G.S. Bansal vs The Delhi Administration

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 21 March 1963

Coram: Raghubar Dayal, J.R. Mudholkar, Subba Rao

The case titled G.S. Bansal versus The Delhi Administration was decided on 21 March 1963 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by a bench consisting of Justice Raghubar Dayal and Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The petitioner in the proceedings was G.S. Bansal and the respondent was The Delhi Administration. The date of the judgment is recorded as 21/03/1963. The bench for this matter is identified as Subbarao, K., with the same judges Dayal and Mudholkar participating. The citation for this decision appears in the 1963 All India Reporter at page 1577 and also in the 1964 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports (Second Series) at page 470. The legal provisions relevant to the case involve the Criminal Trial provisions relating to forgery of valuable security, money due to the accused, and obtaining money by committing forgery with an intention that is dishonest and fraudulent. The specific sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860), that were considered are sections 24, 25, 463, 464 and 467.

The headnote of the decision outlines the factual background. The father of the appellant, identified as Janki Pershad, had purchased Post Office National Savings Certificates with a face value of Rs. 250 each in the name of the Controller of Rationing and had deposited those certificates with the Controller as security for his ration depot. After transferring the ration depot, Janki Pershad applied to the appropriate authority for the release of the security. Before the security could be released, Janki Pershad died. The appellant then placed Janki Pershad’s signatures on the relevant documents, attested those documents himself, caused the securities to be transferred in the name of Janki Pershad, and obtained the money from the Post Office. He was subsequently tried and convicted under section 467 of the Indian Penal Code for forging a valuable security. The appellant argued that he was not guilty of forgery because the money he received was due to him as the sole heir of his father, that he gained no personal advantage, and that no other person was injured.

The Court held that the appellant was rightly convicted under section 467 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court explained that by adopting the device of forging the documents, the appellant avoided the expense of obtaining a succession certificate and thereby secured an economic advantage. Additionally, he relieved himself of the inconvenience of satisfying the Rationing Authority and the Post Master General that he was the sole heir, which was an uneconomic advantage. Consequently, the false document was made both dishonestly and fraudulently. The Court distinguished the case of Dr. Vimla versus The Delhi Administration, reported in the 1963 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports (Second Series) at page 585.

The judgment proceeds to note the criminal appellate jurisdiction for Criminal Appeal No. 219 of 1960. The appeal was filed by special leave from the judgment and order dated 7 January 1960 of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi, which had affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, under section 467 of the Indian Penal Code. The sentence imposed was imprisonment until the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 250. Counsel for the appellant included A. S. R. Chari, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, while counsel for the respondent comprised Frank Anthony and R. N. Sachthey. The judgment was delivered on 21 March 1963 by Justice Subbarao. The appellant, who was an Under Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, was at the time under suspension, and he was the son of Janki Pershad, who had held a ration depot in Delhi.

In 1948 Janki Pershad bought three Post Office National Savings Certificates, each bearing a face value of rupees 250, in the name of the Controller of Rationing, Delhi, and he deposited those certificates with the authority as security. On 21 February 1952 he transferred the ration depot to his grandson, S K Bansal, who was the son of the appellant. Subsequently, on 16 April 1952 Janki Pershad applied to the rationing authority for the release of the security, stating that he had transferred the relevant ration depot to his grandson, who had provided a fresh cash security of his own. Before the security could be released, Janki Pershad died on 1 June 1952.

Unaware of his death, the rationing authority sent a letter on 1 July 1952 to Janki Pershad, informing him that the security he had deposited had been released and that the pledged certificates should be transferred into his name by completing the prescribed form enclosed with the letter and presenting that form together with the certificates returned by the post office. The prosecution alleged that, because Janki Pershad was already deceased, the appellant filled out the transfer form, affixed a signature purporting to be that of his father, had the signature attested, and placed the seal of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, beneath his own attesting signature. He then submitted the form and the certificates to the post office. Although the post‑office clerk expressed some doubts about the authenticity of Janki Pershad’s signature, the clerk, relying on an assurance given by the appellant, issued fresh certificates in the name of Janki Pershad on 12 July 1952.

On 3 September 1952 the appellant signed the backs of the three certificates as Janki Pershad to indicate their cancellation, and he added his own attestation and the seal of his office. He also issued a letter of authority in favour of Bhawani Shankar, a clerk attached to his office, authorising that person to cash the certificates. Bhawani Shankar presented the certificates at the post office, produced the required receipts, and received rupees 275 as payment. The amount obtained was handed over to the appellant. On 8 September 1956 the First Class Magistrate of Delhi framed charges against the appellant under section 467 of the Indian Penal Code and committed the case for trial before the Court of Sessions. On 2 February 1959 the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, found the appellant guilty of the offence under section 467 and imposed the sentence of imprisonment until the rising of the Court and a fine of rupees 250. The appellant’s appeal to the High Court was dismissed on 7 January 1960, leading to the present appeal. The charges framed were: first, that between 9 July 1952 and 3 September 1952 in Delhi the appellant dishonestly or fraudulently attested the signatures of the deceased Janki Pershad on the application for transfer of the National Savings Certificates, thereby authorising the Postmaster of the General Post Office, Delhi, to transfer the certificates; and second, that between the same dates the appellant dishonestly or fraudulently obtained a sum of rupees 275 by forging the signatures of the deceased on the certificates and on a letter of authority, and thereby obtained payment through the Postmaster, G P O, Delhi, via Bhawani Shankar, committing an offence punishable under section 467 of the IPC.

In this case the Court recorded that the prosecution alleged two separate offenses. The first accusation stated that the appellant, between 9 July 1952 and 3 September 1952 in Delhi, had fraudulently transferred National Savings Certificates from one person to another and had thereby authorized the Post Master of the General Post Office, Delhi, to effect the transfer, which was alleged to constitute an offense punishable under section 467 of the Indian Penal Code and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Sessions. The second accusation contended that, during the same period and in the same place, the appellant had dishonestly or fraudulently obtained a sum of Rs 275 by falsely attesting the signatures of the deceased Janki Pershad Bansal on three National Savings Certificates, forging a letter of authority purporting to be written by the deceased, and consequently obtaining payment of Rs 275 from the Post Master through Bhawani Shankar on the basis of those forged certificates, an act also alleged to be punishable under section 467 of the Indian Penal Code and cognizable by the Court of Sessions.

The appellant denied every element of the prosecution’s case. He asserted that he had not forged his father’s signature on the application, the certificates, or the letter of authority; that he had not visited the post office to obtain fresh certificates; that he had not employed Bhawani Shankar to encash any certificates; that he had not signed the alleged attestation of his father’s signature; and that he had not placed his official stamp on any document. In effect, his defence amounted to a complete denial of the allegations.

The learned Additional Sessions Judge examined the entire evidentiary record and concluded that both charges were proved beyond doubt, consequently finding the appellant guilty of the offense under section 467 of the Indian Penal Code. On appeal, the judge, identified as Chopra J., reviewed the same evidence anew. He held that although the prosecution had not established that the signature on the application form was forged by the appellant, there was clear and convincing proof that the appellant had attested to it. Regarding the second charge, he found that the signatures of Janki Pershad on the backs of the three certificates and the signature on the letter of authority were all forged by the appellant. On the basis of these findings, he dismissed the appeal.

Thus, there were concurrent factual findings that the appellant had placed his father’s signature on the relevant documents, had attested those documents, had caused the securities to be transferred in his father’s name, and had received the money from the Post Office. Because these findings were based on relevant evidence, the Court followed its usual practice and accepted them. Nevertheless, counsel for the appellant argued that, given these findings, the appellant could not be guilty of forgery under section 464 of the Indian Penal Code because he had received money that was admittedly due to him as the sole heir of his father, and therefore he had neither obtained a benefit for himself nor caused injury to another, a point he said was directly addressed by a recent decision of this Court in Dr Vimla v. The Delhi Administration.

In this case the appellant argued that he neither derived any personal benefit nor caused any injury to another, and that the point had been directly and fully addressed by a recent decision of this Court in Dr. Vimla v. The Delhi Administration (1). Counsel for the State, Mr. Anthony, rejected both the factual and legal contentions advanced by the appellant’s counsel. He asserted that, on the basis of the proven facts, the appellant’s act of placing his father’s signature on the relevant documents demonstrated a clear intention to obtain an economic advantage for himself, because he employed a device that allowed him to avoid the trouble and expense of obtaining a succession certificate. The dispute over how the decision in Dr. Vimla (1) should apply to the present facts becomes clearer when the facts of that earlier case are recalled. In the earlier case it was held that when a person who had deposited postal certificates as security with a department dies, the heir may recover the amount by following either of two procedures: first, after securing a succession certificate, the heir may apply to the concerned department for release of the security and subsequently apply to the postal department to have the certificates encashed; second, if the current value of the certificates at the time of the holder’s death does not exceed Rs 5,000, the heir may, after a period of three months from the date of death, satisfy the Post Master General that he is the sole heir and, upon making the required declaration, recover the money (1) [1963] Supp 2 S.C.R 585. The first method requires the heir to incur expenses in obtaining a succession certificate, whereas the second method requires a waiting period of three months and the submission of evidence to convince the Post Master General that the claimant is the sole heir of the deceased certificate holder. In the present matter the appellant forged the signature of Janki Pershad on the reverse side of the application form to effect the transfer of the Post Office National Savings Certificates into his father’s name, obtained fresh certificates issued in the name of his father, signed Janki Pershad’s name on the backs of three certificates as a token of their cancellation, affixed his own attestation and the stamp of his office to those certificates, supplied a letter of authority in favour of Bhawani Shanker as if it had been issued by Janki Pershad, and subsequently received the money from the Post Office. By following this scheme the appellant succeeded in having the certificates that were originally held in the name of the Ration Department transferred into the name of his deceased father, and he also obtained the monetary amount payable to his father. The scheme involved two distinct steps: the first step was to cause the certificates held in the name of the Ration Department to be transferred into the name of his father, and the second step was to receive the money payable to the deceased father.

In this case the second step that the appellant pursued was to obtain the money that was payable to his deceased father. Because the father died before the certificates could be transferred into his name by the Ration Department, the appellant was required to inform the Department of this fact and to obtain from the Department an application addressed to the Postal Authority requesting that the certificates be transferred in his favour. The Rationing Authority could not have issued such an application to the Postal Authority unless the appellant had produced a succession certificate establishing his right to succeed to his father’s interest. No rule or statutory provision was placed before this Court that would empower the Rationing Authority to agree to transfer the security held by it to a person claiming to be the heir of the owner without the production of a succession certificate. With respect to the second stage of the process, the appellant would not have been able to obtain the money from the Postal Department within three months in the absence of a succession certificate, and thereafter he would also have been required to produce satisfactory evidence of his heirship to the satisfaction of the Post Master General. This alternative route necessarily involved delay, because the appellant could only make an application to the Postal Authority after the expiry of three months, and the subsequent payment would depend on the officer’s satisfaction, which could cause further delay or even result in rejection. Nevertheless, on the facts the appellant’s intention at the time he prepared the false documents was to bypass the alternative procedure that was available to him and to secure the money without incurring the expense and trouble of obtaining a succession certificate. Section 463 of the Indian Penal Code provides: “Whoever makes any false document or part of a document with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery.” Section 464 of the same Code states: “A person is said to make a false document—First—Who dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document, or makes any mark denoting the execution of a document, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was made, signed, sealed or executed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed or at a time at which he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed; or Secondly—Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part thereof, after it has been made or executed either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; … A person, therefore, will be guilty of forgery if he dishonestly or fraudulently signs a document with the intention mentioned.”

In section 464 of the Code, the provision defines dishonesty as the intention to cause wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person. Section 25 of the same Code defines a fraudulent act as one done with the intention to defraud. Applying these definitions to the facts, the Court found that the appellant fabricated false documents with the purpose of obtaining wrongful gain for himself. By using the described scheme, the appellant avoided the expense that would otherwise have been necessary to obtain a succession certificate. Even if it is assumed that the appellant would eventually have received the money after satisfying the requirements of the rationing authority and the Post Master General, the use of the false documents still gave him a distinct advantage because he was spared the effort of proving his status as the sole heir to those authorities, and he avoided the risk of their possible refusal, which could have caused further delay. Consequently, the appellant obtained an advantage that was not purely economic in nature. In the first scenario he acted dishonestly, and in the second scenario his conduct was fraudulent. In both circumstances his conduct satisfied the elements of forgery as defined in section 463 of the Indian Penal Code.

The Court then distinguished the present case from the earlier decision in Dr Vimla’s case. In that earlier case, the Court had examined the meaning of the term “defraud” and held that defrauding requires both deceit and injury to the person deceived. The Court explained that injury includes any loss that is not merely economic, such as deprivation of property or harm to a person’s body, mind, reputation, or other interests. The Court further observed that a benefit to the deceiver usually corresponds to a loss to the deceived, and even in the rare situation where the deceiver gains without any loss to the deceived, the requirement of injury is deemed satisfied.

The factual matrix in Dr Vimla’s case involved the purchase of a car in the name of her minor daughter Nalini. The insurance policy on the car was transferred to Nalini’s name by the appellant signing the necessary documents as Nalini. When the car was damaged, the claimant signed the claim form and receipt in Nalini’s name and collected the compensation. Effectively, the transaction was carried out in the daughter’s name for reasons known only to the appellant, although the true owner of the vehicle was the appellant herself. The Court observed that in that situation the appellant did not obtain any economic or non‑economic advantage from the false documents, and the insurance company did not suffer any economic or non‑economic loss. Therefore, the earlier decision was not applicable to the present facts where the appellant secured a clear economic gain and avoided procedural obstacles.

In this matter, the Court observed that the earlier finding of non‑guilt with respect to forgery was based on the absence of any benefit to the person who had executed the false documents. By contrast, the Court held that the appellant in the present case had clearly obtained an economic advantage through the fabrication of false documents. The Court explained that the appellant avoided spending the amount of money that would have been necessary to obtain a succession certificate; the reference to the decision reported in [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 585 was placed in the text to illustrate that point. Moreover, by using the false documents, the appellant was able to receive the monies that belonged to his deceased father, monies to which he was entitled as an heir, thereby gaining a direct financial benefit. In addition to this monetary gain, the Court noted that the appellant derived a non‑economic advantage because he was relieved of the trouble and inconvenience of obtaining a certificate of proof that would have been required to satisfy the rationing authority and the Post Master General in order to claim the funds. As a result of these findings, the Court concluded that the appellant was guilty of making false documents both dishonestly and fraudulently. The Court affirmed that the High Court had correctly arrived at its conclusion that the appellant’s conduct was unlawful. Consequently, the Court held that the appeal could not succeed, ordered that the appeal be dismissed, and entered a final order dismissing the appeal.