Mohinder Singh vs State Of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 1961

Decision Date: 31 July, 1963

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah

In this case the appellant, Mohinder Singh, sought special leave to appeal the judgment of the Punjab High Court rendered in Criminal Appeal No 19 of 1961 and Murder Reference No 4 of 1961, which had been decided on 17 February 1961. The High Court had affirmed the conviction of Mohinder Singh under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and had confirmed the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life. Earlier, a Court of Session had tried Mohinder Singh together with three other persons; the three co‑accused had been acquitted, whereas Mohinder Singh had initially been sentenced to death. On appeal, the High Court altered that death sentence to life imprisonment, and it was this order that the Supreme Court was called upon to review. The factual backdrop disclosed that Mohinder Singh, who belonged to the Jat community, had entered into an illicit relationship with Ms Puro, a Mazhbi woman who had been abandoned by her husband. He habitually visited Ms Puro’s residence, a conduct that provoked resentment among other Mazhbis, including some of her relatives. Although these Mazhbis did not object to Mohinder Singh personally, they insisted that he should marry Ms Puro to render the relationship legitimate; Mohinder Singh declined, claiming a higher social status. The prosecution’s case stated that on the evening of 12 April 1960, Mohinder Singh was riding a mare toward the Mazhbi locality, accompanied by the three co‑accused who were later acquitted. Upon reaching the precincts, a group of Mazhbis—namely Dula Singh, Hazara Singh, Resham Singh, Inder Singh and Khushia—confronted him. Mohinder Singh allegedly challenged them to halt his progress, drew a country‑made pistol, and fired at Dula Singh, who collapsed and died. He then discharged a second shot that wounded Khushia, Inder Singh and Resham Singh, and subsequently fired a third shot that injured two additional individuals, Sulakhan Singh and Narain Singh, who were positioned behind the initial group. After the shooting, Mohinder Singh and his companions fled the scene. The episode occurred at approximately 7 p.m., and a police report was filed the following morning at 6 a.m. Mohinder Singh was arrested on 17 April 1960, while his three companions had been taken into custody a day earlier. On 26 April 1960, Mohinder Singh gave a statement to the police, declaring, “I having put my country‑made.12‑bore pistol and two cartridges in a bag, have concealed in the Sitas, on the right side of Bakki road, at Bridge Raj Ba Thandewala and I can get the same recovered on pointing out.” This declaration was made before witnesses Sham Singh and Kehar Singh, who subsequently corroborated it in court. Acting on the statement, police excavated a bag one foot below the ground surface and retrieved a.12‑bore pistol together with two cartridges, one of which had misfired and bore the imprint of the firing pin, along with a cotton

Investigators recovered a bag at the scene that contained a.12‑bore pistol and two.12‑bore cartridges; one of the cartridges had failed to fire and bore the imprint of the pistol’s firing pin. In addition, police discovered three spent.12‑bore cartridges at the location of the offence. All five cartridges, both live and spent, together with the pistol, were examined by Dr B.R. Sharma, a ballistic expert. Dr Sharma testified that the spent cartridges and the mis‑fired cartridge originated from the same firearm, which was the pistol identified in Mohinder Singh’s earlier statement to the police. During the committal proceedings, the prosecution called every eyewitness previously listed, as well as Sham Singh and Kehar Singh, who had witnessed the police search. The prosecution also produced the documents required by Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code that related to the crime. Some of the eyewitnesses, while giving their primary testimony in the committal court, described the incident exactly as set out in the earlier narrative, but upon cross‑examination they asserted that Mohinder Singh was not among the assailants, despite having initially named him and fully described the episode. Other eyewitnesses did not identify Mohinder Singh at all, explaining that after sustaining injuries they had lost consciousness and therefore saw nothing further. Those latter witnesses were cross‑examined by the prosecution on the basis of their earlier statements to the police, and they denied having been influenced or persuaded by the accused. Relying on the evidence presented, the learned magistrate concluded that a prima facie case existed against the accused and therefore committed them for trial before the Sessions Court. At the Sessions trial, the same eyewitnesses altered their testimony, now affirming the accusations against the defendants and supporting the prosecution’s entire case. When the accused cross‑examined these witnesses, the witnesses explained that their earlier statements had been given out of fear of the accused. The Sessions Judge of Ferozepore accepted the prosecution’s case against Mohinder Singh, found him guilty of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to death. The judge dismissed the charge against the other accused, ordering their acquittal. The High Court affirmed the Sessions Judge’s judgment but modified the sentences as previously noted. After the High Court refused to grant a certificate, the present appeal was filed by special leave. The appellant, Mr Gopal Singh, raised seven points contending that the conviction of Mohinder Singh could not be sustained. He first challenged the order of commitment, arguing that it was not founded on any evidence and should therefore be set aside. While acknowledging that, under Section 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a commitment order becomes final and may be quashed by the High Court only on a question of law, the Court examined the record and found that sufficient evidence existed to support the commitment. Accordingly, the Court noted that, pursuant to Chapter XVIII of the Code, the magistrate was authorized to consider both the evidence before him and the documents referred to in Section 173, and that the police statements clearly established a prima facie case, as did the primary examinations of some witnesses in the committal court.

In this case, the Court explained that under Chapter XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure a magistrate was authorised not only to consider the evidence presented before him but also to examine the documents referred to in Section 173 of the Code. The statements recorded by the police established a prima facie case, and the examination‑in‑chief of several witnesses before the committal court also supported that conclusion. The Court noted that, after the witnesses later gave reasons for modifying their testimony, they either partially or wholly altered their statements in favour of the accused. Nevertheless, the magistrate was entitled to rely on the original examination‑in‑chief and the other documents and to reach the view that a prima facie case existed. After reviewing the extraordinary circumstances of the matter, the Court was satisfied that the stage at which the order of commitment could be set aside had already passed and that no question of law could be raised. Accordingly, the Court rejected the first contention raised by the counsel.

The Court then turned to the remaining points raised by the counsel, all of which except one concerned evidential matters. The counsel argued that the first information report was filed late, that the time noted as 6 a.m. was incorrect because the first witness, Hazara Singh, claimed to have made the report at 10 a.m., and that the evidence was inconsistent and contradictory from one stage to another, especially since it came from persons who were highly interested and therefore unreliable. The Court observed that such issues were matters of evidence appreciation and that it was not the practice of this Court, on a special leave criminal appeal, to re‑examine the evidence in detail unless circumstances showed a miscarriage of justice. The Court reminded that it was not a court of appeal in criminal matters except where a certificate was issued by a High Court or in the exceptional situation described in Article 134 of the Constitution. No such circumstance was found here, and the evidence appeared to be coherent, even though at some stage the witnesses seemed to have yielded to the accused, possibly out of fear or greed. The witnesses had explained why they behaved as they did, and the Court found that their status as persons of lower social standing, combined with intimidation by the accused or his associates, could explain why they initially altered their testimony. The Court further noted that the witnesses eventually regained courage and gave truthful statements at the time of the committal order.

The Court also observed that the testimony of the eye‑witnesses was reinforced by the discovery, based on the accused’s own statement, of a pistol and two cartridges in a cloth bag described by him. The weapon identified matched the empty cartridges found at the scene of the occurrence, which were responsible for the death of Dula Singh and injuries to others. This corroboration strengthened the evidential basis for the conviction.

At the scene of the occurrence the pistol that had caused the death of Dula Singh and injuries to other persons was discovered buried underground, and only the individual who placed it there could have known the exact location of the hiding place. Mr. Gopal Singh asserted that the weapon had been concealed close to a little‑used path, making it improbable that anyone other than the person who had placed the bag would have been aware of its existence. He further explained that the hiding place lay within one mile of the police‑station house, thirteen miles from Mohinder Singh’s village and three miles from the site of the incident, and he argued that it was unlikely that Mohinder Singh would have chosen such a remote spot when a nearer location was available. These matters pertained to the appreciation of evidence, and both the High Court and the Court of Session had accepted the evidence concerning Mohinder Singh’s statement and the discovery of the pistol. The Court saw no reason to depart from those findings, even if it considered a re‑examination of the evidence necessary.

Mr. Gopal Singh then contended that the discovery of the pistol and the statements leading to that discovery should not be relied upon because Mohinder Singh had been acquitted in a companion case instituted under Section 19(1)(f) of the Arms Act. To support this contention, he relied upon observations made by Lord MacDermott in the case of Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor (Federation of Malaya, 1950 AC 458 at p. 419), which had been applied by this Court in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab. Consequently, the Court found it necessary to discuss the two authorities cited.

The Judicial Committee case arose on appeal from the Supreme Court of the Federation of Malaya. In that matter the accused had been prosecuted under the Emergency (Criminal Trials) Regulations, 1948 of the Federated Malaya States. He faced two charges: (a) carrying a firearm and (b) possessing ammunition. He was acquitted of the ammunition charge, and on appeal a retrial was ordered for the firearm charge. At the retrial a statement made by the accused to a police inspector, admitting possession of both the firearm and the ammunition, was proposed as evidence. In effect, the statement constituted an admission of guilt for both offences originally charged. The assessors at the retrial were not informed of the earlier acquittal on the ammunition charge, despite existing legal warnings about the admissibility of such admissions. The Privy Council held that the acquittal on the second charge created a verdict whose correctness had to be accepted in the subsequent trial, and that the statement could not be admitted because it was impossible to separate the portion concerning ammunition from the portion concerning the firearm. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence were set aside. Lord MacDermott explained the effect of an acquittal, stating: “The”

The Court explained that a verdict of acquittal delivered by a competent court after a lawful trial does not merely mean that the acquitted person cannot be tried again for the same offence. The Court added that such a verdict is binding and conclusive in every later proceeding between the same parties to the adjudication. The maxim “Res judicata pro veritate accpitur” therefore applies with equal force in criminal matters as it does in civil cases. In the present matter, the appellant had been acquitted at the first trial of the charge that he possessed ammunition. Because of that acquittal, the prosecution was required to accept the correctness of the finding and was prohibited from attempting to overturn it in the second trial. Likewise, the appellant was entitled to rely upon his acquittal wherever it was relevant to his defence. The Court noted that the acquittal did not establish his innocence on the separate charge of possessing a firearm, but it nevertheless diminished, to some extent, the strength of the prosecution’s case. This was because the facts proved at the first trial in support of the ammunition charge were clearly relevant to the firearm charge, given the circumstances in which the ammunition and the revolver were discovered and the fact that the two items matched each other. The Court then referred to its earlier application of these observations in the case of Pritam Singh. In that case two men, Chanan Singh Orara and Sardul Singh, had been shot dead by four persons identified as Pritam Singh Fatehpuri, Gurdial Singh, Pritam Singh Lohara and Kartar Singh. One of the accused, Pritam Singh Lohara, had made a statement to the police that led to the recovery of a revolver. He was convicted of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code in the Sessions Trial, the judgment of which was appealed to this Court, but he was acquitted in a separate trial under Section 19(1)(f) of the Arms Act. The High Court, on appeal from the murder conviction, held that because of the acquittal, the evidence concerning the discovery of the weapon and the statements that led to it could not be examined. This Court affirmed that conclusion, relying on the dictum of Lord MacDermott.

Counsel for the appellant argued that, on an equivalent line of reasoning, the Privy Council’s observations should also govern the present case and that the evidence relating to the pistol’s discovery and the statement that led to it ought to be excluded. He maintained that the present appeal constituted a proceeding that followed the acquittal dated 3 May 1962, and therefore the acquittal’s broad effect, as described by Lord MacDermott, required respect. The Court, however, rejected that submission. It held that the two authorities cited by the appellant did not assist his case because the Privy Council decision involved a re‑trial of one charge while leaving the acquittal on the other charge undisturbed, and the evidence relied upon in the second trial was inseparably linked with the charge on which the acquittal had been rendered. In contrast, in the present matter the acquittal on the arms charge was rendered after the murder trial had concluded and after the appellate court had dismissed the appeal. Consequently, the Court concluded that the circumstances of the earlier cases were not controlling, and the evidence concerning the pistol and the associated statement could not be excluded on the ground of the earlier acquittal.

In the second trial the prosecution relied on evidence that was so closely connected with the matter on which the accused had previously been acquitted that the earlier acquittal affected the admissibility of that evidence. The Court observed that if the earlier acquittal were treated as binding and conclusive for the later proceeding, then the statement made by the accused could not be admitted, and without that admission there would be no basis on which to sustain the conviction, thereby compelling the setting aside of that conviction. The Court noted that, in the present case, the acquittal on the charge under the Arms Act could likewise have been given effect because that acquittal had been recorded before the conviction for murder was entered. However, the Court found that the two cited authorities did not govern the present situation. The reason was that the acquittal in the firearms matter was recorded long after the trial before the Court of Session had concluded and after the High Court had dismissed the appeal. That later acquittal resulted from the two search witnesses, identified as Sham Singh and Kehar Singh, withdrawing their earlier statements; the learned Magistrate consequently decided that it was unnecessary to await the testimony of the police officer who had investigated the murder. From the subsequent developments it was evident that these witnesses, who had originally stood firm, were persuaded during the interval to give testimony that contradicted their earlier versions and the documents they had signed. The Court therefore held that the magistrate could not, on a parity of reasoning, grant the acquittal in light of the Sessions Court’s earlier conviction unless the evidence had been fully recorded.

The Court further expressed the view that the later acquittal should not be taken into account when hearing the present appeal, which was instituted on special leave and concerned only the examination of the High Court’s judgment to determine its legal correctness. The Court concluded that, given the circumstances described, the present case was materially different from the two authorities relied upon by the appellant, and thus those authorities could not serve as precedents. Accordingly, the Court rejected the appellant’s contention. No additional point of substance was raised in the appeal, and the Court found that the arguments presented were without merit. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal.