Mangilal vs Suganchand Rathi

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 307 of 1963

Decision Date: 24 October 1963

Coram: J.R. Mudholkar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In this matter, the case is styled Mangilal versus Suganchand Rathi and was decided on the twenty‑fourth day of October, 1963. The judgment was authored by Justice J. R. Mudholkar and delivered by a Bench consisting of Justice J. R. Mudholkar, Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K. N. Wanchoo, and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioner is identified as Mangilal and the respondent as Suganchand Rathi. The judgment was pronounced on the same date of October 24, 1963. The official citation of the decision appears as 1965 AIR 101 and 1964 SCR (5) 239. Additional citator references include F 1967 SC 1419 (5) RF, 1972 SC 819 (11) RF, 1974 SC 818 (15, 26) D, 1976 SC 588 (8) D, 1976 SC 869 (6, 7) D, 1978 SC 1518 (8, 9, 14, 17) O, 1979 SC 1745 (13, 17) D, 1988 SC 1470 (10) R, and 1992 SC 96 (14). The statutory provisions that were examined comprise section 4(a) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (the 1955 Act, Act 23 of 1955) which deals with the requirement of a notice and the condition of the tenant being in arrears at the date of the suit, as well as section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which prescribes the manner of giving a valid notice.

The factual matrix established that the respondent was a tenant of the petitioner and was in arrears of rent amounting to one thousand and twenty rupees for a period of one year. On the eleventh day of April, 1959, the petitioners served a notice upon the respondent requiring payment of the outstanding one thousand and twenty rupees within one month from the date of service, and warning that failure to comply would result in an ejectment suit. The respondent received this notice on the sixteenth of April, 1959. Subsequently, on the twenty‑fifth of June, 1959, the respondent replied to the notice and enclosed a cheque for one thousand three hundred and twenty rupees, which covered both the arrears and the rent due up to the thirtieth of June, 1959. The petitioners accepted and cashed this cheque and then issued a fresh notice on the ninth of July, 1959, directing the respondent to vacate the premises by the end of July. The respondent did not vacate, and the petitioners consequently instituted an ejectment suit on the ground that the respondent remained in arrears for one year and had failed to remit the arrears within the one‑month period specified in the April 11 notice. From the undisputed evidence it was clear that the respondent was indeed in arrears and had not paid within the time prescribed by clause (a) of section 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955. The Court held, first, that although the April 11 notice could be interpreted as a composite notice under section 4(a) of the Accommodation Act and section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, it was ineffective under section 106 because it did not constitute a notice of fifteen clear days; the respondent had received only fourteen clear days’ notice. The Court relied upon the authorities in Subadini v. Durga Charan Lal, I.L.R. 28 Cal. 118 and Gobind Chandra Saha v. Dwarka Nath Patita, A.I.R. 1915 Cal. 313, while distinguishing Harihar Banerji v. Ramsashi Roy, L.R. 45 I.A. 222. Secondly, the Court noted that the suit was fundamentally based on the July 9, 1959 notice, which gave the respondent more than fifteen clear days to vacate and was therefore a valid notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

The Court noted that the notice issued on July 9 1959 granted the defendant more than fifteen days of clear notice to vacate the premises and that this notice satisfied the requirements of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, thereby constituting a valid notice under that provision. The Court then examined the argument that a suit based on clause (a) of section 4 of the Accommodation Act could not be maintained unless the tenant was already in arrears on the date the suit was filed. The Court rejected this argument, observing that accepting it would amount to rewriting the statutory language by substituting the phrase “that the tenant was in arrears of rent at the date of suit” for the actual wording which requires that “the tenant has failed to make payment etc.” The Court emphasized that it is not within a court’s power to assume the role of the legislature, nor is it appropriate to impose an artificial interpretation on the statute and attribute to it an intention that cannot be discerned from the language employed, especially by relying on concepts drawn from other statutes that are intended to protect tenants from eviction by landlords. Further, the Court held that the landlord does not need to demonstrate the existence of the ground set out in clause (a) of section 4 at the time the suit is instituted. It is sufficient for the landlord to prove that the tenant was indeed in arrears, that the landlord served a notice of one month demanding payment of the arrears, and that the tenant failed to pay the arrears within the one‑month period following service of that notice. The Court explained that the effect of clause (a) of section 4 is merely to remove the limitation created by the introductory words of section 4 on the landlord’s right under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to terminate a month‑to‑month tenancy by giving a termination notice. The tenancy remains a month‑to‑month tenancy, but the unfettered right to terminate under section 106 becomes exercisable only when one of the grounds specified in section 4 of the Accommodation Act is shown to exist. Finally, the Court observed that by cashing a cheque for Rs 1,320 the plaintiffs did not relinquish all rights that accrued to them under the notice dated April 11 1959. No right under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had arisen because the notice was ineffective for purposes of terminating the tenancy, and consequently there was no question of waiver concerning that portion of the notice. Regarding the right arising under clause (a) of section 4 of the Accommodation Act, the defendant remained liable to pay rent even after the notice was given, and the plaintiffs’ acceptance of the rent did not, by itself, constitute a waiver of that right.

The appeal arose from a special leave petition challenging a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 158 of 1962. The appellant was represented by senior counsel, including the Additional Solicitor‑General of India and other counsel, while the respondents were instructed by a team of counsel. The judgment was delivered on 24 October 1963 by Justice Mudholkar.

The matter before the Supreme Court concerned an appeal by special leave against the High Court’s order that dismissed the defendant’s appeal. The defendant had contested the lower courts’ decision ordering his ejectment from certain premises that he occupied as a tenant of the plaintiffs. Both parties agreed that the defendant was in tenancy of the premises, for which the agreed rent was Rs 110 per month.

It was undisputed that the defendant had fallen into arrears of rent for the period from 1 April 1958 to 31 March 1959, amounting to Rs 1,020. Consequently, on 12 April 1959 the plaintiffs served a written notice upon the defendant. The notice informed him that he was in arrears for twelve months, demanded payment of the sum of Rs 1,020 within one month of the notice, and warned that failure to comply would result in the filing of an ejectment suit against him.

In addition to the demand for arrears, the same notice stipulated two further grounds for requiring the defendant to vacate the premises by 30 April 1959. The first ground asserted that the plaintiffs genuinely needed the premises for their own business. The second ground alleged that the defendant had sub‑let a portion of the premises to two persons without obtaining the plaintiffs’ permission and without any right to sub‑let. The notice was received by the defendant on 16 April 1959.

On 25 June 1959 the defendant responded to the notice. He enclosed a cheque for Rs 1,320, which covered both the rental arrears of Rs 1,020 and the rent due for the period up to 30 June 1959. The plaintiffs accepted the cheque and subsequently cashed it on 4 July 1959. Shortly thereafter, on 9 July 1959 the plaintiffs issued a fresh notice demanding that the defendant vacate the premises by the end of July 1959. In that notice the plaintiffs expressly stated that they had cashed the cheque under protest.

The defendant, however, did not vacate the premises following the second notice. As a result, the plaintiffs instituted the present suit for eviction on 14 August 1959, seeking to recover possession of the premises.

During the earlier proceedings, the plaintiffs had pleaded two grounds for eviction: that the premises were required by them bona‑fide for the purpose of their business, and that the defendant had illegally let out part of the premises. The courts below rejected both of those grounds, and consequently those claims were excluded from further consideration.

Therefore, the sole issue that remained for determination before the Supreme Court was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to eject the defendant on the basis that he was in arrears of rent for one full year and had failed to pay those arrears within one month after the service of the notice dated 11 April 1959.

The tenancy in question was a month‑to‑month tenancy, which meant that, under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the plaintiffs could lawfully end the tenancy by giving the tenant a written notice of fifteen days that would expire at the end of the month of tenancy. The premises, however, are located in Jabalpur, where the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (No 23 of 1955) – hereafter called the Accommodation Act – is applicable. Section 4 of the Accommodation Act provides that a civil suit for the eviction of a tenant may be filed only if the landlord relies on one or more of the specific grounds enumerated in that section. One of those grounds is that the tenant has failed to pay any arrears of rent within one month after receiving a written notice of demand from the landlord. Consequently, before the plaintiffs could obtain a decree for possession, they had to prove that the defendant had not paid the rental arrears within the one‑month period prescribed by clause (a) of section 4. The undisputed facts show that the defendant was indeed in arrears of rent and that he did not make payment within the time required by that clause. The learned Additional Solicitor‑General, nevertheless, argued that despite these facts the suit could not be decreed for several reasons. First, he contended that the notice dated 11 April 1959 was invalid for the purposes of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act because the notice did not give the tenant a clear fifteen‑day period that would expire at the end of the month of tenancy. Second, he claimed that the plaintiffs had waived both the notice and the default by (a) accepting a cheque of Rs 1,320, which covered rent up to 30 June 1959; (b) issuing a fresh notice on 9 July 1959; and (c) filing the suit on 14 August 1959 on the basis solely of the second notice. Third, he maintained that the second notice was likewise invalid under both the Transfer of Property Act and the Accommodation Act. Fourth, he asserted that there was no cause of action on 14 August 1959 under section 5 of the Accommodation Act because, on that date, no rent was in arrears. The Court indicated that it would address these points in the order in which they were raised. The learned Additional Solicitor‑General correctly submitted that the provisions of section 4 of the Accommodation Act are supplemental to those of the Transfer of Property Act, and that a landlord must satisfy the requirements of both section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 4 of the Accommodation Act before evicting a tenant. Moreover, the Accommodation Act does not repeal Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act, which continues to govern leases of immovable property.

The Court explained that Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act governs leases of immovable property. Under section 106 of that Act, a month‑to‑month tenancy may be terminated only when either the landlord gives the tenant, or the tenant gives the landlord, a written notice of fifteen days that expires on the last day of a rental month. Such a notice is indispensable for ending the legal relationship between landlord and tenant; without a valid termination, the landlord is not entitled to regain possession by evicting the tenant. Section 106 does not impose any further conditions beyond the prescribed fifteen‑day notice. However, section 4 of the Accommodation Act adds an additional layer, stating that a landlord may not evict a tenant unless one of the specific grounds enumerated in that provision is proven to exist. The appellant argued that the ground set out in clause (a) of section 4 was satisfied because the defendant was in arrears of rent for an entire year and, despite being served with a notice demanding payment within one month of receipt, had failed to pay the outstanding amount.

The learned Additional Solicitor‑General observed that the notice dated April 1959 could be considered satisfactory for the purposes of clause (a) of section 4 of the Accommodation Act, but it could not be regarded as a proper notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for two reasons. First, the notice did not expressly intend to terminate the tenancy, and second, the notice fell short of the fifteen‑day period required by section 106. The High Court, however, treated the notice as a composite notice that complied with both section 4(a) of the Accommodation Act and section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and the Court agreed with that interpretation. The Court noted that the plaintiffs, after demanding that the defendant pay all rent arrears due up to the end of March 1959 within one month from the date the notice was served, added the statement “failing which suit for ejectment will be filed.” Those words clearly demonstrated the landlord’s intention to terminate the tenancy in accordance with the relevant provisions of both statutes.

Nevertheless, the Court considered whether the notice might be ineffective under section 106 because it did not constitute a clear fifteen‑day notice. The Court referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Subadini v. Durga Charan Lal, which held that the notice contemplated by section 106 must be a notice of fifteen clear days. The method of calculation excludes the day on which the notice is served, and even if the expiry day is included, the result shows that the defendant received only fourteen clear days’ notice. Accordingly, if the view expressed in that earlier decision is accepted, the notice would be deficient by one day in relation to the requirement of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

In this case the Court observed that, assuming the earlier decision is correct, the notice given fell short of the period required by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by one day. The Court noted that the correctness of that decision was not questioned by the High Court in Gobinda Chandra Saha v. Dwarka Nath Patita (2). No authority was cited that expressed a contrary view. Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that a notice to quit should be given a liberal construction and referred to the decision in Harihar Banerji v. Ramsashi Roy (3). In that decision the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, at page 225, observed that notices to quit, although not strictly accurate or consistent in their statements, may still be good and effective in law; that the test of their sufficiency is not what they would mean to a stranger ignorant of the facts and circumstances, but what they would mean to tenants presumably conversant with those facts and circumstances; and that they are to be construed not with a desire to find faults which would render them defective, but to be construed “at res magis valeat quam pereat.” The Court held that this authority was of no assistance because the defect there concerned the description of the demised premises, and the Privy Council had reasoned that the recipient would be familiar with the actual description. Here the issue was entirely different, namely whether the landlord had given the tenant the minimum period of fifteen clear days contemplated by section 106 within which to vacate. The provision was intended to confer a facility on the tenant and therefore must be construed so as to enable the tenant to obtain the fullest benefit of that facility. The Court concluded that a liberal construction of a notice which would deprive the tenant of the benefit of the fifteen‑day period was not permissible. Accordingly, the Court approved the view expressed in Subadini’s case (1) and held that the notice dated 11 April 1959 was ineffective because it did not satisfy the requirements of section 106. Counsel for the plaintiffs, however, pointed out that a notice complying with section 106 had actually been served on 9 July 1959, that this notice gave more than fifteen clear days to the defendant, and that the suit had been based on that notice, making it competently instituted. The Court considered these submissions and thought

In this part of the judgment the Court addressed the second and fourth matters raised by the learned Additional Solicitor‑General together. The learned Additional Solicitor‑General argued that, at the time the suit was filed, there were no rent arrears and that, under section 4(a) of the Accommodation Act, a tenant could not be evicted unless the tenant was in arrears on the date the suit was instituted. The Court reproduced the opening words of section 4, clause (a), which read: “No suit shall be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds: (a) that the tenant has failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a written notice of demand from the landlord.” The Court observed that this provision specifically required a tenant to have failed to pay the arrears of rent within the period prescribed in the clause. It clarified that the provision did not intend to require that the ground for eviction continue to exist on the date the suit was filed. The Court further noted that section 4(a) differed markedly from similar provisions contained in the Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, where the statutes afforded tenants broader protection and allowed them to settle arrears even after the suit had been commenced. To bring Madhya Pradesh law into conformity with those statutes, the Accommodation Act had been replaced by the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (Act 41 of 1961). Under clause (a) of section 12 of that Act, a landlord could sue for eviction when the tenant had neither paid nor offered to pay the full amount of legally recoverable rent arrears within two months of a properly served written notice of demand. The Court pointed out that subsection 3 of the same section barred an eviction order on the basis of clause (a) if the tenant deposited the amount required by section 13. Moreover, subsection 1 of section 25 gave the tenant the right to apply, within a prescribed time, for permission to deposit the rent arrears with the court. The Court therefore concluded that the scheme of the new Act represented a substantial departure from the approach of section 4 of the 1955 Act. Nevertheless, the learned Additional Solicitor‑General contended that, when other grounds listed in section 4 and the provisions of sections 16 and 17 of the new Act were examined, it appeared that a tenant must be in arrears at the time the suit was instituted. The Court indicated that it would consider this argument in the subsequent discussion.

In the present dispute, the Court observed that for a landlord to rely on the ground of eviction under clause (a) of section 4, the tenant need not be in arrears at the exact moment the suit is instituted. The learned Additional Solicitor‑General, however, urged the Court to examine clauses (g), (h), (j) and (k) of section 4 and argued that the conditions specified in those provisions must continue to exist up to the date of filing of the suit, and therefore clause (a) should be interpreted as containing a similar temporal requirement. The Court explained that clauses (g) and (h) relate to situations where the landlord requires the premises for his own residence or for his own business. Clause (j) pertains to a circumstance in which a tenant has served a written notice to quit and, as a result, the landlord has entered into a contract to sell or let the premises or has taken any other step that would seriously prejudice his interests unless he regains possession. Clause (k) concerns premises that were let to a tenant as a residence because the tenant was in the service of the landlord, and the tenant has ceased to be in such service, whether before or after the commencement of the Act. The Court held that it was not necessary to determine in the present case whether the grounds embodied in those clauses must inevitably persist on the date of the suit. What was essential, the Court said, was to give the language of clause (a) its ordinary meaning and to refrain from altering that language merely because different wording was employed in other clauses. To accept the learned Additional Solicitor‑General’s contention would amount to rewriting the statute, substituting the expression “the tenant was in arrears of rent at the date of the suit” for the statutory phrase “the tenant has failed to make payment …”. The Court stressed that a court cannot usurp the legislative function, nor can it impose an artificial construction on the statutory text and attribute to the legislature an intention that is not discernible from the language used, especially by borrowing concepts from other statutes that aim to protect tenants from eviction. Regarding sections 16 and 17, the Court noted that they offered no assistance to the defendant; it was unnecessary to reproduce their contents, but it sufficed to say that those sections were intended to give a limited retrospective effect to the new provision in section 4. Consequently, the Court concluded that the landlord does not have to demonstrate that the condition in clause (a) existed on the date the suit was filed. The landlord merely needs to establish that the tenant was, in fact, in arrears, that the tenant had been served a notice demanding payment of the arrears, and that the tenant failed to comply with that notice within the prescribed one‑month period.

In this case, the Court explained that the landlord was required to serve a notice demanding payment of the arrears, and the tenant nevertheless failed to pay those arrears within one month after the notice was served. The Court observed that if the provision were read in the manner suggested, the result would be that a landlord who had served a notice under clause (a) of section 4, and whose tenant did not pay the arrears within the prescribed month, could nevertheless keep the tenancy in force, continue to receive rent from the tenant, and at any later time, at his own discretion, terminate the tenancy. The Court held that such an intention cannot reasonably be said to have been given by the legislature, a view also expressed by the learned Additional Solicitor‑General, and described the argument as theoretically possible but practically far‑fetched. The Court noted that a landlord who wishes to evict a tenant and therefore relies on the ground provided in clause (a) of section 4 would not wait for years before filing a suit against the defaulting tenant. Consequently, the Court concluded that, in furnishing this ground, the legislature intended only to give a limited protection to tenants – in other words, protection only to those tenants who were diligent and regular in paying rent. The Court added that although a legislature is free to afford wide protection to tenants who constantly default, it does not follow that every protection provision must be given its widest possible amplitude. Further, the Court rejected the assertion that the suggested interpretation would deprive a tenant, for whose benefit section 4 was enacted, of the relief provided by section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, which offers protection against forfeiture for non‑payment of rent. The Court quoted section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, which defines forfeiture as occurring when the lessee breaches an express condition that allows the lessor to re‑enter, when the lessee renounces his character as lessee, or when the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease permits re‑entry, each requiring written notice of the lessor’s intention to terminate. The Court clarified that the effect of clause (a) of section 4 is merely to remove the barrier created by the opening words of section 4 to the landlord’s right under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to terminate a month‑to‑month tenancy by giving a notice of termination. This provision does not transform a periodic tenancy into a fixed‑term or indefinite tenancy, nor does it insert a clause of re‑entry on the ground of non‑payment of rent; the character of the tenancy remains month‑to‑month, but the unfettered right to terminate under section 106 is now exercisable only when one of the grounds specified in section 4 of the Accommodation Act is shown to exist.

In this matter, the lease contained a provision allowing the landlord to re‑enter on the ground of non‑payment of rent, while the tenancy continued to be classified as a month‑to‑month tenancy. However, the lease also stipulated that the unrestricted right to terminate the tenancy granted by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act could be exercised only when one of the grounds specified in section 4 of the Accommodation Act was shown to exist. The Court then examined the question raised by the learned Additional Solicitor‑General as to whether the plaintiff’s alleged waiver of the tenant’s default arose because the tenant failed to pay the arrears within one month after receiving the notice dated 11 April 1959. It is undisputed that the plaintiff deposited a cheque for Rs 1,320 on 4 July 1959, thereby receiving not only the arrears of rent payable up to March 1959 but also rent due up to 30 June 1959. No credible allegation was made that the plaintiff accepted the money under protest. The case does not fall within illustration (a) to section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act, which provides that acceptance of rent due after the expiry of a notice to quit amounts to a waiver of that notice. Moreover, when the plaintiff cashed the cheque, no suit had yet been instituted on the basis of the 11 April 1959 notice, and merely claiming acceptance under protest could not establish a waiver. Even assuming acceptance alone, it is difficult to infer a waiver of the right that accrued to the plaintiff under subsection 4(a) of the Act as a consequence of the tenant’s failure to pay the arrears. The reason is straightforward: as argued by the learned Additional Solicitor‑General, the 11 April 1959 notice could not lawfully terminate the tenancy, and thus the landlord‑tenant relationship persisted. Consequently, the plaintiff was entitled to accept the rent, and such acceptance cannot be construed as an intention to waive the tenant’s default, because under the Accommodation Act the tenant remained entitled to remain in possession and remained liable for rent. The learned Additional Solicitor‑General also suggested, albeit weakly, that if the 11 April 1959 notice were also construed as a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, then the plaintiff’s acceptance of rent on 4 July 1959 might constitute a waiver of the rights arising from that notice. However, as already noted, the suit is predicated upon the notice dated 9 July 1959, which seeks eviction of the tenant on the ground that he must vacate the premises by the end of July 1959, and the rights accruing from that later notice remain unaffected.

The Court observed that the plaintiffs’ entitlement to commence the suit on the basis of the notice dated 9 July 1959 had not been relinquished in any manner, and that the fact that the plaintiffs had received rent from the defendant before that date did not, by itself, extinguish the right created by that notice. The Court acknowledged that if the notice of 11 April 1959 were interpreted as a “composite” notice—meaning that it was intended both as a notice contemplated by clause (a) of section 4 of the Accommodation Act and as a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act—then the acceptance of rent, taken together with other surrounding circumstances, might give rise to an inference that the plaintiffs had waived the right that flowed from the provision of section 106. However, the Court found it difficult to understand how such an interpretation could support a claim of waiver of the right arising from clause (a) of section 4. The Court reiterated that the notice of 11 April 1959, insofar as it sought to invoke section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, was ineffective; consequently, the landlord‑tenant relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant persisted. Accepting rent under those circumstances could not be taken as an indication that the plaintiffs had waived a distinct statutory right—namely, the right conferred by section 4 of the Accommodation Act, which arose because of the defendant’s default in payment of rent arrears.

The Court further explained that the notice of 11 April 1959, in its present form, did not by itself grant the plaintiffs the authority to institute legal proceedings. Until such authority was acquired, the plaintiffs were entitled to receive the rent that became due on a month‑to‑month basis, and the defendant remained obligated to pay the rent whenever it fell due, up to the point at which the landlord‑tenant relationship was lawfully terminated. Accordingly, the mere fact that the plaintiffs accepted rent after the date of the April notice could not be construed as a waiver of any right. The Court therefore rejected the argument presented by the learned Additional Solicitor‑General that the act of cashing a cheque for Rs 1,320 amounted to a waiver of all rights that had accrued to the plaintiffs under the 11 April notice. Since no right under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had ever vested in the plaintiffs—owing to the notice’s ineffectiveness with regard to termination of the tenancy—there was no basis for a claim of waiver concerning that portion of the notice. Regarding the right under clause (a) of section 4 of the Accommodation Act, the Court noted that the defendant continued to be liable for rent even after the notice was served; therefore, the acceptance of rent by the plaintiffs did not, in itself, constitute a waiver. The Court had already addressed this point, emphasizing that the contention that the April notice was invalid under both statutes was unfounded; while the notice could be viewed as composite, it was ineffective only insofar as it attempted to operate under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and it was not held to be invalid under the Accommodation Act. Consequently, no further discussion was necessary on that matter.

The Court observed that the notice in question related to both the Transfer of Property Act and the Accommodation Act. It explained that, although the notice might be described as a composite notice covering the two statutes, it was ineffective to the extent that it claimed authority under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court noted that the notice could not operate as a valid notice under that provision because it failed to meet the statutory requirements. The Court further clarified that no suggestion had been made that the portion of the notice intended to operate under the Accommodation Act was invalid. Consequently, the Court found no further issue to be addressed regarding the validity of the notice under the Accommodation Act. Having examined these points, the Court concluded that there was nothing further to be said on the matter. For these reasons, the Court affirmed the decree issued by the High Court and ordered that the appeal be dismissed. The Court also directed that the costs of the appeal be awarded. The final order therefore dismissed the appeal and imposed the costs on the appellant.