General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking, Bombay vs. Mrs. Agnes

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 133 of 1961

Decision Date: 10 May 1963

Coram: Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal, J.R. Mudholkar

In this case, the Supreme Court of India considered an appeal filed by the General Manager of the B. E. S. T. Undertaking, Bombay, against Mrs. Agnes. The judgment was delivered on 10 May 1963. The bench that heard the matter consisted of Justices Subbarao K., Dayal Raghubar, and Mudholkar J.R. The case is reported in 1964 AIR 193 and 1964 SCR (3) 930, with a citator reference of D 1984 SC 505 (21). The dispute concerned the application of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (Act 8 of 1923) and the relevant Standing Rules, specifically rules I (e), 3, 5, 9 (a), 10 (a), (b), (c), 12 (a), 19 (a), (b), 31 (a), and 39 (a).

The facts, as set out in the headnote, indicated that the deceased, P. Nanu Raman, was employed as a bus driver by the appellant corporation. After completing his duties for the day, he left the bus he had been operating at the depot and boarded another bus owned by the same undertaking in order to travel to his residence. While traveling in that second bus, an accident occurred, resulting in injuries that caused his death. The widow, identified as the respondent, filed an application before the Court of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation seeking compensation on the ground that the accident had arisen “out of and in the course of his employment.” The Commissioner dismissed the application, but on appeal the High Court reversed that decision and issued a decree in favour of the widow.

The Court quoted Section 3 (1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, which provides: “If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provision of this chapter.” The Court, speaking through Justices Subbarao and Mudholkar, held that the Standing Rules grant a bus driver, in his capacity as driver, the facility to travel in any bus belonging to the undertaking. This facility is not a gratuitous concession but a right arising from the necessity of maintaining punctuality and efficiently performing his onerous duties. Consequently, the right of a bus driver to travel in the undertaking’s buses for the purpose of discharging his duties promptly and efficiently constituted a condition of his service, implying an obligation on his part to use the buses as part of his employment duties. The Court further explained that while the doctrine of reasonable or notional extension of employment originated in contexts such as workshops, factories, or harbours, the same principle applies to a city transport service, requiring adaptation to its unique operational requirements. By analogy, the entire fleet of buses forming the transport service may be regarded as the “premises” of the employer for the purposes of determining whether an accident occurred within the course of employment.

In this case the Court agreed with the finding of the High Court that the accident which struck Nanu Raman occurred while he was employed and consequently the municipal corporation was liable to pay compensation. The Court, however, expressly held that the authorities cited by the High Court – namely Cremins v. Guest Keen & Nettlefolds Ltd. [1908] 1 K.B. 469, St Helens Colliery Co. Ltd. v. Heurfson [1924] A.C. 59, Aderman v. Great Western Railway Co. [1937] A.C. 454, Weaver v. Tredegar Iron and Coal Co. Ltd. (1940) 3 All E.R. 157, Dunn v. A.G. Lockwood & Co. (1947) 1 All E.R. 446, Hill v. Butterley Co. Ltd. (1948) 1 All E.R. 233, Jenkin’s v. Elder Dempster Lines Ltd. (1953) 2 All E.R. 1133 and Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 881 were held not to apply to the present facts. According to Justice Raghubar Dayal, Rule 19 of the municipal standing rules could not be interpreted as forming part of a bus‑driver’s contract of service and therefore it could not be used to artificially lengthen the period of his duty or to extend the notion of “course of employment” to include the time he spent travelling by bus after completing his duties or on his way to commence them. The Court stressed that the situation did not warrant a notional enlargement of the employer’s premises – the premises being, in this context, the entirety of the bus fleet – for the purpose of deeming the driver to be on duty while he was a passenger on another bus. Consequently the Court concluded that it was impossible to hold that the deceased was on duty at the moment he travelled on the other bus, that the accident arose out of his employment, or that the corporation was therefore exempt from liability. The Court relied on the principles stated in S.S. Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 881 and also considered the earlier authorities of Dennis v. A. J. White & Co. [1917] A.C. 479, St Helens Colliery Co. v. Hewitson [1924] A.C. 59, Weaver v. Tredegar Iron & Coal Co. (1940) 3 All E.R. 157, Newton v. Guest Keen & Nettlefolds Ltd. (1926) 135 L.T. 386, the Longhurst cases [1917] A.C. 249 and M’Robb’s case [1918] A.C. 304, all of which were referred to in reaching the final conclusion.

The matter before the Court was Civil Appeal No. 133 of 1961, taken on special leave from the judgment and order dated 29 July 1959 delivered by the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 317 of 1958. Counsel for the appellant were appointed to represent the appellant, while counsel for the respondent represented the respondent. The appeal was heard on 10 May 1963. The judgment was pronounced by two judges, Subba Rao J. and Mudholkar J., with Subba Rao J. delivering the main opinion and Justice Dayal J. delivering a separate judgment. Subba Rao J. framed the appeal as raising a compact but challenging question concerning the proper construction of section 3(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (1923) and how that provision should be applied to the facts of the present case. He described the statutory framework of the Bombay Municipal Corporation, which operates a public utility transport service in Greater Bombay through the Bombay Electricity Supply and Transport Committee, and noted that the service is conducted under the name of the Bombay Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking. The Court’s analysis thus centered on interpreting the statutory language of the Act in relation to the employment conditions of a municipal bus driver who was traveling on a municipal bus when the accident occurred.

The Bombay Electric Supply and Transport (B.E.S.T.) Undertaking owned a fleet of buses, and the Bombay Municipal Corporation employed a staff that included bus drivers to operate those buses. The undertaking maintained several depots located in different parts of the city, and each depot housed and serviced the buses assigned to its area. A driver was required to report to the depot assigned to him each morning, operate the bus for the scheduled service from morning until evening, and after completing his duties return home once the bus was parked back in the depot. The efficiency of the transport service depended, among other factors, on the convenience afforded to drivers for travelling between their homes and the depots. To facilitate this, Rule 19 of the Standing Rules of the Bombay Municipality B.E.S.T. Undertaking allowed a specified number of traffic outdoor staff members who were in uniform to travel standing in a bus without paying any fare. Because the city of Bombay covered long distances, this statutory privilege was considered helpful to maintaining efficient service.

On 20 July 1957, a driver named P. Nanu Raman completed his duties for the day at approximately 7.45 p.m. at the Jogeshwari bus depot. After leaving his bus in the depot, he boarded another bus in order to travel to his residence in Santa Cruz. While travelling on that bus, it collided with a stationary lorry that was parked at an awkward angle on Ghodbunder Road near Erla Bridge in Andheri. The impact of the collision threw Raman onto the road, causing serious injuries. He was taken to a hospital for medical treatment, but he succumbed to his injuries on 26 July 1957.

Following Raman’s death, his widow filed an application before the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation in Bombay, seeking a compensation sum of Rs 3,500 on the basis that the accident had arisen “out of and in the course of his employment.” The General Manager of the B.E.S.T. Undertaking was made the respondent in the proceeding. The General Manager contended, among other arguments, that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the driver’s employment. The Commissioner dismissed the widow’s claim, accepting the General Manager’s contention.

The widow appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the High Court of Bombay. The High Court examined whether the accident fell within the meaning of “out of and in the course of his employment” under Section 3(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. The Court concluded that the accident did arise out of and in the course of Raman’s employment and consequently entered a decree in favor of the widow for the sum of Rs 3,500, together with costs. Dissatisfied with that outcome, the General Manager of the B.E.S.T. Undertaking filed the present appeal against the High Court’s order. Section 3(1) of the Act provides that “If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.”

The Court observed that Section 3(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act states that if a workman suffers personal injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, the employer is liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. Counsel for the appellant, Mr Pathak, argued that the expression “arising out of and in the course of his employment” is of the same subject matter as the corresponding words in the English statute and that those words have been definitively interpreted by the House of Lords on several occasions. He further contended that an accident occurring to an employee while he is travelling to his home after leaving the premises of his work falls outside the scope of the expression unless the employee has a contractual or other obligation to use the particular vehicle that is involved in the accident. Applying that view to the facts, Mr Pathak submitted that the deceased, Nanu Raman, had finished his duties for the day, was under no contractual obligation to board the bus that later met with the accident, and was therefore in the same position as any ordinary member of the public who chose to travel on that bus. In contrast, the amicus curiae, Mr Ganapati Iyer, maintained that the appellant’s proposed interpretation was unduly narrow. He argued that the proper construction of the phrase requires a close and intimate relationship between the employment and the accident, and that it is sufficient that the deceased possessed a right under his contract to travel by the bus, even if there was no specific obligation to do so. Moreover, Mr Iyer submitted that, in a broader sense, the employee had a duty to avail himself of the means of travel that were part of his service arrangement. He noted that because the same wording appears in the English legislation, it is appropriate to examine leading English decisions on the issue. Accordingly, the Court turned to the case of Cremins v. Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds Ltd., in which the Court of Appeal faced a comparable question. In that case, Cremins was a coal miner employed by the appellant company and, together with other miners, resided in Dowlais, located six miles from the colliery. The company operated a daily train, using carriages that technically belonged to the appellants but were operated by personnel of the Great Western Railway Company, to convey the miners from Dowlais to a platform at Bedlinog. This platform had been constructed, repaired, illuminated, and controlled by the company, and only the miners were permitted to use it, although a public railway station existed a short distance away. From the platform, the miners walked a short distance along a high road to reach the colliery, a journey of roughly a quarter of a mile. Return trips were similarly provided free of charge. While waiting on the platform for the return train, Cremins was struck and killed by the train. His widow subsequently filed a claim for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1906, relying on Section 1 of that Act. The Court of Appeal held that the widow was entitled to compensation, interpreting the statutory language in light of the implied terms of the employment contract that required the employer to provide the means of transport and gave the workers a right, if not an obligation, to travel without charge. This authority was highlighted to illustrate how the relationship between employment duties and the circumstances of an accident may be assessed.

Under section 1 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1906 the widow of the deceased would be entitled to compensation if the accident had arisen “out of and in the course of his employment”. The Court of Appeal held that the widow was indeed entitled to compensation, as reported in (1) [1908] 1 K.B. 469. In delivering the judgment, Lord Justice Cozens‑Hardy, Master of the Rolls, explained his reasoning by stating that his decision was based on an implied term of the contract of service. He elaborated that it was an implied term of the employment contract that the employers should provide the trains, and that the colliers possessed a right, if not a strict obligation, to travel to and from their place of work without charge. In a concurrent judgment, Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton, L.J., expressed a very similar view, observing that it appeared to him that the workmen were expected to travel to and from the colliery by the trains and carriages that the employers supplied, and that both parties intended this arrangement to form part of the contract of employment. Although the fatal accident occurred on the platform, the Court’s decision accepted the principle that an implied term of the contract of service required the colliers to travel to and from the colliery by the trains provided by their employers. In that case the colliers certainly possessed a right to use the train, yet it was uncertain whether a legal duty was imposed on them to do so. Nevertheless, the Court was prepared to interpret the word “duty” in a popular sense, encompassing the expectation of the user in the specific circumstances of the case. By contrast, the House of Lords in St Helens Colliery Company Ltd. v. Hewitson (1) adopted a stricter, more legalistic approach to the concept of “duty”. In that matter a workman employed at the colliery was injured in a railway accident while travelling in a special colliers’ train from his workplace to his home at Maryport. An agreement between the colliery company and the railway company required the railway to furnish special trains for conveying the colliery’s workmen to and from the colliery and Maryport, and the colliery company agreed to indemnify the railway against any claims by the workmen for accidents, injury, or loss arising while using the trains. Any workman who wished to travel by these trains signed a release with the railway company, relinquishing all claims in the event of an accident, after which the colliery company issued a pass and charged the employee a sum that was less than the full fare, deducting this amount weekly from his wages. The House of Lords, by a majority, held that because there was no obligation on the workmen to use the train, the injury did not arise in the course of employment as defined by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1906. Lord Buckmaster, after referring to the passage already quoted, articulated this conclusion.

In the judgment, the Court referred to a passage extracted from Cremins’s Case (1) in which a judge expressed difficulty in accepting the prevailing test, stating, “I find it difficult to accept this test,” and further observed that the workman was neither under any control in the present case nor bound in any way to use the train or, after leaving it, to obey directions; although the workman was where he was as a consequence of his employment, the judge opined that the accident did not occur in the course of that employment. Lord Atkinson also embraced this principle, but he added an important qualification at page 70, noting that where the physical characteristics of the locality make the employer’s means of transit the only practical way for the workman to reach his workplace, the contract of service may implicitly contain a term imposing an obligation on the employer to provide such means and a reciprocal obligation on the workman to avail himself of them. This observation was recorded in the report of the case cited as (1) [1908] 1 K.B. 469, and the learned lord conceded that, given the particular circumstances of a case, an implied duty on the employee to use a specific mode of transport could be recognized.

Lord Shaw, dissenting, offered a broader interpretation of the statutory language, contending that the phrase “arising out of the employment” should be understood to refer to the employment in its entirety—including its nature, conditions, obligations and incidents—and he asserted that a man’s employment is as expansive as his contract. After examining the terms of the agreement between the parties, Lord Shaw concluded at page 86 that the arrangements had persisted for the entire twelve‑year period of service, resulting in a close and continual daily relationship between the company and the worker; in that relationship the workman secured his access to work while the company provided the means of transport.

Lord Wrenbury aligned himself with the majority view and articulated a practical test at page 92, suggesting that a useful inquiry in many cases is whether, at the moment of the accident, the employer would have been entitled to issue an order to the workman and whether the workman would have been under a duty to obey such an order. He further indicated that, under certain circumstances, a term of duty might be implied, observing that there are situations falling within what may be regarded as the “incidents” of employment where the journey to and from work could be considered part of the employment because, by implication rather than express language, the employer has designated a particular route and the employee owes a duty to follow it. However, he warned that merely travelling to or from work, even though it is a necessary incident of employment, does not alone establish such a duty. The decision, therefore, affirms the principle that an employee may bear a duty or obligation to make use of the means of transit offered by the employer, whether that duty is expressly stated or implicitly derived from the contract of service.

The Court explained that an employer may impose a duty on an employee to use transport that the employer provides, and that such a duty may be either expressly stated in the contract of service or may be implied by the circumstances of the employment. The House of Lords examined this issue in the case of Alderman v. Great Western Railway Co. (1). In that case the applicant was a travelling ticket collector employed by the railway company. His contractual duties required him to travel from his home in Oxford to Swansea, where he was required to stay overnight, and to return the next day to Oxford. Between the time that he signed off at the end of the workday in Oxford and the time that he signed on again the following morning in Swansea, he was free to use his own time as he wished, and he could reach the railway station in Swansea by any route and by any means of transport that he preferred. On one morning, while proceeding from his lodging in Swansea to the Swansea station in order to perform his normal duties, he slipped on the street and suffered personal injury. He subsequently sued for compensation, asserting that the injury had occurred in the course of his employment.

The House of Lords held that, at the moment of the accident, the applicant was not carrying out any duty imposed by his contract of service, and consequently the accident did not arise in the course of his employment. The judgment quoted the reasoning at page 462, observing that when the applicant set out from the house in which he had chosen to lodge in Swansea to go to sign on at the station, he had been, since he signed off the previous afternoon, free from any control of his employer and, for all practical purposes, was in the same position as an ordinary member of the public using the streets to reach his employer’s premises. The Court applied the principle that if, at the time of the accident, an employee occupies the same position as an ordinary member of the public, the accident cannot be characterised as having occurred in the course of employment. In other words, the case involved a simple situation in which an employee travelled to the station in the same manner as any other member of the public, even though his purpose was to sign on for work.

The Court then turned to the authority of Weaver v. Tredegar Iron and Coal Co. Ltd. (1). In that appeal the House of Lords reviewed the entire law on the concept of “duty” and gave it a broader interpretation. The facts concerned a collier who was caught in a crowd of fellow workmen attempting to board a train and who was knocked off the railway platform, sustaining injuries. The platform and the train were both owned, managed and controlled by a railway company, but the platform was situated alongside a railway line that passed through the colliery premises owned by the workers’ employer, and access to the platform was possible only from the colliery premises. The platform was not open to the public, and it did not appear in the railway company’s public timetable. These facts were later used to illustrate how the scope of an employee’s duty may extend beyond the narrow limits previously suggested.

The railway fare for the workers was taken from their wages by the employers as a regular deduction each month. Although the colliery was located next to a public road that permitted the men to travel home on foot or by cart, in reality every employee chose to use the railway service provided under the employer‑company arrangement. One of the workers was injured in an accident while using the railway platform that was reserved for colliery employees. The injured employee subsequently filed a claim for compensation, alleging that the accident occurred in the course of his employment. The House of Lords, by a majority, held that the accident had arisen in the course of and out of the employment, and therefore the worker was entitled to compensation. Lord Atkin framed the central issue by asking whether the employee was performing a duty, either directly or indirectly imposed by his contract of service, when the accident occurred, and he answered that the term “duty” as used in the test possessed such a broad meaning that it offered little practical guidance in determining liability. Lord Atkin further explained that the vague connotation of “duty” could not be dismissed, but it failed to point clearly toward the desired legal outcome. He observed that the course of employment cannot be confined merely to the specific time or place of the task expressly assigned to the workman. The employment relationship does not automatically cease when the “down tools” signal is given or when the workman leaves the workshop where he was engaged. In other words, the employment may continue by its own momentum beyond the momentary stopping point, extending to incidental movements of the employee. After reviewing the relevant authorities, Lord Atkin concluded that the statutory phrase “the course of the employment” demanded a literal interpretation. Accordingly, employment begins when the workman enters into service and ceases only when he terminates that service, which is his duty both at the start and end. Lord Wright expressed the same principle differently, noting that when a man used the ordinary and proper means of leaving the colliery, the notion of duty was relevant only in an artificial sense. He added that this artificial duty reflects the employee’s obligation to come to work and to go away when his work has ended. Lord Romer set out a test for such situations, stating that when a workman travels to or from his work and suffers an accident, the first question is whether he was at the accident location. If the workman was there because of his employment, liability may arise; otherwise the accident is considered to have occurred while he was acting as a member of the public. He concluded that in the present case the employee was present at the site of the accident solely by virtue of his status as an employee of the colliery.

The Court noted that Lord Porter had examined the question of duty and, at page 179, had observed that it could be useful in some cases to ask whether the employee owed a duty to his employer at the moment the accident occurred. He added that if the concept of duty were interpreted broadly, it might become a decisive test, but that interpreting duty in that way simply meant that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment. According to Lord Porter, an employee’s work was not limited to the specific task for which he was hired; it also covered activities that were incidental to that task. He listed examples such as the periods when the employee took meals, the moments when he moved from one part of the employer’s premises to another, and the intervals of rest, all of which could be considered part of his work. He further explained that the employee’s duties were not confined to the employer’s premises. The employee might be engaged in work elsewhere, for instance constructing a house, performing work on a road, or working at a dock. The relevant inquiry, Lord Porter said, was not whether the employee was physically on the employer’s property but whether he was operating within the sphere or area of his employment.

Turning to the issue of alternative means of travel, Lord Porter remarked that even if the employee could have chosen a different method, that fact did not prevent him from recovering damages, provided the incident occurred in the course of his employment. He equated the phrase “part of his duty” with “in the course of his employment” and explained that the employee’s duty included both travelling to the place of work and travelling away from it. He further stated that as long as the employee was in a location where only persons engaged in the work would have any right to be, and where the employee himself would have no right to be except for the work he was employed to do, he would ordinarily still be considered to be acting in the course of his employment. However, Lord Porter clarified that he was not addressing situations where the necessities of the job forced the employee to travel through public streets or other public places.

The Court observed that this decision did not abandon the duty test, but it expanded its meaning beyond earlier rulings. Under the broader interpretation, the employee’s duty comprised going to the work site and leaving it, and the employee might be required to use transport supplied by the employer to fulfill that duty. The Court explained that the nature of the service, the customary practice within that service, and the practical necessities of the work would be the principal factors in determining the scope of the employee’s duty. The Court also referred to the Court of Appeal decision in Dunn v. A.G. Lockwood & Co., reported in the 1947 volume of the All England Law Reports, where the appellate court implied a similar term of duty under comparable circumstances involving a workman who lived at one location and was employed at another.

In the case involving a workman who lived at Whitstable and was employed at Margate, the contract allowed the employee, though it was not mandatory, to travel from Whitstable to Margate on the 7.40 a.m. train, which reached Margate at 8.15 a.m. The employee’s wages were to commence from 8.00 a.m. On one occasion, while proceeding from Margate station by the quickest possible route to his place of work, the employee slipped and sustained injuries. The Court concluded that the employment contract imposed a duty on the worker to proceed to his work as promptly as possible after arriving at Margate station. Consequently, the accident was deemed to have occurred “out of and in the course of the employment” within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Lord Oaksey, L.J., observed that the accident occurred in the course of employment because, at that moment, the employee was performing a duty owed to his employer under the contract. The permission to use the 7.40 a.m. train, coupled with the stipulation that wages would begin at 8.00 a.m., implied an obligation on the employee to travel by the most expedient route after his arrival. This decision exemplifies a broader interpretation of the “duty” test, achieved by implying an obligation from the surrounding circumstances.

A similar principle was applied in Hill v. Butterley Co. Ltd., where a female employee, while crossing her employer’s premises on her way to the office to “clock in” before starting work, slipped on an icy slope and was injured. Although there was no public right of way across that part of the premises, the inhabitants of a nearby village regularly used the same area, without objection from the owners, to reach an adjoining railway station. The Court held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employee’s employment. The fact that the area was also used as a public pathway did not prevent the Court from finding that the injury occurred in the course of her employment.

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Jenkins v. Elder Dempster Lines Ltd. further illustrated the interpretation of “arising out of and in the course of employment.” In that case, a ship on which the deceased was employed was moored against the harbour mole at Las Palmas. At the landward end of the mole, a gateway staffed by police was intended to keep unauthorized persons off the mole, yet entry was effectively unrestricted and a variety of people were permitted to pass. After the ship had moored, the crew went ashore for a short period. Upon returning, the police at the gate identified the crew’s vessel and allowed them to re‑enter the mole. In the darkness, the deceased slipped over the side of the mole and drowned. The widow’s claim for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Acts was denied. Sir Raymond Evershed, M.R., framed the issue as whether the workman, at the relevant time, was acting within the scope of his employment. He explained that the presence of the employee at the accident site must be sufficiently connected to his employment to lead to the conclusion that he was acting within its scope. This ruling established a broader test requiring a nexus between the accident and the employment. The Court later applied this principle in Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja, accepting the doctrine of a “notional extension” of the employer’s premises.

In the case under discussion, the deceased employee fell over the side of the harbour mole and drowned. The widow subsequently filed a claim for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Acts, but the claim was rejected. The Master of the Rolls, Sir Raymond Evershed, framed the central inquiry as follows: “Was the workman at the relevant time acting in the scope of his employment?” He answered the question by indicating that, according to the authorities, a workman may be regarded as acting within the scope of his employment if his presence at the place where the accident occurred is sufficiently connected to his duties to lead to the conclusion that he was acting in the scope of his employment. This formulation effectively introduces a broader test, requiring a nexus between the accident and the employment. The Court therefore examined the scope of the relevant statutory provision in the decision of Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja and adopted the doctrine of “notional extension” of the employer’s premises, a principle also discussed in the case reported in (1) (1953) 2 All B.R. 1133 and A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 881, 882, which concerns the context of an accident to an employee.

Justice Imam, delivering the judgment of the Court, articulated the legal principle that, as a general rule, a workman’s employment does not commence until he reaches his place of work and does not continue after he has left that place; the journey to and from work is ordinarily excluded. However, the Court affirmed that this rule is subject to the theory of notional extension of the employer’s premises, which may include areas that the workman repeatedly traverses when travelling to and from the actual workplace. A reasonable extension in both time and space may be recognized, allowing a workman to be deemed in the course of his employment even if he has not yet reached or has already departed from his employer’s premises. The Court emphasized that each case must be examined carefully, considering all facts and circumstances, to determine whether an accident arose out of and in the course of employment, keeping the notion of notional extension in mind at all times. Applying this approach to the facts before it, the Court concluded that the accident in the present case did not occur in the course of employment. Accordingly, under section 3(1) of the Act, the injury must be caused by an accident that arises out of and in the course of the workman’s employment. The determination of when employment begins and ends depends on the specific facts of each case. Nevertheless, the Courts have consistently held that employment does not necessarily terminate at the “down‑tool” signal or when the workman leaves the actual workshop. There is a notional extension of both entry and exit in terms of time and space, and the extent of such extension must be decided based on the particular circumstances of the case at hand.

In this case the Court observed that the beginning or the ending of an employment relationship cannot be determined solely by the moment an employee starts work or puts down his tools. The Court explained that the employment may also be deemed to commence or to terminate at the point when the employee uses the means of access and egress to the place of work. Accordingly, if an employee is contractually bound to travel by a particular mode of transport, that contractual duty extends the field of employment to include the journey on that transport. The Court noted that earlier authorities interpreted the word “duty” in a very narrow manner, but later decisions have broadened the concept. Even when an employee has a theoretical option to choose an alternative route, the Court held that such an option does not defeat the duty if the normally accepted route is shown to be necessary or compelled by practical circumstances. The Court further observed that none of the authorities cited before it dealt with a transport service covering a large metropolitan area such as Bombay, and therefore those authorities offered only general principles and little assistance for the present question. Some of the earlier judgments even expressly excluded from discussion any situation where work requirements forced an employee to travel through public streets or other public places. Consequently, the Court recognised that the factual situation before it was novel and not directly addressed by existing case law. To understand the full scope of the duty owed by a bus driver in a broader sense, the Court decided to examine the relevant Standing Rules of the Bombay Electric Supply and Transport (BEST) Undertaking. Only those rules that related to permanent bus drivers and were material to the enquiry were extracted for consideration.

Rule 31 (a) provides that every application for a bus‑driver test must be written and signed by the applicant himself. Rule 31 (i) further states that an applicant for the position of bus driver must be at least twenty years of age and not more than forty years of age, and that a birth certificate must be produced in cases where the age is doubtful. Rule 31 (1) requires that, after recruitment, the Undertaking’s rules and regulations be explained to the newly recruited men by the Recruiting Clerk. Rule 5 obliges the Undertaking to supply uniforms to all permanent members of the Traffic Outdoor Staff in accordance with the attached uniform chart. Rule 3 mandates that “calling time” be recorded in ink on the time cards by the Starters once a week for permanent men and daily for extra men. Rule 9 (a) prescribes that the normal duty hours for bus drivers are eight hours per day. Rule 10 (a) explains that permanent men who arrive on time and work the duty for which they are scheduled will be paid for one day’s work; any work performed beyond the eight‑hour limit set out in Rule 9 (a) will be recorded as overtime and compensated in accordance with Rule 25. Rule 10 (b) provides that men who fail to arrive at their designated call time or who miss their assigned cars will be placed at the bottom of the Extra List for that day and will not be allotted any work. These extracted provisions were presented by the Court to determine the extent of the contractual duty owed by a bus driver under the specific employment framework of the BEST Undertaking.

In the regulations, a driver who does not have work available for the day will be recorded as “Late‑No‑Work” and will receive no wages for that day. If work is actually available, the driver will be recorded as having arrived late and will be paid only for the hours actually worked. A driver who misses his assigned car more than three times within a calendar month, regardless of whether he receives work on those occasions, will be moved back to the Extra List, which comprises non‑permanent employees. The rules further state that any driver who is more than one hour late for duty shall be marked as “ABSENT.” All requests for exchange of duties must be addressed to the Traffic Assistant who is in charge of the relevant depot, and such requests require his sanction. Regarding travel on company buses, the regulations permit four uniformed members of the Traffic Outdoor Staff to travel standing on a double‑deck bus, with two standing on the lower deck and two on the upper deck; on a single‑deck bus only two uniformed members may travel, and they must do so standing. Uniformed traffic staff are expressly prohibited from occupying seats, even if they pay the fare, to indicate that they are traveling solely in the capacity of a driver for the Undertaking. Transfer of a man from one depot to another is allowed only under the order of a Senior Traffic Officer and only when the receiving depot is experiencing a shortage of staff. In summary, a bus driver is recruited under the terms explained before appointment, enters into an agreement based on those terms, and is assigned to a specific depot. He receives a uniform, works eight hours per day, and must report punctually at the calling time. If he is over one hour late, he is marked absent; if he misses his car and no work is available, he receives no pay; if he misses his car more than three times in a month, he is relegated to the extra list. While in uniform, he may travel for free on any company bus but must stand and may not occupy a seat, underscoring that his travel is solely for the purpose of fulfilling his duties as a driver.

When a driver was absent for three days in a month, the Undertaking removed him from the permanent list. To enable a driver to maintain punctuality and to discharge the heavy responsibilities of his post, the Undertaking granted him the facility, in his capacity as a driver, to travel in any bus owned by the Undertaking. Consequently, the Court regarded the right to travel in those buses as a condition of his service, necessary for him to perform his duties punctually and efficiently. The Court noted that Bombay is a city of considerable distances and that the transport service practically covers the whole of Greater Bombay. Without the right to travel in the Undertaking’s buses, a driver would find it extremely difficult to sign on and sign off at the depots at the scheduled times because he would have to cover long distances on his own. The Court observed that lacking this right would not only disrupt punctuality and timetables but would also diminish the driver’s efficiency in discharging his duties.

The Court recorded the statement of a Traffic Inspector of the B.E.S.T. Undertaking, who affirmed that instructions were given to all drivers and conductors that they could travel in other buses of the Undertaking. This fact, the Court said, supported the practice of drivers using the buses for commuting between their homes and the depots. Considering the class of employees, the Court held that it would be unreasonable to suggest that they could travel by local suburban trains or by walking. The former was unaffordable to them, and the latter was impracticable given the long distances involved. Because free transport was provided in the interest of service, and because drivers had to traverse great distances to reach their depots, the Court found that the use of the buses was a proven necessity that created an implied obligation on the drivers to travel in those buses as part of their duty. The Court emphasized that drivers were not exercising a public right but were acting as members of the service. The entire area of Greater Bombay constituted the field of the service, and every bus formed an integrated part of that service. The Court further explained that decisions relating to accidents occurring to an employee in a factory or on employer‑owned premises were of limited relevance where an employee had to operate over a broader area in a bus that itself formed part of an integrated fleet. While the doctrine of reasonable or notional extension of employment had originated in the context of workshops, factories or harbours, the Court held that the doctrine equally applied to a city transport service, though it must be adapted to the service’s particular characteristics. By analogy, the Court said that where a factory’s premises are limited, in a city transport service the “premises” could be understood as the entire fleet of buses that constitute the service. An illustration was then proposed to clarify this point.

In this case the Court observed that, because the employees had to travel long distances, the Corporation made it a condition of service to provide a bus that collected all drivers from their homes so that they could reach their depots in time and return after the day's work, thereby allowing them to arrive home after a heavy shift that ended about 7 p.m. without further strain on their health. The Court asked whether such a facility could be characterized as one given in the course of employment. It held that the facility was indeed a duty of the employees in the interest of the service and that they were required to use the bus both for coming to the depot and for going back to their homes. The Court further explained that if the employer were to open its entire fleet of buses for this purpose, the employees would receive the benefit not as members of the public but as employees, and not as a mere grace but as a right, because the efficiency of the service demanded it. Consequently, the Court concluded that when a driver used the bus to travel to or from the depot, any accident that occurred to him while so traveling constituted an accident in the course of his employment. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the High Court that the accident which befell Nanu Raman occurred in the course of his employment and that his wife was therefore entitled to compensation. The Court noted that no attempt was made to challenge the correctness of the quantum of compensation fixed by the High Court. Before concluding, the Court expressed gratitude to Mr. Ganapati Iyer for assisting as amicus curiae. The appeal was dismissed without costs. In a separate opinion, Justice Raghubar Dayal expressed that the appeal should be allowed. He recounted that the deceased, Nanu Raman, was a bus driver employed by the appellant Corporation and that on 20 July 1957, after completing his duty for the day at about 7.41 p.m. at Jogeshwari Bus Depot, he boarded another bus in order to travel to his house. While traveling, the bus met with an accident and, as a result of the injuries sustained, the driver died. The central question was whether those injuries were caused to him out of and in the course of his employment. If they were, the appellant Corporation would be liable to pay compensation under section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923; if not, the Corporation would not be bound to pay. Justice Dayal observed that the deceased was off duty when he received the injuries, having finished his day's work and having left the bus on which he was posted. He had not only left that bus but also boarded another as a passenger.

In this case, the Court observed that the deceased employee had boarded another bus as a passenger after completing his duty. The Court explained that, pursuant to rule 19 of the Standing Rules of the Traffic Department of the B.E.S.T. Undertaking, a person wearing the uniform of the corporation was permitted to travel on the bus without payment. The central issue before the Court was whether this concession amounted to a term of the employee’s service and formed part of his contract of service. The Court expressed the view that the concession did not constitute either a term of the contract or a condition of service. It noted that rule 19 was not directed solely at bus drivers or at the traffic staff of the corporation; rather, the rule set out the categories of persons who were entitled to free travel on buses. The Court reproduced the text of the rule, which read as follows: “Free Travelling on Buses – (a) Four members of the Traffic Outdoor Staff in uniform are permitted to travel standing on a double‑deck bus irrespective of their designation, two on the lower deck and two on the upper deck; on a single‑deck bus only two members are permitted. (b) Traffic Staff in uniform shall not occupy seats even on payment of fares. (c) Municipal Councillors and non‑Councillors, Members of the Schools Committee holding Tram‑cum‑Bus passes must occupy a seat and are not permitted to travel standing or in excess. (d) One police officer above the rank of a Jamadar is allowed to travel free by standing; all other ranks must occupy seats and pay their fares. (e) Meter Readers and Bill Collectors of the Consumers’ Department and Public Lighters of the Public Lighting Department are permitted to travel in buses outside the Tramway Areas when on duty either in uniform or on production of the Undertaking’s badge by payment of Undertaking’s tokens, which are stamped “Service” and will be accepted in lieu of cash and ticket. (f) Traffic Officers and only those Officers holding a bus‑cum‑Tram Pass and Silver Badge and Bombay Motor Vehicle Inspectors holding passes are permitted to travel standing and may board the bus outside the Queue Order.” The Court explained that clauses (c) to (e) extended the concession of free travel to persons who were not members of the traffic staff, and therefore the rule could not be regarded as a contractual term with those individuals; it was merely a privilege or concession granted to them. The Court further clarified that this privilege was subject to certain restrictions. Clauses (a), (b) and (f) specifically dealt with concessions allowed to members of the traffic staff. From clause (a) the Court inferred that the number of traffic outdoor staff who could travel on a bus was limited to four on double‑deck buses and to two on single‑deck buses, and that they had to be in uniform. Moreover, even if such staff purchased tickets and paid fares, they were prohibited from occupying seats while in uniform. The Court concluded that, even if the concession of free travel were intended to promote punctuality and efficiency among bus personnel, it was not embedded in the conditions of service and therefore did not form part of the contractual obligations of the employee.

In this case, the Court observed that bus drivers often travelled long distances between their homes and their places of duty, either to return from work or to report for work. The Court noted that, because of this circumstance, there could be no reasonable limit on the number of traffic outdoor staff who might need to travel on a particular bus. It was possible that more than two or four members of the traffic outdoor staff lived in nearby neighborhoods and would need to join duty or return from duty at roughly the same time. The Court further held that it would be more conducive to the efficient performance of their duties if, when travelling to join duty, the staff members were permitted to sit rather than being required to travel standing. The Court found that there was no justification for denying them a seat when they paid the applicable fare, and it declared such a denial to be impermissible.

The Court concluded that the rule which allowed members of the traffic outdoor staff to travel free of charge, subject to certain limitations, was not linked to the conditions of their service, nor to the requirement that they observe punctuality or discharge their duties efficiently. Instead, the Court described the rule as a mere concession granted by the employer to its employees. This conclusion was reinforced by the fact that the rule did not restrict the concession to travel that occurred only when the staff were traveling from their homes to join duty or when they were returning home after completing duty. The rule permitted the staff to take advantage of the privilege whenever they needed to travel by bus, provided they wore their uniform at the time. The Court explained that the requirement to be in uniform served only as a visible indication that the passenger was a member of the traffic outdoor staff, not as proof that the employee was on duty or travelling to or from his home. Accordingly, the Court did not interpret rule 19 as a condition of service for the Corporation’s bus drivers, nor did it view the rule as an artificial extension of the drivers’ period of employment to include the time spent travelling by bus after finishing duty or before commencing duty. The Court emphasized that a bus driver was under no obligation to travel by the Corporation’s bus, and he was not required to wear his uniform while travelling. If a driver preferred to travel comfortably by paying the fare for a seat, he could simply remove his uniform and board the bus. The Court found no circumstances in the evidence presented that compelled a driver to travel by bus on his way to join duty or on his return journey after completing duty.

In this case the Court observed that although Bombay was a city of considerable distances, it was not necessary for every bus driver to live far from the place where he was required to commence or terminate his duty. The record contained no evidence that the salaries of the drivers were so low that they could not afford railway tickets if they wished to travel by train, nor that they could not purchase a seat on a bus if they preferred to travel in comfort. Consequently the Court held that the drivers were not compelled by necessity to use the Corporation’s buses, and therefore it was inappropriate to notionally expand the territorial scope of the premises within which they were required to discharge their duties. While the Corporation’s bus service indeed covered the whole of Bombay, this did not imply that the area of a driver’s duty extended as widely as the area covered by all the buses. The Court explained that the notional extension of the employer’s premises could, at most, be limited to the particular bus assigned to the driver during his working hours. Accordingly, the premises of a bus driver could be deemed to include the vehicle itself, and the employer’s liability for injuries could be reasonably extended only up to the moment the driver boarded the bus to begin his duty and up to the moment he left the bus after completing his duty. Before boarding the bus, the driver was not on actual duty, and after leaving the bus at the conclusion of his shift, he was likewise not on duty. The Court therefore concluded that when the deceased driver alighted from his bus at Jogeshwari Bus Depot at 7.41 p.m., he was already off duty and free to travel home as he chose. The employer exercised no control over him thereafter, except to prevent him from traveling in uniform on a bus when the permissible number of uniformed traffic staff had already been reached, a restriction that stemmed from the provisions of Rule 19 rather than from his status as a corporate driver. After the deceased boarded another bus to return to his residence, he no longer performed any function connected with his employment, and the Court found it impossible to characterize his travel on that bus as being “in the course of employment” or as arising out of his employment. The Court then referred to the principles laid down in S. S. Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja, noting the established propositions for interpreting the expression “in the course of employment.”

In considering the meaning of the expression “in the course of employment,” the Court outlined several general principles. First, the Court stated that, as a rule, a worker’s employment does not begin until he arrives at his place of work, and it does not continue after he has left that place. Second, the Court explained that, as a rule, the travel to and from the place of work is not included within the scope of “in the course of employment.” Third, the Court noted that these two rules may be modified by the doctrine of notional extension of the employer’s premises. Under this doctrine, the area that the worker regularly traverses when going to and leaving the actual workplace may be treated as part of the employer’s premises. The Court recognised that such an extension may involve a reasonable expansion in both time and space, and that a worker may be regarded as acting in the course of his employment even though he has not yet reached, or has already departed from, the employer’s physical premises. Fourth, the Court emphasized that the facts and circumstances of each case must be examined very carefully in order to decide whether an accident occurred within the course of employment, always keeping the theory of notional extension in mind. Applying the first two principles, the Court concluded that the deceased could not be said to have sustained his injuries in an accident that arose out of, or was in, the course of his employment. The Court further held that the third principle did not apply to the present facts, as previously indicated. The Court clarified that the phrase “an area which the workman passes and re‑passes in going to and in leaving the actual place of work,” mentioned in the third proposition, does not, by reference to the second proposition, refer to the ordinary route taken from the worker’s home to his workplace or the return journey from the workplace to his home. Rather, the expression is intended to describe areas that the employee must traverse out of necessity, solely in his capacity as an employee. Such areas include the space between the workplace and a public place or a public road that any member of the public may access at any time. Consequently, these are areas that employees must necessarily pass and re‑pass when travelling to and from their place of work, and these areas may either belong to the employer or to a third party from whom the employer has obtained permission to allow its employees to use the land. The Court observed that the necessity of passing over such land is presumed, because without crossing that land the employee could not reach his place of work. In this sense, the notion of the employer’s premises is extended to cover those areas that the employee, as a matter of necessity, must traverse repeatedly. After reviewing the specific facts of the case in light of these general principles, the Court proceeded to its further analysis.

In this case the Court restated the general propositions noted earlier and quoted at page 883 that “It is well settled that when a workman is on a public transport he is there as any other member of the public and is not there in the course of his employment unless the very nature of his employment makes it necessary for him to be there.” The Court explained that a workman does not become engaged in the course of his employment at the moment he departs from his home and travels toward his place of work; rather, he is considered to be in the course of his employment only when he reaches the place of work or arrives at a point or area that falls within the theory of notional extension, beyond which the employer is not liable to pay compensation for any accident that may occur to the employee. The Court observed that this view was consistent with the observations made earlier in the judgment.

The Court further noted that the expression “unless the very nature of his employment makes it necessary for him to be there” contemplates situations where the duties of an employee require him to use a public road, a public place, or a public means of transport in discharging his responsibilities. To illustrate this principle, the Court referred to the case reported as Dennis v. A. J. White and Company (1) and also directed attention to the authorities St. Helens Colliery Co. v. Hewitson (2) and Weaver v. Tradegar Iron and Coal Co. Ltd. (3). In the St. Helens case a colliery worker travelled by a special train operated by a railway company under a contract with the employer for the convenience of the worker to and from the colliery and his residence. While travelling he met with an accident, and the question arose whether he was entitled to compensation from his employer. The House of Lords held that it was an inseparable part of the employment contract that the employee had obtained a pass authorising the travel, and that the employee had released his right to claim compensation against the railway company. Nevertheless the Court considered that this release alone was not sufficient to determine his entitlement to compensation.

The Court distinguished the facts of the present case from those of the St. Helens case. It observed that nothing in the contract of employment of the deceased with the appellant indicated that the employee was entitled to travel free on the buses of the Corporation, and that the deceased was not granted any such privilege of free travel. Moreover, the deceased did not perform any act in consideration of such a privilege. While the employee in the earlier case had expressly released his rights against the railway company, the deceased in the present matter had not released any rights against the Corporation. The House of Lords, however, had ultimately held that the employee was not entitled to any compensation. Lord Buckmaster, speaking at page 66, remarked, “The real question to my mind is whether, when he entered the train in the morning, it (1) [1917] A.”

In the authorities cited, namely C. 479, the decision reported in 1924 A.C. 59, and the report of 1940 3 All. E.R., the Court examined whether the employee was acting in the course of his employment within the meaning of the Act. The Court expressed difficulty in fixing a precise test that would allow the answer to be given in favour of the respondent. The same difficulty was noted in the present case, where it is hard to say that the deceased entered the bus that later met with an accident while he was acting in the course of his employment. Lord Buckmaster, speaking at page 67, observed that the workman was under no control in the present case and was not bound in any way either to use the train or, when he left, to obey any directions; although he was where he was because of his employment, the Lord said he did not think the accident occurred in the course of that employment. The same reasoning can be applied to the deceased, for he was not under his employer’s control while on the bus and he was not obligated to use the bus or obey any instruction after he stepped off the bus on which he had been deputed for the day.

In the Weaver case the employee was held entitled to compensation, and the factual distinction between that case and the present one was clearly described by Lord Romer at page 176. He explained that, on the principle already stated, the appellant in the present case was plainly entitled to the compensation he sought. After finishing his work at the colliery, the appellant intended to return home by train. To reach the train he walked directly from the colliery premises onto a platform, which was the sole means of access to the train and on which he had no right to be except by virtue of his status as a colliery employee. While standing on the platform, the appellant suffered an accident, and in Lord Romer’s opinion that accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. However, the county court judge and the Court of Appeal held that they could not grant relief because of the precedents set in St. Helens Colliery Co., Ltd. v. Hewitson and Newton v. Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds, Ltd. The Law Lords noted that to accept the conclusion that those two decisions removed any right to compensation for the appellant would require supposing that they established a principle inconsistent with earlier authorities such as Longhurst’s case, M’Robb’s case, and the later affirmed decision in McCullum’s case. The Court regarded that supposition as impossible and therefore deemed it necessary to determine what the real principles established in Hewitson and Newton’s cases actually were.

In addressing the arguments, the Court examined the basis of the decisions in Hewitson’s Case (1) and Newton’s Case (2). The Court stated that a detailed statement of the facts in Hewitson’s Case (1) was necessary. It observed that, had the accident to the appellant in the present matter occurred while the appellant was actually travelling in the train on his way home, the situation would have been materially identical to the circumstances of Hewitson’s Case (1). The two cases would have been indistinguishable. However, the workman in Hewitson’s Case (1) had failed on the ground that he possessed no contractual duty to his employer to be in the train. The judges who decided that case had taken great care to determine whether Hewitson was under any such contractual obligation. From their detailed inquiry, the Court inferred that the judges did not regard Hewitson, when he was on the train, as engaged in an act that is always treated as part of a workman’s employment because it is merely incidental to the employment proper. In other words, they treated him as a workman who had left the place of his labor and the means of access to it, using the meaning of those words as explained in the earlier cited authorities. When a workman performs an act that is merely incidental to his employment, it is rarely true that he is under a contractual obligation to his employer to perform that act. On the basis of this reasoning, the Court held that Nanu Raman did not die from injuries sustained in an accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment. Consequently, the respondent was not entitled to any compensation from the appellant under section 3 of the Workman’s Compensation Act 1923. The Court therefore allowed the appeal, awarded costs, and set aside the order of the lower court. By agreement of the majority, the appeal was dismissed without costs, and the appeal was accordingly dismissed.