Deputy Director of Consolidation vs Deen Bandhu Rai

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 483 of 1963

Decision Date: 23 August 1963

Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, S.K. Das, Raghubar Dayal, J.R. Mudholkar

In the matter titled Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh versus Deen Bandhu Rai, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 23 August 1963. The opinion was written by Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, with Justices S. K. Das, Raghubar Dayal, and J. R. Mudholkar forming the bench. The case is reported in 1965 AIR 484 and 1964 SCR (4) 560. The dispute concerned the application of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953 (U.P. Act No. V of 1954), specifically sections 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20 and 23, and dealt with an application for permission to transfer land by way of exchange.

The four respondents filed two separate applications before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) seeking permission under subsection (1) of section 16A of the Act to exchange certain plots situated in eleven villages where consolidation proceedings were already underway. The Settlement Officer refused the permission pursuant to subsection (2) of section 16A, a refusal that was subsequently affirmed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The respondents challenged these orders by filing a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court. A single judge dismissed the petition, but the respondents obtained a special leave to appeal before a division bench of the High Court. The division bench held that subsection (2) of section 16A was mandatory and therefore the Settlement Officer was bound to grant permission because the proposed exchange was not likely to defeat the scheme of consolidation. Accordingly, the division bench directed the Settlement Officer to pass an order consistent with those principles. The Deputy Director of Consolidation then appealed to this Court by special leave.

The Supreme Court set out three principal holdings. First, when an application for transfer is made at the stage specified in subsection (1) of section 16A, the Settlement Officer must allow the application unless he is satisfied, after recording reasons in writing, that the proposed transfer would defeat the consolidation scheme. Second, if a conflict exists between a “principle” formulated under section 18 or a concrete “proposal” confirmed under section 23 and the transfer sought, the Settlement Officer may refuse permission under subsection (2) of section 16A; otherwise, the application should be allowed provided it meets the conditions of subsections (1) and (2). The determination of whether such a conflict exists is left to the Settlement Officer. Third, the direction issued by the division bench to the Settlement Officer was found not to be in conformity with subsection (2) of section 16A read together with the other relevant provisions of the Act. The appeal arose from Civil Appeal No. 483 of 1963, taken by special leave from the judgment and decree dated 19 March 1962 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 56 of 1961.

In the appeal filed on 23 August 1963, counsel C.B. Agarwala, K.B. Garg and C.P. Lal appeared for the appellants, while counsel J.P. Goyal represented the respondents. The judgment was delivered by Justice Ayyangar. The appeal concerned Section 16‑A of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (U.P. Act No. V of 1954), which will be referred to simply as “the Act”. Section 16‑A provides that, after the statement required by Section 16 is published and until a notification under Section 52 is issued, a tenure‑holder may not transfer, by sale, gift or exchange, any plot or share that forms part of a consolidation scheme unless the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) has previously granted written permission. Sub‑section (2) obliges the Settlement Officer to grant such permission unless, after recording his reasons in writing, he is satisfied that the proposed transfer would likely defeat the scheme of consolidation.

The four respondents submitted two separate applications to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) requesting permission, under sub‑section (1), to exchange specific plots situated in eleven villages that were included in ongoing consolidation schemes. The Settlement Officer declined the applications pursuant to sub‑section (2) and recorded his reasons. The respondents challenged this refusal by filing a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who affirmed the officer’s decision. The respondents then approached the Allahabad High Court, seeking a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the order. The single judge hearing the petition dismissed it. Consequently, the respondents filed a special appeal, which the Division Bench allowed. The High Court held that the Settlement Officer had rejected the exchange applications on grounds unrelated to the statutory criteria and therefore issued a writ of mandamus directing the officer to pass fresh orders consistent with the law as explained in its judgment. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the Settlement Officer applied to the High Court for a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution, which was denied. They then obtained special leave to appeal to this Court under Article 136. After hearing counsel for both sides, the Court concluded that, although the High Court was correct in setting aside the Consolidation authorities’ refusal under Section 16‑A, the directions given to the Settlement Officer regarding the reconsideration of the applications were not proper. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, and the applications were remitted to the Settlement Officer for disposition in accordance with law.

The Court observed that the directions issued by the High Court to the Settlement Officer were not proper. Consequently, although the appeal was to be allowed, the Court ordered that the pending applications be sent back to the Settlement Officer so that they could be dealt with correctly in accordance with the law. The Court then indicated that it would explain the reasons for reaching this conclusion. The record of facts was not presented with complete clarity, but the essential points could be extracted. There were four respondents. Respondents one and two were brothers and the sons of the third respondent, while the fourth respondent was the mother of the brothers. A decree issued by a Court in 1940 had divided the entire family property. Under that decree, the two sons received parcels of land in each of the eleven villages involved in the consolidation proceedings. The father, who was the third respondent, obtained land in eight villages, and the mother, the fourth respondent, obtained land in five villages. At the time the applications were filed, consolidation proceedings were ongoing in all eleven villages. Two applications were subsequently made to the Settlement Officer seeking permission to exchange the lands so that the two brothers would become the sole tenants in three villages, the father would become the sole tenant in six villages, and the mother would become the sole tenant in the remaining two villages. The Court noted that it would later discuss the stage of the consolidation proceedings when the applications were filed, but for the present it was sufficient to state that the Settlement Officer rejected the exchange applications by an order dated 28 February 1951. A revision of that order to the Deputy Director was also dismissed by an order dated 28 February 1959, although the Court indicated that this later dismissal was not material to the present dispute. The central issue before the Court was whether the reasons given by the Settlement Officer for rejecting the applications were legally sound and proper.

To evaluate the arguments presented by counsel for the appellant, the Court found it necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act governing consolidation and the grounds upon which an application for land exchange could be refused. The Court pointed out that the Act had undergone significant amendments in 1958 and 1963, and therefore the provisions considered were those in force at the time relevant to the appeal. The preamble and the short title of the Act made clear that the purpose of the legislation was “the consolidation of agricultural holdings for the development of agriculture.” Section 3(2) of the Act defined the term “Consolidation” as the rearrangement of holdings in any area among the several entitled tenure‑holders in such a manner as to make the holdings held by them … (the definition continued in the original text). The Court indicated that this definition and the procedural rules set out in the later chapters of the Act were the basis for assessing whether the Settlement Officer had acted within his authority when he refused the applications for exchange.

The judgment therefore presents the material in a more compact form, omitting portions not material for our purpose. Section 4, with which Chapter II begins, provides that, with a view to consolidation, the State Government may declare its intention to prepare a scheme of consolidation for any district or other local area. Every such declaration must be published in the official Gazette and also in each village of the relevant district or local area. Section 5 then specifies the legal effect of a declaration made under section 4, stating that the district or local area shall be deemed to be under consolidation operations from the date specified in the declaration and that the duty of preparing and maintaining the khasra and the Annual Register shall be transferred to the Settlement Officer. The remaining provisions of Chapter II relate to the examination of revenue records, the correction of entries therein, and the procedure for taking objections to the provisionally published statements of plots, tenure‑holders and other related details. Chapter III, which is more directly relevant to the question in issue in the present appeal, is headed “Preparation of Consolidation Scheme” and contains section 16‑A. Section 13 offers a definition of a “Consolidation Scheme”, providing that it shall consist of (a) the statement of principles referred to in section 14, (b) the statement of proposals referred to in section 19, and (c) such other statements as may be prescribed. Section 14, which is referred to in section 13(a), mandates that the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall, for each village under consolidation operations, prepare a written statement – called the Statement of Principles – setting out the principles to be followed in framing the consolidation scheme. This statement must also outline in broad terms the proposed resurvey and layout of the village, including (a) the existing and proposed means of communication, (b) areas proposed for planting trees or set apart for pasture, fisheries, manure pits, khaliyans, cremation grounds and graveyards, (c) areas to be set apart for “abadi”, (d) the location of works of public utility, (e) provisions for public conservancy, (ee) the basis on which tenure‑holders will contribute towards land required for public purposes and the extent to which vacant land may be utilised for that purpose, and (f) any other matter that may be prescribed. The Assistant Consolidation Officer must prepare this statement in consultation with the Consolidation Committee as prescribed. If a difference of opinion arises between the Assistant Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Committee on any matter, the dispute shall be referred to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), whose decision shall be final. Section 15, acting as a rider to section 14, sets out the principles that must be observed in preparing the Statement of Principles under section 14, and begins by stating that the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall, in preparing the statement, have regard to the specified principles.

In this case, the Court referred to the statutory provision that reads, “Consolidation Officer shall, in preparing the statement of principles under section 14, have regard to the following principles:” The Court explained that the allotment of plots must be based on the rental value of each plot, and that the size of any plot to be allotted may not differ by more than twenty percent from the size of the original plot unless the Director of Consolidation expressly permits a larger variation. The Court further noted that, wherever possible, only those tenure‑holders who already own land in a specific block should receive land in that same block, and that the number of chaks allotted to any tenure‑holder, after excluding areas set aside for abadi and for public purposes, must not exceed the total number of blocks in the village unless the Director of Consolidation for Holdings grants an exception. The Court added that each tenure‑holder should, as far as practicable, be allotted land in the location where he holds the greatest portion of his existing holdings. The Court observed that members of the same family should, where feasible, receive adjoining chaks. The Court also stated that the location of the tenure‑holder’s residential house or any improvement made by him should be taken into consideration, as far as practicable, when allocating chaks. The Court further indicated that small tenure‑holders should, as far as possible, be given land near the village abadi. The Court mentioned an additional principle that an existing compact holding or farm having an area of six and one quarter acres or more should, as far as possible, not be disturbed or divided. The Court then recorded that clause (1‑A) is left blank in the statutory text. Finally, the Court pointed out that subsection (2) requires the Assistant Consolidation Officer to also consider any other principles that may be prescribed or specified by the Consolidation Committee, provided that those principles do not conflict with the provisions of the Act or the applicable rules.

The Court continued by describing the procedural provisions in the statute. Section 16 requires that the principles prepared under section 14 be published in the village to which the statement relates, and section 16(2) allows persons likely to be affected by the scheme to file objections “in the manner prescribed” within fifteen days of such publication. The Court then referred to section 16‑A, which had been set out earlier in the judgment, and proceeded to explain section 17, which governs the disposal of objections filed under section 16(2) and the appeals arising from those disposal orders. Section 18 deals with situations where no objections are filed, or where objections are filed and subsequently resolved; in either case the statement is confirmed, declared final, and ordered to be published in the village. The Court noted that section 19, which is mentioned in section 13(b), pertains to the statement of proposals. According to subsection 19(1), once the statement has been confirmed under section 18, the Assistant Consolidation Officer must, in accordance with that confirmed statement, prepare a statement of proposal in the prescribed form. This proposal must include the particulars specified in clause (b) of sub‑section (1) of section 11 for each tenure‑holder, the khasra numbers of the plots proposed to be allotted in place of the original holdings, and other related details as required by the statute.

The provision stipulates that the statement of proposal must include, first, the nature of the rights in the allotted field, together with its rental value and the soil classification of that field; second, a brief explanation of the reasons supporting the proposal; third, the compensation payable for trees, wells, buildings or any other improvement calculated in the manner prescribed by law; fourth, the area set aside for public purposes, the layout of such areas and the rental value attached to them; fifth, the revenue or rent that the tenure‑holder is required to pay for the allotted plot; and sixth, any other particulars that may be prescribed under the Act. In addition, the statement of proposals must be accompanied by a village map that shows the proposed arrangement of the plots. Whenever, in the course of preparing a statement of proposal, the Assistant Consolidation Officer finds it necessary to amalgamate any land that is used for public purposes with any holding in the scheme, the officer is required to make a declaration to that effect. That declaration must state that the rights of the public as well as the rights of all individuals in or over the land are proposed to be transferred to other land earmarked for public purposes, and that, upon such transfer, those rights shall be extinguished in the land from which they are transferred. The statement of proposals must be prepared in consultation with the Consolidation Committee, following the prescribed manner. If a difference of opinion arises between the Assistant Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Committee on any matter contained in the statement of proposals, the dispute must be referred to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), whose decision is final. Under section 20(1) the statement of proposals prepared under section 19 is required to be published in the village, and under section 20(2) the persons affected by the proposals are permitted, within fifteen days of such publication, to file written objections before the Assistant Consolidation Officer. Section 21 prescribes the procedure for disposing of objections filed under section 20. Section 23 becomes applicable where no objections are filed under section 20, or where objections have been filed and disposed of, and it provides that the confirmed statement shall be published and shall be final, except with respect to land that is the subject‑matter of references made to the Civil Judge and that has not been disposed of at that time. The remaining chapters and provisions of the Act deal with the execution and enforcement of schemes so framed and are not necessary to set out here. The Court now proceeds to narrate the factual details as they appear from the record. The exact date on which the applications for permission to exchange were filed is not ascertainable from the record, nor are the precise prayers made with reference to each of the eleven villages. Nonetheless, the writ petition filed by the respondents provides the following information concerning the eleven villages in which the properties of the petitioners are situated.

The petitioners’ lands are situated in eleven villages, namely Garhar Buzurug, Mahmauni, Bibipur, Bhitari, Tahabarpur, Taraudhi, Shambhupur, Shrikantpur, Lachahara, Nawada and Garhar Khurda. At the time the application for exchange was filed, the consolidation proceedings were at different stages in these villages. In Garhar Buzurug, Mahmauni, Bibipur, Bhitari and Tahabarpur the matters were pending under section 12 of the Consolidation Act. In Nawada and Lachahara the proceedings were proceeding under section 20, while in Shrikantpur and Shambhupur the scheme had already been confirmed and was in the enforcement phase. In Garhar Khurda the statement of proposals under section 19 had attracted an objection; the objection was upheld and consequently fresh principles were being formulated under section 16. The Consolidation authorities expressly acknowledged that this description accurately reflected the status of the proceedings on the date of the application. In addition, the writ petition alleged that in Shrikantpur, Shambhupur and Lachahara the properties sought to be exchanged were located in adjacent chaks, an allegation that became relevant to the Settlement Officer’s reasons for rejecting the applications filed under section 16‑A(2).

Two separate applications for exchange had been filed, one by the father together with his two sons and another by the mother together with the same sons. After briefly summarising the content of the applications, the Settlement Officer stated: “Under this section [16‑A(2)] it is to be considered as to whether the exchange is likely to defeat the scheme of consolidation or not.” He then observed that, based on his records and an inquiry he had conducted, the statement of principles under section 16 had been published in seven villages, while in five villages—namely Shambhupur, Nawada, Garhar Khurda, Lachahara and Shrikantpur—both the principles and a statement of proposals had also been published under section 20. No information was provided concerning the remaining four villages for which exchange applications had been made. The Settlement Officer promised to explain the reasons for rejecting the applications by referring to the report of the Consolidation Officer, which he had obtained upon receipt of the two applications. He quoted that report saying: “the consolidation officer reported that chak formation was in hand in these villages.” He added his agreement with that assessment: “I entirely agree with him that the exchange of land, which is of considerably big area shall disturb either the concluding phase of chak formation or the proposed chaks already formed.” He further noted that permitting the exchange would, under sections 15(c) and 15(b) of the Act, require a review of the chaks of the tenure‑holders, a review that would inevitably dislocate and disturb other chak holders. He concluded by stating: “By the exchange …” indicating that allowing the exchange would enlarge the holdings of the father, mother and sons, thereby adversely affecting the interests of smaller tenure‑holders.

The Settlement Officer had argued that granting the exchange sought by the parties, who were described as large tenure‑holders, would cause those parties to become even larger land‑holders and that the resulting increase of land in their favour would adversely affect the interests of smaller tenure‑holders, creating unwanted disturbance and displacement for them. He further contended that, because the parties consisted of a father, a mother and their sons, they might, to the greatest extent possible, be able to derive benefits under section 15(d) of the Consolidation and Rehabilitation Act. The learned judges of the Division Bench examined the reasons offered by the Settlement Officer for rejecting the application and identified two principal factors that had prompted the officer to issue an order adverse to the respondents. First, the judges noted that, given the stage already reached in the formation of chaks, granting the petition would require considerable effort by the officers of the Consolidation Department, specifically those referenced in “37‑2 S. C. India/64,” to readjust the chaks of other holders. Second, the judges observed that the petitioners were already substantial land‑holders and that permitting the exchanges would further enlarge their holdings. The learned judges pointed out that neither of these considerations constituted a legitimate or pertinent ground on which an application for exchange made under section 16‑A(1) could be denied, and consequently they granted the writ petition. In applying section 16‑A(2), the Court emphasized that where an application falls within the ambit of section 16‑A(1)—that is, where it is filed at the stage contemplated by that provision—the Settlement Officer is obligated to allow the application unless the conditions laid down in the latter part of sub‑section (21) are satisfied. The key condition requires the officer to be satisfied that the proposed transfer is likely to defeat the “scheme of consolidation.” The respondents before the High Court had contested the meaning of the phrase “the scheme of consolidation,” arguing that the term should be understood in its ordinary, dictionary sense as the “mode” or “process” of effecting consolidation. On that construction, they maintained that because the sought exchanges would, if permitted, result in an aggregation of land, the applications ought to have been granted. Both the learned single judge and the judges on appeal rejected this submission, holding that “the scheme of consolidation” does not refer to a generic method of consolidation but is a specific reference to the provisions of section 13(a), (b) and (c), which the Court had previously quoted. This interpretation was accepted as correct, and the respondent’s counsel did not dispute this position before the Court. The subsequent issue for determination was whether the reasons provided for rejecting the exchange application contravened the criteria set out in sections 13(a), (b) or (c). The Court observed that the Settlement Officer must focus his attention on the criteria enumerated in those provisions when deciding whether to allow a transfer.

The Settlement Officer may reject an application for a proposed transfer only when he is satisfied that allowing the transfer would contravene either the principles laid down in section 14, the proposals set out in section 19, or any other matters that section 13(c) requires to be considered. In such a case the officer is also required to record in writing the reasons that led him to reject the application. The Court observed that the order issued by the Settlement Officer did not clearly specify the precise grounds on which the rejection was based. The Court expressed only limited doubt on two matters. First, it was uncertain whether, to a large extent, the reasons given by the Settlement Officer for rejecting the applications were the same two reasons that the High Court had earlier identified and used as grounds for declaring his order invalid. Second, it was uncertain whether those reasons were relevant or appropriate for refusing the application for exchange under section 16‑A(2). The Court held that if those reasons had indeed been taken into account, the order could not be justified. Consequently, the Court concluded that the learned judges of the High Court had acted correctly in setting aside the Settlement Officer’s order under Article 226.

Before disposing of the Settlement Officer’s order, the Court noted another relevant point. In the petition filed before the High Court and the accompanying affidavit, the respondents claimed that the lands in the three villages they sought to exchange – Shrikantpur, Shambhupur and Lachahara – were situated in adjacent chaks as described in the “proposals.” The appellant did not deny this allegation in the counter‑affidavit filed before the High Court; instead, the appellant expressly acknowledged the correctness of the claim. If the lands were indeed in adjacent and contiguous chaks, the Court found it difficult to see how granting permission to exchange them would violate any principle or proposal, because no other persons’ rights would be affected and the result would simply be that one family member would hold both adjoining chaks instead of two relatives holding separate adjacent chaks. The counsel for the appellant did not contest this view. Moreover, the Settlement Officer, in his order, observed that given the relationship between the parties, they would be “deriving benefits of section 15(d) of the Act,” a reference that the appellant’s counsel interpreted as acknowledging the advantage of contiguity arising from their familial ties. If the officer intended this reasoning, the Court held that it should have compelled him to allow the exchange for at least some of the lands. Therefore, a blanket rejection of the permission to exchange every parcel of land could not be sustained, providing an additional reason for setting aside the officer’s order. The Court indicated that it would next address the appellant’s complaint concerning the directions given by the learned judges to the Settlement Officer regarding the fresh disposal of the applications.

In this case the appellant’s counsel complained that the learned judges had given directions to the Settlement Officer concerning a fresh disposal of the applications. The learned judges explained, in their view, the applicable law and practically required the Settlement Officer to grant the permission that had been sought; it was this portion of the judgment that the appellant challenged as erroneous and incorrect. The learned judges articulated their reasoning as follows: they observed that nothing in the statement of principles or in the statement of proposals could oppose the formation of larger chaks for a particular tenure‑holder. On the contrary, the entire scheme of the Act, including the statements of principles and proposals, envisaged that each tenure‑holder should, as far as possible, possess a single, as large as possible, chak. Accordingly, the transfer would not defeat the scheme of consolidation but would actually further it. Section 16‑A(2) was described as being in a mandatory form, obliging the Settlement Officer to grant permission unless he was satisfied that the proposed transfer was likely to defeat the scheme of consolidation. Having concluded that the exchange was not likely to defeat the scheme, the judges held that the officer was bound to grant permission. In the concluding part of their judgment they directed the Settlement Officer to pass an order, keeping in view the principles of law that they had set out earlier, that is, the passage just quoted. This led the Court to consider the scheme of the Act and the precise meaning of the phrase “likely to defeat the scheme of consolidation” in section 16‑A(2). Using the language of section 13, the question to be examined was whether the transfer for which permission was sought would contravene the principles referred to in section 14 or the proposals referred to in section 19. Two important points were noted regarding both the “principles” of consolidation under section 14 and the “proposals” under section 19: the Act expressly provides for objections to be filed and considered before the principles or proposals attain finality. It was not clear from the record whether the present respondents had filed any objections to the principles or the proposals under section 16(2) or section 20(2) respectively, based on their claim to exchange. If such objections had been filed, they would be dealt with in the manner prescribed, and the decision on the objections and on the application for sanction would be founded on the same grounds. However, if no objections were filed, the Settlement Officer, in dealing with the application under section 16‑A(1), would have to consider whether the proposed transfer, if permitted, would substantially and concretely affect any of the principles that had become final under section 18 or the proposals that were confirmed under section 23. A conflict that would justify a rejection under section 16‑A(2) must exist between a finalized principle or a concrete proposal on the one hand and the transfer prayed for on the other. If such a conflict existed, the officer would be entitled to refuse permission; otherwise, the applicant would be entitled to receive the permission sought. The officer was required to decide whether these conflicts existed and to pass a speaking order setting out the grounds for holding that such a conflict existed, with the Court’s jurisdiction being attracted only if there was an error apparent on the face of the record or a similar infirmity in the officer’s order. Accordingly, the direction of the learned judges did not, with all respect, appear to be in accordance with the proper interpretation of section 16‑A(2) read with the other relevant provisions, and the order of the learned judges was set aside.

In this case, the Court explained that a conflict required for a refusal under section 16‑A(2) must arise between either a “principle” that has been formulated under section 14 or a concrete “proposal” that has been confirmed under section 23, and the transfer that the applicant seeks. If such a conflict exists, the Settlement Officer is authorized to deny the permission; if no conflict is found, the applicant is entitled to receive the permission that has been requested. The Court emphasized that it is the Settlement Officer’s duty to determine whether any such conflict exists and to issue a reasoned order that sets out the grounds on which the officer concludes that a conflict does exist. The Court further observed that the jurisdiction of the courts would be triggered only when the officer’s order contains an error apparent on the face of the record or some similar infirmity. Accordingly, the Court held that the direction given by the learned judges did not, with due respect, conform to a proper construction of section 16‑A(2) read together with the other relevant provisions, and consequently the Court set aside the order of those learned judges.

The Court then turned to another point that it had already noted, namely the respondents’ claim in their petition to the High Court that the lands whose transfer was sought were contiguous in three of the villages involved in the applications. The Court observed that this assertion had also been admitted by the appellant in his counter‑affidavit. Counsel for the respondents, while accepting that if the factual situation were as alleged the exchange applications would have to be allowed for those plots, argued that a drafting mistake had been made in the counter‑affidavit filed in the High Court. According to that argument, except for one village, lands belonging to third parties actually intervened between the chaks of the various respondents in the other two villages. Ordinarily, once a party has admitted a factual allegation, that party cannot later contest it. However, the Court found this case to be unusual because the parties appeared more focused on legal points than on the precise factual details. In view of this peculiarity, the Court decided that it would not be appropriate to hold the appellant bound by the admission made in his affidavit before the High Court. Moreover, since the Court was now directing the Settlement Officer to dispose of the pending applications in accordance with law, the Settlement Officer could consider the actual location of the plots when deciding whether to grant the requested permission. The Court noted that after the order of the learned Division‑Bench judges, the Settlement Officer reconsidered the matter afresh and, on 31 August 1962, issued an order granting permission under section 16‑A(1). A review of that order showed that the same was

The permission was granted by the Settlement Officer not after any examination of the application in reference to the relevant provisions of the Act, nor after consideration of the “principles” and “proposals” contained in sections fourteen to eighteen and sections nineteen to twenty‑three respectively; the order was issued solely because the High Court had directed it. The counsel for the respondents attempted to argue that the second order, dated thirty‑first August 1962, had become final and therefore could be raised as a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal. Their contention was that, without first setting aside that order, the appellant could not obtain any relief concerning the correctness of the High Court order that was now before this Court on appeal. The Court considered that objection to be without merit because the subsequent order of the Settlement Officer was entirely dependent upon, and was passed in mechanical compliance with, the order of the High Court. Consequently, if the order of the learned Judges were found to be erroneous and required setting aside, the existence of the Settlement Officer’s order would not hinder that result, for the Settlement Officer’s order would fall away together with the High Court order on which it was based.

The appeal is therefore allowed, and both the order of the learned Judges and the Settlement Officer’s order dated thirty‑first August 1962 are set aside. The Settlement Officer is directed to take the respondents’ applications for permission to effect the exchange, place them on his file, and dispose of them in accordance with law, having regard to the observations made in this judgment. It is further clarified that the Act underwent substantial amendments in 1958 and 1963, and the Settlement Officer, while dealing with the applications according to law, must consider those later enactments only to the extent that they apply to the present case. No order as to costs is made in this Court.