J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co., Ltd. vs Badri Mali and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 480 and 481 of 1962

Decision Date: 9 May 1963

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta

In the matter of J. K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co., Ltd. versus Badri Mali and others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 9 May 1963. The judgment was authored by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, who sat on the bench together with Justices K. N. Wanchoo and K. C. Das Gupta. The case is reported in 1964 AIR 737 and 1964 SCR (3) 724, and it has been cited in subsequent authorities such as RF 1969 SC 306 and F 1972 SC 1598.

The dispute originated when the Government of Uttar Pradesh referred an industrial dispute concerning the employment of certain “Malis” to the Adjudicator in Kanpur. The Adjudicator examined whether the Malis qualified as workmen under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and whether they could be considered industrial employees for the purpose of a government order dated 6 December 1948 that provided a dear‑food allowance. The Adjudicator concluded that the Malis were indeed workmen within the meaning of the Uttar Pradesh Act, but held that they were not industrial employees and therefore were not entitled to the dear‑food allowance. The adjudicator also rejected the Malis’ claims for weekly holidays and for leave with wages.

Both parties filed appeals against the adjudicator’s decision before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The appellant, J. K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills, saw its appeal dismissed. In contrast, the tribunal allowed the respondents’ appeal and granted the Malis the dear‑food allowance. The tribunal further allowed the respondents’ claim for leave with wages on the basis of social justice, while it rejected their claim for a weekly holiday. The appellant subsequently filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court, which was dismissed as infructuous. The appellant then obtained special leave to appeal to this Court.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that the Malis could not be regarded as workers under section 2 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. The appellant also contended that the Malis were not industrial employees within the meaning of the government order of 6 December 1948 and therefore were not eligible for the dear‑food allowance. Further, the appellant maintained that the Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in granting the respondents’ demand for leave on the ground of fair‑play and social justice.

The Court examined the statutory definition of “worker” in section 2 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act and considered the nature of the Malis’ employment. It held that the Malis satisfied the criteria of a worker because they were employed by the appellant, received their remuneration from the appellant, and performed their duties under the appellant’s control and supervision. The Court noted that the Malis discharged the function of looking after the properties of the appellant, that their conditions of service were determined by the appellant, and that the continuance of their service depended on the pleasure of the appellant. Moreover, the bungalows and gardens on which the Malis worked were amenities supplied by the appellant to its officers.

Consequently, the Court concluded that the Malis were engaged in operations that were incidentally connected with the main industry carried on by the employer. This incidental connection satisfied the requirement that an employee who performs any work or operation that is incidentally related to the employer’s primary industry qualifies as a workman, provided the other conditions of section 2 are met. The Court’s finding established that the Malis were workers within the meaning of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act and that they were also industrial employees for the purposes of the 6 December 1948 government order, thereby entitling them to the dear‑food allowance.

The Court observed that the work performed by the Malis was closely connected with the principal industry operated by the employer, and therefore could not be characterized as remote, indirect or far‑reached. The Court likened the situation of the Malis to that of bus drivers, noting that when an employee engages in any task or operation that is incidentally related to the employer’s main industry, such a person qualifies as a workman, provided that the remaining conditions prescribed in section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act are fulfilled. Consequently, the Court held that the Malis satisfied the definition of industrial employees under the Government order dated 6 December 1948, and that this status entitled them to claim the benefit of dear‑food allowance. The Tribunal was found to have erred in restricting the meaning of “industrial employees” by equating it solely with the definition of “worker” contained in the Factories Act, 726. Moreover, the Court affirmed that the Tribunal was justified in granting the respondents’ request for leave on the basis of fairness and social justice. The Court emphasized that the notion of social justice has become an essential component of industrial law, making it unreasonable for any party to argue that industrial adjudication may disregard considerations of social justice when resolving industrial disputes. Social justice, according to the Court, is not a narrow, one‑sided or pedantic concept confined merely to industrial arbitration; its scope is broad and it rests on the fundamental ideal of socioeconomic equality, seeking to eliminate socioeconomic disparities and inequalities. In addressing industrial matters, the Court explained that social justice does not adopt a rigid, doctrinaire stance nor does it submit blindly to abstract theories; rather, it embraces a realistic and pragmatic approach. The aim is to balance competing claims of employers and employees by arriving at outcomes that are just and equitable for both sides, thereby fostering harmony between capital, labour and their relationship. The Court referred to a series of authorities to support this view, namely Shri Bhikari, Kanpur v. Messrs. Cooper Allen & Co., Kanpur (1952 L.A.C. 298); The Upper India Chini Mills Mazdoor Union v. The Upper India Sugar Mills (1953 L.A.C. 870); The Suti Mill Mazdoor Sabha, Kanpur v. Messrs. The British India Corporation Ltd., Kanpur (1956 L.A.C. 549); J.K. Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., Kanpur v. The Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union, Kanpur ([1953] 2 S.C.R. 1315); Muir Mills Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union, Kanpur ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 991); Messrs. Crown Aluminium Works v. Their Workmen ([1958] S.C.R. 651); and The State of Mysore v. The Workers of Gold Mines ([1959] S.C.R. 895). The judgment was issued by the Civil Appellate Jurisdiction in Civil Appeals Nos. 480 & 481 of 1962, arising from special leave to appeal the order dated 10 March 1958 of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Nos. 1006 and 1007 of 1955, and from the decision dated 15 July 1955 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow, III Bench in Appeal Nos. III‑274 and 300 of 1954.

The counsel for respondent number two, appearing in Civil Appeal No 480 of 1962, was joined by counsel J P Goyal who represented respondents numbers three through twelve in the same appeal, as well as the respondents in Civil Appeal No 481 of 1962. The judgment was dated 9 May 1963 and was delivered by Justice Gajendragadkar. The Court explained that an industrial dispute had arisen between the appellant, J K Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co., Ltd., and its employees, and that the Government of Uttar Pradesh had referred the matter to an adjudicator in Kanpur on 30 November 1953. The dispute comprised two separate claims made by the respondents. The first claim concerned the dismissal of a gardener named Badri Mali. The respondents contended that Badri’s termination was unlawful and that he was entitled to be reinstated together with full wages for the period of his forced unemployment. The second claim involved ten Malis employed by the appellant; they sought a dear‑food allowance, weekly holidays and leave with wages.

Before the adjudicator, the appellant argued that the Malis were not “workmen” within the meaning of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No 28 of 1947), and therefore the referral was improper. The appellant further asserted that the respondents’ claim for a dear‑food allowance could not be sustained because Government Order No 3754 (LL)/XVIII‑894 (L)‑1948, issued by the Uttar Pradesh Government on 6 December 1948, applied only to industrial employees, and the Malis did not qualify as industrial employees under that order. The appellant also resisted the respondents’ requests for weekly holidays and leave with wages on the ground that, if the Malis were not workmen under the Act, they were not entitled to any relief in these proceedings. The adjudicator rejected the appellant’s contention and held that the Malis were indeed workmen within the meaning of the Act, thereby affirming the validity of the reference. On the merits of the first claim, the adjudicator found Badri’s dismissal to be without justification, ordered his reinstatement, and directed the appellant to pay Badri compensation equal to half his wages, i.e., Rs 45 per month, for the period from his dismissal until reinstatement. Regarding the second claim, the adjudicator concluded that the Malis were not industrial employees and therefore were not eligible for the dear‑food allowance under the cited Government order. The adjudicator likewise rejected the respondents’ claims for weekly holidays and leave with wages. Consequently, the award on the second item was decided against the respondents. This award was pronounced on 31 May 1954. The adjudicator’s decision gave rise to two appeals before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and the appellant, by way of Appeal No 300 of 1954, contested the correctness of the adjudicator’s findings.

In the appeal concerning Badri, the Labour Appellate Tribunal examined the earlier finding that Badri was a workman and that his dismissal lacked justification. The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s argument challenging that finding and consequently dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The respondents, through appeal No. 274/1954, asserted that the Adjudicator had erred in deciding that the Malis were not industrial employees and therefore not eligible for the dear‑food allowance prescribed by the relevant Government order. The Tribunal accepted the respondents’ submission and applied the provision of the Government order to grant the Malis the dear‑food allowance. Regarding the respondents’ claim for a weekly holiday, the Tribunal rejected it, but it allowed their claim for leave with wages. The Tribunal further directed that the Malis should be granted leave in accordance with the procedure set out in section 79 of the Factories Act (No. 63 of 1948). Although the Tribunal noted that the Factories Act did not strictly apply to the Malis, it reasoned that the underlying principle of the statutory leave provision embodied a notion of social justice. Therefore, the Malis deserved a comparable benefit. The respondents also sought full wages for Badri for the period of his forced unemployment, rather than the modest amount of Rs 45 per month awarded by the Adjudicator. The Tribunal upheld this claim as well, ordering that Badri receive his full wages for that period. As a result, the respondents’ appeal achieved substantial success, and the Tribunal’s decision was formally announced on 15 July 1955.

The decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was subsequently contested by the appellant before the Allahabad High Court through writ petition No. 1006/1955. The appellant argued that the Tribunal’s ruling was manifestly erroneous and illegal, and therefore should be set aside pursuant to Article 226 of the Constitution. While the writ petition remained pending, the Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal that had been sitting at Lucknow was dissolved. Consequently, the High Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition concerning a decision of a Tribunal that no longer operated within its territorial jurisdiction. On that basis, the High Court dismissed the writ petition as having become futile, and rendered its order on 10 March 1958. The appellant then filed two special leave appeals, numbered 480/1962 and 481/1962, before this Court. The first appeal challenges the High Court’s dismissal of the writ petition, and the second challenges the Labour Appellate Tribunal’s decision. Counsel appearing for the appellant indicated that he would not argue the first appeal because the resolution of the second appeal would determine the entire dispute between the parties. Consequently, the first appeal was rendered unnecessary, and the present proceedings focus solely on the merits raised in appeal No. 481/1962.

The Court noted that the present petition challenged only the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and therefore the Court would consider only Civil Appeal No 481/1962. The counsel for the appellant did not dispute either the correctness or the propriety of the Tribunal’s decision concerning the claim of the respondents relating to Badri’s dismissal, and therefore that portion of the dispute was left untouched. The main issue raised by the appellant was the contention that the Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in holding that the ten Malis qualified as workmen under section 2 of the Act. Section 2 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time, provided that the term “workman” should be given the meaning assigned to it in section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. That provision defined a workman as any person, including an apprentice, employed in any industry to perform any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment were expressed or implied. Consequently, the question before the Court was whether the ten Malis whose claims gave rise to the present reference could be said to fall within that definition. To resolve this question, the Court examined the factual findings recorded by the lower tribunals. The ten Malis had been appointed by the appellant to maintain the gardens attached to the bungalows of certain officers of the mills, which were situated within the mill compound. Some of the Malis were also tasked with looking after the gardens of Kamla Niwas, a residential building allotted to the Governing Director of the mills and likewise located inside the mill compound. A few of them were required to work in the gardens attached to the residence of the Director‑in‑charge of the mills. These gardens were distinct from the gardens that formed part of the mill premises themselves. The mill complex comprised a large, expensive colony in which the factory lay within a fenced compound; beyond that compound, but still within the colony, were the officers’ bungalows and the Director’s residence. The gardens attached to those bungalows were the ones tended by the ten Malis, and it was evident that the Malis were appointed, supervised and controlled by the appellant, who also possessed the authority to dismiss them. Their total monthly wages amounted to roughly Rs 450. The appellant collected a modest contribution from the officers toward the salaries of the Malis, while approximately seventy‑eight per cent of the wages were paid directly by the appellant. The contributions made by the officers

The Court observed that the contributions made by the officers were recorded as revenue of the appellant, and from the appellant’s funds the Malis received their wages, which were entered as debits in the appellant’s accounts. A register kept by the appellant’s clerk listed the names of the ten Malis, and the clerk also recorded their daily attendance. The appellant appointed these Malis, supervised and controlled their work, and retained the authority to dismiss them. In contrast, the officers who occupied the bungalows possessed no authority over the Malis and could not exercise any jurisdiction over them. In light of these facts, the Court said that the issue raised by Mr Pathak regarding the legal status of the Malis required determination. Mr Pathak argued that the essential words in the definition provided by section 2(s) were “employed in any industry”. He maintained that, before a person could be regarded as a workman under that provision, it was necessary to demonstrate that the person was employed in the employer’s industry. The appellant’s industry, according to Mr Pathak, consisted of spinning and weaving operations, and the Malis performed no work in those operations; therefore, he concluded that their employment by the appellant did not make them workmen within the meaning of the Act. The Court acknowledged that this argument initially appeared persuasive, but noted that a closer examination caused it to collapse. The Court explained that, if the construction advocated by Mr Pathak were accepted without alteration, clerks employed in the factory would cease to be workmen, because under his test they were not employed in the spinning or weaving activities carried out by the appellant. Yet it was undeniable that clerks who performed purely clerical duties for the appellant were regarded as workmen under section 2(s). Consequently, the Court rejected a literal reading of the phrase “employed in any industry”. Instead, the Court held that the phrase must be interpreted to include employees whose work is connected with operations incidental to the main industry. Once the concept of incidental connection with the main industry was introduced, the literal construction proposed by the appellant could no longer be sustained. The Court admitted that delineating the precise scope of employment covered by the principle of incidental relationship was not simple and would involve certain limits. As an illustration, the Court pointed out that sweepers employed by the appellant to clean the mill premises performed work that, while not directly tied to the spinning or weaving processes, was unquestionably necessary for the efficient functioning of the industry. Accordingly, such sweepers would be considered workmen under the statutory definition.

In the present case the Court found it unreasonable to exclude sweepers from the definition of workman contained in section 2(s). The Court considered a similar question concerning the drivers of buses owned by an industry for the purpose of transporting its workmen. It observed that the connection of such drivers to the main industry is one degree removed, because the drivers operate the buses that convey employees to the factory, yet the buses themselves are employed by the factory for that purpose. Even with this degree of removal, the Court held that it would be difficult to deny the drivers the status of workmen under section 2(s) simply because they do not perform the primary manufacturing tasks. Counsel Mr Pathak was unable to prevent the definition from being extended to cover such categories, but he nonetheless argued that sweepers who clean the interior of the factory premises may be classified as workmen, whereas those who sweep the area surrounding the factory should be excluded. He contended that the external sweeping, although incidentally connected, was indirect and remote and therefore fell outside the ambit of section 2(s). The Court rejected this line of argument. It stated that any employee who is engaged in work or operations that are incidentally connected with the employer’s main industry qualifies as a workman, provided the other statutory criteria are met. The Court emphasized that modern industrial operations are complex and rely on numerous ancillary activities, and that the collective total of these activities constitutes the industry as a whole. Consequently, denying work‑man status on the ground that the employee’s duties are not directly related to the core manufacturing process would be unreasonable.

The Court further illustrated its point by returning to the example of factory‑owned buses. If the drivers of such buses can be said to assist an operation that is incidental to the primary industrial work, then there is no justification for excluding other categories of employees, such as the Malis, who perform duties that are likewise incidental. While discussing this, the Court noted that the appellant owns certain bungalows which are allotted to its officers in accordance with the terms and conditions of their employment. Because these bungalows are provided as part of the officers’ service conditions, the appellant bears the responsibility of maintaining the bungalows and the gardens attached to them. The Court observed that where the service terms require the provision of bungalows and associated gardens, it would be difficult to argue that employees tasked with looking after these properties have no relation to the industry carried on by the appellant. The employment, conditions of service, remuneration and supervisory control all flow from the appellant, and the work assigned—namely, the upkeep of the allotted properties—constitutes an incidental operation that supports the overall industrial enterprise.

In examining the circumstances surrounding the gardens that are attached to the officers’ bungalows, the Court observed that when the terms and conditions of service prescribe that officers must be provided with bungalows and that gardens are an integral part of those bungalows, it becomes difficult to justify a claim that the work performed by the Malis—who are employed by the appellant, receive their wages from the appellant, and operate under the appellant’s control and supervision while looking after the appellant’s property—has no connection with the industry carried on by the appellant. The Court emphasized that the employment relationship is wholly with the appellant, that the conditions of service are set by the appellant, that the remuneration is substantially paid by the appellant, and that the continuation of the Malis’ service depends entirely on the appellant’s satisfaction, subject to the standing orders that the appellant has prescribed. Accordingly, the specific duties assigned to the Malis consist of caring for the properties that have been allotted to the officers of the appellant.

The Court further likened the provision of bungalows and gardens to the provision of transport facilities such as factory‑owned buses. Just as drivers who look after the buses are considered to be engaged in work that is incidentally connected with the main industrial activity, the Malis who maintain the gardens must likewise be regarded as performing operations that are incidentally related to the employer’s principal industry. While acknowledging that drawing a precise line in these matters is not easy, the Court noted that a reasonable limitation must be placed on the definition of “incidental” so as to exclude activities whose relationship to the main industrial operation is remote, indirect, or far‑fetched. The Court stated that it is not prepared to characterize the work of the Malis in the present case as remote, indirect, or far‑fetched, and therefore upheld the Labour Appellate Tribunal’s conclusion that the Malis qualify as workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act.

Before concluding, the Court added that industrial adjudication has consistently treated Malis who look after gardens attached to officers’ bungalows as workmen within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Act. The Court’s attention was drawn to two decisions of the Labour Appellate Tribunal that are directly on point. In the case of Shri Bhikari, Kanpur v. Messrs. Cooper Allen & Co., Kanpur, (1) the Tribunal considered a gardener employed by the company and placed on the company’s payroll, and observed that it could not understand why such a person should not be regarded as a workman within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The citation (1) refers to [1952] L.A.C. 298, a definition that had been adopted by the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act under which the present proceedings were instituted. The same view was subsequently affirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in later cases.

In the matter of The Upper India Chini Mazdoor Union versus The Upper India Sugar Mills, the Tribunal examined the claim of a person named Rati Rama who had been employed as a Mali. The Tribunal dismissed the employer’s argument that Rati Rama should be classified as a domestic servant. It observed that the mere fact that the Company assigned Rati Rama to perform gardening duties for the Managing Director, duties that the Company is unquestionably obliged to provide and to compensate, does not transform Rati Rama into a domestic servant. These two decisions, which directly address the issue, were rendered under section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act—the very provision presently under consideration. The Court expressed a reluctance to disturb the well‑established and consistent line of decisions issued by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, unless those decisions are demonstrably erroneous. The next issue requiring determination was whether the Malis qualify as industrial employees within the meaning of the relevant Government Order. That Government Order commences with two operative paragraphs, followed by a table of minimum basic wages and additional provisions. The first two paragraphs read as follows: “(1) This order shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from December 1, 1948 and shall, in respect of the matters covered by it, bind all the industries affected thereby and the workmen employed therein. (2) The minimum basic wage payable to employees (industrial or clerical) in the various industries and undertakings specified in column 1 of Table I hereunder shall, so long as this order remains in force, be the amounts mentioned against them in column 2 or 3 thereof, as the case may be.” Paragraph 3 deals with the dear‑food allowance, and it is on the basis of that claim that the respondents argued that this paragraph does not apply because the Malis are not industrial employees. The Court noted that the first paragraph makes it unequivocally clear that the Order binds all industries affected by it and the workmen employed therein; consequently, once it is established that the Malis are workmen under section 2 of the Act, the Order must extend to them. In assessing this point, the Court considered that the Order was issued under the powers conferred by clauses (b) and (g) of section 3 of the Act, which plainly refer to persons who are workmen under section 2. Therefore, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the Order applies to such workmen and to the industries that employ them. However, it was urged that paragraph 2 specifies the minimum basic wage as payable to “employees, industrial or clerical,” suggesting a limitation to only those categories. The Court found this argument to be untenable.

The Court observed that the appellant had argued that the second paragraph of the Government order applied only to employees who were either industrial or clerical, and that the term “industrial employees” was not defined. The appellant contended that this class of industrial employees must be narrower than the broader class of workmen defined in section two of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court rejected this contention as wholly unsound. It explained that the second paragraph expressly mentions “industrial or clerical employees” because the accompanying wage table segregates employees into two distinct categories, industrial and clerical. The brackets that follow the word “employees” merely clarify the classification used in the table. Moreover, the Court held that it would be unreasonable to assume that, once the order had prescribed a minimum basic wage for the workmen referred to in paragraph one, the legislature intended to exclude any of those workmen merely because they did not fall within the narrow categories of industrial or clerical employees. The scheme of the order, the Court said, is plain and unambiguous, and its benefits were meant to extend to all workmen covered by section two of the Act. This interpretation was the one adopted by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and the Court agreed that it was correct. Consequently, the Court found no ground to question the validity of the order passed by the Tribunal that awarded the respondents the dear‑food allowance under paragraph three of the Government order.

The Court then turned to the earlier decision in The Suti Mill Mazdoor Sabha Kanpur v. Messrs. The British Indian Corporation Ltd., Kanpur (1956 L.A.C. 549). In that case, the Labour Appellate Tribunal had held that the phrase “industrial employees” was limited to persons employed directly or indirectly in the manufacturing process of a factory. While doing so, the Tribunal noted that the term was undefined and attempted to rely on the definition of “worker” contained in the Factories Act to determine its scope. Although counsel had urged that “industrial employees” should be understood in the broader sense given to “industry” in the Industrial Disputes Act, the Tribunal rejected that argument. The Court found this approach erroneous because the Government order was issued under the Industrial Disputes Act, and the appropriate definition to consult was that of “workman” in section two of that Act. Accordingly, the Court held that the Tribunal erred in adopting a narrow construction of “industrial employees” based on the Factories Act definition, and that the correct reference should have been to the definition of “workman” in the governing statute.

The Court observed that the definition of “industrial employees” should be understood by referring to section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, because that provision determines the true meaning of the expression. Accordingly, the Court held that the Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in adopting the very narrow construction of “industrial employees” that the Government order employed. The next matter raised before the Court was the award by the Labour Appellate Tribunal of leave benefits to the respondents on the same basis as section 79 of the Factories Act. Counsel for the petitioner, Mr Pathak, argued that the claim for leave had been made specifically on the basis of the Factories Act and the Uttar Pradesh Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, and that once it was found that those two Acts did not apply to the Malis, the claim should have been dismissed. The Tribunal, however, held that although the two Acts were inapplicable, a claim for leave could still be justified on the ground of social justice. Mr Pathak objected to this decision on a technical ground, asserting that the claim itself was founded solely on the provisions of the two specified Acts and therefore should be rejected because those Acts did not apply. The Court found that this contention was not well‑founded. It noted that paragraph 10 of the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents did refer to the two Acts, but that the prayer clause presented the claim in general terms without specifically invoking those statutes, and the reference itself was also made in general terms. Consequently, the technical ground advanced by Mr Pathak could not be sustained, because the adjudicator was required to decide a general claim and the fact that the two Acts did not apply did not preclude the leave claim at the threshold stage. Thereafter, Mr Pathak contended that the Tribunal’s reliance on the principle of social justice was legally unsound, and he cited earlier Supreme Court observations that considerations of social justice were “not only irrelevant but untenable,” referring to J.K. Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. The Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union and Muir Mills Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union. The Court rejected this argument without hesitation, observing that the evolution of industrial law over the past decade and several decisions of this Court in industrial matters had underscored the relevance, validity, and significance of the doctrine of social justice, as reflected in authorities such as Crown Aluminum Works v. Their Workmen and The State of Mysore v. The Workers of Gold Mines.

The judgment referred to the case of Workmen (s) and The State of Mysore v. The Workers of Gold Mines (4) as an illustration of the principle involved. The Court observed that the idea of social justice has become an essential component of industrial law, making it unreasonable for any party to argue that industrial tribunals may disregard social‑justice considerations when resolving industrial disputes. It further explained that the notion of social justice is not narrow, one‑sided or pedantic, nor is it limited only to industrial adjudication; its reach is broad and comprehensive. According to the Court, social justice rests on the fundamental ideal of socioeconomic equality and aims to assist in removing socioeconomic disparities and inequalities. Nevertheless, while applying this concept to industrial matters, the Court held that it does not follow a rigid doctrinaire approach as indicated in earlier authorities such as (1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1315, (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 991, (3) [1958] S.C.R. 651 and (4) [1959] S.C.R. 895, but instead adopts a realistic and pragmatic stance. Consequently, the Court stated that the doctrine seeks to balance the competing claims of employers and employees by arriving at a solution that is just and fair to both sides, with the objective of fostering harmony between capital and labour and maintaining good industrial relationships. The ultimate purpose of industrial adjudication, the Court noted, is to promote the growth and progress of the national economy; therefore, disputes are settled on principles of fair play and justice. For this reason, the Court observed that on several occasions industrial tribunals have deemed it appropriate to grant reasonable leave to workmen who may not fall strictly within the scope of the Factories Act or the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. After examining the material, the Court concluded that there was no merit in the grievance raised by Mr Pathak, who contended that the Labour Appellate Tribunal should not have granted the respondents’ request for leave on the grounds of fair play and social justice. Accordingly, the Court held that Civil Appeal No 481/1962 failed and was dismissed with costs, while Civil Appeal No 480 of 1962, which had not been pressed, was dismissed without any order as to costs. In sum, both appeals were dismissed.