Gopal Narain vs State Of Uttar Pradesh and Anr

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Petition No. 12 of 1962

Decision Date: 3 September 1963

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.R. Mudholkar, Subbarao J

In the matter titled Gopal Narain versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, the Supreme Court rendered its judgment on the third of September, 1963. The case was heard by a bench comprising Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K. N. Wanchoo, Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, and Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The petitioner in the proceeding was Gopal Narain, while the respondents were the State of Uttar Pradesh and an additional party. The official citation for this decision is reported in the 1964 All India Reporter at page 370 and in the 1964 Supreme Court Reports (fourth series) at page 869. The judgment also appears in subsequent citator references, including the 1990 Supreme Court Reports at page 322, the 1992 Supreme Court Reports at page 1848, and other legal reporting compilations. The substantive legal provisions examined in this case include Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India, as well as sections 128(1) and 131(1)(h) of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act of 1916, which is identified as Uttar Pradesh Act No. II of 1916.

The factual backdrop of the dispute involved the city of Bareilly, which originally consisted of two separate settlements. In the year 1870, the municipal authorities undertook the development of the vacant land separating these settlements, creating a new residential district that required substantial municipal expenditure. To finance the provision of special amenities to the inhabitants of this newly created area, the municipality imposed a house tax. Following the enactment of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916, the municipal board introduced additional levies, first a latrine tax and subsequently, beginning in 1939, a scavenging tax, both of which were confined to the same residential zone, identified as the civil lines. Gopal Narain, who owned a house in this area, challenged the validity of these taxes by filing the present petition. The petitioner advanced four principal contentions: first, that section 128(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, insofar as it authorized the municipal board to impose the specified taxes only in a portion of the municipality, contravened Article 14 of the Constitution and was therefore void; second, that even assuming the section did not offend Article 14, the municipal notification that imposed the house tax and scavenging tax solely upon the civil lines area was invalid because the classification could not be justified under the doctrine of classification; third, that the taxes were imposed contrary to the statutory framework of the Act, thereby infringing the petitioner’s right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property protected by Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution; and fourth, that section 131(1)(b) of the Act violated Article 14 by granting the municipal board an arbitrary power to levy taxes of any amount upon any person or class without articulating a clear policy for classification.

The Court’s holding addressed these arguments in several respects. First, the Court observed that while a tribunal must exercise caution to avoid speculation that could conceal an evident deficiency in legislation, it is permissible for a court to discern the policy underlying a statute when such a policy is clearly evident upon a fair and careful reading of the relevant statutory provisions. However, the Court cautioned that it is neither feasible nor advisable for a court to prescribe a rigid formula for extracting a policy from an enactment in the absence of an explicit statutory declaration of such a policy; the approach must be tailored to the specific provisions and context of each statute, including its preamble, and the policy must emerge either expressly or by necessary implication from the statute itself.

The Court explained that when a statute does not contain an express declaration of policy, the existence of a policy must be inferred from the provisions of the Act itself, including its preamble, and that such a policy must appear clear either expressly or by necessary implication from the statute. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court referred to several authorities, namely Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S. R. Tendolkar, State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Dhirendra Krishna Mondol v. Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, P. Balakotaih v. Union of India and M/s. Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India. The Court then turned to a fair reading of sections 7, 8 and 128 of the municipal Act, observing that these provisions make it clear that the monies collected by the Municipal Board as taxes are primarily intended to enable the Board to perform its duties within the municipal area or within any part of that area as the case may require. The Court noted that the duties and functions of the Board need not be discharged throughout the entire municipality simultaneously; where different portions of a municipality require special treatment with respect to the provision of amenities, it is reasonable to combine the power of taxation over that portion with the separate treatment accorded to it. This legislative guidance, the Court said, is evident from the three cited sections. Looking at the policy disclosed by sections 7, 8 and 128 and applying the liberal view that a law of taxation receives in the application of the doctrine of classification, the Court held that it is not possible to say that the policy so disclosed violates the rule of equality. In support of this view, the Court cited Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income‑tax Officer, Kasharagod, Purshottam Govindji v. B. M. Desai, K. T. Moopol Nair v. State of Kerala and Bareilly Municipality v. Kundan Lal. The Court further observed that the contrast between the old city and the civil‑lines area is so marked with respect to amenities that there exists a reasonable relation between the taxes imposed and the geographical classification made for taxation purposes; consequently, the notification imposing those taxes does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution. Finally, the Court pointed out that sections 131, 132 and 133 of the Act demonstrate that the rate of tax to be levied and the persons or class of persons liable to pay it bear a reasonable relation to the taxable subject under the Act. The rate and the liable class are determined by a quasi‑judicial procedure after affording an opportunity to the affected parties, subject to revision by the State Government. Therefore, it cannot be said that the

The Court observed that the authority given to the Municipal Board to levy taxes was not an arbitrary power that violated Article 14 of the Constitution. It further stated that, although a tax may be levied only in accordance with law, the present case had not demonstrated that the challenged taxes were imposed contrary to section 131 or any other relevant provisions of the Municipalities Act. The validity of a tax, the Court explained, depended on the existence of a lawful power to tax a particular subject. In the circumstances before it, the Municipal Board unquestionably possessed the power to impose a scavenging tax. The Court noted that the notification referred to clause (xii) of section 128 of the Act when it should have referred to clause (xi), but that this clerical error did not diminish the Board’s authority to levy the tax.

The case originated as Original Jurisdiction Petition No. 12 of 1962, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the petitioner appeared on behalf of the petitioner, while counsel for respondent No 1 and counsel for respondent No 2 represented the respective respondents. The judgment was delivered by Justice Subba Rao on 3 September 1963. The petition challenged the constitutional validity of section 128(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916, on the ground that it permitted a Municipal Board to impose any of the taxes listed in the Act anywhere within the municipal area. The Court described Bareilly as an old city in Uttar Pradesh that, in the mid‑nineteenth century, comprised congested small houses and narrow lanes, with a separate cantonment area situated at a distance. Between the old city and the cantonment lay undeveloped, uneven land, part of which the Bareilly Municipal Board acquired and, together with some additional land, developed at considerable expense. The newly created neighborhood became known as the Civil Lines, for which the Board provided special amenities. The facts concerning the amenities and a map showing the division of Bareilly into the old city, the cantonment, and the Civil Lines were set out in the Board’s counter‑affidavit, and the Court found no reason to reject those facts as an accurate representation of the city’s geographical and developmental divisions. In the Civil Lines area, which the Board had acquired and developed, the Board began imposing house tax from 31 January …

In 1916 the legislature of the State of Uttar Pradesh enacted a statute that was intended to bring together and amend all existing laws dealing with municipalities. That Act became operative on the first day of July 1916. Once the legislation was in force, the municipal authorities in Bareilly discontinued the earlier levy that had been collected and, pursuant to the new law, introduced a fresh house tax applicable to properties situated in the Civil Lines area. This house tax was declared to be effective from the first day of January 1918. In addition, a separate tax on latrines was imposed beginning on the twenty‑fifth day of May 1918; however, that levy was later supplanted by a scavenging tax, which started to apply from the first day of April 1939.

The individual who brought the present writ before the Supreme Court was a resident of the Civil Lines locality and the owner of a house identified as door number forty‑three. He filed the petition seeking a declaration that section one hundred twenty‑eight, sub‑section one, of the 1916 municipal Act was unconstitutional to the extent that it empowered the Bareilly Municipal Board to levy any tax within any portion of the municipal area. He also asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Municipal Board of Bareilly not to recover from him either the house tax or the scavenging tax. In response to this petition, the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Bareilly Municipal Board were joined as respondents one and two respectively.

The counsel appearing for the petitioner advanced six separate points, but those points were grouped by him under four principal headings. First, he contended that section one hundred twenty‑eight, sub‑section one, of the Act, insofar as it permits the Municipal Board to impose taxes in any part of the municipality, violates article fourteen of the Constitution and must therefore be held void. Second, even assuming that the provision did not offend article fourteen, he argued that the specific notification issued by the Municipal Board which imposed the house tax and the scavenging tax only on the Civil Lines area was itself invalid because the classification on which those taxes were based could not be justified. Third, he submitted that the two taxes were imposed in contravention of the statutory requirements of the Act, and that the imposition of those levies on his building infringed his fundamental right guaranteed by article nineteen, clause one, sub‑clause f, of the Constitution. Fourth, he maintained that section one hundred thirty‑one, sub‑section one, clause b, of the Act also contravened article fourteen, on the ground that it gave the Municipal Board an arbitrary power to levy taxes of any amount on any person or class of persons without any clear policy for classification.

The counsel for the Municipal Board, identified as Mr Pathak, opposed each of the petitioner’s submissions. The Court indicated that it would address the arguments raised by the Municipal Board at the appropriate stage of the judgment. To begin its analysis of the petitioner’s first contention, the Court found it useful to read the relevant portion of section one hundred twenty‑eight of the municipal statute. That provision states: “Section 128. (1) Subject to any general rules or special orders of the State Government in this behalf, the taxes which a board may impose in the whole or any part of a municipality are—(i) a tax on the annual value of buildings or lands or both…”

Section 128 of the Act listed, among other taxes, a “scavenging tax.” No general rules or special orders had been issued by the State Government regarding the imposition of any tax in any part of a municipality. The petitioner argued that the authority given to the Municipal Board to levy a tax on any part of the municipality amounted to a naked and arbitrary power because the Act failed to disclose any policy or provide guidance for making a valid classification, and that, consequently, the provision violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court observed that the legal position on this issue was well settled. Referring to the decision of Das, Chief Justice, in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S. R. Tendolkar, the Court noted that a statute challenged on the ground of violation of Article 14 could be categorized into one of five classes. The Court focused on classes (iii) and (iv), which were pertinent to the present matter. Class (iii) held that a statute might refrain from fixing any classification and instead leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons or things to which its provisions would apply. In assessing the validity of such a statute, the Court would not automatically strike it down merely because no explicit classification appeared or because discretion was granted; rather, it would examine whether the statute set out any principle or policy to guide the exercise of that discretion in the matter of selection or classification. If the statute merely delegated arbitrary and uncontrolled power, enabling the Government to discriminate among similarly situated persons or things, the Court would consider the discrimination inherent in the statute and would strike down both the law and any executive action taken under it, as it had done in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, and Dhirendra Krishna Mandal v. Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs. Class (iv) recognized that a statute could also leave classification to governmental discretion but at the same time lay down a policy or principle to guide that discretion. When such a guiding policy was present, the Court would uphold the statute as constitutional, as demonstrated in the decision of Kathy Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra. The discussion therefore turned to whether the Act in question had, in fact, laid down a policy to guide the Municipal Board in selecting any part of a municipality for the purpose of imposing the taxes enumerated in section 128.

The question that needed to be examined was whether the Act contained a policy that would guide the Municipal Board in selecting any part of the municipality for the purpose of levying any of the taxes specified in section 128 of the Act. Because a legislature may sometimes be reluctant or inadvertently fail to express its policy with clarity, courts are often burdened with the difficult task of discerning that policy, if it can be discovered, by reading the provisions of the Act fairly. Certain statutes expressly set out a policy to direct the exercise of discretion of an authority that has been given the power to classify. Other statutes, even when they do not state the policy in explicit terms, may nevertheless convey it clearly through necessary implication arising from their provisions, thereby offering genuine guidance for the discretion vested in the authority. While a court must guard against speculative reasoning that could conceal a evident defect in legislation, it is permissible for the court to identify a policy when that policy is plainly discernible on a careful reading of the relevant sections of the Act. The Court, in Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra (1), identified a clear legislative policy by analysing the preamble of the Act together with the surrounding circumstances. In P. Balakotaish v. Union of India (2), the Court arrived at the policy by examining the Act as a whole, and in M/s. Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India (3) the policy was derived from the preamble itself. Subsequent decisions endorsed this approach. However, it is neither feasible nor advisable to prescribe a precise formula for extracting such a policy from an Act when the statute does not contain an explicit declaration of policy. The method depends on the particular provisions of each Act, including its preamble, but it is essential that the policy emerge unmistakably, either expressly or by necessary implication from the statutory language. The next issue was whether the present Act supplied any genuine guidance to the Municipal Board for exercising its discretion under section 128(1). The Act in question is a consolidating and amending legislation relating to municipalities in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Section 7 of the Act outlines the duties of a municipal board, directing it to perform functions related, inter alia, to sanitation, drainage, road laying, schools, health, water supply, hospitals, maternity centres and similar matters. Section 8 empowers a municipal board, at its discretion, to provide special amenities and to undertake other duties listed in the section, duties that involve substantial expenditure. These duties and discretionary functions cannot be carried out unless the municipality possesses the power to raise revenue through taxes. Section 128 of the Act confers that taxing power on the Municipal Board.

The provision grants a taxation power to the Municipal Board, authorising it to levy the taxes listed in the statute upon the whole of the municipality or any portion thereof. A careful interpretation of these three sections reveals that the revenue collected through such taxes is principally intended to enable the Board to fulfil its statutory duties within the municipal territory, or within whichever part of that territory is concerned. It was argued that, although a combined reading of the provisions indicates the general purpose of taxation, the statutes do not disclose any policy guiding the circumstances in which the Board may choose a specific part of the municipality for the imposition of a tax or taxes. The Court rejected that contention. Sections seven and eight set out the obligatory duties and the discretionary functions of a municipality. These duties and functions do not have to be carried out throughout the entire municipal area at one time; they may be introduced progressively, beginning in one zone of the municipality with a view to extending them to the whole area in due course. Moreover, the amenities required in one part of the municipal area may differ from those required in another part. A particular part may also demand a larger outlay for development because of its soil condition, its distance from the well‑developed centre, or historical factors. Accepting that different parts of a municipality may need special treatment with respect to the provision of amenities, it is reasonable to associate the power of taxation over a part of the municipality with such distinct treatment. While the first two sections, by necessary implication, permit a municipality to provide special amenities in a portion of its area, the third section empowers it to impose taxes in that same portion. Accordingly, the legislative guidance becomes apparent: a municipality may levy a tax on a part of a city when that part, owing to its peculiar situation or other reasons, must be supplied with special amenities that impose a heavy financial burden on the municipality.

The next issue examined was whether the policy derived from these provisions violated Article 14 of the Constitution. It was submitted that all citizens of a city, directly or indirectly, enjoy the amenities created in any part of the city, and therefore the classification underlying the policy lacked a reasonable nexus with the intended objective. It was further argued that amenities such as good roads, extensive parks, electrification and water supply, when provided in one part of the city, could equally be utilized by residents of other parts, and consequently the cost of such amenities should be met from the general revenue. The Court observed that the indirect benefit to residents of other areas cannot be equated with the direct benefit conferred on the specific part that is treated as a separate unit for taxation purposes. Thus, the classification based on the need to finance specially‑provided amenities in a particular portion of the municipality was found to have a rational connection with the purpose of the tax, and it did not offend the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14.

The Court observed that while the municipality might draw revenue for general purposes from the general revenues, the indirect advantage that accrues to the whole city cannot be treated as the same as the direct benefit that is granted to a particular part of the city when that part is designated as a separate unit for the purpose of taxation. Referring to the decision in Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income‑Tax Officer, Kasaragod, the Court explained that taxation law is not exempt from the doctrine of classification, citing the earlier rulings of Purshottam Govindji v. B. M. Desai and K. T. Moopol Nair v. State of Kerala. The Court added that, because of the intrinsic complexity involved in adjusting fiscal matters among diverse elements, the judiciary permits a broader discretion to the legislature when it creates classifications, provided that such classifications conform to the fundamental principles of the doctrine. It further noted that the legislative power to classify is described as having a “wide range and flexibility” so that the legislature may shape its system of taxation in every proper and reasonable manner.

Applying this liberal approach to the provisions contained in sections 7, 8 and 128 of the enactment, and relying on the authorities reported in [1963] 3 S.C.R. 809, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 887 and [1961] 3 S.C.R. 77, the Court held that the policy set out in those sections does not violate the principle of equality. The Court reaffirmed the position taken in several earlier decisions that the equality clause does not prohibit a geographical classification when the distinction among geographical units bears a reasonable relationship to the objective that the law seeks to accomplish. This principle was previously applied to a taxation statute in Khandige Sham Bhat’s case, where the Court also accepted that the legislative authority to classify enjoys a wide range and flexibility, enabling it to adjust the tax scheme in all proper and reasonable ways. The Court cited the commentary in “Willis, Constitutional Law” (page 590) to emphasize that a State may designate a territory within a city as a unit for taxation purposes.

Consequently, the Court concluded that the impugned provision, which permits a geographical classification for taxation purposes that is reasonably related to the statute’s purpose of providing special amenities to a particular unit having peculiar circumstances that demand such facilities, does not infringe the equality clause. The Court noted that the same question had been examined by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bareilly Municipality v. Kundan Lal, where the majority held that the power granted to the municipal board to select a portion of the municipality for levying a tax was not an arbitrary power but was governed by the purpose intended by the Act. Agreeing with that view, the Court proceeded to consider the next issue, namely whether the notification issued by the Municipal Board imposing the tax in the Civil Lines area violated Article 14 of the Constitution.

The Court examined the contention that the Municipal Board’s imposition of taxes in the Civil Lines area violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court observed that the affidavit submitted on behalf of the Municipal Board, together with the accompanying map, demonstrated that the Civil Lines locality had been treated as a distinct development unit since 1870. According to the evidence, the Board had acquired land in that zone, laid out wide roads, demarcated spacious building plots, and provided a range of special amenities for the residents. These amenities included broad thoroughfares, larger plots for the construction of houses, parks, gardens, enhanced lighting, foot‑paths furnished with cement benches, water booths staffed by watermen to dispense drinking water, and special sanitary facilities. In contrast, the older part of the city of Bareilly consisted of narrow lanes, small plots of land, and modest houses situated in congested neighbourhoods. The Municipal Board had imposed a house tax on the Civil Lines area as early as 31 January 1870, and after the enactment of the relevant statute, the Board re‑imposed the challenged tax in accordance with the provisions of that Act. Regarding the scavenging tax, the Board employed different collection methods in the two zones: in Civil Lines, night‑soil and rubbish were collected directly from each bungalow, whereas in the city’s older precincts they were gathered from a common collection point in each ward, a method that required considerably less expenditure. The Court therefore concluded that for roughly ninety years the Civil Lines area had functioned as a separate geographical unit for taxation purposes, a distinction justified by historical practice, the provision of additional amenities, and the higher costs incurred by the Board in that locality. The Court noted that the disparity in amenities between the old city and Civil Lines was so pronounced that a reasonable relationship existed between the taxes levied and the geographical classification employed for taxation. Accordingly, the Court held that the notification imposing the taxes on Civil Lines did not transgress Article 14 of the Constitution.

The Court then turned to the second issue, namely whether Section 131 of the Act contravened Article 14. Section 131 was quoted in full: “When a board desires to impose a tax, it shall by special resolution frame proposals specifying— (a) the tax, being one of the taxes described in sub‑section (1) of Section 128, which it desires to impose; (b) the persons or class of persons to be made liable, and the description of property or other tax thing or circumstances in respect of which to be made liable, except where and insofar as any such class or description is already sufficiently defined under clause (a) or by this Act; (c) the amount or rate leviable from each such person or class of persons; (d) any …” The Court proceeded to analyse the language of the provision in the context of the constitutional guarantee of equality.

The contention put forward was that section 131 of the Act permits a municipal board to levy a tax of any quantum and to impose it upon any person or class of persons without providing any guideline for fixing the tax rate or identifying the liable persons. It was argued that this authority conferred on the municipal board amounted to an unguided and naked power. The Court observed, however, that section 131 does not, by itself, create a power to impose a tax. The power to levy a tax is vested in section 128, which enumerates with great care the various subjects that may be taxed. Section 131 merely provides the procedural mechanism for imposing the taxes described in section 128. The taxes cannot be imposed in a vacuum; there must be a system for determining the rate of taxation and the persons or class of persons who are liable to pay. If section 131 were read in isolation, some justification might be found for the objection, but when it is read together with section 128, it creates a reasonable nexus between the tax, the rate payable, and the person or class of persons liable to pay it.

For example, section 128 authorises the municipal board to levy a tax on the annual value of a building and to make the person connected with that building liable to pay the tax. To resolve the questions of rate and liability, a quasi‑judicial procedure is prescribed in section 131 and the succeeding sections of the Act. Under section 131 the board must prepare proposals that specify the tax, the rate, the persons or class of persons liable, and any other details required by the statute. The board then publishes these proposals in the manner prescribed. Section 132 allows any inhabitant of the municipality to file objections to the published proposals within a fortnight. The board is required to consider each objection and to pass orders on the matter by special resolution. If the board decides to amend its proposals, it must publish the amended proposals, which may again be subject to objections.

After the board has made its final orders, it must forward the proposals along with any objections received to the prescribed authority under section 133. The prescribed authority then forwards the proposals and objections to the State Government, which makes the ultimate decision. When the proposals are approved by the prescribed authority or the State Government, the State Government drafts rules taking into account the draft rules submitted by the board. Once the State Government sanctions those rules, they are sent back to the board, and the board, by special resolution, directs the imposition of the tax effective from a date specified in the resolution. The resolution is subsequently notified by the State Government in the Gazette. This procedural framework demonstrates that the rate of tax and the persons or class of persons liable to pay are linked reasonably to the taxable subjects under the Act, and that the tax is not imposed arbitrarily. Consequently, the Court concluded that the power conferred upon the municipal board is not an arbitrary power offending Article 14 of the Constitution.

The State Government was to publish the tax order in the Gazette, and it was observed that the statutory provisions ensured that both the rate of the tax and the persons or class of persons liable to pay it bore a reasonable relation to the subjects that were taxable under the Act. The rate to be imposed and the identification of the liable persons or classes were to be determined through a quasi‑judicial procedure that gave the affected parties an opportunity to be heard, with the final determination subject to revision by the State Government. Consequently, it could not be said that the power conferred on the Municipal Board amounted to an arbitrary power that violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The next question raised by counsel was whether the taxes had been imposed in breach of the procedure prescribed by the Act. It was noted that the house tax had been imposed effective 31 January 1870, the latrine tax had been imposed effective 23 May 1918, and that the latrine tax had been replaced by a scavenging tax effective 1 April 1939. Although many decades had elapsed, no party had challenged the validity of those taxes on the ground that the procedural requirements had not been strictly observed. A presumption existed that when a statutory authority made an order, it had complied with the prescribed procedure, and that presumption was not weakened by the long‑standing acquiescence of the residents of the Civil Lines. Nevertheless, no tax could be levied or collected except in accordance with law, and any tax imposed otherwise would infringe the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. While the passage of a long period between the imposition of a tax and a subsequent challenge might give rise to certain presumptions where evidence is lost to the passage of time, such a lapse could not absolve the statutory authority if it imposed a tax in contravention of the statutory provisions. Accordingly, the Court proceeded to consider the specific objections raised by the petitioner. Sections 131 to 136 of the Act laid down the procedural steps to be followed for imposing a tax, and a summary of those sections had already been provided in a different context. Counsel for the petitioner contended that the Municipal Board had violated the provisions of section 131(1) of the Act because (i) the Board had failed to include all necessary details in the proposals made under that section, and (ii) the Government had not framed the rules after the Act came into force in accordance with the procedure prescribed by section 131 and the subsequent sections of the Act. With respect to the first objection, an allegation was made in the petitioner’s affidavit; however, no allegation was made concerning the second objection. In a matter of this nature, the Court was not prepared to allow the petitioner to challenge the validity of the tax on the second ground in the absence of a specific allegation.

It was noted that the affidavit filed by the petitioner contained a specific allegation concerning the first ground, namely that the Municipal Board had failed to provide all necessary details in the proposals required under section 131(1) of the Act. The same allegation was denied in the counter‑affidavit filed by the Municipal Board. No specific allegation regarding the second ground, which concerned the Government’s failure to make the rules after the Act came into force, appeared in the petitioner’s affidavit; consequently, the petitioner could not be permitted to question the validity of the tax on that basis.

On 5 April 1917 the Municipal Board passed special resolutions that read in part: “Draft proposals under Section 128(1)(i) for revising Government Notification No 135 dated 13‑1‑1870 levying tax on the buildings and lands in the Civil Lines Station of the Bareilly Municipality. Resolved that Draft Proposals be notified.” On its face the resolution indicates that draft proposals existed. Those draft proposals are not before the Court, but it is presumed that they would have contained all the details required by the relevant statutory provision. The contention that the Board had omitted required particulars was therefore rejected. Consequently, it was held that the petitioners had not established that the taxes challenged were imposed in breach of section 131 or any other applicable provisions of the Act.

The final argument advanced by the petitioners concerned the scavenging tax. Section 128(1)(xi) of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916 empowers a municipal board to impose a scavenging tax, while clause (xii) of the same section authorises a tax “for the cleaning of latrines and privies.” The notification imposing the tax stated that, under sub‑section (2) of section 135 read with section 136 of the Act, the Bareilly Municipal Board, exercising the power conferred by section 128(1)(xii), had imposed a scavenging tax in the municipality. The notification, numbered 3298/XI‑18 H and dated 20 September 1933, superseded an earlier notification numbered 628/XI‑18 H dated 24 January 1923, and was to take effect on 1 April 1939. The tax was described as a levy for the removal of nightsoil and rubbish, to be collected from the occupier or owner of each bungalow situated within the Civil Lines ward.

According to the same notification, nightsoil and rubbish were indeed collected by the Municipal Board from each bungalow in the Civil Lines area. The petitioners argued that the Board lacked authority to impose a scavenging tax under clause (xii) of section 128(1) and that, therefore, the tax was illegal. In its counter‑affidavit, the Board contended that the reference to clause (xii) in the notification was a typographical error and should read clause (xi). The issue to be resolved was whether the Board possessed the power to levy a scavenging tax. It was observed that a distinction must be drawn between a tax on scavenging and a tax for cleaning latrines and privies, with clause (xi) appearing to be broader than clause (xii). The Board’s counter‑affidavit further explained that the collection of nightsoil and rubbish from the bungalows fell within the combined functions described in clause (xi) of section 128. Accordingly, the validity of the tax depended on the existence of statutory authority to tax the subject matter.

In this case the Court examined whether the Municipal Board possessed the authority to levy a scavenging tax. The Court held that the essential question was whether a power to tax existed with respect to the subject matter raised before it. After reviewing the material, the Court found that the Municipal Board unquestionably had the power to impose the scavenging tax. The Court further observed that the reference to clause (xii) in the notification was evidently a clerical mistake and that the intended reference should have been to clause (xi). The Court stated that this mistake did not diminish or defeat the Municipal Board’s authority to levy the tax, because the substantive statutory power remained intact despite the erroneous citation. The Court considered the argument that the notification was invalid on the ground of the erroneous clause and concluded that the argument lacked any merit. Accordingly the Court dismissed the petition. The order of dismissal also directed that the petitioning party bear the costs of the proceedings. The judgment reaffirmed that a typographical error in citing a statutory provision could not be allowed to defeat a clear statutory power that had been exercised. In sum, the petitioners’ challenge was rejected in its entirety and the petition was dismissed with costs.