Chittaranjan Das vs State of West Bengal
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 165 of 1960
Decision Date: 22 April, 1963
Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta
In the case titled Chittaranjan Das versus State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 22 April 1963. The judgment was written by Justice P B Gajendragadkar and the bench consisted of Justices P B Gajendragadkar, K N Wanchoo and K C Das Gupta. The petitioner was Chittaranjan Das and the respondent was the State of West Bengal. The decision is reported in the 1963 All India Reporter at page 1696 and also appears in the 1964 Supreme Court Reporter at page 237, with subsequent citations in later reports. The matters addressed by the Court included the conduct of a jury trial for a charge of rape, the requirement to state particulars of time and place under section 222 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the propriety of charging a jury, alleged misdirection of the jury, the admissibility of prior statements of the prosecutrix as substantive evidence, and the circumstances under which a verdict may be set aside. The statutory provisions mentioned in the record comprised sections 109 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code, sections 222 (1) and 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act.
The appellant, Chittaranjan Das, held the position of Zonal Officer in the Refugee Rehabilitation Office, while the co‑accused, Ganesh De, was employed as a peon in the same office. A minor girl named Sandhyarani, who lived with her mother in a refugee colony, was approached by a woman named Manibala who promised her a nursing job. Acting on that promise, Sandhyarani was taken to the appellant’s house in mid‑November 1958 on the representation that the appellant intended to give her employment. The appellant raised the expectation of a job and then forced her to submit to sexual intercourse. Over the next month she was taken to the appellant’s house on two or three further occasions, and on each occasion the appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with her. Sandhyarani’s mother filed a complaint, which led to an investigation. The police recovered Sandhyarani from the residence of Ganesh De, recorded her statement, and forwarded a charge sheet that specified the dates on which the appellant allegedly raped her. The charge sheet framed three separate counts against the appellant, each count describing a distinct period: the first count covered 18 November 1958 to 21 November 1958, the second count covered 1 December 1958 to 6 December 1958, and the third count covered 9 December 1958 to 15 December 1958. Ganesh De was charged under section 376 read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial was conducted before the City Sessions Court with the assistance of a jury. The jury returned a verdict of guilty against the appellant on all three counts, and the Sessions Judge accepted this verdict. The appellant was convicted under section 376 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for four years in respect of the first count; no separate sentence was imposed for the second and third counts. Ganesh De was also sentenced to a similar term of imprisonment. The appellant subsequently filed an appeal, which was dismissed summarily by a vision.
The High Court bench noted that the appellant had secured a certificate under article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution, which gave rise to the present appeal. The Court explained that when the particulars required by section 222 (1) of the Code can be specified with exactness, the prosecution is obliged to include those particulars in the charge. However, if the nature of the information available to the prosecution makes precise specification impossible, the absence of such particulars does not render the charge invalid. To determine whether a charge in a criminal trial violates section 222 (1), the Court must consider all relevant facts and assess whether, in light of those facts, the charge could and should have been framed more precisely. If the Court reaches the conclusion that a more precise charge was warranted, it must then examine whether any defect in the charge caused prejudice to the accused. Applying this test, the Court found that the charge framed in the present proceedings did not breach the requirements of sections 222 (1) and 222 (2) and was therefore valid. The decision in Ali Hyder v. Emperor, (1939) 40 Cr. L.J. 280, was held to be inapplicable. The Court further observed that the position under section 421 is clear and unambiguous. It stated that when the High Court, in considering criminal appeals, concludes that there is no merit in the appeal, it is not obligatory for the High Court to record reasons for its summary dismissal. Consequently, the High Court was not correct in granting the certificate to the appellant on the ground that his appeal should not have been summarily dismissed by another Division Bench of the High Court. The cases Mushtak Husain v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 282 and Shreekantiah Ramayya Municipally v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1935 S.C. 287, were distinguished. The Court also held that the requirement of corroboration concerning the evidence of a prosecutrix had been thoroughly explained by the Sessions Judge to the jury. In view of the numerous statements made by the learned Judge in his charge on this issue, it was difficult to accept that the charge was materially defective. The failure of the learned judge to reiterate the point about the onus of proving the girl's age, when he dealt with the actual evidence, was not considered a misdirection, let alone a material misdirection that could have prejudiced the appellant. The Court explained that when a prior statement is put to a witness in cross‑examination under section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, its primary purpose is to challenge the witness by referring to the trial evidence. Accordingly, the learned judge was not wrong in law in informing the jury that the prior statement relied upon by the defence could assist the defence in arguing that the girl was not a straightforward witness and had altered her story over time; however, that prior statement could not be treated as substantive evidence.
The Court observed that the evidence presented at trial had been correctly considered and that, according to established legal principles, the charge had not been subject to serious misdirection. In a jury trial, the determination of factual issues was left to the jury’s verdict, and the Court acknowledged that a verdict which surprised the judge could not, by itself, be labeled as perverse. Consequently, the Court concluded that there was no basis for overturning the jury’s finding and ordered that the appeal be dismissed.
The judgment was rendered in criminal appellate jurisdiction under Criminal Appeal No 165 of 1960, arising from an order dated 22 July 1960 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No 448 of 1960. Counsel for the appellant included A S R Chari, N S Bindra, and D N Mukherjee, while counsel for the respondent comprised B Sen, S C Mazumdar, and P K Bose. The judgment was delivered on 22 April 1963 by Justice Gajendragadkar. The appellant, Chittaranjan Das, had been charged with an offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The charge was framed on three separate counts. The first count alleged that between 18 November 1958 and 21 November 1958, at 29A and B, Kailash Bose Street, Calcutta, the appellant had committed rape upon Sandhyarani Das Gupta, also known as Nirmala. The second count alleged a similar offence at the same location and against the same girl between 1 December 1958 and 6 December 1958. The third count alleged the same offence again at the same place between 9 December 1958 and 15 December 1958. Alongside the appellant, Ganesh De was charged with abetting the alleged offence, the charge being framed under Section 376 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Presidency Magistrate of the 8th Court, Calcutta, conducted the commitment proceedings, found that the prosecution evidence established a prima facie case against both accused, and committed them to the Sessions Court on 4 May 1960 because the offence was triable exclusively by a Sessions Court. The trial then proceeded before the City Sessions Court at Calcutta with a jury. The jury returned guilty verdicts against the appellant on all three counts and a similar verdict against Ganesh De. The learned Sessions judge held that the jury’s verdict was not perverse, accepted it, convicted the appellant under Section 376, and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for four years on the first count, without imposing separate sentences on the remaining counts. Ganesh De received an identical term of imprisonment. This order was dated 9 July 1960. The appellant subsequently challenged the correctness of the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned Sessions judge.
In this case the appellant first filed an appeal before the Calcutta High Court, but a Division Bench of that Court was not persuaded by the arguments presented on his behalf and consequently dismissed his appeal on 22 July 1960. The appellant thereafter sought a certificate under article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution. That application was granted by the Chief Justice and a Justice on the basis that some of the questions the appellant wished to raise before this Court were substantial points of law, and a certificate was therefore issued. It is on the basis of that certificate that the appellant approached this Court. Before considering the legal issues raised in the present appeal, the material facts leading to the prosecution were briefly set out. The prosecution case involved a minor girl named Sandhyarani Das Gupta, who was residing with her mother Soudamini in the Refugee Colony at Ghola. It was alleged that a woman identified as Maniprova, also known as Manibala Majumdar, persuaded the girl to go to her residence on Ashutosh Mukherjee Road, Bhowanipur, during the first week of November 1958, promising her a nursing job. At that time the appellant held the position of Zonal Officer in the Refugee Rehabilitation Office at Tollygunge, while the co‑accused Ganesh De was employed there as a peon. The prosecution alleged that, subsequently, Sandhyarani was taken to the appellant’s house in mid‑November 1958 on the representation that the appellant intended to provide her with employment. Upon meeting the appellant, the girl was allegedly given hope of a job and was then sexually assaulted by him. The prosecution further claimed that she was brought to his residence on two or three additional occasions within a month, and each time the appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with her, promising employment each time. As a result of those encounters, the girl allegedly became pregnant, and the appellant is said to have been eager to procure an abortion. According to the prosecution, Manibala attempted to induce the abortion but was unsuccessful, leading to the girl being taken on 11 February 1959 to the Chittaranjan Sevasadan where the abortion was finally performed. Afterward, the girl reportedly returned to her own home of her own accord. The evidence indicated that she was again taken to the appellant’s house and assaulted on two or three further occasions. During one of these meetings, the appellant introduced her to a young man named Himangsu Ganguli, who had approached the appellant seeking a job. The appellant is alleged to have exploited the vulnerable positions of both Himangsu and Sandhyarani by arranging a sham marriage between them, after which he demanded a photograph as proof of the marriage. A group photograph was subsequently taken involving Ganesh De, Manibala, Himangsu and Sandhyarani, with the latter two posing as husband and wife. Himangsu and Sandhyarani then provided a copy of the photograph to the appellant, and on that occasion the appellant allegedly assaulted her again. This narrative outlines the prosecution’s version of events against the appellant.
The Court recorded that the appellant required a photograph as proof of a simulated marriage, and consequently a group picture was taken that included Ganesh De, Manibala, Himangsu and Sandhya, the latter two posing as husband and wife. After the photograph was copied, Himangsu and Sandhya delivered the copy to the appellant. The Court noted that, following this delivery, Sandhya was again subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant. The prosecution summarized these events as the essential facts of its case. On 6 June 1959, Sandhya’s mother lodged a complaint alleging that her daughter had vanished. The Enforcement Branch of Calcutta investigated the complaint and, on 10 June 1959, recovered Sandhya from the residence of Ganesh De. She was then taken to the Tollygunge Police Station where her statement was recorded. The Court observed that the alleged offence, as described in Sandhya’s statement, fell within the jurisdiction of the Amherst Street Police Station; therefore, the case files were transferred to that station. A second statement from Sandhya was recorded at Amherst Street on 12 June 1959. Based on this statement, a challan was issued that identified 14 November 1958, 30 May 1959 and 6 June 1959 as the dates on which the appellant had allegedly raped Sandhya. The appellant was subsequently arrested together with co‑accused persons and was charged before the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, as previously mentioned. The High Court, while granting a certificate to the appellant, held that the issue raised by the appellant concerning the alleged invalidity and illegality of the charge was a substantive point. The High Court observed that the scheme of section 222 of the Criminal Procedure Code appeared to indicate that the charge in the present case contravened the requirement of subsection (1) and was therefore invalid. The Court further noted that the High Court seemed to rely on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ali Hyder v. Emperor for support of this contention.
The Court then turned to the appellant’s argument concerning the requisites of section 222. It recalled that the charge against the appellant comprised three separate counts, each specifying a range of dates during which the alleged rapes were said to have occurred. The first count covered the period from 18 November 1958 to 21 November 1958, the second from 1 December 1958 to 6 December 1958, and the third from 9 December 1958 to 15 December 1958. The appellant contended that subsection (1) of section 222 requires a charge to state, among other particulars, the exact date and time at which the offence was committed, and that the charge therefore failed to meet this requirement. Before addressing this contention, the Court read the full provision of section 222. Subsection (1) mandates that a charge must contain particulars of the time and place of the alleged offence and the identity of the person or thing against whom it was committed, so as to give the accused reasonable notice of the matter with which he is charged. Subsection (2) provides an exception for cases of criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money, whereby it is sufficient to specify the gross sum involved and the dates between which the offence is alleged to have been committed, without detailing exact dates or items, provided that the period does not exceed one year. The appellant argued that only offences falling within the ambit of subsection (2) were exempt from the requirement of stating a precise date and time, and that his alleged offences did not belong to that category. The Court indicated that it would examine this argument in the context of the three counts and the language of section 222.
In the provision that governed the form of a charge, the section required that the charge contain particulars of the time and place of the alleged offence and of the person or thing against which the offence was committed, so that the accused could receive reasonably sufficient notice of the matter with which he was charged. The subsection further provided that when the accused was charged with criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money, it would be sufficient to state the gross sum involved and the range of dates during which the offence was alleged to have been committed, without needing to specify individual items or exact dates; such a charge would be treated as a single offence under the definition of another section, provided that the interval between the first and last of those dates did not exceed one year. The appellant argued that this exception applied only to the offences listed in the second subsection, and that for all other offences the first subsection required the charge to specify the exact date and time of the alleged offence. The Court considered that contention to be without merit. The counsel for the appellant, who also represented himself, acknowledged that in the majority of charges falling under the first subsection it was customary to state that the offence was committed on or about a particular date, without necessarily indicating the precise time. Consequently, the counsel did not assert that every charge must contain an exact date and exact time. The Court observed that if a charge could lawfully state that a particular offence occurred on or about a given date, then the presence of a period of four, five or six days in the charge did not automatically violate the requirement of the first subsection. Although the second subsection dealt specifically with two classes of offences and allowed a broader description of time, this did not imply that every other charge had to pinpoint the exact date and hour of the offence. The Court recognized that a charge describing an overly long period might be criticized as vague and general, because the purpose of the provision was to ensure that the accused received reasonably sufficient notice of the case against him. The essential requirement in any criminal trial was that the charge give the accused a fairly reasonable idea of the case he would face.
The Court observed that a criminal charge had to be framed in a manner that gave the accused a reasonably clear idea of the case he would have to meet, and that the validity of each charge was to be assessed by applying the test of whether the accused had received a reasonably sufficient notice of the matter with which he was charged. The Court explained that if a charge were overly vague concerning the time of the alleged offence, the accused might be substantially deprived of the chance to raise an alibi defence; consequently, criminal courts naturally took care to draft charges with sufficient precision and particularity so as to ensure a fair trial. However, the Court stated that it would not be correct to declare a charge invalid merely because it failed to state the exact date and exact time at which the offence was alleged to have been committed.
The Court further noted that procedural requirements were generally intended to serve the ends of justice, and that placing undue emphasis on mere technicalities in matters that were not of vital significance could sometimes frustrate those ends. It distinguished between provisions of procedure that were mandatory, where the legislature’s clear intention made any breach a serious infirmity in the proceedings, and provisions that, while intended to be observed, were not of essential importance; a breach of the latter did not automatically vitiate a trial unless the accused could demonstrate that the violation had caused prejudice. This principle was illustrated by reference to sections 535 and 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
To illustrate the principle, the Court considered a murder case in which the prosecution relied principally on circumstantial evidence. In such cases, the investigation typically began with, and gained momentum after, the discovery of the dead body. The Court held that it would be unreasonable to expect the prosecution to frame a charge that specified the exact date on which the murder was committed. At most, the prosecution could indicate a broad period during which the murder must have occurred. Accordingly, the Court explained that the degree of precision required in a charge concerning the date of the alleged offence depended on the nature of the information available to the prosecution. Where the necessary particulars could be precisely identified under section 222(1), the prosecution was obliged to include them in the charge; where, because of the facts of the case, such particulars could not be precisely specified, the omission of those details did not render the charge invalid.
In considering whether a charge that omitted certain particulars could be set aside, the Court observed that the omission of such particulars did not, by itself, invalidate the charge when the prosecution lacked precise information. The Court illustrated this principle by referring to the facts of the present case. The testimony of Sandhya demonstrated that she and her family experienced severe hardship as refugees, and her desperate desire to support her destitute relatives made her readily susceptible to Manibala’s suggestion that she earn money by selling her body. Because the minor girl was repeatedly exposed to the threat of sexual intercourse with multiple persons, the Court found it unreasonable to expect her to be able to specify the exact dates on which each individual had intercourse with her. To require that a charge of rape against the appellant contain the precise date of the alleged offence would, in effect, render the charge impossible to sustain, since the victim would ordinarily be unable to state those dates with certainty. Consequently, the Court held that, in evaluating whether a charge under section 222 (1) was defectively framed, it must examine all relevant facts; if, after such examination, the Court concluded that the charge could and should have been framed more precisely, it could then assess whether the defect had caused prejudice to the accused. The Court expressed that this approach represented a reasonable method for addressing the appellant’s contentions. The High Court had not been persuaded that prejudice existed, having summarily dismissed the appeal, and the Court indicated that the appellant could not successfully contest the High Court’s view on this point.
The Court further noted that the decision cited by the High Court, namely Ali Hyder (1), did not support the appellant’s contention. The next ground upon which the High Court had granted a certificate of appeal was the assertion that the Division Bench should not have summarily dismissed the appeal. In reaching the conclusion that this argument raised a substantial point of law, the High Court referred to two decisions of this Court: Mushtak Hussein v. State of Bombay (2) and Shreekantiah Ramayya Municipalli v. State of Bombay (3). In Mushtak Hussein, this Court had unequivocally observed that it was not proper for a High Court to dismiss an accused’s appeal summarily when the appeal raised arguable issues worthy of consideration. The Court clarified that while summary dismissal might be justified where no substantive issue arose, it was inappropriate where the appeal presented arguable points. In Shreekantiah Ramayya, the Court noted an anomalous situation in which one appeal was summarily dismissed by one Bench while another, concerning the same judgment, was admitted by a different Bench. Drawing on the reasoning in Mushtak Hussein, this Court reiterated that summary dismissals of appeals that raise substantive and important issues must be disapproved. Accordingly, the Court affirmed that the High Court’s summary dismissal was not justified in the present case.
The Court observed that where an appeal clearly presents no arguable issue, a summary dismissal is justified, but where an appeal does raise arguable points, the summary rejection order should indicate the High Court’s view on those points. The Court illustrated this principle by referring to the case of Shreekantiah Ramayya, where two separate accused persons appealed the same judgment; one appeal was summarily dismissed by one Bench of the High Court while the other appeal was admitted by a different Bench. In view of this inconsistent treatment, the Court reiterated its earlier observation in Mushtak Hussein that summary rejections of appeals that raise substantial and important issues must be disapproved. The Court emphasized that there can be no doubt that High Courts, when dealing with criminal appeals, should not summarily reject an appeal that raises arguable and substantial questions of fact or law, and it would be redundant to state that a High Court will not dismiss an appeal if it is satisfied that such questions exist. The Court further noted that it remains the responsibility of the High Court hearing the criminal appeal to determine whether the appeal raises any arguable or substantial question of fact or law. Section 421(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that upon receiving a petition and copy under section 419 or section 420, the appellate court must peruse the documents and, if it finds no sufficient ground for interference, may dismiss the appeal summarily. The proviso to this section mandates that no appeal filed under section 419 shall be dismissed unless the appellant or his pleader has been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard in support of the appeal. Sub‑section (2) authorises the appellate court to call for the case record before dismissing the appeal under sub‑section (1), but it does not impose an obligation to do so. Consequently, the position under section 421 is clear and unambiguous. When a criminal appeal is presented before the High Court, the Court must be satisfied that the appeal raises an arguable or substantial question; if satisfied, the appeal should be admitted. Conversely, if the High Court is satisfied that the appeal lacks substance and that the trial court’s view is substantially correct, it may dismiss the appeal summarily. The Court stressed that a summary dismissal does not require the High Court to record detailed reasons before dismissing the appeal, provided it has considered the merits and concluded that admission is not warranted.
In the present case the Court observed that the High Court had not applied its mind to every point raised by the appellant. The Court explained that a summary dismissal means that, after considering the merits of the appeal, the High Court decides that it is not advisable to admit the appeal because, in its view, the decision that is being challenged is correct. Consequently, the Court held that the High Court was not justified in granting a certificate to the appellant on the ground that his appeal should not have been summarily dismissed by another Division Bench of the same High Court. The Court further clarified that when a High Court, while dealing with criminal appeals, concludes that there is no substance in the appeal, it is not obligatory for the Court to record reasons for that conclusion before summarily dismissing the appeal.
The third ground on which the High Court had granted the certificate concerned an alleged misdirection in the charge delivered by the learned Sessions Judge to the jury. The Court noted that, when the defence argued that the charge was vague and that the dates specified in the charge did not correspond to the dates given by Sandhya in her evidence, the learned Judge told the jury that, if the statement of the girl in her cross‑examination were taken as the basis, the dates on which the girl was alleged to have been assaulted would not be covered by the three sets of dates mentioned in the charge, and he added that “in case you hold that the charges are in order, then you shall proceed to consider the evidence.” The appellant urged before the Division Bench that this final statement amounted to a misdirection. The appellant’s argument was that the validity of a charge is a question of law which the learned Judge should have decided himself and then directed the jury accordingly; by leaving that question to the jury, the Judge allegedly failed to exercise his jurisdiction and therefore the charge suffered a serious misdirection. The Court found that the argument lacked substance. It further observed that after the committal order was passed by the Presidency Magistrate, the appellant moved the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction, claiming that the charge framed against him was defective and invalid and should be quashed. The High Court rejected that claim and held the charge to be valid within the meaning of sections 222 and 234 of the Code. Accordingly, at the time the learned Sessions Judge delivered his charge to the jury, the question of the charge’s validity had already been considered and decided by the High Court, rendering the alleged misdirection untenable.
In this case, the Court observed that the finding of the High Court was binding on the learned Sessions Judge. Consequently, when the Sessions Judge instructed the jury that they might consider whether the charges were in order, he was merely allowing the jury to examine a matter that had already been decided against the appellant and in favour of the prosecution. Any grievance arising from that portion of the charge, the Court said, would belong to the prosecution rather than to the appellant. The Court then turned to the other alleged misdirections referred to by counsel for the appellant. Counsel contended that, in explaining the proper legal position regarding the evidence of a prosecutrix in a rape case, the Sessions Judge failed to tell the jury that, because of the contradictions in Sandhya’s evidence and because of her past career and record, her testimony should not be believed. Counsel further argued that when criminal courts require corroboration of a prosecutrix’s evidence, prudence demands that the prosecutrix first appear to be a reliable witness. If the prosecutrix does not appear reliable, or if her evidence suffers serious infirmities, corroboration of certain particulars would not assist the prosecution. Counsel maintained that the Sessions Judge did not properly bring this point to the jury’s attention. The Court found no substance in this contention. After a careful reading of the charge, the Court was satisfied that, on the whole, the charge was not only fair but actually more favourable to the appellant than to the prosecution. The overall tone of the charge, the Court noted, showed that the Sessions Judge was not convinced that the prosecution had proved its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Court emphasized that, in delivering the charge, the Sessions Judge could not usurp the jury’s function; he could not pronounce on the reliability of any witness. The Sessions Judge had, in fact, elaborately explained the requirement of corroboration concerning the evidence of a prosecutrix such as Sandhya. He told the jury that Sandhya was the most important witness and that there was little corroborative evidence to support her story. He warned that although it was not illegal to rely on a prosecutrix’s evidence, doing so would be unsafe. He urged the jurors, before convicting the appellant on Sandhya’s uncorroborated testimony, to consider whether they were sufficiently convinced of her truthfulness to accept her evidence in its entirety. He also drew the jury’s attention to the broad and material contradictions in her testimony and asked them to keep those contradictions in mind when deciding whether to accept her evidence.
In addressing the jury, the learned judge advised them to bear in mind the fact that they must decide whether to accept the prosecutrix’s testimony, and he reminded them that this consideration should guide their judgment. After reviewing all the statements made by the judge in his charge, the judgment found it difficult to accept the grievance raised by the counsel for the appellant that the charge was materially defective on this point. The next alleged misdirection relied upon by the counsel for the appellant concerned the prosecution evidence regarding the age of the girl. The prosecution maintained that the girl was below sixteen years of age, whereas the defence argued that she was above sixteen and therefore a consenting party. Evidence on the girl’s age was presented by the prosecution through the testimony of the girl’s mother, Saudamini, and by two medical experts, Dr. Nag and Dr. Saha. Having fairly and accurately summarized this material evidence, the learned judge told the jury that the evidence was somewhat conflicting and warned them that they must decide as a question of fact whether the girl’s age at the relevant time was above or below sixteen. The counsel for the appellant contended that, at this stage, the learned judge should have instructed the jury that the burden of proving that the girl was below sixteen rested on the prosecution, and that any doubt as to her age should be resolved in favor of the appellant. The judgment held that this argument lacked substance. In the first part of his charge, the learned judge explained to the jury the essential elements that the prosecution had to establish under section 376, and he made clear that the prosecution bore the burden of showing that the girl was below sixteen. Consequently, the failure to repeat the point about the burden of proof when dealing with the actual evidence could not be said to constitute a misdirection, let alone a material misdirection that might have prejudiced the appellant. The final alleged misdirection cited by the counsel for the appellant involved the judge’s statement that the previous statements made by the girl, which had been placed on record, did not constitute substantive evidence but were intended only to contradict the testimony she gave in court. It appeared that, on behalf of the appellant, the girl’s earlier statement had been introduced under section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. In that earlier statement, the girl had sworn that Anil Chatterjee had sexual relations with her on a daily basis and that she had also had sexual relations with others. During cross‑examination, the girl admitted that her earlier statement had been recorded by the Magistrate of Alipore, but when the contents of that statement were put to her, she said she did not recall making those statements.
In this matter, the Court observed that when a prior statement is introduced to a witness during cross‑examination pursuant to section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, the dominant objective of such an introduction is to challenge the witness by contrasting the earlier statement with the testimony offered at trial. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial judge could not be said to have erred in law by informing the jury that the earlier statement, which the defence had relied upon, might enable the defence to argue that the girl was not a consistent or reliable witness and that her account had varied over time. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the earlier statement could not be classified as substantive evidence for the purposes of the trial. This interpretation reflected the correct legal position, and the Court concluded that no valid grievance could be raised against the trial judge for articulating this position in the language employed by the learned Sessions judge. Consequently, the Court rejected the claim advanced by counsel that the trial charge suffered from serious misdirections, finding that such a grievance was not well‑founded.
The Court further noted that, after the jury returned its verdict, the Sessions Judge examined whether the verdict should be accepted or whether a reference should be made. The judge observed that the jury’s decision against the appellant was essentially based on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix, yet he determined that the jury’s course of action could not be characterized as illegal and was not perverse. Counsel for the appellant argued that, in view of the overall tone of the judge’s charge to the jury, the judge should have regarded the verdict as perverse and declined to act upon it. The Court declined to accept this argument. While the trial judge had indeed pointed out in his charge that the girl’s evidence was unsatisfactory, lacked corroboration, and that certain circumstances made the prosecution’s case appear improbable, the judge was nonetheless required to leave to the jury the ultimate determination of whether the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The jury deliberated for approximately ninety minutes and returned a unanimous finding of guilt. The Court held that, even though a jury verdict may sometimes be surprising to a judge, such surprise does not justify labeling the verdict as perverse. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, the appellant was ordered to surrender in accordance with his bail bond, and the judgment of dismissal was affirmed.