Hari Narain vs Badri Das

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1963

Decision Date: 4 March 1963

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah

The matter before the Supreme Court of India was styled Hari Narain versus Badri Das, with the judgment rendered on 4 March 1963. The opinion was authored by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, who sat on the bench together with Justice M. Hidayatullah and Justice J. C. Shah. The petitioner in the case was Hari Narain and the respondent was Badri Das. The decision carries the citation 1963 AIR 1558 and 1964 SCR (2) 203, and it is referenced in several subsequent reports, including R 1964 SC 345 and RF 1969 SC 1273, among others. The case concerned the practice of the Supreme Court regarding the revocation of special leave that had been previously granted, particularly focusing on the effect of inaccurate, untrue, or misleading statements made in a petition for special leave.

The procedural history set out in the headnote explains that the respondent had instituted a suit for the ejectment of the appellant. The trial court dismissed that suit, after which the respondent appealed to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge in Jaipur City. That appeal was accepted and the respondent’s claim for ejectment was allowed. The appellant then appealed to the Rajasthan High Court, but that appeal was dismissed and the High Court also refused to grant a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court. The appellant subsequently filed a petition for special leave to approach the Supreme Court, and that petition was granted. The respondent thereafter filed a petition before this Court seeking revocation of the special leave on the ground that the appellant had made inaccurate, untrue, and misleading statements in the petition for special leave. The Supreme Court examined the petition and found that the appellant had indeed made wholly untrue statements in the special leave petition. The Court held that the special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked and the appeal dismissed. The Court emphasized that it is of utmost importance that parties, when making material statements and setting out grounds in applications for special leave, must avoid any statements that are inaccurate, untrue, or misleading. The Court further observed that it evaluates statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in such petitions at their face value, and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making false or misleading statements.

The judgment was recorded under the civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1963, arising from the judgment and decree dated 30 July 1962 rendered by the Rajasthan High Court in Civil Regular S. A. No. 223 of 1961. Counsel for the appellant included senior advocates and their junior, while counsel for the respondent also appeared. The judgment was delivered on 4 March 1963 by Justice Gajendragadkar. In his introductory remarks, Justice Gajendragadkar stated that it was unnecessary to address the merits of the points raised by the appellant because the Court was satisfied that the respondent’s prayer for revocation of the special leave was well‑founded. He then noted that the appellant was a tenant of the premises that formed the subject of the suit and that those premises were owned by the respondent. These premises were let

The premises were let to the appellant by the respondent under a rent‑note dated 8 December 1953, and the appellant was permitted to use those premises for his oil mill. The lease stipulated that the appellant must pay the agreed rent to the respondent each month. It further provided that if the appellant defaulted for three months, the respondent would be entitled to evict the appellant before the expiry of the five‑year lease term and, additionally, to claim rent for the balance of the lease period. On 2 May 1959, the respondent instituted an ejectment suit against the appellant before the Court of Munsif, East Jaipur City. In that suit the respondent alleged that he had received rent from the appellant up to 31 October 1957, but that thereafter the appellant had failed to pay rent despite repeated demands. The respondent claimed that at the date of filing the suit the appellant remained in arrears of rent and had also failed to pay the house tax as required by the lease agreement. The respondent further asserted that the appellant’s tenancy had terminated by the expiration of time on 1 December 1958, yet the appellant had not surrendered possession of the premises to the respondent. The respondent noted that the appellant had attempted to deposit a lump sum of Rs 1 053 to cover the period from 1 November 1957 to 30 November 1958, which the respondent considered insufficient. The respondent pleaded that during the eighteen‑month period the appellant had committed more than three defaults, each default consisting of two months’ rent, and that at the date of the suit rent or mesne profits for an additional five months and two days remained unpaid. On that basis the respondent sought a decree of ejectment against the appellant. The appellant denied the respondent’s claim, contending that the respondent was not entitled to eject him under section 13(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950 (Act XVII of 1950). The appellant further argued that because the respondent had previously accepted rent payments, the respondent had waived any right to evict, and therefore no default existed. Accordingly, the appellant resisted the respondent’s prayer for his eviction. At the first hearing of the suit in the trial court, the appellant deposited Rs 648 as rent due up to that date, a payment that the respondent accepted without prejudice. Based on the parties’ pleadings, the trial judge framed four issues, the principal one being whether the appellant had committed three defaults of two months each within the eighteen‑month period. The trial court found in favor of the appellant on that principal issue as well as on the other issues it had framed. Consequently, the respondent’s suit was

The trial court dismissed the respondent’s suit, and consequently the respondent filed an appeal before the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge in Jaipur City. The appellate court examined the evidence presented by the respondent and concluded that the appellant had indeed committed the three statutory defaults. Because of those defaults, the appellate court held that the appellant was liable to a decree for ejectment. Accordingly, the decree originally issued by the trial court was set aside and the respondent’s claim for ejectment was affirmed. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the appellant challenged the appellate decision by filing a second appeal before the Rajasthan High Court. A learned single judge of that High Court heard the matter and dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The appellant then sought leave to appeal under the Letters Patent, but the same judge rejected that request. Undeterred, the appellant applied for special leave to appeal to this Court, and the application was granted. The appellant’s principal contention before this Court concerned the interpretation of section 13(1)(a) of the Act read together with section 13(4). However, this Court has decided not to consider the merits of that interpretation because it is satisfied that the statements made by the appellant in the special leave petition are inaccurate and misleading. The respondent therefore argues that the appellant secured special leave on the basis of factual misrepresentations contained in the petition. In the special leave petition, the appellant listed six grounds of appeal against the High Court’s decision.

The petitioner’s final ground alleges that the respondent had pursued eviction in the trial court on the basis of alleged non‑payment and non‑tender of rent from 2 December 1958, yet the First Appellate Court and the High Court supposedly constructed a new case by relying on alleged defaults occurring before that date, which the landlord himself had not relied upon. This ground appears to have been raised to support the broader argument that the High Court mis‑interpreted section 13(1)(a) of the Act. The respondent contends that this description is a complete misstatement of the actual position and points to paragraph 3 of the plaint for clarification. Paragraph 3 records that the rent due for the period from 1 November 1957 to 30 November 1958, which was in default, was paid by the appellant through a cheque on 2 December 1958. That paragraph expressly refers to those defaults and incorporates them into the respondent’s case that the appellant had accumulated more than three defaults, each lasting two months, within an eighteen‑month period. Consequently, the respondent maintains that the appellant’s categorical statement in the last ground of the special leave petition is unequivocally false.

In the present petition for special leave, the appellant asserted a ground that was entirely false. A second ground in the same petition was also inaccurate. In that ground the appellant claimed that, by making the rent payments due to the respondent, he had become a statutory tenant and, as he admitted, had not committed any default after 1 December 1958. This claim must be read together with the material averments in paragraph 6 of the petition, where the appellant stated that at the first hearing he deposited Rs 648 on account of rent due up to that date and that the respondent accepted the deposit. Both of these statements omitted the crucial fact that the deposit made in Court was accepted by the respondent without prejudice; consequently, the contention that the appellant admittedly made no default after 1 December 1958 was likewise false. Counsel for the respondent, Mr Pathak, argued that because of these serious misstatements in the special‑leave petition, his client was justified in assuming that the leave had been granted on the strength of those false statements, and therefore he prayed that the special leave granted to the appellant should be revoked. Counsel for the appellant, Mr Setalvad, contended that he had appeared at the time when special leave was granted and, to the best of his recollection, had not relied on those grounds but had only urged that the High Court had misconstrued section 13(1)(a) of the Act. The Court accepted Mr Setalvad’s statement, but held that what was actually urged before the Court at the time of granting special leave could not be decisive of the present matter and might not even be material. It was noted that special leave had been granted on 26 September 1962, that an appeal may be heard long after the leave is granted, that counsel appearing at the admission stage may differ from counsel at the final hearing, and that the bench granting the leave may not be the same bench hearing the appeal. Accordingly, the respondent’s contention that the inaccurate statements did not influence the grant of leave was not a satisfactory answer. Mr Setalvad also pointed out that the impugned statements and grounds were substantially copied from the averments made in the appeal before the High Court.

Although the statements may have been drawn from the High Court proceedings, the Court observed that two crucial averments, which if true could have significantly assisted the appellant in invoking the protection of section 13 (1) (a) even under the construction placed by the High Court, were in fact false. In the Court’s view, this falsehood represented a serious infirmity in the petition itself. The Court emphasized that when making material statements and setting out grounds in applications for special leave, absolute care must be exercised to avoid any inaccurate, untrue or misleading statements. In reviewing applications for special leave, the Court naturally accepts the factual statements and grounds presented in the petitions at their face value, and it would be fundamentally unfair to betray the Court’s confidence by submitting false or misleading material. Consequently, the Court concluded that, in the present circumstance, the special leave that had been granted to the appellant should be withdrawn. Accordingly, the special leave was revoked and the appeal was dismissed, with the appellant ordered to bear the costs of the respondent. Counsel for the appellant then sought a period of time for the appellant to vacate the premises, drawing the Court’s attention to the fact that the appellant had invested substantial sums in installing the machinery of an oil mill that was being operated in the disputed premises. Counsel for the respondent fairly conceded that, provided the appellant unconditionally undertook to deliver possession of the premises to the respondent within six months from the date of this judgment, the respondent would refrain from executing the decree for ejectment. Acting on the respondent’s suggestion, counsel for the appellant offered an unconditional undertaking on the appellant’s behalf. The Court accordingly directed that, based on the appellant’s undertaking, the respondent should not execute the decree for a period of six months from the date of this order. Special leave was therefore revoked and the appeal dismissed.