Karam Singh Sobti and Anr vs Shri Pratap Chand and Anr

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 392 of 1963

Decision Date: 29 August 1963

Coram: M. Hidayatullah, S.K. Das, K.C. Das Gupta

In this case, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 29 August 1963 in the matter of Karam Singh Sobti and another versus Shri Pratap Chand and another. The opinion was authored by Justice M Hidayatullah and the bench was composed of Justices M Hidayatullah, S K Das and K C Das Gupta. The parties are designated as petitioner Karam Singh Sobti and another and respondent Shri Pratap Chand and another. The decision is reported in 1965 AIR 83 and 1964 SCR (4) 673 and is also referenced as RF 1965 SC 87 (10). The issues concerned the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, specifically Section 57 and the meaning of the phrase “shall have regard to the provisions of this Act” in the first proviso of Section 57(2). The case also involved the Delhi Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, Section 35, and the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The factual dispute centered on a finding by a lower appellate court that a landlord had acquiesced in sub‑letting, and whether the High Court could interfere on the ground that there was no supporting evidence.

The headnote explains that Section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, which came into force on 9 June 1952, barred courts from ordering the eviction of a tenant at the instance of a landlord except in the situations enumerated in the proviso to that section. Clause (c) of the proviso authorized eviction where a tenant, before the commencement of the Act, sub‑let the premises without obtaining the landlord’s consent. Relying on this provision, the respondent landlord instituted a suit against the appellant and respondent number 2 seeking their removal from a shop‑room that had been let to respondent number 2. The landlord alleged that the premises had been sub‑let to the appellant without his consent. The appellant defended the suit by asserting that the landlord had, by his conduct, acquiesced in the sub‑letting. The trial judge dismissed the suit, holding that the landlord had not acquiesced. The appellant subsequently appealed the decision before the Additional Senior Sub‑judge. That judge set aside the trial judge’s decree, concluding that the landlord had indeed acquiesced in the sub‑letting and that the sub‑letting had commenced not later than November 1950.

The landlord then moved the High Court in revision under Section 35 of the 1952 Act. While the revision petition was pending, the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, came into force. Section 57 of the 1958 Act provides that (1) the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, insofar as it applied to the Union Territory of Delhi, is repealed; and (2) notwithstanding such repeal, all suits and other proceedings that were pending at the commencement of the 1958 Act shall continue and be disposed of as if the 1952 Act remained in force, as if the 1958 Act had not been enacted. The provision further states that in any such suit or proceeding for the fixation of standard rent or for the eviction of a tenant from premises to which Section 54 does not apply, the court or other authority shall have regard to the provisions of the 1958 Act.

The Court observed that the provision stating “court or other authority shall have regard to the provisions of this Act: Provided further that the provisions for under the said Act shall continue in force in respect of suit and proceedings disposed of thereunder” required interpretation. It held that, because of subsection (2) of section 57 of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958, the revision proceeding had to be disposed of according to the rules of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952. The Court further found that no material evidence existed to support the appellate court’s conclusion that respondent No 2 had acquiesced in the sub‑letting to the appellant. On this basis the High Court allowed the revision petition, and the appellant thereafter filed an appeal before this Court.

In its judgment the Court stated that the High Court was authorized under section 35 of the 1952 Act to set aside the findings of the lower court on the question of acquiescence where such findings were not backed by any evidence. It explained that a finding reached without evidential support could not be said to have been decided “according to law” as contemplated by section 35. The Court cited the authorities Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhai Lall Chowdhury, [1962] Supp. I SCR 933; Pooran Chand v. Motilal, [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 906; and Lala Beni Ram v. Kundan Lal, (1899) LR 26 IA 58 in support of this proposition. It also held that the appellant’s right to contest the trial judge’s decree by way of appeal was not defeated by the failure of respondent No 2 to lodge an appeal of its own.

Justice Das, Acting Chief Justice, and Justice Hidaytullah, speaking for the majority, addressed the dissent of Justice Sarkar. They explained that the first proviso to section 57(2) of the 1958 Act did not require that a suit for eviction filed under the 1952 Act be governed wholly by the newer legislation. The applicable law would remain that of the 1952 Act, with the addition that any modifications or clarifications introduced by the 1958 Act should be applied where they merely amend or clarify existing provisions. Where the 1958 Act creates entirely new rights or liabilities, those new provisions could not override the provisions of the 1952 Act. The Court observed that if the phrase “shall have regard to the provisions of this Act” in the first proviso were read to mean that the 1958 Act applies to all suits and proceedings mentioned in section 57(2) except for the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the substantive effect of section 57(2) would be substantially weakened. Moreover, such a reading would give retrospective effect to the 1958 Act, contrary to the clear wording of section 57(2) which declares that all suits and proceedings pending at the commencement of the new Act shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the old Act.

In this case, the Court explained that matters that arose under the new Act were to be dealt with according to the provisions of the old Act. The proper method, the Court said, was to read the first proviso in harmony with the substantive provision of section 57(2). According to Justice Sarkar, the phrase “shall have regard to the provisions of the new Act” in section 57(2) of the 1958 Act gives a retrospective effect to all the provisions of the 1958 Act, not only to some of them. The Court clarified that those words do not indicate an intention to apply only certain provisions of the new Act, because interpreting them that way would effectively nullify the first part of the subsection. The expression “suits and other proceedings” in subsection (2) of section 57 of the 1958 Act, the Court held, embraces appeals and revision cases as well. The Court then listed numerous authorities that support this interpretation, including Hari Shankar v. Rao Giridhari Lal Choudhary [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 933; Pooran Chand v. Motilal, [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 906; Lala Beni’ Ram v. Kundan Lal, (1899) L.R. 26 I.A. 58; Mukesh Chand v. Jamboo Parshad, (1963) LXV P.L.R. 285; Shri Kishore Aggarwal v. Satya Dev, (1959) LXI P.L.R. 574; Jhabar Mal Chokhani v. Jinendra Parshad (1963) LXV P.L.R. 469; Ryots of Garbandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 129; Mysore States Electricity Board v. The Bangalore Woollen Cotton & Silk Mills Ltd. [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 127; Bulaqui Das v. Ram 42-2 S.C. India/64. 650 Saran, (1960) LXIII P.L.R. 231; Jiva Bhai Purshottam v. Chhagan Karson, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 568; Bimal Parshad Jain v. Niadarmal, (1960) LXII P.L.R. 664; and Man Mohan Lal v. B. D. Gupta, (1962) LXIV P.L.R. 51. After citing these authorities, the judgment proceeded to the formal heading of the case. The document identified the civil appellate jurisdiction, noting that it was Civil Appeal No. 392 of 1963, taken on special leave from a December 13, 1962 order of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench at Delhi) in Civil Revision No. 427‑D of 1957. The counsel for the appellants were listed as Bishan Narain, O. C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain and J. B. Dadachanji, while the counsel for respondent 1 were A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and K. K. Jain, and counsel for respondent 2 was S. N. Andley. The date of the judgment was August 29, 1963. The judgment was delivered by Acting Chief Justice S. K. Das, with Justice M. Hidayatullah also participating, and a dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Sarkar. Acting Chief Justice S. K. Das expressed regret that his conclusion differed from that of his learned brother Justice Sarkar concerning the true scope and effect of section 57 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, hereinafter referred to as the Control Act of 1958. The Court noted that the Control Act of 1958 repealed the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, insofar as that earlier Act applied to the Union Territory of Delhi, but that the 1958 Act retained certain savings for “suits and proceedings” that were pending at the commencement of the 1958 Act. The Court indicated that these savings would be addressed later, and that the factual background giving rise to the appeal had been fully set out in Justice Sarkar’s judgment, and therefore need not be repeated.

In this appeal, the factual background had already been set out in detail by the earlier judgment, so the Court did not repeat those facts. The respondent, Pratap Chand, sought eviction of the appellant from room number 6 in Pratap Buildings, Connaught Circus, New Delhi, and based his claim on clause (c), sub‑clause (i) of the proviso to section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. Section 13(1) provides that, notwithstanding any other law or contract, no court shall grant a decree for recovery of possession of premises to a landlord against a tenant, unless the case falls within the limited exceptions enumerated in the proviso. One such exception, set out in clause (c), sub‑clause (i), applies where, before the commencement of the 1952 Act, a tenant has sub‑let, assigned, or otherwise transferred possession of the whole or part of the premises without obtaining the landlord’s consent. The principal question for determination, therefore, was whether the landlord‑respondent could rely upon this particular exception to obtain possession. The trial judge, in a decree dated 11 June 1956, ruled in favour of the landlord, having decided that the landlord had not acquiesced in the sub‑letting and thus was entitled to possession. An appeal was subsequently heard by the Additional Senior Subordinate Judge of Delhi. That judge found that the sub‑letting commenced no later than November 1950 and that, thereafter, the landlord continued to receive rent with full knowledge of the sub‑letting. On the basis of these findings, the Subordinate Judge concluded that the landlord could not invoke the exception in clause (c), sub‑clause (i) of the proviso, and accordingly denied the landlord’s reliance upon it. The Subordinate Judge delivered his judgment on 11 June 1957, all of which occurred before the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, came into force on 9 February 1959. On 26 August 1957, the landlord filed a revision before the High Court of Punjab under section 35 of the 1952 Act. While this revision was pending, the 1958 Act became effective. The High Court observed that there was no evidence to support the Subordinate Judge’s finding that the landlord had acquiesced in the sub‑letting, and therefore it was open to the High Court to interfere with the revision. The High Court also considered the true scope and effect of section 57 of the 1958 Act and held that, by virtue of sub‑section (2) of that provision, the revision had to be adjudicated according to the provisions of the 1952 Act. Consequently, the High Court allowed the revision, set aside the appellate decision, and restored the trial court’s decree for possession.

The High Court observed that there was no evidence to support the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the respondent‑landlord had consented to the sub‑letting of the room to the appellant. Because the case lacked any evidential basis for that finding, the High Court held that it was within its power to intervene on the revision application. The issue of the actual scope and effect of section 57 of the Control Act of 1958 was raised before the High Court. After examining that provision, the High Court concluded that, by virtue of sub‑section (2) of section 57 of the 1958 Act, the revision before it had to be decided according to the rules laid down in the Control Act of 1952. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the petition for revision, set aside the earlier appellate decision, and restored the decree for possession that had been issued by the trial court.

Subsequently, the appellant applied to this Court for special leave to appeal. After the grant of special leave, the appellant filed the present appeal challenging the judgment and order of the High Court dated 13 December 1962. The Court expressed complete concurrence with the conclusions reached by Justice Sarkar, J. on three specific points: first, whether the High Court was competent, on a revision application, to set aside the finding of the lower appellate court on the issue of acquiescence; second, whether the High Court was correct in holding that the record contained no evidence to substantiate the Subordinate Judge’s finding of acquiescence; and third, whether the appeal before the Subordinate Judge was maintainable in the absence of an appeal by the Automobile Association of Upper India. Based on these agreed conclusions, the respondent‑landlord would be entitled to succeed unless the operation of section 57 of the Control Act of 1958 prevented that outcome.

If the provisions of the 1958 Act were to apply, then sub‑section (1) of section 14 of that Act would bar the respondent‑landlord, because the sub‑letting in the present matter did not occur on or after 9 June 1952. Consequently, the exception provided in clause (b) of the proviso to sub‑section (1) of section 14 of the 1958 Act would not be available. Thus the narrow question before the Court is whether the present case is governed by clause (c)(i) of the proviso to sub‑section (1) of section 13 of the Control Act of 1952, or whether it falls under the provisions of the Control Act of 1958. The answer to that question depends on the true scope and effect of section 57 of the Control Act of 1958. The Court then reads the text of section 57, which provides: “57. (1) The Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, in so far as it is applicable to the Union territory of Delhi, is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits and other proceedings under the …”

The provision required that any suit or other proceeding that had been started under the earlier Act and was still pending at the moment the new Act became operative must be carried forward and finally decided in accordance with the rules of the earlier Act, as if that Act had never been repealed. However, where the pending matter concerned a suit or proceeding for fixing a standard rent or for evicting a tenant from premises to which section 54 did not apply, the court or other authority hearing the case was directed to also have regard to the provisions of the new Act. In addition, the clause provided that the appeal provisions contained in the earlier Act would continue to apply to any suits and proceedings that were finally disposed of under that earlier regime. Two questions therefore arose from section 57. First, it was unmistakably clear that if sub‑section (2) of section 57 were read in isolation, the present case would fall under the provisions of the Control Act of 1952, assuming that an application in revision qualified as a “proceeding” within the meaning of that sub‑section. The difficulty lay in interpreting the two provisos attached to sub‑section (2). The initial issue concerned the true scope and effect of the first proviso, specifically the meaning of the phrase “shall have regard to the provisions of this Act.” The second issue was whether an application in revision fell within the expression “suits and proceedings” in sub‑section (2) by virtue of the second proviso, which made a special provision for appeals. The Court noted that if it were to decide against the appellant on the first question and hold that the revision application, assuming it was a proceeding under sub‑section (2), must be dealt with according to the 1952 Act, then the second question would become unnecessary and would not need to be answered in this case. Consequently, the Court chose to address the first question, whose answer would be decisive for the appeal. The Court further observed that section 57 of the Control Act of 1958 had been examined in several decisions of the Punjab High Court, and it would refer to those decisions later. Before analyzing the specific language of the section, the Court intended to consider the question on general principles of statutory construction, keeping in mind the words used in the provision. A brief reference to the overall scheme of the two Control Acts was also appropriate. Chapter XI of the Control Act of 1952 dealt with the concept of standard rent and included provisions concerning other charges that a landlord might impose, the dominant purpose of which was to prevent the collection of rent in excess of the standard amount and to prohibit unlawful additional charges. Chapter III of the same Act dealt with the control of eviction of tenants and contained section 13, which had already been mentioned. Chapter IV addressed hotels and lodging houses, a subject that was not relevant to the present dispute, and therefore required no further discussion.

No reference was required to the provisions contained in that chapter. Chapter V of the 1952 Control Act dealt with the jurisdiction of courts, the procedure for appeals, review and revision, while Chapter VI contained miscellaneous provisions. It was necessary to note that Chapter V granted ordinary civil courts the power and jurisdiction to hear suits for recovery of possession of all premises defined in the Act, and it also gave the parties the usual right of appeal from the first civil court and the right to move the High Court in revision against the appellate judgment. The definition of “premises” in the Act expressly excluded rooms that formed part of a hotel or a lodging house. For matters involving hotels and lodging houses, the Act assigned jurisdiction to a Controller who would be appointed by the Central Government.

The Control Act of 1958 introduced radical changes in many areas, including the eviction of tenants, which was the subject of the present appeal. Under the 1958 Act, jurisdiction to order recovery of possession of premises on any of the grounds specified in the proviso to section 14 was placed in a Controller appointed under section 35. Section 16 of the 1958 Act imposed restrictions on sub‑letting. It declared that any premises sub‑let, whether in whole or in part, on or after 9 June 1952 without the landlord’s written consent could not be considered lawfully sub‑let. However, if a tenant had sub‑let the whole or any part of the premises before 9 June 1952 and the sub‑tenant was in occupation at the commencement of the 1958 Act, the premises would be deemed lawfully sub‑let even though the landlord’s consent had not been obtained. Section 17 required the sub‑tenant to give notice to the landlord, and section 18 provided that, in certain circumstances, the sub‑tenant would be treated as the tenant. Although the detailed provisions of sections 16, 17 and 18 were not directly relevant to the present case, it was important to emphasise that the 1958 Act fundamentally altered the law relating to eviction of tenants on the ground of sub‑letting. The critical date for determining the lawfulness of a sub‑letting was fixed as 9 June 1952, the date on which the 1952 Control Act came into force. Sub‑letting that occurred before that date was regarded as lawful if the sub‑tenant occupied the premises at the commencement of the 1958 Act, whereas any sub‑letting that took place after that date without the landlord’s prior written consent was treated as unlawful for the purposes of the 1958 Act. The discussion then proceeded to consider section 57 of the Control Act.

In this case the Court examined section 57 of the 1958 Act in the context of the overall scheme of the two Control Acts that had been described earlier. The first sub‑section of section 57 expressly repeals the 1952 Control Act to the extent that it applied in the Union Territory of Delhi. The Court noted that, if the repeal operated in isolation, the General Clauses Act of 1897 would determine the legal effect of the repeal, meaning that the repeal would not disturb any earlier operation of the repealed enactment, nor affect any act done or suffered under it, nor alter any right, privilege, obligation or liability that had been acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed law. However, the Court observed that the General Clauses Act ceases to apply where the repealing legislation demonstrates a different intention. That intention, the Court said, is unmistakably expressed in sub‑section (2) of section 57, which contains a saving clause. Sub‑section (2) provides that, notwithstanding the repeal of the 1952 Act, all suits and proceedings that were pending under the 1952 Act at the moment the 1958 Act commenced must continue and be disposed of according to the provisions of the 1952 Act, as if the 1952 Act had never been repealed and the 1958 Act had not been enacted. The Court emphasized that this saving provision is the most forceful expression of legislative intent in this context. The Court recalled its earlier observation that, if sub‑section (2) were read without the accompanying provisos, the case would unequivocally be governed by the 1952 Act. The issue before the Court, therefore, was whether the first proviso to sub‑section (2) altered that position and, if so, to what degree. The first proviso, the Court explained, states inter‑alia that in eviction matters involving a tenant of premises to which section 54 does not apply, the court or other authority must “have regard to” the provisions of the 1958 Act. The Court noted that section 54 need not be considered because it merely preserves the operation of certain statutes that are inapplicable to the premises under consideration. The Court then questioned the meaning of the phrase “shall have regard to the provisions of this Act,” referring to the 1958 Act, asking whether this phrase rescinds the effect of sub‑section (2) except for jurisdictional questions concerning civil courts dealing with eviction matters pending when the 1958 Act came into force. The Court rejected that interpretation, expressing its inability to agree with such a reading of the first proviso. Instead, the Court held that the first proviso must be read in harmony with the substantive saving provision of sub‑section (2). To achieve this harmony, the Court adopted the view endorsed by the Punjab High Court, namely that the words “shall have regard to” should be understood as requiring the court to consider the 1958 Act’s provisions where they modify or clarify the 1952 Act, without displacing the saving effect of sub‑section (2).

In this case the Court explained that the words “the provisions of this Act” should be understood to mean that whenever the new Act has made a slight modification or clarification of the earlier law, those modifications and clarifications must be applied. The Court found no alternative way of reconciling sub‑section (2) with the first proviso that would be consistent with that meaning. The Court noted a similar expression in section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, which had been addressed by this Court in the decision of Mysore State Electricity Board v. The Bangalore Woolen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. and others. In that decision the Court referred to the Privy Council judgment in Ryots of Garbandro v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi and concurred with the Privy Council’s view that the phrase “have regard to” or “having regard to” does not possess a special technical meaning beyond its ordinary usage; it merely requires that the provisions to which regard must be given be taken into consideration. The Court observed that if the phrase in the first proviso to sub‑section (2) were interpreted to mean that the provisions of the Control Act of 1958 must apply to every suit or proceeding mentioned in sub‑section (2) except for the question of civil‑court jurisdiction, then the substantive effect of sub‑section (2) would be substantially weakened for all practical purposes. The Court held that such a reading would be inappropriate. It rejected the argument advanced before it that the first proviso concerned only two matters—fixed standard rent and eviction of a tenant—and that, for those two matters alone, the Control Act of 1958 should apply and not the new Act. The Court explained that if that had been the intention, the legislature could have simply inserted a clear clause in sub‑section (2) stating, “Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits and other proceedings under the said Act except those for fixation of standard rent and eviction of a tenant shall be governed by the new Act.” Since sub‑section (2) contains no such wording, the Court could not interpret the proviso in the manner suggested by the appellant, as doing so would affect the jurisdictional provisions of the new Act and limit the civil court’s power to pass an eviction decree. The Court then examined the Punjab High Court decisions. In Shri Krishna Aggarwal v. Satya Dev the High Court had held that the first proviso to sub‑section (2) of section 57 was directory rather than mandatory, granting courts and authorities discretion to consider the new Act’s provisions when appropriate and in the interest of justice. While noting that earlier decision, the Court said it would not rely on it as the basis of its own judgment. Instead, the Court concluded that the proper approach is to read sub‑section (2) together with its first proviso in a manner that harmonises both provisions as fully and consistently as possible.

In the decision Bulaqi Das Madan Moha & others v. Ram Sarup (1) the court expressed the view that the proviso must possess meaning and effect, and that the intention of the proviso was that when the old provisions were repeated with modifications, the old Act should be read in the light of those modifications provided that such modifications did not create new rights or liabilities. The same judge articulated a comparable view in Shri Bimal Parshad Jain v. Shri Niadarmal (2). The issue was later examined by a Division Bench in Shri Jhabar Mal Chokhani v. Shri Jinendra Pershad (3). At pages 474 and 475 of the report, Justice Dulat, speaking for the Bench, observed: “It would thus appear that apart from Gosain, the other learned judges of this court have generally agreed that the proviso to s. 57, sub‑section (2), does not demand that a suit for the eviction of a tenant filed under the previous Act of 1952 must be governed entirely by the provisions of the new Act but that, on the other hand, the provisions applicable continue to be the provisions of the old Act with this addition that, where the new Act has slightly modified or clarified the previous provisions, those modifications and clarifications should be applied, but, where entirely new rights and new liabilities have been created, the new provisions must not be allowed to override the provisions of the previous Act, and nearly all the cases have been decided on that basis.” The Court agreed with the view expressed by Justice Dulat. It also concurred with the High Court that if the first proviso to sub‑section (2) of s. 57 were interpreted in the manner advanced by the appellant, it would effectively give retrospective effect to the provisions of the Control Act of 1958, even though sub‑section (2) of s. 57 plainly states that all suits and proceedings pending at the commencement of the new Act shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the old Act. This reasoning essentially restates that the proviso must be read harmoniously with the substantive provision. (1) (1960) LXII P.I.R. 231. (2) (1960) LXII P.I.R. 664. (3) (1963) LXV P.L.R. 469. For the reasons outlined, the Court concluded that in the present matter the respondent‑landlord was entitled to the benefit of clause (c), sub‑clause (i) of the proviso to s. 13(1) of the Control Act of 1952, and that the first proviso to sub‑clause (2) of s. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 did not impede that entitlement. Consequently, the respondent‑landlord was entitled to succeed because the appellant had failed to demonstrate any acquiescence by the landlord to the alleged sub‑letting. Accordingly, the High Court was correct in allowing the petition in revision and in restoring the decree for possession originally granted by the trial court. The appeal therefore failed and was dismissed with costs. SARKAR J.‑The respondent Pratap Chand, hereafter referred to as the respondent, who was the owner of

Prasad, the owner of Pratap Buildings situated at Connaught Circus in New Delhi, had leased room number six in that building to the Automobile Association of Upper India, which was previously known as the Automobile Association of Northern India and is referred to in the proceedings as the Association. The Association, in turn, permitted a further occupant, identified as the appellant, to occupy the same room as a sub‑tenant. These factual circumstances were not contested by any party. On the fifth day of October in the year 1959, the landlord served a formal notice of termination upon the Association. Subsequently, on the twenty‑fifth day of December 1954, the landlord instituted a civil suit against both the Association and the appellant seeking their removal from the premises. The present appeal emanated from that suit, and the central question presented for determination was whether the appellant could be lawfully evicted under the applicable rent‑control legislation.

The governing statute for the dispute was Section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Act of 1952, which had become operative on the ninth of June 1952. Section 13 categorically prohibited a court from ordering the eviction of a tenant at the instance of a landlord, except in the limited circumstances enumerated in the proviso appended to that provision. Clause (c) of the proviso permitted a decree for recovery of possession where the court was satisfied that, prior to the commencement of the Act, the tenant had, without obtaining the landlord’s consent, sub‑let, assigned, or otherwise transferred possession of the whole or any part of the premises. The landlord relied upon this particular clause in asserting that the Association had sub‑let the shop‑room to the appellant without obtaining the requisite consent, and that the landlord became aware of this unauthorized sub‑letting towards the end of May 1954.

The Association did not present a vigorous defence to the suit, whereas the appellant contested the landlord’s claim. Both the Association and the appellant admitted that the landlord’s consent had not been obtained before the sub‑letting began. Nevertheless, the appellant argued that the landlord possessed full knowledge of his occupation of the shop‑room as a sub‑tenant, that the landlord continued to accept rent from the Association with that knowledge, and that such conduct amounted to an implied acquiescence in the sub‑letting. Accordingly, the appellant contended that the landlord was not entitled to an eviction order on the ground of unauthorised sub‑letting.

At the trial level, the learned judge rendered a judgment dated the eleventh of June 1956. In that judgment the trial judge concluded that the landlord had not acquiesced in the unauthorised sub‑letting and, on that basis, ordered the eviction of both the Association and the appellant. The appellant then appealed pursuant to Section 34 of the 1952 Act before the Additional Senior Sub‑Judge of Delhi. The appellate judge examined the evidence and held that the sub‑letting had commenced no later than November 1950 and that the landlord had continued to receive rent while being fully aware of the sub‑letting arrangement. Consequently, the appellate judge determined that the landlord was not entitled to a decree for recovery of possession, set aside the trial judge’s order, dismissed the suit, and delivered his judgment on the eleventh of June 1957.

Following the appellate decision, the landlord filed a revision petition before the High Court of Punjab on the twenty‑sixth of August 1957, invoking Section 35 of the Act. While this revision petition was pending, the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 was enacted, thereby repealing the 1952 Act but preserving certain provisions of the repealed legislation for pending matters. The revision proceedings therefore raised the further issue of which statutory provisions of the new Act, if any, should govern the pending case.

The Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 repealed the earlier Act of 1952, yet it preserved certain provisions of the repealed statute for application to matters that were already pending when the new legislation came into force. Consequently, a central issue in the present appeal was to determine which specific provisions of the 1958 Act should govern the outstanding proceedings. In the revision petition filed by the respondent, two principal contentions were advanced. First, the respondent challenged the Senior Sub‑Judge’s finding that the landlord had acquiesced in the sub‑letting. Second, the respondent argued that, irrespective of that finding, the appellate judgment was erroneous because the tenant – the Association – had not appealed against the trial judge’s decree of ejectment. The respondent maintained that the unappealed decree remained effective, thereby terminating the tenancy, and that the appellant, who held possession only through the Association, consequently possessed no legal right to remain in the demised premises. In response, the appellant defended the Additional Senior Sub‑Judge’s decision on its merits, denying that the failure of the Association to appeal extinguished the appellant’s rights. The appellant further asserted that, pursuant to section 57(2) of the 1958 Act – a provision to be considered later – the landlord’s entitlement to possession must be adjudicated under the 1958 Act, and that, under section 16 of that same Act, the landlord was not entitled on the facts found to an order of ejectment for sub‑letting without consent. The High Court did not conduct a single consolidated hearing of all the issues; instead, it heard the matters in several stages. After considering the evidence, the Court concluded that the tenant’s failure to appeal did not deprive the sub‑tenant of a right to relief; that there was no material evidence supporting the appellate Court’s conclusion that the landlord had acquiesced in the sub‑letting; that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court permitted it to set aside the lower appellate Court’s finding on that ground; and that section 57(2) of the 1958 Act did not oblige the High Court, while exercising its revisional powers, to resolve the landlord’s right to possession by reference to the 1958 Act. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the revision petition and reinstated the trial Court’s decree for possession. This judgment of the High Court is now under challenge in the present appeal.

The foremost question before this Court is whether the High Court possessed the competence to exercise its revisional jurisdiction by overturning the lower appellate Court’s finding that the landlord had acquiesced in the sub‑letting. The revision petition was filed under section 35 of the 1952 Act, which empowers the High Court to examine whether the decision of the inferior court was rendered “according to law”. In the precedent of Harz Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Choudhury, this Court held that a revision petition under section 35 does not authorise the High Court to interfere with a plain finding of fact. The respondent relied on that precedent to argue that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to disturb the lower appellate Court’s factual determination of acquiescence. However, the Court distinguished the present case on the ground that, unlike the cited authority where evidence existed to support the lower court’s finding and the High Court merely re‑assessed that evidence, the present revision involved a finding that was unsupported by any evidence. When a court reaches a conclusion without evidential basis, it cannot be said to have decided the matter “according to law”. This principle was later affirmed in Pooran Chand v. Motilal and was also referenced in Lala Beni Ram v. Kundan, which was cited on behalf of the respondent. The analysis therefore turns on whether the High Court’s intervention was justified given the lack of evidential support for the acquiescence finding, and whether such intervention falls within the scope of its statutory revisional powers under section 35 of the 1952 Act.

The Court observed that Section 35 of the 1952 Act did not empower the High Court to disturb a plain finding of fact. Counsel for the appellant relied on a previous decision to argue that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to overturn the lower appellate Court’s finding of acquiescence. The Court noted, however, that in the cited case there was material evidence capable of supporting the finding reached by the lower court, and the High Court had merely reassessed the weight of that evidence—a step it was not permitted to take. The Court distinguished that situation, citing the decision reported at (1) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 933, as fundamentally different from the present case where the High Court interfered on the ground that no evidence existed to back the finding. The Court held that a finding arrived at without any evidential foundation could not be said to have been decided “according to law,” referring to Pooran Chand v. Motilal. The Court also referred to the authority Lala Beni Ram v. Kundan, cited for the respondent, which described acquiescence as a matter of legal inference drawn from established facts rather than a factual question itself. Consequently, the Court posed the question of whether the High Court was correct in concluding that the record contained no evidence to support an inference of acquiescence. The only evidence, the Court said, was that the respondent knew the appellant occupied the demised premises. The Court agreed with the High Court that mere knowledge by a landlord that a person other than the tenant was in possession does not automatically infer that the landlord knew that person to be a sub‑tenant. Such an inference, the Court reiterated, was difficult to draw in the present circumstances.

To assess the factual matrix, the Court recounted the history of the appellant’s occupation. The appellant had taken possession of the room sometime in 1949 and remained there until November 1950, sharing the premises with an Association. During that period he published a magazine titled the All India Motorist, which served as the official organ of the Association, under an agreement that provided “office accommodation for the staff of the A.I. Motorist to be provided by the Association in 6, Pratap Buildings.” The appellant, who at one time served as General Secretary of the Association, was constantly on the premises conducting both the Association’s work and his own business. In November 1950 the Association relocated to another premises because the demised room proved too small for its expanding activities. From that point onward, the appellant held sole possession of the room and continued his businesses there, including the publication of the Association’s official organ. In May 1954 the agreement between the Association and the appellant for printing and publishing the magazine was terminated, and the Association began publishing its own magazine. The Court cited the decisions (1) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 906 and (2) [1899] L.R. 26 I.A. 58 in relation to the subsequent developments, noting that after May 1954 the appellant occupied the room solely for his own purposes. The Court concluded that these facts did not establish that the respondent had any reason to infer that the appellant was a sub‑tenant from November 1950 onward, and therefore the High Court’s view was not erroneous.

In the factual record the appellant was the only person using the room for his own purposes after May 1954. The Court observed that the evidence did not show that the respondent had any reason to believe that, from the commencement of the sub‑tenancy in November 1950, the appellant was in possession as a sub‑tenant, because up to that date the appellant had been using the room for the work of the Association. Only after May 1954 did the appellant occupy the room exclusively for his personal business. Consequently, the respondent could reasonably have thought that the appellant’s occupation prior to 1954 was essentially on behalf of the Association. The Court further noted that, since 1954, the respondent had never accepted any rent from the appellant. On the basis of these facts the Court could not accept the proposition that the view taken by the High Court was erroneous.

The Court then considered the appellant’s reliance on the decision in Mukesh Chand v. Lamboo Parshad (1). The Court noted that, in that case, the court had held that knowledge of possession, on the particular facts, amounted to evidence of possession under a licence. However, the Court held that it was unnecessary to pronounce on the correctness of that decision because the present dispute turned on a different question: whether knowledge of possession can be treated as evidence of possession under a contract of sub‑tenancy. The Court also recorded that counsel had raised the point that, even if acquiescence by the respondent had been proved, such acquiescence would not have barred the landlord’s statutory right to recover possession when a sub‑letting had been made without the landlord’s consent. As no evidence of acquiescence was established, the Court found it unnecessary to address that argument.

The next issue concerned the appellant’s right to appeal when the Association chose not to appeal the trial Court’s decree. The Court found no difficulty on this point. The suit had been filed against both the tenant, namely the Association, and the sub‑tenant, namely the appellant, and a single decree had been passed by the trial judge against both parties. The appellant possessed an independent right to appeal that decree, a right that could not be defeated by the Association’s decision not to lodge an appeal. Because there was only one decree, the appellant was entitled to have it set aside, even though setting it aside would also release the Association from the decree. The appellant could contend that the decree was erroneous and should be set aside on the ground that it was based on a mistaken finding that the respondent had not acquiesced in the sub‑letting by the Association to the appellant. The appellant could raise any other ground of appeal available to him. Accordingly, the lower appellate Court was fully competent to entertain the appellant’s appeal against the joint ejectment decree and to grant whatever relief the appellant was entitled to, notwithstanding the Association’s lack of appeal.

Finally, the Court turned to the last and more difficult point raised in the appeal, which concerned the interpretation of section 57 of the Act of 1958. The Court indicated that this question would be considered next.

The Court began by setting out the relevant provision of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1958. Section 57 of that Act reads as follows: Sub‑section (1) declares that the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, insofar as it applies to the Union Territory of Delhi, is repealed. Sub‑section (2) then provides that, notwithstanding the repeal, any suit or other proceeding that was pending at the commencement of the 1958 Act and that was instituted under the repealed Act shall continue to be heard and decided according to the provisions of the repealed Act, as if that Act had never been repealed and the 1958 Act had not been enacted. The provision goes on to add a first proviso stating that, in any such proceeding involving the fixation of standard rent or the eviction of a tenant from premises to which section 54 does not apply, the court or other authority must have regard to the provisions of the 1958 Act. A second proviso follows, providing that the appellate provisions that existed under the repealed Act shall remain in force for suits and proceedings that are finally disposed of under that Act.

The appellant argued that the first proviso to sub‑section (2) of section 57 required the High Court, when deciding the revision petition concerning an ejectment claim, to apply the 1958 Act in the same manner as the repealed Act. The appellant further contended that, because section 16 of the 1958 Act prohibited the passing of an ejectment decree against either the Association or the appellant under the facts of the present case, the High Court’s decree ordering eviction was legally untenable. In response, the respondent advanced a two‑part answer. First, it asserted that the proviso merely obliged the court to “have regard to” the provisions of the 1958 Act, meaning that only those provisions of the new statute that merely clarified or modified the old law could be applied, and no other provisions of the 1958 Act could affect the case. According to that view, the new Act would offer no assistance to the appellant.

The respondent’s first contention relied on a decision of the Punjab High Court, but the Court expressed inability to accept that reasoning as correct. The Court noted the earliest relevant authority of the Delhi High Court, Shri Krishna Aggarwal v. Satya Dev (1), which held that the first proviso conferred a discretion on the court to apply the provisions of the 1958 Act when the interests of justice required such application. The Court observed, however, that later decisions have abandoned that view, expressly rejecting it in the most recent case, Jhabar Mal Chokhani v. Jinendra Parshad (2). Since that later authority had not been raised before the Court, the Court deemed further discussion unnecessary. The Court emphasized that an interpretation which makes the substantive rights of the parties contingent upon a court’s discretionary choice is untenable. The Court also considered the various reasons presented to support the argument that the first proviso limited the effect of the 1958 Act to only those provisions that were modifications or clarifications of the repealed Act, and found none of those reasons to be persuasively founded.

It was argued that the expression “have regard to” supports the view that the first proviso merely allows the court to consider the provisions of the new Act, and that this argument relied upon the decision in Ryats of Garbandho v. Zemindar of Parliakimedi (3) as cited in Jhabar Mal’s case (2). In the Parliakimedi case the Judicial Committee was reported to have held that the words meant that the relevant provisions must be taken into consideration, but that compliance with them was not mandatory. The present analysis, however, notes that the Judicial Committee’s observation was qualified by a caution that “any general interpretation of such a phrase is dangerous and unnecessary,” and that the decision was directed at the statute then before it, not at the present situation. Consequently, the Court is unable to see how the Parliakimedi decision supports the proposition for which it was cited in Jhabar Mal’s case (2). In that earlier case the words were given a meaning that compliance with the indicated provisions was optional, a meaning that no party seeks to impose in the present matter, where the contention that the first proviso confers a discretionary power on the court has already been rejected.

The Court further observes that the Parliakimedi case (3) does not constitute authority for the proposition that the phrase “shall have regard to the provisions of this Act” imposes an obligation to apply only those provisions of the new Act that are merely modifications or clarifications of the earlier Act, which is the meaning advanced by the respondent. The Judicial Committee in Parliakimedi was not addressing a situation in which two statutes existed, one of which had been repealed, whereas the present case involves precisely that circumstance; therefore the two cases are wholly different. Likewise, the decision of this Court in Mysore State Electricity Board v. The Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. (1), where the same words were considered, offers even less assistance.

Another argument presented by the respondent was that the rule against granting a statute more retrospective effect than its language requires, as discussed in Shri Krishna’s case (2), should limit the operation of the proviso. A similar view had been expressed in Bulaqui Das v. Ram Sarup (3), where it was suggested that the proviso should be read so that only those provisions of the new Act that modify the old would apply, thereby disturbing vested rights as little as possible. The Court, however, cannot agree with that approach. The words “shall have regard to the provisions of this Act” confer retrospective operation on those provisions, and there is nothing in the language to restrict the scope of that operation to a subset of the provisions. The general principle that a statute is not presumed to have retrospective effect does not justify narrowing the operation where the words themselves do not indicate any limitation. Accordingly, the Court finds no basis to construe the phrase “shall have regard to the provisions of this Act” as imposing any limitation on its retrospective application.

The Court observed that the issue had arisen in the precedent known as Parlakimedi case (see reference 4) and noted that the ordinary meaning of the words does not change when those words are employed in a clause that gives a statute retrospective effect. It added that the argument being advanced rested solely upon the language of those words. The respondent’s final line of reasoning, according to the Court, was that the proviso should be read in harmony with the first part of sub‑section 2 and should not be interpreted so as to destroy that first part entirely; the respondent relied on the decisions in Shri Krishna’s case (reference 2) and Jhabar Mal’s case (reference 5) for support. The Court affirmed that the principle articulated in those authorities – namely, that a harmonious construction is required when two parts of a statute clash in a way that could not have been intended by the legislature – is well settled. The Court cited the relevant authorities, namely (1) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 127, (2) [1959] LXI P.L.R. 574, (3) [1960] LXII P.L.R. 231, (4) [1943] L.R. 70 I.A. 129, and (5) [1963] LXV P.L.R. 469. It emphasized, however, that this rule applies only where there is a genuine conflict between two statutory provisions that could not have been intended. In the present matter, the Court held, there is no such conflict, because the proviso functions as an exception to the main clause to which it is attached and is intended to narrow, rather than eradicate, the scope of that main clause.

The Court explained that there is no reason to be uneasy when the plain language of the proviso reduces the operative reach of a larger part of the provision, because that reduction reflects the legislature’s purposeful intention. It reiterated the fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that the ordinary meaning of clear language must be given effect. To illustrate, the Court imagined a hypothetical wording of the proviso as “shall apply the provisions of this Act”; under such wording, the entire first part of the sub‑section would be displaced. In reality, however, the wording is “shall have regard to the provisions of this Act”. The Court held that this expression does not imply that only a portion of the new Act’s provisions may be applied, nor can it be read so, because doing so would effectively nullify the first part of the sub‑section. The Court rejected any attempt to stretch the language of the proviso in a zealous search for harmony, stating that the expressed legislative intent must be respected and that no question of creating harmony arises. Since the words do not convey any discretionary power, they impose a mandatory duty. The Court further observed that applying the new Act’s provisions to pending proceedings would not create the sort of disharmony the legislature could not have intended. Under the first part of the sub‑section, all pending suits and proceedings are to be disposed of under the old Act. The proviso, however, directs that in certain pending matters the court or authority hearing the case must have regard to the provisions of the new Act. The Court noted that the courts and authorities operating under the two Acts are distinct entities.

In this case, the Court explained that the first part of the subsection obliges courts and authorities operating under the old Act to dispose of all matters that are pending before them. The Court observed that the proviso does not alter that obligation, because the proviso merely requires those courts and authorities to decide some of the pending matters by applying certain provisions of the new Act. The Court further noted that the proviso leaves the scope of the first part untouched with respect to pending suits and proceedings other than those concerning eviction of a tenant or fixation of standard rent. Such other matters would include actions by tenants seeking restoration of possession and disputes between hotels, lodging‑house keepers and their boarders. The Court added that even if the number of such cases is fewer than the number of eviction or rent‑standardisation cases, the comparative quantity is irrelevant to the statutory construction. The Court then stated that if the proviso were read as obligating the application of every provision of the new Act to all pending proceedings, except the categories already mentioned, it would be a misreading. The Court further observed that under such a reading the first part of the subsection would still remain operative. The Court emphasized that it is not the duty of a court interpreting a statute to give words a meaning they do not plainly bear. Doing so would render another part of the statute inoperative, especially where one part is expressly intended to limit the effect of another. The Court reminded that, in construing a benevolent statute, any doubt should be resolved in the manner that gives the larger benefit to the persons the statute seeks to protect. The Court cited Jiva Bhai Purshottam v. Chhagan Karson(1) in support of that principle. The Court clarified that it does not harbor any doubt that the phrase “shall have regard to the provisions of this Act” may be limited to those provisions of the new Act. Those provisions, the Court said, are the ones that modify or clarify the old Act. After having considered all the reasons presented in support of the respondent’s contention, the Court found them unconvincing for the reasons already explained. Consequently, the Court concluded that the proviso plainly makes it obligatory to apply the provisions of the new Act when deciding pending suits and proceedings for the ejectment of tenants. The Court noted that this applies to the courts that were dealing with those matters under the old Act. The respondent then argued that the first proviso to section 57(2) of the 1958 Act never makes any part of that Act applicable to pending revision cases. The respondent said the proviso only refers to suits or proceedings and a revision case is neither. The Court noted that this view is supported by Shri Krishna’s case(1) and Man Mohan Lal v. B. D. Gupta(2), but that an opposite view was taken in Bimal Parshad v. Niadarmal(3).

In the decision reported as Niadarmal (3) the Court noted that the two earlier High Court judgments had concluded that the expression “suit or proceeding” appearing in the first proviso of sub‑section (2) of section 57 did not extend to either an appeal or a revision case. The Court explained that this conclusion was drawn from the wording of the second proviso to the same sub‑section, which had been set out earlier. According to the earlier view, the legislature’s specific reference to appeals in the second proviso signalled an intention that an appeal should not be treated as a “suit or proceeding” within the scope of the first proviso. Further, it was argued that if an appeal were regarded as part of a “suit or proceeding”, the second proviso would become entirely superfluous, because the matters dealt with in that proviso would then be covered by the remainder of sub‑section (2). The Court found that this line of reasoning rested on a misinterpretation of the second proviso, which provides that “the provisions for appeal under the said Act shall continue in force in respect of suits and proceedings disposed of thereunder.” The Court clarified that the phrase “provisions for appeal” refers to the rules governing how, when, and in which court an appeal may be instituted, together with the competence, procedure and forum for such appeals. These words do not refer to any substantive provision of the old Act that decides the merits of an appeal, because no statute contains a separate set of rules for determining the merits of an appeal distinct from those applicable at the trial stage; the merits are always decided under the same substantive provisions. Consequently, the expression “provisions for appeal” cannot be understood as relating to merits‑determining provisions. The term “appeal” was introduced in the second proviso solely to address appeals from the suits or proceedings mentioned therein—namely, those that had been finally disposed of under the old Act. It was not intended to imply that the “suits or proceedings” referred to in the rest of the sub‑section excluded an appeal. Moreover, the Court observed that the second proviso would not be redundant even if “suit or proceeding” were interpreted to include an appeal, because the second proviso specifies the law that governs the competence of appeals and revision petitions arising from cases disposed of under the old Act, whereas the remainder of sub‑section (2) deals with the jurisdiction of courts to hear pending matters and the substantive law by which those matters are to be decided and disposed of. Finally, the Court pointed out that, under the two Acts, jurisdiction is conferred upon different authorities, and nothing in the second proviso suggests that the expression “suit or proceeding” in the first part of sub‑section (2) or in the first proviso was meant to include an appeal or a revision case.

In this case, the Court examined whether the expression “suit or proceeding” that appears in the first part of sub‑section (2) and in the first proviso was meant to encompass an appeal or a revision case. One argument advanced was that a revision could not be characterised as a suit because a revision does not involve a rehearing of the matter. The Court observed, however, that even accepting this distinction does not settle the question of whether the word “proceeding” includes an appeal or a revision case. Moreover, the Court noted that the appellant’s contention that an appeal is a rehearing and therefore would fall within the meaning of “suit” would be true if the second proviso were absent. The Court had already demonstrated that the presence of the second proviso does not prevent an appeal from being read into the phrase “suit or proceeding” in the remainder of the sub‑section. Consequently, if an appeal is to be treated as a suit and no substantive difference can be drawn between an appeal and a revision, the logical implication is that the term “suit” could, on this reasoning, also cover a revision case. The Court accepted the admission that the word “appeal” in the second proviso is itself inclusive of a revision case. It further held that any alternative interpretation would be untenable, for no coherent reason could be found to treat a revision case differently from an appeal.

The Court went on to state that, in plain English, there is no difficulty in reading the word “proceeding” to include both an appeal and a revision case. It saw no justification for the legislature to apply one legal regime to matters pending at the original stage when the new Act came into force, and a different regime to appeals or revision cases that were pending at that time. A third argument presented by the appellant was that allowing appeals or revisions within the scope of “suit or proceeding” might require a remand for the taking of fresh evidence. The Court regarded this as an argument of convenience lacking persuasive force and could not identify a circumstance in which a remand would be necessary. Even assuming a case had begun under the old Act and all evidence had already been led, a remand for new evidence would arise only if the pleadings were amended to give effect to rights created by the new Act. Since a landlord who obtains a new right can always institute a fresh suit, the taking of additional evidence cannot be avoided. The Court concluded that if “suit or proceeding” were interpreted to exclude appeals or revision cases, the result would be anomalous. It also noted that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which preserves certain rights under repealed statutes, cannot be invoked to keep alive rights under the 1952 Act for the purpose of sub‑section (2) of the provision in question.

Section 57 of the 1958 Act expressly identifies which provisions of the 1952 Act were to remain in force despite the repeal of that earlier legislation. The respondent argued that nothing in the first part of subsection (2) or in its first proviso would cause the old Act to apply to appeals that were already pending, or to appeals that might be filed after the new Act became effective. This raised the question of which law would govern the appeals and revision cases that were pending at the moment the new Act took effect, as well as those that might be filed later under the second proviso. It would be unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended to discontinue all pending appeals or revision proceedings. Consequently, the Court considered it an unnatural reading of the expression “suit or proceeding” in the first part of subsection (2) and its first proviso to exclude appeals and revision cases. In the Court’s view, the High Court was obliged, under section 57(2) of the 1958 Act, to apply the provisions of that Act when it was determining the merits of the revision case that was pending at the time the new Act came into force.

The next issue for consideration was how the merits of that pending revision case were influenced by the new Act. The appellant maintained that section 16 of the new Act barred the High Court from passing a decree of ejectment against him in the revision proceeding. The Court found this contention to be incorrect. Section 16(1) declares that certain sub‑lettings are to be treated as lawful sub‑lettings, and the sub‑letting made to the appellant fell within the category described in section 16(1). However, the purpose of deeming such sub‑lettings lawful under section 16(1) is to prevent an ejectment order against the sub‑tenant when the tenancy of the intermediate tenant terminates, and this protection applies only when the sub‑tenant has given the required notice, as prescribed in sections 17 and 18. The appellant had not given that notice, and therefore could not benefit from those protective provisions. Moreover, section 16(1) does not, in any other circumstance, stop the ejectment of a tenant or sub‑tenant.

Nevertheless, because the provisions of the new Act were applicable to the pending revision case, the respondent bore the burden of proving that he was entitled to an order of ejectment under the new legislation. The respondent’s sole ground for seeking ejectment was that the appellant had sub‑let without the landlord’s consent. The conditions under which ejectment may be ordered under the new Act are set out in the proviso to section 14. That proviso provides that a sub‑letting made on or after 9 June 1952 without the landlord’s written consent may justify a decree for possession, but it does not apply to any other form of sub‑letting. In the facts established in the present case, the sub‑letting to the appellant was not of that kind, because it occurred in

In the present case the sub‑letting in question had taken place in November 1950. Even assuming that this sub‑letting was undertaken without the landlord’s written consent, the law of the new Act did not provide that such a sub‑letting, occurring on that date, could justify an order for possession of the premises against the tenant at the instance of the landlord. No other provision of the new Act was identified by the parties that would authorize a landlord to obtain a possession order on the basis of a sub‑letting of this character. Consequently, the Court concluded that the High Court lacked authority to grant a decree for possession and, instead, should have dismissed the revision proceedings. The question of whether the landlord respondent might be entitled to a possession order for any other reason under the new Act did not arise for consideration in this appeal, and the Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on that hypothetical point. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed. The Court then issued its order, stating that, in accordance with the majority judgment, the appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded.