M. Ramappa vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh and Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 356 of 1962

Decision Date: 22 January 1963

Coram: M. Hidayatullah, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, J.C. Shah

The case titled M. Ramappa versus Government of Andhra Pradesh and another was decided on 22 January 1963 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice M. Hidayatullah and the bench comprised Justices M. Hidayatullah, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo and J. C. Shah. The petitioner was M. Ramappa and the respondents were the Government of Andhra Pradesh and an additional party. The date of the judgment is recorded as 22/01/1963. The bench is identified in the report as consisting of Justice Hidayatullah, Justice Sinha, Chief Justice Bhuvneshwar P., Justice Gajendragadkar, Justice Wanchoo, Justice Shah and Justice J. C. Shah. The citation for this decision is reported as 1964 AIR 777 and 1964 SCR (1) 671. The statutes discussed include provisions relating to state service, dismissal of an employee and the appointment of a disciplinary tribunal, specifically the Hyderabad Public Servants (Tribunal of Enquiry) Act, 1950 (Hyd. XXIII of 1950) sections 3 and 4, the Andhra Civil Services (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules, 1953, and the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (XXXVII of 1956) sections 115, 120, 121, 122 and 127.

The headnote records that the appellant had been a servant in the Hyderabad Revenue Service and was serving as Deputy Secretary to the Government in the Public Works Department. The Government of Andhra Pradesh ordered that the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings conduct an enquiry. After examining the charges, the Tribunal recommended that the appellant be dismissed from service and, following due notice, the Government of Andhra Pradesh executed the dismissal. The appellant then filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution seeking to set aside the dismissal order; this petition was rejected by the High Court. Before this Court, the appellant contended that the appointment of Mr Sriramamurthy as the member of the Tribunal was invalid because he was not qualified to act under the Hyderabad Act. The Court held that, by virtue of section 127 of the States Reorganisation Act, the provisions of that Act applied even if they conflicted with the Hyderabad Public Servants Act, 1950. Accordingly, section 127 together with the authority conferred by section 122 allowed the Government of Andhra Pradesh to designate an authority under the Hyderabad Act even when that authority might not meet the qualifications prescribed by the Hyderabad Act. The concluding language of section 122 indicated that the issuance of a notification under that section would cause the existing law to operate in a modified manner. Consequently, section 122 caused the Hyderabad Act to be read in accordance with the notification, and the Act, after the notification, was applied as modified and was partially adapted by the notification. The adaptation under section 120 was not a prerequisite for the notification, and once the notification was issued, the Hyderabad Act operated in the manner specified, rendering the appointment of Mr Sriramamurthy valid. The judgment was rendered in civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 356 of 1962, being an appeal by special leave against the Andhra Pradesh High Court judgment and order dated 13 December 1960 in Writ Petition No. 46 of 1960. Counsel for the appellant included A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, B. Parthasarthi and R. Vasudev Pillai, while the respondents were represented by the Advocate‑General of Andhra Pradesh, D. Narsaraju, and counsel K. R. Choudhri and P. D. Menon. The judgment was delivered on 22 January 1963.

Justice Hidayatullah delivered the judgment in an appeal by special leave challenging the Andhra Pradesh High Court decision dated 13 December 1960, which had dismissed Writ Petition No 46 of 1960. The petitioner before this Court was the appellant, while the respondents comprised the Government of Andhra Pradesh together with the Chairman of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings of Andhra Pradesh. The appellant had been employed in the Hyderabad Revenue Service and, in the year 1956, occupied the post of Deputy Secretary to the Government within the Public Works Department. Following a report from the Investigation Division, the Government of Andhra Pradesh ordered an inquiry under section 4 of the Hyderabad Public Servants (Tribunal of Enquiry) Act, 1950, to be conducted by Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings. The Tribunal examined a total of nineteen separate charges and then submitted its comprehensive report to the government on 11 July 1959. In that report the Tribunal found four charges proved and, because the first charge involved acceptance of a bribe and charge fourteen related to tampering with records, it recommended that appellant be dismissed from service. After giving the appellant the required notice of the proposed action, the Government of Andhra Pradesh formally issued an order that effectuated the appellant’s dismissal from his position in the service. The appellant then filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution, seeking judicial review of the dismissal order. He argued that the order was illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of the authority that had issued it, and therefore should be set aside. Among the substantive grounds raised, the appellant asserted that the Hyderabad Public Servants (Tribunal of Enquiry) Act, 1950, required every member of the Tribunal to be a judicial officer. He further maintained that the statutory provision additionally stipulated that the judicial officer must have served as a Sessions judge in India for at least three years before being eligible for appointment. The appellant pointed out that the enquiry had originally been conducted before Mr R Bhaskara Rao, who acted as the Tribunal until 19 April 1959. He asserted that Mr M Sriramamurthy subsequently assumed the role, did not satisfy the statutory qualification, yet heard the arguments and prepared the Tribunal’s report. The core issue before the High Court, as identified by the parties, was whether, under the facts of the case, Mr Sriramamurthy was disqualified from acting as a member of the Tribunal. The High Court examined the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act, particularly those relating to the adaptation of existing tribunals after the reorganisation of states. It also considered the notification dated 1 November 1956, which had been issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to clarify the status of disciplinary tribunals. That notification identified the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings in Andhra Pradesh as the authority authorised to operate under the Hyderabad Public Servants (Tribunal of Enquiry) Act, 1950. Applying these materials, the High Court concluded that Mr Sriramamurthy was legally competent to perform the functions vested in the Tribunal by the Hyderabad Act. Consequently, after evaluating the statutory framework and the notification, the High Court dismissed the appellant’s petition and upheld the dismissal order. Counsel for the appellant, identified as Mr Vishwanath Sastri, argued that the appointment of Mr Sriramamurthy was invalid because he did not satisfy the qualification requirements imposed by the Hyderabad Act. The present Court indicated that its examination would be confined to the Hyderabad Public Servants (Tribunal of Enquiry) Act, 1950, and to the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (Act No XXXVII of 1956). The provisions of the Hyderabad Act that are directly relevant to the dispute are sections 3 and 4, and these sections will be considered in the subsequent analysis.

The Court examined the relevant statutory provisions of the Hyderabad Public Servants (Tribunal of Enquiry) Act, 1950, focusing first on Section 3, which established the composition of the Tribunal. Section 3(1) provided that a Tribunal consisting of one or more members would be constituted for the purposes of the Act. Section 3(2) required that every member of the Tribunal be a judicial officer who had served as a Sessions judge in the territory of India for not less than three years. The Court then turned to Section 4, which empowered the Government to refer any case involving an allegation of misconduct, inefficiency, or disloyalty on the part of a public servant to the Tribunal for enquiry and to obtain a report, subject to any prescribed procedure. In the pre‑reorganisation period, the applicable rules in the State of Andhra were the Andhra Civil Services (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules, 1953, framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Those rules, which came into force on 1 October 1953, stipulated in Rule 3(a) that the Tribunal should consist of one judicial officer of the status of District and Sessions judge. The Court noted that the petitioner admitted that Mr M Sriramamurthi satisfied the qualification prescribed under that Rule. On 1 November 1956, the State of Andhra Pradesh was created by merging portions of Hyderabad State with the existing State of Andhra. The Court explained that the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, addressed the coexistence of differing laws in the newly formed units and contained specific provisions for the transition of public servants. Under Section 115, any person who, immediately before the appointed day, was serving in an existing State whose territory was transferred to another State would, from that day, continue provisionally to serve in the successor State unless required to serve provisionally in another successor State. Consequently, the appellant automatically became a servant of the successor State, namely Andhra Pradesh. Section 120 gave the new State Government the authority to adapt, repeal, or amend the law of an existing State as necessary, with such adaptations taking effect until altered, repealed, or amended by a competent legislature or authority. Section 121 conferred a special power on courts, tribunals, and other authorities to interpret laws where no specific provision existed for adapting a law to a newly formed State, provided that the substance of the matter was not altered. Section 122 further empowered the Central Government, in respect of any Part C State, and the State Government, in respect of any new State or transferred territory, to specify by notification in the Official Gazette the authority, officer, or person who, from the appointed day, would be competent to exercise the functions exercisable under any law then in force, and such law would have effect accordingly. Finally, Section 127 declared that the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act would have effect notwithstanding any inconsistency with any other law. The Court concluded that, because of Section 127 and the power under Section 122, the Government of Andhra Pradesh was competent to designate an authority to operate under the Hyderabad Act even if that authority did not meet the qualification prescribed in the Hyderabad Act itself.

Section 122 empowered the Government to issue a notification in the Official Gazette that could specify the authority, officer or person who, from the appointed day, would be competent to exercise any functions that were exercisable under any law then in force, and the law so mentioned in the notification would take effect accordingly. The provision therefore allowed the government to designate a new authority for the performance of functions under existing legislation by means of a Gazette notification.

Section 127 of the same Act expressly provided that the provisions of the Act would have effect notwithstanding any inconsistency that might exist with any other law. Consequently, the Court observed that the States Reorganisation Act would continue to apply even if its provisions conflicted with the Hyderabad Public Servants (Tribunal of Enquiry) Act, 1950. By virtue of Section 127, together with the power conferred by Section 122, the Government of Andhra Pradesh was competent to name an authority under the Hyderabad Act even though that authority might not satisfy the qualification requirements laid down in the Hyderabad Act itself.

The concluding words of Section 122—“shall be competent to exercise such functions exercisable under any law in force on that day as may be mentioned in that notification and such law shall have effect accordingly”—demonstrated that once a notification under Section 122 was issued, the existing law would operate in a modified manner as dictated by the notification. The Court noted that this language showed the notification itself altered the manner in which the law was to be applied, without requiring a prior adaptation of the Hyderabad Act under Section 120.

Mr. Vishwanath Sastri had argued that before the Hyderabad Act could be departed from, it first needed to be adapted under Section 120 by substituting an authority different from that named in Section 3. The Court held that this argument would have been effective only if Section 122 had not concluded in the manner described above. By its very terms, Section 122 makes the Hyderabad Act operate in accordance with a notification issued under that section, and the Act, after the notification, applies as adapted by the notification itself.

In the Court’s opinion, adaptation of the Hyderabad Act under Section 120 was not a condition precedent to the issuance of the notification. Once the notification was issued, the Hyderabad Act applied according to the terms of that notification, and therefore the appointment of Mr. Sriramamurthy under the notification was valid. The Court agreed with the High Court’s conclusion that the appointment was lawful.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs, and the Court affirmed that the appeal failed.