Jang Singh vs Brijlal and Ors

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 687 of 1962

Decision Date: 20 February 1963

Coram: M. Hidayatullah, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.C. Shah

In this case the Supreme Court recorded that the petitioner, Jang Singh, had brought a suit for pre‑emption of certain lands against the first respondent, Brijlal, and other respondents. A compromise decree was issued in favour of the petitioner directing him to deposit Rs 5,951, subject to a deduction of the Rs 1,000 that had already been paid. The decree further stipulated that if the balance was not deposited promptly, the suit would be dismissed with costs. The petitioner applied to the Subordinate Judge for permission to pay the remaining amount. The Court clerk prepared a duplicate challan and gave it to the petitioner, but the challan incorrectly stated the payable sum as Rs 4,950 instead of Rs 4,951. Relying on this incorrect figure, the petitioner deposited the amount shown on the challan. Subsequently it was discovered that the deposit was short by Re 1. The Subordinate Judge accepted the objection, set aside the decree of pre‑emption in favour of the petitioner, and ordered dismissal of the suit. The District Judge later reversed the Subordinate Judge’s order, holding that the error originated from the Court and its clerk, who had instructed the petitioner to deposit an amount that was one rupee less than required. Consequently, the District Judge excused the petitioner to the extent that responsibility for the shortfall was shared by the Court. The High Court subsequently set aside the District Judge’s decision, and the petitioner appealed to this Court by special leave. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s reversal was erroneous and affirmed the correctness of the District Judge’s decision. Accordingly, the Court ordered the petitioner to pay the remaining Re 1 in the Subordinate Court. The Court observed that the petitioner was illiterate and that the Court’s officers had significantly contributed to the mistake. While recognising that a litigant must remain vigilant, the Court emphasized that when a litigant seeks the Court’s assistance to fulfil an obligation imposed by a decree, the Court must ensure that accurate information is provided and must not abandon the litigant to his own devices. If the Court supplies incorrect information, the responsibility of the litigant, though not entirely eliminated, is at least shared by the Court. Therefore, a litigant acting in good faith on the basis of the Court’s erroneous direction cannot be held liable for the mistake, and no act of the Court should cause harm to a litigant.

In this case, the Court emphasized that it is the inherent duty of the judiciary to ensure that any person who suffers injury because of a mistake made by the Court be placed in the position that he would have occupied but for that error. The judgment concerned a civil appeal numbered 687 of 1962, which was permitted by special leave and sought review of a judgment and decree dated 1 December 1961 issued by the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in execution second appeal no 586 of 1960. The appellant was represented by counsel, while the respondents numbered two to six were represented by a team of counsel. The judgment was pronounced on 20 February 1963 by Justice Hidayatullah. The appeal, having obtained the special leave of this Court, arose out of the execution of a decree granting pre‑emptive rights to the appellant, Jang Singh. The High Court, by the order under review, concluded that Jang Singh had failed to deposit the full amount prescribed by the decree within the time fixed for him, and consequently held that his suit for pre‑emption should be dismissed along with all ancillary proceedings, on the ground that there existed no decree from which execution could be pursued.

The factual background was straightforward. Jang Singh instituted a suit seeking pre‑emption of the sale of certain lands against Brij Lal, the vendor, and Bhola Singh, the vendee, before the Sub‑Judge 1st Class, Sirsa. On 25 October 1957, the Court passed a compromise decree in favour of Jang Singh, directing him to deposit a balance of Rs 5,951 after accounting for Rs 1,000 already paid, and setting a deadline of 1 May 1958 for the payment. The decree further provided that failure to make the deposit punctually would result in dismissal of his suit with costs. On 6 January 1958, Jang Singh filed an application before the Sub‑Judge, Sirsa, requesting assistance to make the deposit of the remaining amount. The Clerk of the Court, who also acted as the executing officer, prepared a duplicate challan and handed it to Jang Singh together with his application, so that the amount could be paid into the Bank. It was later alleged that the challan, and the order issued on the application, incorrectly stated the amount as Rs 4,950 instead of the correct Rs 4,951. Acting on the challan, Jang Singh deposited the erroneous sum on the same day and received one copy of the challan as acknowledgment from the Bank. In May 1958, he obtained an order granting possession of the land, and the Naib‑Nazir reported that the entire amount had been deposited with the Court. Subsequently, on 25 May 1958, Bhola Singh applied to the Court for payment of the amount held in deposit. The Naib‑Nazir, in his report on that application, observed that Jang Singh’s deposit was short by one rupee. On that basis, Bhola Singh moved the Court for dismissal of Jang Singh’s suit.

The Sub Judge at Sirsa accepted Bhola Singh’s application for dismissal of Jang Singh’s suit and for recall of all orders that had been made in Jang Singh’s favour. He observed that, in pre‑emption cases, a court did not have the authority to extend the time fixed by the decree for payment of the price. Accordingly, he held that the pre‑emptor, by failing to deposit the correct amount, had caused the dismissal of the suit under the decree. He also ordered that the earlier orders that had been passed in favour of Jang Singh be reversed and that possession of the fields be restored to the opposite party. Jang Singh appealed against that order.

The District Judge recorded the testimony of the Execution Clerk, the Revenue Accountant, the Treasury ice, and Jang Singh himself. He also examined Bhola Singh. The learned District Judge found that the case record showed that, on the day the matter was compromised and the decree was passed, Jang Singh was not present and did not know the exact amount stipulated by the decree. The judge assumed that Jang Singh had a duty to be punctual and to ascertain the exact sum before making the deposit. However, he held that Jang Singh had approached the court with an application intending to make the deposit as ordered, and that the court and its clerk had made a mistake by directing him to deposit an amount that was one rupee short. Because the responsibility for the shortfall was shared with the court, the District Judge concluded that Jang Singh was excused. He therefore held that Jang Singh deserved relief, stating that the act of the court had prevented him from depositing the full amount. The judge concluded that the deposit that had been made satisfied the terms of the decree, and he set aside the Sub Judge’s order dismissing the suit.

Bhola Singh then appealed to the High Court. A learned single judge heard the appeal and expressed the view that the decree had not been complied with. He held that, under the law, the time fixed by the decree for payment of the decretal amount in pre‑emption cases could not be extended by the court. He also found that the claim that the short deposit was due to an act of the court was not supported by evidence. Consequently, he set aside the decision of the District Judge and restored the order of the Sub Judge at Sirsa. The facts of the case were described as almost self‑evident. A search was made for the application on which the order directing a deposit of Rs 4950 had been based, but that application remained untraced despite the District Judge’s several adjournments. Nevertheless, it was clear that the challan had been prepared under the court’s direction, and both the duplicate challan prepared by the court and the one presented to the bank had been produced.

In the matter before the Court, the documents that were produced showed a lower amount than the sum that had originally been claimed as due. The payment slip, known as a challan, was openly acknowledged to have been prepared by the Execution Clerk, and it was also admitted that Jang Singh was an illiterate individual. The Execution Clerk testified regarding the usual procedural steps, explaining that first a report is issued by Ahmed concerning the amount held in deposit, and subsequently the Court issues an order on the application before the challan is prepared. From this description, it follows that any error in the amount shown on the challan would have been substantially contributed to by the Court and its officers. While it is undeniably true that a litigant must remain vigilant and exercise care, when a litigant approaches the Court seeking assistance so that the obligations imposed by a decree can be strictly fulfilled, the Court is obligated, whenever it does not leave the litigant to act entirely on his own, to ensure that correct information is provided. If the Court, in supplying that information, makes a mistake, the responsibility of the litigant does not vanish entirely but is at least shared by the Court. When a litigant relies in good faith on the information supplied by the Court, the Court cannot hold him accountable for a mistake that the Court itself caused. There exists no higher guiding principle for the Court than the rule that no act of the Court should cause injury to a litigant, and the Court has a duty to restore a person to the position he would have occupied but for any mistake of the Court. This principle is encapsulated in the maxim “Actus curiae neminem gravabit”. In the present case, the Court could have directed Jang Singh to make the deposit after obtaining a certified copy of the decree, thereby leaving him to determine the correct amount and to deposit that amount. The Court, however, chose not to take that approach. Instead, the Court issued an order and, through its clerk, prepared a challan that displayed the amount claimed to be payable. Jang Singh complied with the direction contained in the order and implicitly reflected in the challan, performing the payment exactly as instructed. Consequently, an error originated from the Court, and that error must be corrected; it cannot be rectified by transferring blame to Jang Singh. Dismissing his suit on the basis that Jang Singh was also partly negligent does not absolve the Court of its responsibility for the mistake. Jang Singh was entitled to rely upon the Court and its officers and to act according to their directions, and the record shows that he did so promptly and fully. Hence, the erroneous belief that the amount shown in the challan was the true sum payable was induced in his mind by the Court’s action, and the Court must bear full responsibility for that error.

In this case, the Court observed that the error made by the lower courts must be corrected before any order dismissing the suit of Jang Singh can be entered. The single judge of the High Court had treated the matter as if it concerned a mere extension of time. He set aside the finding of the District Judge that Jang Singh’s application did not specify any amount and that the record showed only Rs 4950 was due. By doing so, the High Court judge acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred upon him. The record makes clear that, once the District Judge’s finding is accepted and the evidence of Jang Singh and the Execution Clerk is considered, the only logical conclusion is that Jang Singh relied on the order issued by the Court, and any mistake, if it existed, was essentially the fault of the Court itself. Accordingly, applying the well‑established principle that a Court’s act should not prejudice any party, the District Judge was correct in overturning the decision of the Sub‑Judge at Sirsa. However, the District Judge erred in holding that the decree had been “sufficiently complied with”. Full compliance with that decree could be achieved only by the deposit of Re 1, which the District Judge should have directed. In the present opinion, the decision of the learned single judge of the High Court must therefore be set aside. The mistake committed by the Court must be rectified. The matter shall be returned to the point at which the Court’s error occurred, and the appellant shall be directed to pay the additional rupee to Bhola Singh. Should the appellant fail to make this deposit within the time fixed by this judgment, his suit may be dismissed, but not before that opportunity is given. The Court also notes that it is not addressing the question of whether a Court, after issuing a decree for re‑emption, may extend the time originally fixed for the deposit of the decretal amount; that issue does not arise in these proceedings. Because of the Court’s mistake that requires correction, the parties are placed back in the position they occupied on 6 January 1958, the date on which the error was made, and that error is now being corrected nunc pro tunc. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The appellant is ordered to deposit Re 1 within one month from the date he receives the record in the Sub‑Judge’s Court at Sirsa. In view of the special circumstances of the case, no order as to costs is made. The appeal is allowed.