K. S. Ramamurthi Reddiar vs The Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 569 of 1961

Decision Date: 22 January, 1963

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah

In the matter titled K. S. Ramamurthi Reddiar versus The Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry, the Supreme Court of India delivered judgment on 22 January 1963. The opinion was authored by Justice K. N. Wanchoo and the bench comprised Justices Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. C. Das Gupta and J. C. Shah. The petitioner, K. S. Ramamurthi Reddiar, challenged a decision of the Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry, and other respondents. The citation of the judgment is reported in 1963 AIR 1464 and 1964 SCR (1) 656, with subsequent citator references including MV 1966 SC1089 (54), F 1967 SC1857 (6) and RF 1975 SC1331 (180). The dispute arose from an application filed by the petitioner, who was a resident of Pondicherry, for a stage‑carriage permit under the State Transport Authority, Pondicherry, together with fourteen other applicants. The authority granted the permit to a person named Perumal Padayatchi, expressly taking into account that he was a native of Pondicherry along with other considerations. The petitioner’s application was rejected, and his subsequent appeal to the appellate authority, the Chief Commissioner, was dismissed. Consequently, the petitioner instituted a writ petition under article 32 of the Constitution, asserting that the preference shown on the ground of place of birth infringed article 15. At the time the orders that were challenged were issued, Pondicherry had not yet become part of the Indian territory; however, by the time the petition was heard, the territory had been integrated into India. The respondents argued, relying on the decision in N. Masthan Sahib v. Chief Commissioner, reported in [1962] Supp. 1 S. C. R. 981, that the writ petition could not be entertained. The Court held that in article 12 the phrase “under the control of the Government of India” qualifies the term “authorities” and not “territory”, and that article 12 provides an inclusive definition of the word “State”. The Court further observed that if a writ could not be issued at the time an order was passed because Pondicherry was not part of India, then a writ could not be issued later with respect to past acts after Pondicherry became part of India, as that would amount to retrospective operation of the Constitution, referring to Janardan Reddy v. The State, [1950] S. C. R. 940. Lastly, the Court explained that judicial or quasi‑judicial authorities situated outside the territory of India but administered by the Government of India could not be described as being “under the control of the Government of India”, because “control” implies the power of a superior authority to issue directions to an inferior authority, a power that does not extend to quasi‑judicial bodies.

The Court observed that a superior authority may prescribe the manner in which a subordinate authority must perform its duties only when the action involved is executive in nature. In situations where the rule of law governs, it is not permissible for either the Union Government or a State Government to instruct a quasi‑judicial or judicial body to resolve any particular matter in a prescribed way. The Court referred to the decision in N. Masthan Sahib v. Chief Commissioner, [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 981, to support this principle. Furthermore, the Court held that the Chief Commissioner, who acted as the appellate authority in the present case, does not fall within the constitutional definition of “State.” The Chief Commissioner was characterized as a quasi‑judicial authority that does not operate under the control of the Government of India. Consequently, Article 15 of the Constitution, which prohibits discrimination by the State on grounds such as place of birth, did not extend to the Chief Commissioner, and the petitioner could not claim protection under Article 15 against the order issued by the Chief Commissioner at the relevant time.

The matter before the Court arose from Civil Appeal No. 569 of 1961, filed by special leave against an order dated 9 September 1960 issued by the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry in Appeal No. 94 of 1960, which was connected with Writ Petition No. 347 of 1960 filed under Article 32 for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Counsel for the appellant represented the petitioner, while counsel for respondent No 1 represented the first respondent in the civil appeal, and counsel for respondent No 2 represented the second respondent. Counsel for the petitioner and the intervener also appeared, as did counsel for respondent No 1 and counsel for respondent No 3 in the writ petition. The Court noted that the appeal and the writ petition stemmed from the same order of the Chief Commissioner, who acted as the appellate authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, and therefore both were to be considered together. The petitioner was one of fourteen individuals who had applied to the State Transport Authority, Pondicherry, for a stage‑carriage permit. The authority rejected the petitioner’s application and instead granted the permit to Perumal Padayatchi, a respondent in the case. In reaching its decision, the State Transport Authority evaluated several factors, one of which was that Padayatchi was a native of Pondicherry; after weighing all considerations, the authority awarded the permit to him. The petitioner subsequently appealed to the Chief Commissioner, who dismissed the appeal. The Chief Commissioner observed that even if the petitioner’s claims were comparable to those of Padayatchi, the latter would still be entitled to preference because he was a native of Pondicherry. The Court further recorded that, although the petitioner had resided in Pondicherry, he was not a native of the territory. The order dismissing the appeal was dated 9 September 1960, and the appeal was filed with special leave against this order. At the same time, the petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the same order, contending that the preference granted on the basis of place of birth violated Article 15, which prohibits discrimination by the State on that ground.

It was noted that the petitioner was not a native of Pondicherry. The order rejecting the petitioner’s appeal was dated 9 September 1960. An application for special leave to appeal against that order was subsequently filed. In parallel, the petitioner instituted a writ petition challenging the same order and raised identical arguments. The petitioner’s principal contention was that the appellate authority had granted preference to Perumal Padayatchi on the basis that he was a native of Pondicherry—that is, that he was born in Pondicherry—whereas the petitioner was only a resident of Pondicherry, having been born elsewhere. The petitioner argued that granting preference on the ground of place of birth violated Article 15 of the Constitution, which provides that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. The respondents countered that, at the relevant time, Pondicherry was not part of Indian territory and consequently the Constitution did not apply there. Accordingly, the respondents maintained that the petitioner had no entitlement to seek special leave from the Supreme Court under Article 136, nor could he invoke the remedy of a writ under Article 32 against an order issued by the appellate authority while Pondicherry lay outside the Indian Union. In support of this position, the respondents relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in N. Masthan Sahib v. Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry. The petitioner also cited the same decision and conceded that, in view of that precedent, it was not open to him to file an appeal under Article 136; consequently, the appeal might be deemed non‑maintainable. Nevertheless, the petitioner argued that Article 12 defines “the State” for the purposes of Part III of the Constitution to include “the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.” On that basis, the petitioner contended that even though Pondicherry was not then part of India, the appellate authority that issued the order was a “local or other authority under the control of the Government of India” and therefore fell within the scope of Article 32. Further, the petitioner submitted that whatever position prevailed at the time of the Masthan Sahib case had been altered by the fact that Pondicherry became part of Indian territory in August 1962, and that the Supreme Court could now entertain a writ petition against the appellate authority if the order in question violated Article 15.

In this case the Court observed that the order which was being challenged was alleged to violate Article 15 of the Constitution. The respondents, however, maintained that the present inclusion of Pondicherry within the territory of India did not alter the applicability of the decision rendered in Masthan Sahib’s case (1). They argued that the reasons which had led the majority in that earlier case to refuse the issuance of a writ clearly indicated, even though that case did not contain an explicit pronouncement on the current question, that a judicial or quasi‑judicial body could not be described as an authority “under the control of the Government of India” within the meaning of Article 12. Consequently, the Appellate Authority, being a quasi‑judicial body, was not subject to the control of the Government of India and therefore could not be approached under Article 32 at the time the impugned order was passed. The respondents further emphasized that the Constitution was not retrospective in operation; thus the fact that Pondicherry had become part of Indian territory after August 1962 did not confer jurisdiction on this Court to issue a writ now, when it could not have done so in September 1960 even after reading Article 32 together with Article 12. Before addressing the questions raised in the writ petition, the Court noted that, with respect to the appeal, the decision in Masthan Sahib’s case (1) was controlling. Article 136 empowers the Court to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order issued by any court or tribunal situated in the territory of India. It was an acknowledged fact that Pondicherry was not within Indian territory when the order was made, and therefore Article 136 did not apply to that order. The petitioner's concession on this point led the Court to conclude that the appeal must be dismissed in accordance with Masthan Sahib’s case (1), and that no order regarding costs would be made. Turning to the writ petition, the principal issue for consideration was the effect of Article 12 and whether, upon a proper construction of that provision, the Appellate Authority could be regarded as “a local or other authority under the control of the Government of India”. The respondents submitted that the majority decision in Masthan Sahib’s case (1) already settled this matter, holding that a judicial or quasi‑judicial authority does not fall within the scope of “under the control of the Government of India”. Conversely, the petitioner contended that the earlier decision did not contain such a holding, as would be apparent from the concluding part of the judgment, and therefore the question remained open for determination.

The matter was placed before the Court for consideration. Both the petitioner and the respondent relied upon a prior decision, and the Court therefore found it necessary to quote the relevant portion of that decision. The Court first noted that the earlier decision was delivered in two separate judgments. The first judgment was pronounced on 28 April 1961, and the second, final judgment was delivered on 8 December 1961. Although the official report contains only the final judgment, the portion of the first judgment that is material to the present case is reproduced below. In that earlier judgment, counsel for the parties argued that the Court’s power under Article 32 of the Constitution is not confined to authorities located within the territory of India. They maintained that the jurisdiction of the Court extends to giving directions and issuing orders to authorities that operate outside the territory of India, provided those authorities are subject to the control of the Government of India. The Court agreed with this submission, stating that its power under Article 32 is not limited by any territorial restriction. Accordingly, the Court’s authority reaches not only every authority situated within India but also those authorities functioning abroad, so long as they remain under the control of the Government of India.

After addressing Articles 142 and 144 of the Constitution, the Court examined the limitation imposed by Article 142, which confines the direct enforcement of the Court’s orders to the territory of India. The Court therefore posed the question whether a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate order could be issued to set aside a quasi‑judicial order made by an authority outside India, even though that authority is under the control of the Government of India. In answer, the majority observed that if the order of such an external authority is of an executive or administrative character, relief may be granted to the petitioner under Article 32. The Court may then issue suitable orders directing the Government of India to give effect to the Court’s decision by exercising its control over the external authority. Such an order would be enforceable by virtue of Articles 144 and 142. However, the majority held that where the order of the external authority is quasi‑judicial, as was the case before it, this procedure is not viable. The Court concluded that if its orders or directions could not be directly enforced against the authority in Pondicherry, the order would be ineffective, and the Court would not burden itself with an ineffective order. In the final order, the majority further observed that the writ petitions must also fail.

The Court observed that the writ petitions had to be dismissed because, considering the character of the relief claimed and the authority whose orders were being contested, the petitions could not succeed. Accordingly, the petitions were dismissed. The Court further clarified that such dismissals would not bar the petitioners from approaching the Court in the future, should Pondicherry subsequently become part of the territory of India.

The petitioners contended that the majority decision in the earlier case implied that the Appellate Authority was under the control of the Government of India; otherwise it would not have been necessary to refer the two questions to the Government of India in the first part of that decision. They also argued that the concluding observations of the judgment, which stated that the petitioners were not precluded from approaching the Court if Pondicherry became part of the Indian territory, demonstrated that the earlier decision did not hold that judicial or quasi‑judicial authorities could not be under Government of India control. Conversely, the respondents maintained that judicial and quasi‑judicial authorities were not under the control of the Government of India, because if they were, a writ could have been issued against the Government of India in the same manner as against an executive or administrative authority—namely, a writ directing the Government to give effect to the Court’s decision by exercising its powers of control over the authority situated outside Indian territory. The Court carefully examined the majority’s observations and concluded that the earlier decision was not a direct authority on the present question, as the precise issue had not been raised or expressly decided at that time. Nevertheless, the Court noted that the implication of that decision was contrary to the petitioners’ contention. Consequently, the Court proceeded to analyze the respective submissions of the parties regarding the exact scope and effect of the phrase “all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India,” treating the matter as if it were a new question. The petitioners argued that the words “under the control of the Government of India” qualify the term “territory” rather than “authorities,” and therefore read the provision as: “All local or other authorities within the territory of India or all local or other authorities within the territory under the control of the Government of India.” According to this construction, the requirement is that even if a territory is not formally part of India, it must be under the Government of India’s control for its local authorities to fall within the definition.

In this dispute the petitioner argued that the phrase “under the control of the Government of India” in Article 12 modifies the word “territory” rather than the word “authorities”, so that the provision should be read as “all local or other authorities within the territory of India or all local or other authorities within the territory under the control of the Government of India”. According to that reading, any territory that is not itself Indian territory but is placed under the control of the Government of India would cause all local or other authorities situated there to fall within the definition of “the State”. The respondents, by contrast, contended that the same phrase qualifies the word “authorities” and not the word “territory”, and that the correct construction of the clause is “all local or other authorities within the territory of India or all local or other authorities under the control of the Government of India”. After careful examination the Court concluded that the respondents’ interpretation is the proper one, both on grammatical grounds and in view of the scheme of Article 12. Article 12 provides an inclusive definition of the term “the State” for the purposes of Part III of the Constitution. Within that definition the Constitution lists three categories: (i) the Government and Parliament of India, (ii) the Government and the legislature of each State, and (iii) all local or other authorities. These three categories constitute the entire set of bodies that may be described as “the State” under Article 12. The provision then adds qualifying phrases that describe the scope of the third category, namely “all local or other authorities”. The qualifying phrases separate that category into two distinct groups: those authorities that are situated within the territory of India, and those authorities that are under the control of the Government of India. Accordingly, the two qualifying clauses are “within the territory of India” and “under the control of the Government of India”. The Court found that it would be grammatically incorrect to treat the phrase “under the control of the Government of India” as modifying the word “territory” rather than the word “authorities”. The structure of Article 12 makes clear that the Constitution intends to include three classes of bodies within the term “the State”, and that the third class is further subdivided by the two qualifying expressions already identified. Moreover, the expression “all local or other authorities within the territory of India” embraces every authority that operates in the Indian territory, regardless of whether it is subject to the control of the Central Government, the State Governments, or even autonomous bodies that enjoy a degree of independence. In contrast, the second qualifying clause applies only to those authorities that are directly under the control of the Government of India, without any requirement that they be located within the Indian territory. For these reasons the Court affirmed that the respondents’ construction of the provision is correct both grammatically and substantively. Consequently, “all local or other authorities” should be understood as comprising two kinds: (i) authorities that are situated within the territory of India, and (ii) authorities that are under the control of the Government of India.

The Court observed that the phrase “under the control of the Government of India” does not require the authority to be situated within the territory of India. It is sufficient that the authority is subject to the Government of India’s control regardless of its geographical location. Consequently, the Court held that a writ could not have been issued against the appellate authority at the time the impugned order was made, unless that authority could be characterized as “other authority under the control of the Government of India.” The Court further stated that if a writ could not have been issued at that earlier stage, the same remains impossible after Pondicherry became part of Indian territory, because to do so would amount to giving retrospective effect to the Constitution, which is impermissible, as explained in Janardan Reddy v. the State (1). The next issue that required examination was whether a judicial or quasi‑judicial authority located outside the territory of India, but administered by the Government of India, could be said to be “under the control of the Government of India.” To answer this, the Court needed to determine the meaning of the expression “under the control of the Government of India” as it appears in Article 12. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that an authority appointed by the Government of India, remunerated by the Government of India and liable to disciplinary action by the Government of India should be regarded as an authority “under the control of the Government of India.” It was further urged that the Chief Commissioner, who functioned as the appellate Authority, satisfied all those criteria – he was appointed by the Government of India, received his salary from the Government of India and was subject to disciplinary control by the Government of India. Accordingly, the petitioner contended that the Court would have been competent to issue a writ against the Chief Commissioner even when the order was originally passed, and even more so after Pondicherry entered Indian territory. The Court, however, rejected the proposition that a writ under Article 32 could be issued against the appellate authority at the time the order was passed. The Court relied on the majority judgment in Masthan Sahib’s case (2), observing that if such a writ had been permissible, it would have been granted in that earlier case. In Masthan Sahib’s case, the Court explained that the writ was not issued because the quasi‑judicial authority concerned was situated outside the territory of India. The Court held that where the authority is of an executive or administrative character, a writ may be directed to the Government of India, directing it to give effect to the Court’s decision by exercising its powers of control over the authority outside Indian territory. However, the authority in Masthan Sahib’s case, like the authority in the present matter, was a quasi‑judicial body, and therefore the reasoning applied to executive or administrative authorities could not be extended to it.

The Court observed that the appellate body in question functioned as a quasi‑judicial authority, and that resorting to a writ procedure could not be employed because any order or direction issued could not be directly enforced against that authority in Pondicherry, rendering the order ineffective. This observation leads to the conclusion that a quasi‑judicial authority is not subject to the same control by the Government of India as an executive or administrative authority. Consequently, the Court could not issue a directive to the Government of India ordering it to compel a quasi‑judicial authority to implement the Court’s decision by exercising control over an authority located outside the territory of India. The majority opinion in the earlier case clarified that the phrase “under the control of the Government of India” in Article 12 does not refer merely to control that arises from the power to appoint, pay, or impose discipline on an authority. Instead, the control contemplated by Article 12 is a control over the functions of the relevant authority, together with the Government’s power, by virtue of that functional control, to direct the authority to perform its duties in a specified manner. When an authority is of an administrative or executive character, the Government’s control extends beyond appointment, salary and disciplinary powers to include the ability to direct how the authority carries out its functions, and a purely executive or administrative body can always be instructed by the Government of India to act in a particular way with respect to its functions. This, however, cannot be said of a quasi‑judicial or judicial authority, even though the Government of India may have appointed the authority, may be providing its salary, and may possess the power to discipline it under certain circumstances. The Government of India does not possess the power to control the functions of a quasi‑judicial or judicial authority nor to direct it to decide a specific matter in a particular manner. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that the control referred to in Article 12 is control over the substantive functions of an authority, and only when the Government of India can control an authority’s functions can that authority be said to be under the Government’s control. Such functional control is feasible in the case of a purely executive or administrative authority, but it is impossible in the case of a quasi‑judicial or judicial authority, because, where the rule of law prevails, neither the Government of India nor a State government may direct a quasi‑judicial or judicial body to decide a particular issue in a prescribed way. Therefore, this is the nature of the control that the Government of India must be able to exercise in order for an authority to be considered under its control.

The Court observed that an authority situated outside the territory of India could be regarded as being under the control of the Government of India for the purposes of Article 12 only if it were not a quasi‑judicial or judicial body. Because a quasi‑judicial or judicial authority could not be compelled by the Government of India to decide a specific matter in a particular way, such an authority could not be said to fall within the meaning of “authority under the control of the Government of India” contemplated by Article 12. Accordingly, the Court expressed the view that the appellate authority, being a quasi‑judicial body, could not be directed by the Government of India to reach a predetermined conclusion, and therefore it could not be classified as an authority under the control of the Government of India. The Court noted that this conclusion followed the reasoning of the majority in Masthan Sahib’s Case, even though that case had not expressly decided the issue. The Court further held that any judicial or quasi‑judicial authority operating in territories administered by the Government of India but located outside the Indian territory could not be treated as an authority under the control of the Government of India within the meaning of Article 12, and consequently Article 12 did not apply to such authorities. As a result, the Court found that it could not entertain a writ petition under Article 32 read with Article 12 against a quasi‑judicial authority situated outside India, even if that authority had been appointed by the Government of India, received its salary from the Government of India, or was subject to disciplinary control by the Government of India. Because the appellate authority was a quasi‑judicial body, it was not under the control of the Government of India for the purposes of Article 12, and the Court therefore could not have entertained a writ against the order it had issued at the time the order was made. The Court also held that, after Pondicherry became part of India, it could not issue a writ against the appellate authority concerning an order that had been passed before Pondicherry’s accession, since the Constitution was not retrospective for that purpose. The Court then considered the matter from another angle, noting that Article 15 prohibited the State from discriminating against any citizen on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of those categories. Consequently, only a discrimination committed by the “State” as defined in Article 12 could give rise to a claim under Article 15, allowing a citizen to seek relief under Article 32. The Court reiterated that it had held the Chief Commissioner, being a quasi‑judicial authority, was not under the control of the Government of India within the meaning of Article 12, and therefore he could not be regarded as the “State” under that article. Hence, any alleged discrimination, if it existed, would have been carried out by an authority that was not the State, and the protection afforded by Article 15 applied only to discrimination by the State.

By interpreting the term “the State” in the manner explained earlier, the Court concluded that the Chief Commissioner did not fall within the definition of the State for the purposes of Article 15. Consequently, the petitioner could not claim the protection afforded by Article 15 against the actions of the Chief Commissioner at the time the order that is being contested was issued. This interpretation removed any ground upon which the petitioner could rely on Article 15 to obtain relief. Because the petition lacked a valid basis under the constitutional provision, the Court found an additional reason for rejecting the petition. Accordingly, the Court held that the present petition must fail and therefore ordered the dismissal of the appeal. In doing so, the Court also decided that no order as to costs should be made in relation to the appeal. The Court further directed that the writ petition be dismissed, and it ordered that the costs of the writ petition be awarded against the petitioner. Finally, the Court formally recorded that the appeal was dismissed and that the writ petition was dismissed.