Mathuri And Ors vs State Of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeals Nos 93 and 142 of 1962

Decision Date: 11 December 1963

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, P.B. Gajendragadkar

In this case the Supreme Court recorded the matter titled Mathuri and Others versus the State of Punjab, decided on 11 December 1963. The judgment was authored by Justice K C Das Gupta, who sat together with Justice P B Gajendragadkar. The parties were identified as the petitioners, Mathuri and others, and the respondent, the State of Punjab. The official citation of the decision was reported in the 1964 volume of the All India Reporter at page 986 and also in the Supreme Court Reporter at page 916 of the fifth volume. The case concerned the application of sections 149 and 441 of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) and rules 24 and 25 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1900). The issues presented involved a decree for possession whose execution warrants had expired, an alleged criminal trespass by landlords, the meaning of “intention to annoy,” the resistance offered by tenants, and whether the assembly of the tenants could be characterized as unlawful.

The factual background set out that the appellants, who were the principal respondents in the main appeal, together with several other persons, were tried for offences under sections 148, 302 and 307 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The incident arose when certain landlords obtained legal decrees for possession of land and were issued warrants to enforce those decrees. With the assistance of police, the landlords attempted to execute the warrants and evict the tenants. However, the period within which the warrants could be executed had already expired. A large armed crowd, which included the appellants, opposed the landlords’ attempt. Acting on the order of the District Magistrate, the police opened fire on the crowd. As a result, ten members of the crowd and two persons on the other side of the dispute lost their lives, and numerous individuals sustained injuries. The appellants themselves were discovered wounded at the scene after the crowd had retreated. The Sessions Judge convicted each of the appellants of offences punishable under section 148 of the Indian Penal Code, under section 304 part II read with section 149, and under sections 326/149, 324/149 and 532/149, imposing rigorous imprisonment of seven years for each conviction, while acquitting the remaining defendants. Both the appellants and the State subsequently appealed to the High Court, but those appeals were dismissed. Thereafter, each side filed the present appeals before this Court. On behalf of the appellants, counsel argued that because the execution warrants had expired, the landlords’ attempt to take possession constituted criminal trespass, and that the appellants were legally justified in resisting such trespass. Consequently, the appellants asserted that they did not form an unlawful assembly and possessed no intent to commit the offences alleged.

The Court held, first, that the language of sub‑rule 3 of rule 24 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly demonstrates the legislature’s intention that execution of a decree must be completed on or before the date specified on the process. To interpret the provision otherwise would disregard the imperative wording “on or before which it shall be executed.” Moreover, the expression “the reason of the delay” appearing in rule 25, when read in ordinary grammatical sense, refers to the delay in returning the process to the court. Accordingly, the warrants in the present case, by reason of the expiry of the

The Court observed that because the date specified in the execution warrants had passed, those warrants were no longer capable of being executed on the day on which the incident occurred. In support of this proposition the Court referred to the authorities Anand Lal Bera v. The Empress, I.L.R. 10 Cal. (1884) 18; Chelli Latchanna v. The Emperor, A.I.R. 1942 Pat. 480; Nand Lai v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1924 Nag. 68; and Kishori Lal v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1934 All 1016. The Court then turned to the question of whether a person who enters a property with knowledge that such entry will annoy the possessor can be said to have acted “with intent to annoy” as defined in section 441 of the Indian Penal Code. It held that mere awareness of the natural consequence of annoyance does not automatically demonstrate the requisite specific intent. To prove an intent to annoy, intimidate or insult, the Court must be satisfied that causing such annoyance was the dominant purpose of the entry. Accordingly the Court must examine every relevant circumstance, including the accused’s knowledge that the entry would likely cause annoyance, as well as the possibility that a different, dominant purpose—other than causing annoyance—motivated the entry. After considering all the facts of the present case, the Court found that the lower courts were correct in concluding that the landlords and others who entered the land did not commit criminal trespass and that the defence that the assembled persons acted to protect the property from trespass was unfounded. The Court disapproved the decisions in Emperor v. Laxman Raghunath 26 Bom. 558; Sellamuthu Servaigaran v. Pallumuthu Karuppan, I.L.R. 35 Mad. 186; and Kesar Singh v. Prem Ballabh, A.I.R. 1950 All. 157. Conversely, it approved the authorities Bhagwant v. Kedari, 25 Bom. 202; Emperor v. D’Cunha, 37 B.L.R. 880; Nizamuddin v. Jinnat Hussain, A.I.R. 1948 Cal. 130; Satish Chandra Modak v. The King, A.I.R. 1949 Cal. 107; Bata Krishna Ghosh v. State, A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 385; State v. Abdul Sakur, A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 189; Queen Empress v. Rayapadaayachi, 19 Mad. 240; and Vullappa v. Bheema Rao, I.L.R. 41 Mad. 156.

The Court further held that the respondents were not merely passive observers; they actively joined the unlawful assembly with the common purpose of committing the offences for which they had been convicted and sentenced by the lower courts. The State’s contention, raised in its appeal, that offences under section 302 were committed was rejected. While the Court ordinarily refrains from interfering with the sentences imposed by a trial court, it found that the special facts and circumstances of this case warranted a modification. Accordingly, the sentences imposed on the six female respondents and the two male respondents were reduced to reflect the period of imprisonment they had already served, taking into account their extreme old age. The State’s appeal was therefore dismissed. The judgment was delivered in the criminal appellate jurisdiction, concerning Criminal Appeals Nos. 93 and 142 of 1962, which arose by special leave from the Punjab High Court’s judgment and order dated 15 December 1961 in Criminal Appeals Nos. 417 and 552 of 1961. Counsel for the respondents was R.L. Kohli, who appeared on behalf of the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 93/1962 and for the respondents in Criminal Appeal No. 142 of 1962.

Counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 142 of 1962 and counsel for the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 1962 appeared before the Court. The judgment was delivered on December 11, 1963 by Justice Das Gupta. The Court recorded that on June 7 1960 a violent incident occurred in the village of Mohangarh during the delivery of possession of certain lands that were the subject of execution of ejectment decrees obtained by the landlords. In the course of that episode twelve persons were killed and several others sustained serious injuries, including members of the police force who had travelled to the site to assist with the possession. Following the incident thirty‑nine persons were committed to the Sessions Court for trial on charges under sections 148, 302/149 and 307/149 of the Indian Penal Code. According to the prosecution, warrants for delivery of possession in execution of several decrees in favour of the decree‑holders had been issued as early as April 5 1960, but repeated attempts by Revenue Officers to enforce the decrees had failed. On June 7 1960 a further attempt was made to execute the warrants, at which time villagers, including tenants who were to be dispossessed and their friends and sympathisers, attacked the decree‑holders and the police party accompanying them. On behalf of the decree‑holders, Rattan Singh together with four companions – Dharam Singh, Abhey Ram, Bharat Singh and Nihal Singh – entered the field of Prabhu, one of the judgment debtors, with two ploughs yoked to two teams of bullocks. They had travelled only a short distance into the field when a mob estimated to be about two hundred strong, composed of men and women armed with lathis, jailis and gandasas, approached shouting the demand “Kill Rattan Singh and do not allow possession to be taken.” The Sub‑Divisional Magistrate of Sangrur, who was present with the party, announced over a loud‑speaker that he declared the assembly unlawful and instructed it to disperse. Despite the announcement, a sizeable portion of the mob succeeded in reaching Rattan Singh and his party; while Nihal Singh was able to escape, the remaining four were assaulted by several members of the mob.

In response, the police, acting on the order of the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate, launched a lathi charge against the crowd, but the mob retaliated. During this exchange Assistant Sub‑Inspector Gurdial Singh sustained an injury, and some rioters attempted to carry him away. To restore order, Sub‑Inspector Sitaram discharged two shots from his revolver. The Sub‑Divisional Magistrate then directed the police to open fire. A party of four policemen fired two volleys, after which a total of fourteen policemen discharged their weapons. The firing caused the mob to flee, leaving ten of its members dead and several others injured on the field. Rattan Singh and his three companions were also lying injured on the spot, and Rattan Singh together with Dharam Singh later died from their injuries. The Court noted that the incident resulted in significant loss of life and numerous injuries among both the mob and the police personnel involved.

The record shows that a number of policemen also suffered injuries during the incident. The ten appellants were reported to have been found lying injured in the field along with many other persons. Following the disturbance, the police arrested the ten appellants together with a large number of additional individuals, and a total of thirty‑nine persons were eventually committed to the Sessions Court for trial. Every accused person entered a plea of not guilty. Several of the accused asserted that they were not present at the scene of the occurrence and that any injuries they sustained had been incurred elsewhere. In addition, all of the accused uniformly claimed that there had been no unlawful assembly. Their defence contended that the tenants who were in possession of the land had gone to the field solely to protect their property against a criminal trespass, and that the purpose of those who assembled was merely to defend that property. It was further alleged that the police had cooperated with the landlords’ agents to enforce possession warrants even after the prescribed date for execution had elapsed, and that the police themselves were responsible for excessive use of force. The accusation was also made that a large number of people died as a result of police firing while many more sustained injuries, and that villagers were arrested arbitrarily and falsely implicated in the offences.

After reviewing the evidence, the learned Sessions Judge held that the prosecution case was substantially proved and dismissed the accused’s claim of private defence. The Judge concluded that an unlawful assembly had been formed with the common object of murdering Rattan Singh and others. Pursuant to that common object, the Judge found that two offences under section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, read with section 149, had been committed by members of the assembly through the deaths of Rattan Singh and Dharam Singh. In addition, offences under sections 326, 324 and 323, each read with section 149, were also held to have been committed in furtherance of the same common object. The Judge further found that the ten appellants were members of that unlawful assembly and had taken part in rioting while armed with dangerous weapons. Consequently, each of the ten appellants was convicted of the offence under section 148, as well as of two offences under section 304 Part II read with section 149, and of offences under sections 326 read with 149, 324 read with 149 and 323 read with 149. For each conviction under section 304 Part II read with section 149, the ten appellants were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years. Lesser sentences were imposed for the remaining offences, and all sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The ten accused appealed their convictions and sentences to the High Court of Punjab, while the State of Punjab also appealed, contending that the appellants should have been convicted under section 302 read with section 149 rather than merely under section 304 Part II read with section 149. Regarding the other twenty‑nine accused, the Sessions Judge found that their membership in the alleged unlawful assembly had not been proved beyond doubt and therefore acquitted them. The State of Punjab also filed an appeal against that acquittal.

The High Court concurred with the Sessions Judge’s findings, dismissed both the accused’s appeal and the State of Punjab’s appeal concerning the acquittal of the twenty‑nine accused, and upheld the conviction of the ten accused persons. The ten accused have now filed an appeal, designated Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 1962, which has been granted special leave by this Court. The State of Punjab has also filed a separate appeal, Criminal Appeal No. 142 of 1962, seeking special leave to challenge the High Court’s determination that offences under section 302 read with section 149 were not proved. The principal argument advanced on behalf of the ten accused is that, as a matter of law, no unlawful assembly was formed because Rattan Singh and his companions who entered the field were guilty merely of criminal trespass; consequently, the villagers who gathered there did so only to protect their property from such trespass and had no intention of committing the alleged offences. Counsel for the ten accused emphasized that the warrants for delivery of possession were dated for execution in April 1960, rendering them legally non‑executable by 7 June 1960. While the Sessions Court accepted that the warrants had ceased to be executable before that date and the High Court affirmed this view, counsel for the State of Punjab has contested the correctness of that proposition. The Court affirms that the view of the lower courts is sound and notes that it is supported by a long line of decisions of all the High Courts in India, including Anand Lal Bera v. The Empress, Chelli Latchanna and others v. Emperor, Nand Lal v. Emperor, and Kishori Lal and another v. Emperor. An examination of Rules 24 and 25 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure clarifies the position. Rule 24, sub‑rule 3, requires that a day be specified on or before which execution of the process must occur. Rule 25 directs the executing officer to endorse the date and manner of execution, and if the latest specified day for return has been exceeded, to record the reason for delay or for non‑execution and return the process to the Court. Counsel for the State has argued that the phrase “reason of the delay” in Rule 25 contemplates a situation where execution occurs after the date prescribed in Rule 24. In the Court’s opinion, there is no substance to that contention.

In the present case the Court observed that the contention advanced by the counsel that rule 25 contemplated a delay in the execution of a process after the date specified in rule 24 was without substance. The Court explained that when rule 25 is read in its entirety and in the context of the provision in sub‑rule 3 of rule 24, it becomes clear that the term “delay” in rule 25 referred to a delay in returning the process to the Court, whether the process had been executed or not, and not to any delay in the actual execution of the process. The Court pointed out that the language of sub‑rule 3 of rule 24, as quoted, indicated the legislature’s intention that the execution must be completed on or before the date specified on the process. To interpret otherwise, the Court said, would disregard the force of the words “on or before which it shall be executed”. The Court further reasoned that it would be unreasonable for the legislature, after expressly providing that execution must occur on or before the specified date, to subsequently permit execution after that date by using the phrase “reason of the delay”. Consequently, the Court concluded that the ordinary grammatical construction of “reason of the delay” applied to the delay in returning the process, not to a delay in execution. Accordingly, the Court held that the warrants in the present case, which had stipulated a date in April as the last day for execution, ceased to be legally executable before 7 June 1960. The Court then turned to the question of whether, when Rattan Singh and others entered the lands for which possession was to be taken under those warrants, they committed the offence of criminal trespass. The Court noted that this question depended on whether the entrants acted “with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy” the persons then in possession. The Court observed that there was no suggestion that the entry was made with intent to commit any offence, nor with the purpose of intimidating or insulting the possessors. However, counsel for the State argued vigorously that by entering the property to dispossess the occupants under warrants that had already become unenforceable, the entrants must be deemed to have acted “with intent to annoy” those in possession, because they were fully aware that their action would inevitably cause annoyance. The counsel relied on the proposition that every person intends the natural consequences of his act, a rule often cited to infer intention. The Court, however, cautioned that this proposition should not be treated as a binding rule applicable in every circumstance, and that determining the presence of a specific intent requires consideration of all the surrounding facts, including whether the natural consequence of annoyance was the primary purpose of the act.

The Court observed that the proposition which holds that every person intends the natural consequences of his act cannot be treated as an absolute rule that must apply in every case and under every circumstance. The decisive inquiry, according to the Court, is whether the act was performed with a particular intention, and to answer that question all the surrounding circumstances, including the natural consequence of the act, must be examined. The Court further explained that when section 441 of the Indian Penal Code speaks of entering upon property “with intent to commit an offence, or to intimidate, insult or annoy” any person in possession, the reference is to the primary intention that drives the act, and not to any subsidiary or secondary intention that might also exist. In support of this interpretation, the Court referred to a leading exposition of the meaning of “intent” rendered by the Bombay High Court in the 1900 case of Bhagwant v. Kedari. That decision considered the definition of “fraudulently” in section 25 of the Indian Penal Code, which states that a person does a thing fraudulently if he does it with intent to defraud and not otherwise. Justice Batty, at page 226 of the reported judgment, observed that the word “intent” etymologically suggests the metaphor of archery, implying an “aim” that denotes not a casual or merely possible result that might be foreseen, but the specific object for which the effort is made. He further explained that “intent” therefore relates to the dominant motive, without which the action would not have been undertaken. The Court noted that although those observations were originally made to clarify the term “fraudulently,” they possess broader applicability and correctness. In the Court’s view, the observations of the learned Judge provide the appropriate approach for determining whether the essential element of criminal trespass—namely that the entry was “with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy” any person in possession—has been satisfied. From this reasoning it follows that the mere knowledge that the natural result of the entry would be annoyance to the person in possession does not, by itself, prove that the entry was made “with intent to annoy.” The possibility that the actor was aware of the likely annoyance constitutes only one factor among many that must be weighed alongside other relevant circumstances when deciding the precise intent behind the entry. The Court further noted, with some surprise, that a few years later the Bombay High Court, in the case of Emperor v. Laxaman Raghunath, which dealt with section 448 of the Indian Penal Code, held that to establish the required intention for the offence of criminal trespass it is sufficient to demonstrate that the accused performed the act with knowledge that the

The Court observed that the probable consequence of the accused’s act would be annoyance to the complainant. Fulton J., who delivered the judgment, explained that the authorities indicate that there is no presumption that a person intends a result which is merely a possible outcome of his action or a result which, although reasonably certain, is not known to him. Nevertheless, Fulton J. said that when a man voluntarily performs an act, knowing at the time that in the natural course of events a certain result will follow, the law must presume that he intends to bring about that result. It is worth noting that Fulton J. had been a party to the earlier decision in Bhagwant v. Kedari (2), although the later judgment did not refer to any statement there concerning the meaning of the word “intent”. The view expressed in Laxman Raghunath’s case has not been followed by the Bombay High Court in recent years. In Emperor v. D’Cunha (3) it was explained that while the question of knowledge as to what would be the natural consequence of the act can be taken into consideration in deciding intention, it is only one of the circumstances to be considered. The Bombay High Court has consistently held, as reflected in Calcutta High Court decisions such as Nizamuddin v. Jinnat Hussain (1), Satish Chandra Modak v. The King (2), Bata Krishna Ghosh v. The State (3) and State v. Abdul Sakur (4), that the view that annoyance is a natural consequence of the act and that the actor knows this is not sufficient to prove that the entry was made with intent to annoy. The same view was adopted by the Madras High Court in the 1896 case Queen Empress v. Rayapadaayachi (5). Although a different view was taken by that High Court in the 1912 case Sellamuthu Servaigaran v. Pallumuthu Karuppan (6), the matter was examined by a full bench of the High Court in Vullappa v. Bheema Row (7) in 1917. The full bench held that the correct view had been taken in Queen Empress v. Rayapadaayachi (5) and that the legislature did not intend in section 441 that doing the act with knowledge of its consequence should be punishable. Kumaraswami Sastriyar J. stressed that wherever the Penal Code wanted to make a man liable for knowledge of consequences it does so expressly in sections 118 to 120, 153, 154, 217, 293, etc. The learned Judge agreed with an observation of Sir William Mark in Elements of Law (para 222) that a consequence which is likely to follow, without any desire that it should follow, reflects a mental attitude distinct from intention. The Madras

The High Court continued to follow the earlier judicial view of the law. The Allahabad High Court, in the case reported as Emperor v. Motilal (8), also adopted a comparable approach. Counsel for the petitioner referenced several authorities, namely Mr. Kohli (1) A.I.R. 1948 Cal. 130; (2) A.I.R. 1949 Cal. 107; (3) A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 385; (4) A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 189; (5) 9 Mad. 240; (6) I.L.R. 35 Mad. 186; (7) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 156; and (8) I.L.R. 47 All. 855. The petitioner relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kesar Singh v. Prem Ballabh (1), where the learned Judge Desai J. held that when the probable consequence of the accused’s act was to cause annoyance to the complainant, the law presumed that the accused had committed the trespass with that intention; because that intention was not rebutted, the accused was properly convicted under section 447. The Court, however, expressed respectful disagreement with that statement of law and with similar pronouncements found in Laxaman Raghunath’s Case (2) and in Sellamuthu Servaigaran’s Case (3). The Court clarified that the earlier view was not entirely correct and proceeded to articulate the proper legal position.

The Court explained that to prove that entry onto property was made with the intention to annoy, intimidate or insult, it must be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult was the dominant aim of the entry. It is insufficient merely to demonstrate that the natural consequence of the entry was likely to be annoyance, intimidation or insult, even if the entrants were aware of that likelihood. In determining the true aim, the Court must examine all relevant circumstances, including the knowledge that the entry would probably produce such consequences, and also consider whether another purpose—different from causing annoyance, intimidation or insult—was the predominant motive. Applying this principle to the facts before it, the Court affirmed that the lower courts were correct in finding that Rattan Singh and the other respondents had not shown the intention to annoy. While it was possible that they were aware that annoyance might result, the Court held that, being armed with warrants of execution, their principal and dominating purpose was to execute those warrants. The Court further observed, with reference to authorities (1) A.I.R. 1950 All. 157; (2) I.L.R. 26 Bombay 558; (3) I.I.R. 35 Mad. 186, that the respondents could not be reasonably expected to know that the warrants had ceased to be executable in law. Considering the totality of circumstances, the Court concluded that the lower courts were correct in holding that criminal trespass had not been committed or apprehended from the acts of Rattan Singh and the others who entered the property, and that the defence plea alleging otherwise was rightly rejected.

The Court observed that the persons who gathered had the purpose of protecting the property against trespass, and consequently it was not difficult to find that the villagers’ gathering constituted an unlawful assembly whose common object was to kill Rattan Singh and others who were perceived as seeking to dispossess them. The next issue before the Court was whether each individual accused had taken part in that unlawful assembly. Because participation is a question of fact, the Court would normally refrain from re‑examining the matter. However, counsel for the accused, Mr Kohli, argued that the High Court’s findings on this point were fundamentally flawed due to an erroneous interpretation of the evidence. The record contains undisputed testimony that ten of the accused were discovered lying injured at the scene after the remainder of the mob had dispersed. The defence advanced the suggestion that these ten individuals might have arrived at the site merely out of curiosity to see how events unfolded. The High Court rejected this line of argument, relying on the statements of Iqbal Singh, a non‑official (P.W. 9), Munshi Singh, Head Constable (P.W. 22), Kaul Singh, Assistant Sub‑Inspector (P.W. 24) and Ranjit Singh, Head Constable (P.W. 26), which it said demonstrated that jellis, gandasas and lathis had been recovered from the accused’s possession. Had that proof been established, the High Court’s conclusion that “there could be little doubt about their being in the mob and participation in the assault” would have been fully warranted. Nevertheless, Mr Kohli pointed out that the testimony of those witnesses did not actually show that any weapons were taken from the accused. The evidence only indicated that such weapons were found lying in the field near the injured persons and were subsequently taken into police possession. The statements that the weapons were “recovered from their possession” appeared in the memoranda of seizure prepared after the incident and were echoed by some witnesses during their examination‑in‑chief. During cross‑examination, however, each of those witnesses conceded that no weapon had been recovered directly from any of the appellants. It therefore appears clear that, after the police opened fire and the mob broke up, a number of individuals lay dead or injured and some weapons were left scattered in the field, some stained with blood. Those weapons may well have belonged to the dead or injured men, but the prosecution failed to prove that any of them had been taken from the accused themselves. The Court expressed regret that the learned judges hearing the appeal in the High Court had not scrutinised the evidential material with the requisite care. Owing to this serious lapse, the Supreme Court found it necessary to examine the evidence anew in order to determine whether the oral testimony concerning the accused’s participation in the unlawful assembly should be accepted.

In this matter the Court examined whether the oral testimony concerning the participation of the appellants in the unlawful assembly should be accepted. After review the Court concluded that the oral evidence must be admitted. The Court noted a material circumstance: the location where the ten appellants were found lying injured was a considerable distance from the inhabited part of the village. The Court found it unlikely that villagers who left their houses merely out of curiosity would venture so far into the fields. The Court also observed that among the ten appellants some were tenants who were judgment‑debtors, while the remainder were close relatives of those tenants. Considering all the surrounding facts, the Court was satisfied that the appellants were not merely spectators but had joined the unlawful assembly with the common object alleged by the prosecution. The Court referred to the record (1/SCI/64‑59) and held that offences punishable under section 304 Part II together with sections 326, 324 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code were committed by certain members of the assembly who acted in pursuance of the common object; this was clearly established by the evidence and was not contested. The Court could not accept the State’s contention, raised in the appeal, that offences under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code had been committed resulting in the deaths of Rattan Singh and Dharam Singh. Accordingly, the Court affirmed that the appellants had been correctly convicted under section 304 Part II read with section 149, and under sections 326/149, 324/149 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code. The final submission before the Court on behalf of the ten appellants argued that, taking all circumstances into account, the sentences imposed were excessively harsh. The Court acknowledged that sentencing is within the discretion of the trial court and that, ordinarily, a higher court does not disturb a sentence that has been exercised judicially. The Court further observed that there is even less basis for this Court to interfere with sentences that have been confirmed by the High Court. Nonetheless, the Court found it difficult to say that the discretion on sentencing had been exercised judicially in the present case. The Court could not overlook that six of the ten appellants were women and four were men, and that no specific role had been assigned to the women. The Court considered that, in the circumstances, the women were unlikely to have taken a leading part; they entered the field when their male relatives went out, partly to protect their fields and partly to protect their menfolk. The trial court and the High Court had not taken these facts into account and had imposed the same punishment on both men and women. In view of these distinctive circumstances, the Court thought that interference with the sentences imposed on the women was warranted. The Court noted that the women had already served more than two years and nine months of imprisonment.

It was recorded that the women appellants had already served the sentence that had been imposed on them, and that before the commencement of that term they had spent roughly ten months in custody. After examining every circumstance of the case, the Court decided to reduce the punishments awarded to these women‑appellants, who had been convicted under section 304 Part 11 in conjunction with section 149, section 326 149 and section 148, to the period of imprisonment that they had already completed. Regarding the four male appellants, the Court noted that Surjan was seventy years old at the time of the trial and Gokul was sixty‑six years old. Consequently, Surjan is now approximately seventy‑three years old and Gokul is just under seventy years of age. Considering their advanced ages, the Court held that the interests of justice would be best served by also reducing their sentences to the period of imprisonment that they had already undergone. Accordingly, the sentences of Surjan and Gokul were reduced to reflect the time they had already spent in prison. The Court found no justification to alter the sentences imposed on the remaining two male appellants and therefore left those sentences unchanged. As a result, the appeal filed by the accused persons was dismissed in all respects except for the modification of the sentences of the eight appellants whose terms were reduced. The appeal filed by the State of Punjab was also dismissed, and all appeals were thus dismissed.