Madamanchi Ramappa and Anr vs Muthalur Bojjappa

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 376 of 1961

Decision Date: 29 March 1963

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta

In this matter, the parties were Madamanchi Ramappa and another appellant and Muthalur Bojjappa as the respondent. The judgment was delivered on 29 March 1963 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice P B Gajendragadkar and the bench included Justices K N Wanchoo and K C Das Gupta. The case is reported as 1963 AIR 1633 and 1964 SCR (2) 673, with citator reference R 1976 SC 2547 (25). The issues involved the interpretation of the Civil Procedure Code, specifically the power of a second appellate court to interfere with concurrent findings of fact, the adequacy of evidence as a ground for interference, the relationship between equity and express statutory provisions, a single‑judge decision granting special leave under Article 133 (3) of the Constitution of India (1950), and the application of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908).

The factual background set out that the appellant’s father, thirty‑five years before the suit was filed, purchased a parcel of forty acres from a man named Krishnappa, who owned a total of one hundred and sixty‑six acres. After completing the purchase, the appellant’s father took possession of the forty‑acre plot and remained in possession for the remainder of his life. Following his death, the appellant’s mother, acting as guardian, continued to hold possession until the year 1947. Subsequently, the respondent obtained a mortgage decree against Krishnappa; in execution of that decree, the respondent caused the property to be sold at a court auction and himself acquired the parcel in 1943. In 1947 the respondent entered upon the land that was the subject of the present suit, doing so without lawful authority. The appellants then instituted the present suit, contending that the mortgage and the consequent decree and auction sale did not affect their title because the title had already been vested in their father prior to the mortgage. They sought a declaration confirming their ownership, together with a decree granting possession and mesne profits. The respondent denied that the appellant’s father had ever purchased the land from Krishnappa and alleged that the appellants were merely cultivating the land as tenants of Krishnappa; consequently, the respondent argued that the mortgage, the mortgage decree, and the auction sale were binding upon the appellants. The trial court, after examining both documentary and oral evidence, found in favour of the appellants on both title and possession. The respondent appealed to the district judge, who affirmed the trial judge’s findings, concluding that the appellants had established both title and possession within twelve years before the suit’s filing. Neither the trial court nor the first appellate court faced any question of interpreting documents or of drawing legal inferences; the matters were purely factual. The respondent then appealed to the High Court, where a single judge entertained the appeal. The appellant argued that the High Court, under a mistaken belief that a second appellate court may interfere with concurrent factual findings of lower courts even when those findings are based on evidence, improperly overturned those findings. The respondent maintained that the High Court was justified in its interference because the evidence, in its view, was insufficient to support the lower courts’ conclusions.

In the second appeal, the learned single judge of the High Court examined all the material relevant evidence. He concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the findings of fact recorded by the lower courts, and consequently set aside those concurrent findings. The High Court then allowed the appeal, and the present proceeding before this Court arises by reason of a special leave being granted. The principal issue presented for consideration is whether the High Court exceeded the limits laid down in section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question is whether the High Court disturbed the concurrent factual findings that had been made by the trial court and the first appellate court. The Court observed that it has long been settled law that the adequacy of evidence needed to sustain a factual finding is a matter for courts that determine facts. The Court further stated that such a matter cannot be reopened in a second appeal. The Court further stated that no jurisdiction exists to entertain a second appeal on the ground that the factual findings are erroneous, no matter how gross or inexcusable the perceived error may be. The Court explained that whenever it is satisfied that, in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has contravened the limitations imposed by section 100, it becomes incumbent upon this Court to intervene. It must also give effect to the statutory provision. The Court also held that the High Court cannot disturb the concurrent findings of fact on the basis of considerations of equity or justice. This is because the administration of justice must conform to the clear and express provisions of law, and concepts of fairness, however important, must yield to statutory mandates. The Court cited the authority Mussummal Durga Choudrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri (1890) L.R. 171 A. 122. It also referred to Deity Pattabhiramasiqwamy v. S. Hanymayya, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 57. Finally, it mentioned R. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam [1963] 3 S.C.R. 604 in support of this proposition.

The appeal before this Court is numbered Civil Appeal No. 376 of 1961 and is filed by special leave from the judgment and decree dated 5 March 1959 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 545 of 1955. The parties before the Supreme Court are the appellants, who were represented by counsel, and the respondent, who was represented by counsel. The judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered on 29 March 1963 by Justice Gajendragadkar, who presided over the hearing of the special leave appeal. The Court noted that, under Article 133(3) of the Constitution, no appeal lies to this Court from the judgment, decree, or final order of a single judge of a High Court. It also observed that the Supreme Court has traditionally been reluctant to entertain applications for special leave against second‑appellate decisions of a High Court. Nevertheless, the Court explained that when petitioners seeking special leave demonstrate that the High Court, in allowing a second appeal, interfered with questions of fact and thereby violated the statutory limits of section 100, the High Court acted beyond its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court is therefore obliged to entertain the special leave application and to examine whether the High Court exceeded its authority. Accordingly, the Court indicated that the sole ground for granting special leave in the present case is the alleged transgression of the statutory bar on second‑appeal interference with factual findings, and that this ground will form the basis of the Court’s further consideration.

The Court observed that under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is not easy to dismiss a petition for special leave. The Court referred to a decision rendered in 1890 in the case of Mussummat Durga Choudhrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri, where the Privy Council unequivocally held that, as per section 584 of the earlier Code—corresponding to the present section 100—no jurisdiction existed to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, irrespective of how grave or inexcusable the error might appear. The Privy Council also warned that no Indian court possessed authority to expand the grounds enumerated in section 100. The appellants in the present matter argued that this warning had been blatantly ignored, contending that the second‑appellate Court had interfered with concurrent findings of fact when it allowed the respondent’s appeal against them. The Court noted that this was the sole ground on which special leave had been granted to the appellants, and it was the basis upon which the present appeal would be entertained.

The factual backdrop of the appeal was concise and limited in scope. Survey No. 440‑B, located in Rakatla village, originally belonged to a person named Boya Krishnappa and comprised an area of 166 acres. In a suit filed by the appellants before the Subordinate Judge of Anantapur in 1951 (recorded as O.S. No. 72 of 1953), the appellants asserted that forty acres of the said land had been purchased by their father, Chinna Venkataramanappa, from Boya Krishnappa approximately thirty‑five years prior to the filing of the suit, for a monetary consideration. Following the transaction, the appellants’ father took possession of the property and retained it throughout his lifetime. Upon his death, the appellants’ mother, acting as their guardian, continued to possess and manage the property until the year 1947. Throughout this period, the appellants’ family consistently paid the land assessment and occupied the land openly and peacefully.

The respondent, however, had obtained a mortgage decree (O.S. No. 94/1940) against Boya Krishnappa covering the entire Survey No. 440‑B. Pursuant to that mortgage decree, the respondent arranged for the mortgaged property to be sold at a court auction. At the auction, which took place around 1943, the respondent himself purchased the property, after which he began to obstruct the appellants’ possession. In 1947, the respondent unlawfully entered upon the disputed land, giving rise to the present suit. Accordingly, the cause of action for the suit was the wrongful dispossession of the appellants by the respondent circa 1947. The appellants contended that, although Boya Krishnappa may have included the suit property in the mortgage deed executed in his favour on July 31, 1929, that mortgage did not affect the appellants’ title, as the property had already been bought by their father from Krishnappa. Consequently, they argued, the decree issued in the mortgage suit and the subsequent auction sale did not bind them.

In this case, the appellants asked the Court to declare that they held legal title to the land that was the subject of the suit and also requested a decree granting them possession of that land together with an order for mesne profits, both for the period before the suit and for the future. The respondent opposed these prayers. He denied that the father of the appellants had ever bought the land from Boya Krishnappa and he further denied that the appellants’ family had ever paid any revenue assessment as owners of the land. Instead, he asserted that the appellants had been cultivating the land only as tenants of Boya Krishnappa, and consequently the mortgage that Krishnappa had executed in favour of the respondent was binding on the appellants as well as the decree issued in the mortgage suit and the subsequent auction sale. On the basis of these pleadings, the trial Court identified two substantive issues for determination. The first issue concerned whether the appellants were entitled to the suit property and whether they had been in possession of it for at least twelve years immediately preceding the filing of the suit. The second issue concerned whether the court‑sale that the respondent had organised had actually taken place and, if so, whether that sale bound the appellants. The trial judge answered both issues in favour of the appellants. Regarding the question of title, the judge placed the burden of proof on the appellants. He observed that the appellants had not produced a sale‑deed nor a patta to prove the transaction. Nevertheless, after examining the other documents that the appellants had produced, the judge concluded that those documents sufficiently established both the appellants’ title and their possession of the land for the required twelve‑year period. Exhibit A‑8, which was a certified copy of the Changes Register of Rakatla village, showed the names of Boya Krishnappa and Venkataramanappa, the father of the appellants, recorded as Pattadars. Following the death of Venkataramanappa, a circle was drawn around his name and a remark recorded that his sons, the appellants Venkanna and Ramappa, who were minors represented by their mother Lakshmamma as guardian, had been entered as Pattadars. The judge inferred that this entry must have been made before 1926 because no further changes were recorded in 1926, 1927 and 1928. The judge also examined Exhibit A‑1, which indicated that the Kulam Number of the parcel 440‑B was recorded as 210. In addition, the appellants produced a series of cist‑receipt documents (Exhibits A‑2 to A‑5 and A‑9 to A‑35). After reviewing these receipts, the trial Court concluded that they demonstrated that the cist revenue on the land had been paid by the appellants’ family throughout the relevant period. Although the respondent admitted that the appellants’ family had been in possession of the land, he sought to explain that possession by asserting that the family were merely tenants of Boya Krishnappa.

The respondent attempted to discredit the revenue documents relied upon by the appellants by claiming that the village officers who prepared those documents were his personal enemies and had fabricated the cist receipts. The trial Court rejected these contentions and, giving effect to the documentary evidence, made a finding in favour of the appellants on both the question of title and the question of possession within the twelve‑year period. The Court noted that the absence of the appellants’ father’s name in the diglot Exhibit B‑1 did not affect the outcome, because that register had been published in 1927 and the information regarding the transaction in favour of the appellants’ father might not have reached the revenue officers at the time of its preparation. The appellants also offered certain rent notes (Exhibits A‑6, A‑7, A‑36 and A‑37) that they claimed had been executed in their favour by their tenants; however, the trial Court found those notes to be unsatisfactory and not genuine. The Court then considered one circumstance relied upon by the respondent that was adverse to the appellants, namely that the respondent had put the mortgaged properties to…

In this case, the trial court rejected the respondent’s contentions and, after giving effect to the documentary evidence, made a finding in favour of the appellants regarding both their title and possession, determining that the appellants had established title and possession within twelve years preceding the filing of the suit. The court observed that the absence of the appellants’ father’s name in the diglot exhibit B‑1 was not material, because the register containing that exhibit was published in 1927 and, at the time of its preparation, information concerning the transaction in favour of the appellant’s father might not have reached the revenue officers. The appellants had also attempted to prove possession by producing several rent notes that they alleged had been executed in their favour by their tenants, identified as exhibits A‑6, A‑7, A‑36 and A‑37. The trial court, however, held that those rent notes could not be accepted as satisfactory or genuine evidence of possession. The trial court then examined a circumstance relied upon by the respondent that was adverse to the appellants. The respondent explained that, when the mortgaged properties were put up for sale in execution of his mortgage decree against Krishnappa, a Commissioner was appointed to value the crops standing on the land. In those proceedings the appellants stood as sureties for the crops at the request of Krishnappa. The respondent argued that crops were standing on the suit land and that the appellants would not have offered security for those crops if they had been owners of any part of the property, contending that the appellants’ surety bond demonstrated ownership of a portion of the property. The trial court was not persuaded by that argument. It found that the circumstances surrounding the execution of the surety bond did not clearly show that the appellants had furnished security for any crops standing on the suit land at the relevant time. The Commissioner’s report indicated that crops were standing only on a small portion of the entire Survey No. 445‑B. Moreover, the security bond was drafted in English and contained no indication that the surety offered by the appellants related to any crop standing on the land in dispute. Consequently, the trial court declined to assign any significance to that circumstance. Having concluded that the property belonged to the appellants’ family either by lawful transfer or by operation of adverse possession, the trial court held that the mortgage executed by Krishnappa in favour of the respondent and the subsequent proceedings under that mortgage did not affect the appellants’ title. Accordingly, the suit filed by the appellants was decreed in their favour. The respondent challenged this decree by filing an appeal before the District Judge of Anantapur. The learned District Judge framed a single comprehensive issue for determination: whether the appellants had proved title to and possession of the suit property within twelve years before the date of the suit. The District Judge answered both aspects of the issue in favour of the appellants, affirming the trial court’s findings.

In this matter the Court examined both aspects of the issue that had been framed and rendered its decision in favour of the appellants. In the same manner as the trial Court, the Court observed that the appellants had not produced a sale deed or a patta on which to rely. Nevertheless, the Court took into account the oral testimony and the documentary material that had been placed before it by both parties, and it concurred that the trial judge had correctly recorded his findings. The Court expressed its view that “the entire evidence in the case and the probabilities and circumstances made out by unimpeachable documentary evidence helped the appellants to prove both their title and their possession within 12 years before the date of the suit.” Both courts also noted that the respondent had admitted, at the time of the proceedings, that roughly twenty to twenty‑five years earlier all the lands in the surrounding area, including Survey No. 440‑B, were described as banjar, that they possessed no market value and that they were being obtained merely for a nominal asking price. The mortgage deed executed in favour of the respondent further corroborated this admission. The mortgage related to a parcel of 166 acres and the amount advanced under it was Rs 650 only. This circumstance became relevant for determining whether a registered instrument was essential to convey title to the appellants’ father in respect of the suit property. Accordingly, the effect of the concurrent findings recorded by the fact‑finding courts was clear. The Court observed that when the suit property had been purchased, its valuation had not been shown to exceed Rs 100, making it plausible that a sale, as alleged by the appellants, might have taken place between their father and Krishnappa. However, because the evidence concerning that alleged sale was unsatisfactory, the two courts shifted their focus to the evidence of possession in order to decide whether the appellants had established a possessory title as claimed. The Court accepted that the appellants’ family had possessed the land for a period exceeding the statutory limitation, and that such possession was open, continuous and hostile to all others. The respondent’s contention that the possession was that of a tenant was rejected, rendering the possession adverse to the whole world. Moreover, it was established that the possession continued up to the year 1947, which fell within the twelve‑year period immediately preceding the filing of the suit. These conclusions were drawn after a careful appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the probabilities that arose. No issue of interpreting any document or of drawing a legal inference arose; the matters were purely questions of fact, on which both courts recorded identical findings.

The respondent, dissatisfied with the decree pronounced by the District Court on appeal, invoked section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and moved the High Court for relief. His appearance before the High Court was heard by Justice Sanjeeva Rao Nayudu. The learned judge highlighted that the appellants had failed to produce any sale deed to substantiate their claim of title, and he proceeded to examine the documentary evidence upon which they relied. The judge’s analysis centred on the admissibility and authenticity of the documents, and he placed particular emphasis on the absence of a proven sale deed, a point that would later be addressed by the subsequent considerations of the case.

In the proceedings before the High Court, the judge noted that the appellants had failed to produce any document to prove their title and then turned his attention to the documentary evidence on which they relied. He expressed the view that Exhibit A‑8 had not been proved at all and therefore could not be received as evidence. The respondent’s counsel, identified only as the representative for the respondent, conceded that this conclusion was plainly erroneous in law. The document in question was a certified copy of a public document, and according to established law, such a document does not require the testimony of a witness for proof. Moreover, neither the trial Court nor the District Court had raised any objection to the mode of proof presented. After addressing the issue of admissibility, the judge examined whether the document was genuine. He described the document as doubtful and said that no weight could be attached to it. A similar assessment was made regarding the cash receipts on which both lower courts of fact had relied; the judge opined that those receipts were also not genuine and could not be accepted as reliable evidence.

Subsequently, the judge referred to the fact that the appellants had offered security in separate proceedings between the respondent and his judgment‑debtor, Boya Krishnappa. He held that this conduct destroyed the appellants’ case. He also relied on the observation that the lease deeds produced by the appellants had been disbelieved, which further weakened their position. On the basis of these considerations, the judge set aside the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts, allowed the second appeal preferred by the respondent, and directed that the appellants’ suit be dismissed with costs awarded throughout. The appellants now challenge the validity of this decree, arguing that the High Court, in reversing the concurrent factual findings of the lower courts, had clearly contravened the provisions of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question of the limits of the High Court’s powers under section 100 in second appeals has been examined repeatedly by Indian High Courts and by the Privy Council. An early Privy Council decision on the matter is recorded in the case of Mst. Durga Choudhrain. In the later case of Deity Pattabhiramaswami v. S. Hanymayya, the Supreme Court referred to that Privy Council decision and observed that, despite clear and authoritative pronouncements on the scope of section 100, some High Court judges were disposing of second appeals as if they were first appeals. The Court warned that such practice allowed the High Court to assume and exercise a jurisdiction it did not possess, thereby introducing a gambling element into litigation and causing confusion among litigants. On that ground, the Supreme Court set aside the second‑appellate decision that had been brought before it by the appellants. In R. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, the Supreme Court revisited the same issue, reaffirming the legal position regarding the powers of a second‑appellate court under section 100 and cautioning High Courts against interfering with findings of fact, as warned by the Privy Council in Mst. Durga Choudhrain.

In the earlier decision involving Ramalingam Chettiar, this Court again examined the correct legal position concerning the powers of a court hearing a second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court reiterated that the judges of the High Courts must remember the caution and warning expressed by the Privy Council in the case of Mst. Durga Chowdhrain (1) and must not interfere with findings of fact. The Court observed that the judgment in Deity Pattabhiramaswamy (2) had indeed been cited before the learned single judge in the present appeal, yet the judge was inclined to hold that certain aspects of section 100 had not been fully considered by this Court. Consequently, he concluded that the second appellate Court could intervene in the factual conclusions reached by the district judge not only where those conclusions were unsupported by any evidence, but also where, in the judge’s view, the evidence was insufficient to support them. In other words, the learned judge treated the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence as a question of law that could be raised and decided in a second appeal.

The present Court, however, found this view to be a clear misunderstanding of the true legal position. While the admissibility of evidence is indeed a question of law, once it is established that the evidence upon which the fact‑finding court acted was admissible and relevant, a party who is dissatisfied with the factual findings cannot return to the High Court on a second appeal and argue that the same evidence is insufficient to justify those findings. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence to support a finding of fact is a matter that belongs exclusively to the court that originally determined the facts, and it cannot be re‑agitated in a second appeal. This principle is sometimes explained by comparing it to a jury’s role in determining the truth of factual matters; the sufficiency of evidence, like all questions of fact, is left to the fact‑finder for its verdict. This elementary proposition has been consistently accepted without dissent, as reflected in earlier authorities (1) (1890) L.R. 17 J.A. 122 and (2) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 604.

Accordingly, whenever this Court is convinced that, in hearing a second appeal, the High Court has, whether inadvertently or deliberately, transgressed the limits set by section 100, it becomes obligatory for this Court to step in and give effect to the statutory provisions. The Court’s duty, therefore, is to ensure that the High Court does not exceed its jurisdiction by re‑examining factual findings, preserving the proper balance between the law on appeal and the authority of courts of fact.

The Court observed that occasionally the High Court, when hearing a second appeal, may feel that the factual findings of the lower courts do not achieve justice or equity. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that courts are bound to administer justice according to law and that considerations of fairness and equity must yield to clear statutory provisions. The Court further warned that if the High Court disregards the explicit requirements of section 100 while deciding a second appeal, it introduces an element of unpredictability likened to gambling. Such unpredictability, the Court held, undermines the integrity of the judicial process, which must constantly strive to avoid any reproach of arbitrariness. Accordingly, the Court allowed the present appeal, set aside the decree issued by the High Court, and reinstated the decree of the District Judge with costs awarded throughout. The order therefore concludes that the appeal is allowed and that the High Court’s decision is reversed in its entirety. The Court reiterated that justice administered must be based on statutory mandates, not on subjective notions of fairness. It further noted that any deviation from the mandatory provisions of section 100 would compromise the rule of law and the predictability of judicial outcomes. Consequently, the Court ordered that the costs of the proceedings be awarded to the appellant for the entire duration of the litigation.