identified the core issue as the precise meaning and effect of the term “copy” as used in sub‑section (3) of section 81. The appellant contended that, because the provision was mandatory, every requirement of the sub‑section had to be strictly fulfilled and that the word “copy” should be interpreted to mean an exact transcript of the original document. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that “copy” should be understood as a rendition that comes so close to the original that any person reading it would form the same idea as if reading the original. They also suggested that the final part of sub‑section (3) dealing with a copy might be merely directive, relying on the earlier decision of this Court in Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar.

The Court adopted the view that the term “copy” in sub‑section (3) of section 81 does not demand an absolutely exact duplication. Rather, it requires that the copy be so true that no reasonable person could misunderstand its contents. The Court cited Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, third edition, volume 4, page 3098, to support this interpretation. In light of this understanding, the Court considered it unnecessary to explore further whether any portion of sub‑section (3) is merely directory. The judgment also referenced several English authorities. The earliest cited case was Pocock v. Mason, where the omission of the words “the” and “by” in a copy of a writ of capias did not invalidate the arrest because the omission did not alter the meaning. The court in that case explained that requiring an exact copy would demand an intellectual effort that would be inconvenient for those serving the copy, and that the legislature had provided a form to avoid such inconvenience, insisting that only ordinary care was necessary when taking a copy.

The Court observed that the legislature had provided a prescribed form for a copy and required that it be pursued with only ordinary care in its preparation. In the later case of Sutton v. Mary and Burgess, the copy of the writ served on the defendant omitted the letter “s” from the word “she.” The Court held that such an omission was immaterial because it could not mislead anyone. In Morris v. Smith, a motion was filed to set aside the service of a writ of summons on the ground of irregularity, alleging that the defendant, who was an attorney, was described merely as “of Paper Buildings in the Inner Temple, London,” without the addition of the word “gentleman.” The Court determined that the statutory form under 2 Will. 4, c. 39, s. 1 did not require the inclusion of the honorific and that stating the defendant’s residence was sufficient; consequently, the writ of summons was deemed valid. In Cooke v. Vaughan, also reported in the same volume, the Court found that when a writ of capias described the defendant with the term “gentleman” and that term was omitted in the copy served, the copy failed to comply with the requirements of 2 Will. 4, c. 39, s. 4 and therefore was not a proper copy of the writ. On behalf of the respondents, several decisions under the Bills of Sale Act, 1878 and the Amendment Act, 1882 (45 and 46 Vict. c. 43) were cited. Those cases examined whether a bill complied with the form prescribed in the schedule annexed to the Act as required by s. 9 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878 and the Amendment Act, 1882. In re Hewer ex parte Kahen, the Court held that a “true copy” of a bill of sale under s. 10, sub‑s. 2 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878 need not be an exact replica so long as any errors or omissions are merely clerical and of a nature that would not mislead anyone. The Court noted similar conclusions in several other authorities and deemed it unnecessary to list them all.

Having regard to the provisions of Part VI of the Act, the Court expressed the view that the term “copy” does not demand an absolutely exact duplicate but rather a copy so true that no person could, by any possibility, misunderstand it. The test for a true copy, the Court explained, is whether any variation from the original is likely to mislead an ordinary person. Applying this test to the defects alleged in Election Petition No. 269 of 1962, the Court concluded that the deficiencies complained of were not of a nature that would mislead the appellant. Accordingly, there was no failure to comply with the final part of sub‑s. (3) of s. 81. In that view, the objection based on the alleged lack of a true copy could not be sustained.

In the present case the Court observed that the provisions of subsection (3) of section 90 of the Act were not triggered, and consequently there was no basis for dismissing the election petition on the ground of non‑compliance with section 81. This observation resolved the second preliminary objection that had been raised before the Court. The discussion then moved to the third preliminary objection, which concerned the affidavit that had been filed together with the petition alleging corrupt practices against the appellant. The contention advanced on this point was that the affidavit did not adhere to the form prescribed by law and that it had not been properly sworn in accordance with the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961; therefore, the proviso to subsection (1) of section 83 of the Act was alleged to have been breached. Moreover, it was argued that an election petition filed under section 81 must satisfy the requirements of section 83, and that any failure to do so would render the petition invalid under section 81. The Court held that this argument had already been adequately addressed by the Election Tribunal. The Tribunal had correctly noted that although the affidavit was in the prescribed form, an error had been made by the Oaths Commissioner in the verification clause because of his inexperience. The Tribunal’s observation was quoted in full: “It appears that due to inexperience of the Oaths Commissioner instead of ‘verified before me’ words, ‘verified by me’ have been written. The signature of the deponent has been obtained in between the writing with respect to admission on oath of the contents of affidavit by the petitioner and the verification by the Oaths Commissioner. According to the prescribed form the verification should be ‘solemnly affirmed or sworn by … on … date’ before me. The verification of the affidavit of the petitioner is apparently not in the prescribed form but reading as a whole the verification carries the same sense as intended by the words mentioned in the prescribed form. The mistake of the Oaths Commissioner in verifying the affidavit cannot be a sufficient ground for dismissal of the petitioner’s petition summarily, as the provisions of section 83 are not necessarily to be complied with in order to make a petition valid and such affidavit can be allowed to be filed at a later stage also.” This view of the Election Tribunal was affirmed by the High Court, and the present Court agreed with that assessment. It concluded that the defect in the verification clause, arising from the Oaths Commissioner’s inexperience, did not constitute a fatal flaw that would warrant the outright dismissal of the election petition. Turning to Election Petition No. 295 of 1962, the Court reiterated that the defect concerning the time and place of verification was likewise not fatal. Such a defect falls within clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 83 and can be remedied in accordance with the procedural principles governing the verification of pleadings.

In addressing the question of verification, the Court applied the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure that govern the verification of pleadings. Regarding the four enclosures that were absent from the copy served on the appellant, the Court examined the original petition, which contained an endorsement stating: “Enclosed: 1. Two copies of the grounds of election petition. 2. Original treasury receipt of Rs. 2,000/- as security deposit. 3. Certified copy of the order of the Returning Officer rejecting the nomination dated 22‑1‑1962. 4. Vakalatnama duly stamped.” The Court observed that the copy served on the appellant omitted the original treasury receipt of Rs. 2,000/- that had been deposited as security. Although a certified copy of the Returning Officer’s order rejecting the petitioner’s nomination was attached to the served copy, that certified copy bore no signature of the petitioner. The Court noted that the petition itself, in paragraph 9, disclosed that the security deposit had been paid, and it held that the certified copy of the rejection order had been verified as a true copy, rendering any additional signature by the petitioner unnecessary. The Court further held that a copy of the vakalatnama was not mandated by sub‑s. (3) of section 81, nor was it required to make a further endorsement that two copies of the petition had been filed along with the petition. It was undisputed that the copies required by sub‑s. (3) of section 81 had indeed been filed. The sole grievance raised by the appellant concerned the omission of the endorsement “two copies” in the enclosure portion of the copy served on the appellant. Having previously explained the meaning of the word “copy” in sub‑s. (3) of section 81, the Court concluded that the defects identified by the appellant did not possess the character necessary to invalidate the copy served on the appellant in the present matter. The Court also recorded that it had permitted Dr. Z. A. Ahmed to intervene in these appeals on the basis articulated in his petition dated 4 April 1963. The intervener had supported the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant, and the Court affirmed that it had fully considered those arguments in the present judgment, leaving no further matter to be addressed concerning the intervener’s petition. For the reasons set out above, the Court found no merit in either of the two appeals and accordingly dismissed both appeals with costs, ordering that the appeals be dismissed.