H.H. The Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of Udaipur vs The State of Rajasthan and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 528 of 1963

Decision Date: 3 October, 1963

Coram: J.C. Shah, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, Raghubar Dayal

In this case, the Supreme Court recorded that the appeal was filed by H.H. The Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of Udaipur against the State of Rajasthan and other respondents, and the judgment was delivered on 3 October 1963. The bench that heard the matter comprised Justice J.C. Shah, Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K.N. Wanchoo and Justice Raghubar Dayal. The petitioner was identified as H.H. The Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of Udaipur and the respondents were the State of Rajasthan and others. The citation of the decision was reported in 1964 AIR 444 and in the 1964 Second Series of the Supreme Court Reports at page 1, with subsequent citations appearing in various law reports. The statutes that formed the basis of the dispute included the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act 14 of 1947), specifically section 10, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), especially sections 86 and 87B, the Constitution of India, particularly Article 362, and the provisions relating to the rights, privileges and immunities of rulers. The headnote of the judgment explained that a dispute had arisen between the appellant and his employees in the Motor Garage department concerning the employees’ claims for retrenchment, compensation, and leave facilities. The Government of the State of Rajasthan, on 18 December 1957, had referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal of Rajasthan under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The appellant raised two preliminary objections before the Tribunal: first, that the reference was incompetent because it lacked the sanction of the Union Government required under section 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure; and second, that at the time of the reference no Industrial Tribunal had been constituted under section 7A of the Industrial Disputes Act, as amended by Act 36 of 1956, and that the later reconstitution of the Tribunal rendered the reference incompetent. The Tribunal rejected both objections, and the High Court subsequently dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant challenging the Tribunal’s order, leading to the present appeal. The Court held that section 86 read with section 87 of the Code of Civil Procedure protects a ruler from being “sued” and does not bar the institution of other proceedings that are not in the nature of a suit. A proceeding that does not commence with a plaint or petition in the nature of a plaint, or where the claim does not relate to a dispute ordinarily triable in a civil court, would not fall within the scope of section 86. The Court emphasized that section 86 excludes the jurisdiction of civil courts and must be strictly construed, but it does not prevent the commencement of proceedings for adjudication of an industrial dispute for two reasons: neither party to the proceeding is sued by the initiation of the proceeding and the Tribunal is not a court. Further, the Court observed that Article 362 of the Constitution requires that, in the exercise of legislative and executive power by the Union and the State, due regard be given to the guarantees or assurances given under any covenant or agreement concerning the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the ruler of an Indian State. These rights, privileges and dignities, which are recommended for respect for historical reasons, are available to the rulers of Indian States in their capacity as Indian citizens and not as recognition of any continuing sovereign authority. The Court noted that, since the commencement of the Constitution, the appellant has been a citizen of India, and his recognition as ruler under Article 366(22) of the Constitution has not altered that status, although he remains assured a privileged position as a citizen.

In the matter before the Court, it was observed that the proceeding under consideration did not arise in a court of law and that the Tribunal was not a court. The Court then turned to Article 362 of the Constitution, which provides that in the exercise of legislative and executive powers by the Union and the State, due regard must be given to any guarantee or assurance contained in a covenant or agreement concerning the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State. Those rights, privileges and dignities, which are historically recommended to be respected, are available to the Rulers of Indian States solely in their capacity as Indian citizens and are not based on any continuing sovereign authority vested in them. The Court noted that the appellant, having been a citizen of India since the commencement of the Constitution, retained his status as a citizen notwithstanding his recognition as a Ruler under Article 366(22). Accordingly, his citizenship conferred upon him a privileged position, but did not alter the constitutional character of his status.

The Court further examined sub‑section (2) of the Rajasthan Industrial Tribunal (Constitution and Proceedings) Validating Act, 1959. That provision provides that a Tribunal originally constituted under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before the amendment made by Act 36 of 1956, shall be deemed to have been duly constituted under section 7A of the amended Act. Consequently, the reference made on 18 December 1957 was to be treated as if the Tribunal had been constituted under section 7A of the amended Act. The Court held that the Validating Act fell within the competence of the State Legislature because it related to Item 22 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Since the Act was reserved for the President’s consideration, received his assent, and therefore, by virtue of Article 254(2), must prevail in the State of Rajasthan. The Court also referred to the decision in Mundra Metal Works Private Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, W.P. No. 107/58, for support.

The judgment that followed was a civil appellate jurisdiction matter arising from Civil Appeal No. 528 of 1963, which appealed the judgment and order dated 28 March 1962 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 164 of 1961. Counsel for the appellant, comprising a team of senior advocates, represented the appellant, while the Advocate‑General for the State of Rajasthan and counsel for the respondents represented the State. The judgment was delivered on 3 October 1963 by Justice Shah. By order of the President of India, H.H. the Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur, hereinafter referred to as “the appellant,” had been recognized as the Ruler of Udaipur effective from 4 July 1955, succeeding his father, the late Maharana Bhupal Singh. A dispute subsequently arose between the appellant and his employees in the Motor Garage Department concerning conditions of employment. The employees, through the Motor Workers Mazdoor Union, Udaipur, made representations to the Government of Rajasthan. On 18 December 1957, the Government of the State of Rajasthan, invoking section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, referred the dispute to the Rajasthan Industrial Tribunal, seeking a determination of whether the Maharana Sahib Bahadur of Udaipur was liable to pay to the staff employed in the Palace Power House and Motor Garage the arrears of claims, salary, leave wages, overtime wages and weekly holidays, or, if not, the relief to which the staff might be entitled under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.

In the reference that had been made to the Industrial Tribunal, the question was whether the employer was liable to pay the staff of the Motor Garage and Palace Power House the arrears of claims, due salaries, leave wages, overtime wages and weekly holidays in accordance with the schedule appended, and if liability existed, to determine the extent of such liability; alternatively, if liability did not exist, to ascertain what relief the staff could claim under the Industrial Disputes Act because the issue of payment arose from the termination of their services through retrenchment carried out by the employer.

Before the Tribunal the appellant raised two preliminary objections challenging the maintainability of the reference. First, the appellant argued that the reference could not be entertained without a prior sanction from the Central Government as required by section 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure. Second, the appellant contended that at the time the reference was issued no Industrial Tribunal had been constituted under section 7A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as amended by Act 36 of 1956, and that the subsequent reconstitution of the Tribunal rendered the reference incompetent.

The Tribunal dismissed both objections, and the High Court of Rajasthan later dismissed a writ petition filed by the appellant that sought to set aside the Tribunal’s order. The appellant then appealed to this Court, obtaining a certificate of appeal from the Rajasthan High Court.

In its primary submission the appellant claimed that, because the reference had been made without the Union Government’s sanction under section 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure, the reference was infirm. However, the dispute concerned the employees’ claims for retrenchment compensation, leave benefits and other dues, and it was presented to the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, not to a civil court in a suit. Consequently, the appellant was not being “sued” in a court of law.

The appellant relied on section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that no ruler of a foreign state may be sued in any competent court without the Central Government’s consent in writing. Section 87B extends the operation of section 86 to a ruler of any former Indian state. While the appellant is recognised under article 366(22) of the Constitution as a ruler of an Indian state, section 86 shields a ruler only from being sued, not from the institution of other types of proceedings that are not suits. A proceeding that does not commence with a plaint or a petition resembling a plaint, and where the claim does not relate to a dispute ordinarily triable in a civil court, does not fall within the ambit of section 86.

The proceeding for adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act therefore arose from a reference made by the local Government under section 10 and related provisions of that Act, and it was not initiated by a plaint or a petition in the nature of a civil suit.

The Court observed that the proceeding under section ten of the Industrial Disputes Act and the related provisions was initiated by the local Government and did not begin with a plaint or a petition. It further noted that an Industrial Tribunal could not be described as a court within the meaning of section eighty‑six of the Code of Civil Procedure, because the Tribunal was created expressly for the purpose of adjudicating industrial disputes. Section eighty‑six, the Court explained, removes the jurisdiction of civil courts and must be interpreted narrowly. Consequently, the provision does not prohibit the commencement of proceedings for the determination of an industrial dispute for two principal reasons: first, the initiation of the proceeding does not involve suing any party, and second, the Tribunal itself is not a court. The Court recorded that it had been submitted that article three hundred sixty‑two of the Constitution preserved the personal rights, privileges and dignities of a ruler of an Indian State that were guaranteed or assured under any pre‑Constitution agreement or covenant, and that this article placed a limitation on the legislative and executive powers of the Union and the States against any infringement of such guarantees. On that basis, it was argued that, as a ruler of an Indian State, the appellant was entitled to the same privileges enjoyed by a sovereign under rules of international law, including immunity from proceedings in ordinary or extraordinary civil or criminal tribunals, exemption from all taxes, and freedom from being subjected to police or other administrative regulations. The Court further stated that the status of former rulers of Indian States had been fundamentally altered since the year nineteen forty‑seven. Before that year, the princes of India, despite varying degrees of suzerainty exercised by the British Crown, were recognised as possessing a degree of sovereignty and, in the international context of British India, were treated as foreign sovereigns entitled to certain rights, privileges and immunities. The Court explained that the enactment of the Indian Independence Act terminated the suzerainty of the British Crown over the Indian States and simultaneously ended all treaties and agreements that had been in force at the date of the Act between His Majesty and the rulers, as well as all functions, obligations, powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction that His Majesty could exercise with respect to the Indian States by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or any other means. In the same manner as other princely States, the State of Udaipur executed an agreement of accession, whereby the Government of India assumed exclusive responsibility for defence, external affairs and communications concerning the State. The Court noted that this accession was followed by a process of integration of the Indian States within Rajasthan, which ultimately culminated in the creation of the United State of Rajasthan. Finally, the Court recorded that the rulers of the Indian States in the Rajasthan area, including the ruler of Udaipur, participated in forming the United State of Rajasthan.

The covenant that created the United State of Rajasthan was entered into by the rulers of the Rajasthan princely states, including the ruler of Udaipur. The provisions of that covenant were expressly guaranteed by the Government of India. Subsequently the covenant was altered by an agreement that became effective on May 15, 1949. When the Constitution of India came into force on January 26, 1950, the United State of Rajasthan was classified as a Part B State under the Constitution. Later, by operation of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act of 1956, the Part B State of Rajasthan was recognized as a full State of the Indian Union. These constitutional developments meant that the father of the present appellant, who had previously been acknowledged as a sovereign ruler of an independent State, acquired the status of a citizen of India. From the commencement of the Constitution the appellant himself has also been a citizen of India. His continued recognition as a ruler under Article 366(22) of the Constitution has not altered his citizenship, and as a citizen he enjoys the privileges that the Constitution confers upon all Indian citizens.

The covenant of the United State of Rajasthan comprised twenty articles. For the purposes of this appeal it is unnecessary to enumerate every article that dealt with the rights, privileges and dignities of the ruler of Udaipur; only a representative selection is set out. Article XI provided that, as ruler of a covenanting state, the ruler was entitled to receive, each year, a privy purse from the revenues of the United State of Rajasthan in the amounts specified for his State in Schedule 1 of the covenant. Article XII affirmed that the ruler retained full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private property that he possessed when the administration of his State was transferred to the Raj Pramukh, distinguishing such private property from State property. Article XIII guaranteed that the ruler of each covenanting State, as well as his family members, would continue to enjoy all personal privileges, dignities and titles that they had enjoyed either within the State or outside its territory immediately before August 15, 1947. Article XIV secured the succession, according to law and custom, to the throne of each covenanting State and guaranteed the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles of the ruler. Article XV protected the ruler against any legal action or proceeding in any court, whether in a personal capacity or otherwise, concerning any act or omission performed by him or under his authority during his period of administration of the covenanting State. The covenant was drafted in general terms and did not attempt to list exhaustively every personal right, privilege or dignity, limiting itself to those expressly mentioned. The agreement that took effect on May 15, 1949 did not depart from any of the covenant’s articles. Both the covenant and the May 1949 agreement were entered into with the concurrence of the Government of India, and the provisions of each were guaranteed by that Government.

In order to give constitutional recognition to the guarantees and assurances that were contained in the covenants and agreements, Articles 362, 363, the proviso to Article 131 and Article 291 were incorporated into the Constitution. Article 362, which is the provision directly relevant to the matter before the Court, states that “In the exercise of the power of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State to make laws or in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State, due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in article 291 with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State.” This clause therefore mandates that both the Union and the State must observe the guarantees or assurances that were made under any covenant or agreement concerning the personal rights, privileges and dignities of an Indian ruler when they exercise legislative or executive authority. It is important to emphasise that these rights, privileges and dignities are respected for historical reasons and they apply to the Rulers only in their capacity as Indian citizens; they do not recognise any continuing sovereign authority in the Ruler. Consequently, it is unnecessary to discuss the immunities and privileges that a foreign sovereign might claim in the Republic of India, because the constitutional provision deals solely with personal rights of former Rulers and not with any sovereign powers.

The specific issue for consideration is whether a reference by the Government of the State of Rajasthan to an industrial dispute, which brings the dispute within the scope of the Industrial Disputes Act, infringes the guarantee or assurance that was given under the covenant executed by the appellant’s father with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of the State of Udaipur, and if such an infringement occurs, whether the courts have the competence to grant relief. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was originally applicable to British India, but its reach was extended to the whole of India, except the State of Jammu and Kashmir, by the amendment made through the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 48 of 1950, and further extended to the entire country by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 36 of 1956. Accordingly, at the relevant time the Act was applicable to the territory of Rajasthan. The appellant, being an Indian citizen, is ordinarily subject to the provisions of the Act in Rajasthan. He contends that, by virtue of Article 362 of the Constitution, the referral of an industrial dispute to the mechanisms provided under the Act violates the guarantee or assurance relating to his personal rights, privileges and dignities as assured by the covenant that formed the Union of Rajasthan. The appellant’s claim of immunity from the jurisdiction of the Industrial…

In this case, the Court observed that the question of whether the Industrial Tribunal could exercise jurisdiction over the dispute on the ground that it affected a personal right or privilege of the appellant was never presented to the High Court, and consequently no evidence was adduced on that point. The Court referred to the White Paper on Indian States, paragraph 240, page 125, which explains that the privileges enjoyed by the rulers of the Indian States differed from one State to another and could be exercised both within the State and outside it. Such privileges included, among other things, the use of red licence plates on motor vehicles, immunity from the operation of civil and criminal courts, and exemption from customs duties. The Court noted that, contrary to the appellant’s later claim, the High Court did not rely upon Article 362 of the Constitution in any of its proceedings. Because there was no evidence shown to establish that the appellant, described as “Ruler of the Indian State of Udaipur,” was entitled, by virtue of the covenant or agreement he relied upon, to a privilege that would bar proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal, the Court could not entertain that contention. The Court further explained that, even if an exemption from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction were claimed on the basis of a guarantee or assurance contained in the disputed covenant, two additional questions would arise: first, whether the courts have authority to decide the dispute if the covenant or agreement falls within the category mentioned in Article 363 of the Constitution; and second, whether the dispute concerns any right, liability or obligation that originates from any constitutional provision dealing with such treaties or agreements. The Court cited the decision in Sudhansu Shekhar Singh Deo v. State of Orissa, which held that, despite any recommendation to respect the guarantee or assurance given under a covenant or agreement, if Parliament or a State Legislature enacts legislation that is inconsistent with the personal rights, privileges or dignities of a ruler, the validity of that legislation cannot be questioned in any court, as expressly provided by Article 363. The Court pointed out that the High Court had never examined whether the bar to jurisdiction created by Article 363 could be effectively raised, and that the present Court had not been confronted with that issue either, because the appellant’s reliance on Article 362 was raised for the first time before this Court. Accordingly, the Court declined to express any opinion on whether Article 362 conferred on the appellant a privilege exempting him from reference under the Industrial Disputes Act, nor on whether the courts possessed jurisdiction to determine the appellant’s plea. The Court affirmed that the second contention raised by the appellant had been correctly rejected by the High Court, and it noted that the Industrial Disputes Act had been extended to the territory of Rajasthan by the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act.

The State had originally created an Industrial Tribunal by issuing a notification on 2 June 1953 under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Subsequently, the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, numbered 36 of 1956, altered the legislation. The amendment removed the original section 7 and introduced new provisions numbered sections 7, 7A, 7B and 7C. Under the amended scheme, the authority to appoint an Industrial Tribunal was transferred to the appropriate Government by virtue of section 7A. Despite this change, the records show that the Government did not publish a new notification under section 7A to appoint a fresh tribunal. Consequently, the tribunal that had been constituted under the earlier section 7 continued to operate. The present dispute was referred to that tribunal by an order dated 18 December 1957. The Rajasthan High Court, hearing Writ Petition No. 107 of 1958 (Mundra Metal Works Private Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and two others), examined the validity of that reference. The High Court concluded that the reference was invalid because it had been made to a tribunal that had been constituted under section 7 before the amendment introduced by Act 36 of 1956. In response, the State Government re‑established the tribunal under the newly created section 7A by issuing a notification on 16 April 1959. However, the State did not issue a fresh reference of the present dispute to the re‑constituted tribunal. Relying on this omission, the appellant argued that the tribunal created by the 16 April 1959 notification lacked jurisdiction to hear the earlier reference and that, without a new reference, the proceedings were void. The appellant further contended that any constitution or appointment of the tribunal occurring after 30 March 1959 was invalid. The Court deemed it unnecessary to evaluate the substantive merits of these arguments because the Legislature had subsequently enacted the Rajasthan Industrial Tribunal (Constitution and Proceedings) Validating Act, 1959. This validating legislation was placed before the President of India for consideration and obtained his assent. Section 2(1) of the Validating Act declared that, notwithstanding any judgment, order or decision of any court and irrespective of any defect in form or jurisdiction, the Industrial Tribunal for Rajasthan that had been constituted under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by the notification of 2 June 1953—as subsequently amended by an order dated 9 March 1956—would, for the period beginning on 10 March 1957 and ending on 15 April 1959, be deemed to have been properly constituted under section 7A of the amended Act. Furthermore, subsection (2) provided that, regardless of any court’s judgment, decision or order, all references made, all proceedings taken and all orders issued by the tribunal described in subsection (1) during the interval from 10 March 1957 to 15 April 1959 would be treated as if they had been made, taken and issued by a tribunal constituted under section 7A of the Act.

In this case the Court explained that the provisions which validate the Tribunal clearly indicated that the Tribunal, which had originally been constituted under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before that Act was amended by Act 36 of 1956, was to be treated as having been duly constituted under section 7A of the amended Act. Accordingly, the reference that was made on 18 December 1957 was to be treated as if it had been made by a Tribunal that was constituted under section 7A of the amended legislation. The Court further observed that the Validating Act fell within the legislative competence of the State of Rajasthan because it corresponded to Item 22 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Act had been reserved for the consideration of the President of India and had obtained the President’s assent. Consequently, the Court held that, by virtue of article 254(2) of the Constitution, the Validating Act was required to have effect and to prevail within the territory of Rajasthan. After applying these principles, the Court concluded that the contentions raised in the appeal could not succeed. As a result, the Court dismissed the appeal, ordered the appellant to pay the costs of the proceedings, and entered a final order dismissing the appeal.