Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddi vs Lakkireddi Lakshmama

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 251 of 1961

Decision Date: 4 March 1963

Coram: J.C. Shah, P.B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah

In the case titled Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddi versus Lakkireddi Lakshmama, the Supreme Court of India pronounced its judgment on 4 March 1963. The opinion was authored by Justice J.C. Shah and the bench included Justices J.C. Shah, P.B. Gajendragadkar and M. Hidayatullah. The petitioner was Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddi and the respondent was Lakkireddi Lakshmama. The decision is reported in the year 1963 at AIR 1601 and also in the 1964 Supreme Court Reports (Second Series) at page 172, with subsequent citations including 1976 SC 1715, 1977 SC 2230 and references to the Hindu law provisions relating to joint‑family property, partition, the right of a minor, severance of joint property, and the continuance of a suit for partition after the death of a minor.

The factual background involved a Hindu co‑parcenary composed of Butchi Tirupati, his five brothers and his son Pulla Reddy. After the death of Butchi Tirupati in 1947, the son Pulla Reddy, who was then a minor, together with his mother Lakshmama, instituted a suit seeking partition and separate possession of their share in the joint family estate as well as a one‑fourth share in certain property that had been devised under a will dated July 1910, executed by Venkata Konda Reddy. Because Pulla Reddy was a minor, his mother acted as his next friend. During the pendency of the suit, Pulla Reddy died, and the court records identified his mother as the legal representative of the deceased minor.

The defendants challenged the suit on the ground that separating Pulla Reddy’s share would be highly prejudicial to the interests of the minor and contended that there was no evidence that Pulla Reddy and his mother had been expelled from the family house. The trial court held that partition of the joint family property would be beneficial to the minor, an assessment that the High Court later affirmed. The Supreme Court was therefore asked to consider two principal questions: first, whether a suit for partition of joint family property could, after the death of the minor, be pursued by his mother; and second, whether property devised under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy in favour of the defendants, including Butchi Tirupati, had become, by blending with the joint family estate, subject to the character of joint family property.

The Court held that the suit could indeed be continued by the mother after the minor’s death because the action was not based on a personal cause of action belonging to the minor. The right claimed was a proprietary right that attached to the minor and, upon his death even while still a minor, devolved upon his legal representative. The Court explained that a decree for partition granted in a suit instituted by a minor does not create a new right for the minor; rather, it merely recognises the existing right that accrued at the time the suit was filed. Consequently, the institution of the suit, subject to the Court’s determination that it was for the minor’s benefit, does not abate upon his death.

On the second question, the Court observed that the record contained no evidence that Butchi Tirupati had intentionally relinquished his interest in the property devised to him under the 1910 will in order to merge it with the joint family stock. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Lakshmama, as the mother of the minor, was entitled to a one‑fourth share in the devised property. The Court further clarified that separate or self‑acquired property of a Hindu joint‑family member may be treated as part of the joint family property only when the owner voluntarily throws it into the common pool with the intention of abandoning his separate claim.

In this case the Court observed that a suit for partition of joint family property that is filed on behalf of a Hindu minor does not terminate merely because the minor dies while the suit is pending. The suit may be continued by the minor’s legal representative and a decree may be obtained, provided that the Court is satisfied that the institution of the suit was intended to secure the minor’s benefit. The Court further held that the record contained no evidence showing that Butchi Tirupati, by any deliberate act or volition, gave up his interest in the property that had been devised to him under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy so as to cause that property to merge with the joint family estate. Consequently, the Court concluded that Lakshmama, who is the mother of the minor, was entitled to a one‑fourth share in the property at issue. The Court explained that a piece of property that is separate or self‑acquired by a member of a joint Hindu family may acquire the character of joint family property only when the owner voluntarily throws it into the common stock with a clear intention to abandon his separate claim. To establish such abandonment, the Court required a manifest intention to waive the separate right. The Court ruled that the mere fact that other members of the family were permitted to use the property jointly, or that the income of the separate property was spent out of generosity on persons to whom the owner owed no legal duty, or that the owner failed to keep separate accounts, does not amount to abandonment. Acts of generosity or kindness are not ordinarily regarded as an admission of a legal obligation. The Court relied on the precedent set in Kakumanu Peda Subbayyas v. Kakumanu Akkamma, [1959] S. C. R. 1249. The judgment was delivered in the Civil Appellate Jurisdiction in Civil Appeal No. 251 of 1961, which was an appeal from the judgment and decree dated 21 October 1955 of the former Andhra High Court in A. S. No. 64 of 1951. Counsel for the appellants and counsel for the respondent were listed, and the judgment was pronounced on 4 March 1963 by Justice Shah. The appeal, with a certificate granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, challenged the decree in Appeal No. 64 of 1951 that had modified the decree in Suit No. 111 of 1949 before the Subordinate Judge of Guddapah. A genealogical table was presented to clarify the relationships among the parties, showing that Butchi Tirupati was one of the six sons of Bala Konda and that Pulla Reddy and Lakshmama were the plaintiff and his mother, respectively.

In this case the widow of Butchi Tirupati filed Suit No 111 of 1949 before the Subordinate Judge at Cuddapah, seeking relief. She asked for partition and separate possession of her share in the joint‑family estate and for a one‑fourth share in property devised under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy dated 1 July 1910. At the time the suit was instituted her son, Pulla Reddy, was a minor, and consequently his mother Lakshmama acted as his next friend and represented his interests in the proceedings. During the pendency of the suit Pulla Reddy died, and the court records thereafter listed Lakshmama as the legal representative of the deceased minor for purposes of the suit. The Trial Court held that the property devised by the 1910 will in favour of Pedda Venkata (defendant 1), Chinna Venkata (defendant 2), Bala Venkata (defendant 5) and Butchi Tirupati had, by virtue of having become blended with the joint‑family estate, acquired the character of joint‑family property; on that basis the trial court concluded that Lakshmama was entitled to a one‑fifth share in all of the property that formed the subject of the suit. On appeal, the High Court modified the award with respect to the devised property, granting Lakshmama a one‑fourth share in the portion that had been devised under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy, while it affirmed the trial court’s decree that she should receive a one‑fifth share in the joint‑family estate. Defendant 2 (Chinna Venkata), Defendant 3 (Raju Konda) and Defendant 4 (Venkata Konda) challenged those findings before this Court, obtaining a certificate of appeal under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. Two questions remained for determination. The first question was whether Suit No 111 of 1949 for partition of the joint‑family property could be continued after the death of the minor Pulla Reddy by his mother Lakshmama, which required an inquiry into whether the suit had originally been instituted for the benefit of the minor, because established law holds that a court will not decree partition of joint‑family property in a suit filed by a Hindu minor through his next friend unless the court is satisfied that the partition will advance or protect the minor’s interest. The second question concerned whether the property devised under the 1910 will in favour of defendants 1, 2, 5 and Butchi Tirupati, having been blended with their joint‑family estate, could be said to have taken on the character of joint‑family property. For the purpose of answering these questions the Court set out the relevant facts. It was undisputed that at the time of his death in 1947 Butchi Tirupati was a member of a Hindu coparcenary that included himself, his five brothers and Pulla Reddy. Following Butchi Tirupati’s death, defendants 1, 2, 3 and 4 purported to partition the estate that remained in their possession and they executed a deed of partition, annexed as Exhibit A‑3, on 12 August 1948, with the minor Pulla Reddy being represented in the deed by the fourth defendant. That deed allocated certain parcels of land to the share of the first defendant, Pedda Venkata, but it remained silent on the dissolution of the joint‑family as a whole and on the allocation of shares to the other members of the family.

After the deed of partition dated 12 August 1948 failed to mention the other members of the family or to allocate shares to them, Lakshmama instituted a suit on behalf of herself and as next friend of her minor son. She sought a decree for partition of the share that she and her son claimed in the joint‑family estate and in the property that had been devised under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy. In the plaint she alleged that defendants 2, 3 and 4 had refused to give the minor, Pulla Reddy, his share in the estate, had driven her and the minor out of the family house, and had, with a view to prejudice the minor’s right, created a deed of partition that did not disclose the entire joint‑family estate. The first defendant largely admitted the plaintiffs’ claim to a share in the properties that were the subject of the suit. Defendants 2, 3 and 4, however, denied that they had driven the plaintiff and the minor away from the family house and asserted that separating the minor’s share from the joint‑family estate would be highly prejudicial to his interests. They contended that the property of Venkata Konda Reddy had passed by survivorship to their father Bala Konda and, after his death, had been taken by survivorship by his sons – the five defendants and Butchi Tirupati. They further argued that the will of Venkata Konda Reddy was not valid because it attempted to devise property that belonged to the joint family, and that, in any event, the property under that will had become blended with the joint‑family estate and was therefore treated as joint‑family property. On that basis they claimed that the blended property had been included in the partition deed of 12 August 1948. They also asserted that certain land items numbered 6, 7 and 8 in the schedule annexed to the plaint had been given to Chinnamma, sister of the contesting defendants, for her maintenance and consequently were not subject to partition.

The Trial Court held that partition of the joint‑family property would be for the benefit of the minor, Pulla Reddy, and the High Court affirmed that conclusion. The written statements filed by defendants 2, 3 and 4 revealed that maintaining the joint‑family status would prejudice the minor’s interest, and they denied that the items of property identified by the Court as joint‑family property were in fact of that character. They attempted to establish title in favour of their sister Chinnamma to certain property and pleaded that the property devised under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy had ceased to remain separate property of the devisees. The evidence on record demonstrated that the contesting defendants had made living in the joint‑family house difficult for Pulla Reddy and his mother, Lakshmama. Moreover, the partition deed of 12 August 1948, which incorporated only some of the joint‑family property for the purpose of partition, appeared to be an effort to create the impression that the property listed in the deed constituted the whole estate of the joint family.

In this case, the Court observed that the deed of partition appeared also to be an attempt to create evidence that the property described in the deed was the only estate of the joint family. The Court noted that, although a family estate is ordinarily better managed in unity rather than by division, the primary consideration in deciding whether to divide the estate at the request of a minor suitor is the interest of the minor. The Court further explained that if the conduct of the adult coparceners, or any claim made by them, is prejudicial to the minor’s interest, the Court will readily presume that division of the estate is for the benefit of the minor. The conclusion recorded by both the Trial Court and the High Court—that partition would be for the benefit of the minor—was found to be amply supported by the evidence on record. In view of this, the Court found it unnecessary to express any opinion on whether Lakshmama, on her own right, was entitled to file a suit for a share in the joint‑family property, or for the share of her husband Butchi Tirupati in the estate devised under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy, and to prosecute such a suit after the death of her son Pulla Reddy. The Court clarified that an action by a minor for a decree of partition and separate possession of his share in the family property is not founded on a cause of action personal to the minor; the right claimed is a right in property, which devolves upon his death even during minority upon his legal representative. The Court affirmed that it will direct partition only when partition is in the minor’s interest, a limitation imposed not because of any peculiarity in the minor’s estate but for the protection of his interest. The effect of a Court’s decision granting a decree for partition in a suit instituted by a minor is not to create a new right that the minor did not possess, but merely to recognise the right that accrued to him at the time the suit was commenced. It is the institution of the suit, subject to the Court’s decision, and not the decree itself, that brings about the severance. The Court referred to the decision in Kakumanu Peda Subbayyas v. Kakumanu Akkamma (1), where it was held that a suit filed on behalf of a Hindu minor for partition of joint‑family property does not abate on the minor’s death during the pendency of the suit, and may be continued by his legal representative and a decree obtained if the Court finds that the institution of the suit was for the minor’s benefit. Accordingly, the death of the minor Pulla Reddy during the pendency of the suit did not terminate the suit for partition of the property in question. The Court then proceeded to consider the second question, namely the quantum of interest awardable to Lakshmama in the property devised under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy.

Tirupati was the father of three sons, namely Venkata Konda Reddy, Pedda Tirupelu Reddy and Chinna Tirupelu Reddy. On 1 July 1910 Venkata Konda Reddy executed a will in which he bequeathed all of his property, which he asserted he had obtained by partition among himself and his brothers, to the four sons of his nephew Bala Konda. The four grandchildren named in the will were Pedda Venkata, Chinna Venkata, Bala Venkata and Butchi Tirupati, and each of them was born before the date of the will. The very next day, on 2 July 1910, Bala Konda instituted suit number 466 of 1910 before the District Munsif Court at Proddatur, seeking a division of the properties that he claimed were held jointly by him and his two uncles, Venkata Konda Reddy and Chinna Tirupelu Reddy. The suit proceeded, and on 26 June 1911 a decree was passed with the consent of all parties. The decree allotted the property in dispute into five equal shares; one share was assigned to Bala Konda and the remaining four shares were divided into two equal moieties, each moiety being taken by one of his two uncles. Venkata Konda Reddy died in 1915, and the portion of the property that fell to his share under the compromise decree passed to his four grandchildren, as provided by the disposition in his will. The defendants identified as numbers 2, 3 and 4 contend that the property devised by Venkata Konda Reddy’s will subsequently became part of the joint family estate through a process of blending, and therefore the plaintiffs should not be allowed to claim a share larger than the share they possessed in the joint family property. It is relevant to note that defendants 3 and 4 were born after the execution of Venkata Konda’s will and consequently were not among its devisees. The law governing the blending of separate property with joint family property is settled: a separate or self‑acquired asset of a member of a Hindu joint family can acquire the character of joint family property only if the owner voluntarily throws it into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his individual claim, and such abandonment must be demonstrated by a clear intention to waive the separate rights. The mere fact that other family members were permitted to use the property jointly, or that the income from the separate property was used generously to support persons to whom the holder was not legally bound, or that separate accounts were not maintained, does not suffice to infer abandonment, because acts of generosity or kindness are not ordinarily regarded as admissions of a legal obligation. It is true that Butchi Tirupati, one of the devisees under Venkata Konda’s will, was himself a member of the joint family comprising himself, his five brothers and his father Bala Konda. It is also true that the record contains no clear evidence regarding the manner in which the property was dealt with, nor any evidence concerning the appropriation of its income. Moreover, the evidence does not demonstrate that Butchi Tirupati consciously surrendered his interest in the devised property in order to blend it with the joint family estate. In the absence of such proof, the earlier finding that the plaintiff Lakshmama was entitled to a one‑fourth share in the property devised by Venkata Konda Reddy stands.

The Court observed that there was no proof that Butchi Tirupati, with a conscious act or deliberate intention, gave up his entitlement to the property granted to him by the will of Venkata Konda Reddy. Consequently, the record did not show that he voluntarily relinquished his share in order to merge it with the assets held by the joint family. Because the evidence proving such a surrender of interest was absent, the Court found that the High Court’s conclusion was legally sound. The High Court had held that Lakshmama was rightfully entitled to receive one quarter of the estate created by the testament of Venkata Konda Reddy. In its view, the lack of any indication that the property had been blended with the joint family estate supported the entitlement of Lakshmama to that one‑fourth share. Accordingly, the appellate Court concluded that the appeal challenging the High Court’s order could not succeed on its merits. The appeal was therefore dismissed and the parties were ordered to bear the costs of the proceedings as adjudicated. The final order recorded the dismissal of the appeal and imposed the costs on the appellant as required by law. The designation of a fourth share indicated that the testator had divided the property into four equal parts, and the High Court correctly recognized Lakshmama’s entitlement to one such part. Thus, the lower court’s determination aligned with the testator’s apparent intention as reflected in the will and upheld the statutory distribution scheme.