Chandra Deo Singh vs Prokash Chandra Bose and Anr
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 155 of 1960
Decision Date: 22 January 1963
Coram: J.R. Mudholkar, Syed Jaffer Imam, Raghubar Dayal
In this matter, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 22 January 1963. The case was titled Chandra Deo Singh versus Prokash Chandra Bose and another. The judgment was authored by Justice J R Mudholkar, with Justices Syed Jaffer Imam and Raghubar Dayal forming the bench. The petitioner was Chandra Deo Singh and the respondents were Prokash Chandra Bose and the second accused. The citation of the decision appears as 1963 AIR 1430 and 1964 SCR (1) 639, and it has been reported subsequently in several law reports. The factual background concerned a criminal proceeding under the Criminal Procedure Code, sections 202 and 203, relating to a murder alleged in a first information report. The first information report named respondent No 1 and several other individuals as having committed the murder. Subsequently a person claiming to be a relative of the deceased filed a separate complaint asserting that the first information report was false and that other persons, not named in the original report, were in fact responsible for the killing. That complainant requested that a criminal process be issued against those other persons. The Sub‑Divisional Magistrate who received this complaint ordered a First Class Magistrate to investigate the allegation and to submit a report. Later the nephew of the deceased filed an additional complaint implicating respondent No 1 as the murderer. The Sub‑Divisional Magistrate again directed the First Class Magistrate to investigate the new complaint and to report. During the inquiry the complainant produced a witness identified as number 640. Respondent No 1 was permitted to be represented by counsel, and two persons who had also been named in the original first information report were examined as court witnesses. After completing the inquiry under section 203, the First Class Magistrate prepared a report on the first complaint concluding that a prima facie case existed against the persons named therein. In a separate report on the second complaint, the magistrate concluded that no prima facie case existed against respondent No 1. Following those reports, the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate ordered the commencement of committal proceedings against the individuals identified in the first complaint. The complainant, dissatisfied with the finding on the second complaint, filed a revision application before the Sessions Judge, who directed the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate to conduct a further inquiry into respondent No 1. Respondent No 1 and the other three persons against whom committal proceedings had been ordered each filed revision applications before the High Court. The High Court heard the two revision petitions together and allowed the revision applications of respondent No 1 and one of the three other respondents. The present appeal arose from a certificate granted under Article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution of India.
In this appeal, the Court noted that the appellant had raised four principal arguments. First, it contended that respondent No. 1 lacked the legal standing to appear before the Court and to contest a criminal proceeding before any process had been issued. Second, it argued that the High Court had applied an incorrect test in deciding whether to issue process. Third, it asserted that a magistrate who conducted an inquiry under section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code did not have authority to evaluate the evidence as if the proceeding were a trial. Fourth, it maintained that the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate should have recorded his reasons for dismissing the complaint under section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court held that an accused person does not become relevant to the proceedings until a formal process is issued. Even though the accused may be represented by counsel, he does not have a right to participate in the inquiry, and the magistrate has no power to allow such participation. The magistrate could not pose questions at the instance of a person named as accused when no process had been issued against that person, nor could he examine witnesses on that person’s behalf. Consequently, the inquiry conducted by the magistrate was vitiated. The Court referred to the authority in Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatrya Dulaji Ghadigsonkar, 1961 1 S.C.R. 1, to support this conclusion.
The Court further explained that the proper test for deciding whether to issue process is whether there exists “sufficient ground for proceedings,” not whether there is sufficient ground for a conviction. This principle was illustrated by several authorities, including Parmand Brahmchari v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1930 Pat. 30; Radha Kishun Sao v. S.K. Misra, A.I.R. 1949 Pat. 36; Ramkisto Sahu v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1952 Pat. 125; Emperor v. J.A. Finan, A.I.R. 1931 Bom. 524; and Baidya Nath Singh v. Muspratt, (1886) 1 L.R. 14 Cal. 141. While acting under section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the magistrate was not permitted to consider statements recorded by the police during the investigation or to take into account evidence presented in another complaint. The Court held that the High Court was likewise incompetent to do what the magistrate could not do. When a prima facie case exists, even though arguments may be presented on both sides, a committing magistrate is obligated to order commitment for trial, as affirmed in Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia v. State of Bombay, 1958 S.C.R. 618. The Court also stated that if a magistrate dismisses a complaint on the ground that there are insufficient reasons to proceed to trial, he must record those reasons, citing Willie (Williams) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1955 2 S.C.R. 1140. Finally, the Court observed that there is no restriction on conducting an inquiry against one individual while a separate inquiry concerning other individuals involved in the same offence is pending. The judgment was rendered in the Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction as Criminal Appeal No. 155 of 1960, arising from the judgment and order dated 27 January 1960 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. 620 of 59.
In this case, the Court noted that the appeal was filed on a certificate granted by the High Court of Calcutta under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. The relevant facts were as follows: on 25 December 1957, Panchanan Roy lodged a first‑information report at the police station in Bhangar, 24 Parganas, alleging that respondent No. 1, Prokash Chandra Bose, who owned a fishery, had killed Nageswar Singh, a darwan employed at the informant’s master’s fishery, by shooting him with a gun. After the incident, the assailants’ party pursued the culprits, but the principal alleged offender, respondent No. 1, escaped in his own car. Two of his associates, Pannalal Saha and Sankar Ghosh, were arrested by local residents and produced at the police station. The police investigated the matter on the basis of the FIR and submitted a final report dated 17 September 1958.
On 3 November 1958, Mahendra Singh, who claimed to be a distant relative of the deceased darwan—a claim denied by the widow—filed a complaint before Sub‑Divisional Magistrate C. L. Choudhry of 24 Parganas Alipore. He challenged the police’s final report and asked that processes be issued against certain other persons alleged to have murdered Nageswar Singh. The complaint also asserted that the first‑information report lodged by Panchanan Roy on 25 December 1957 was false and that it had been prepared at the direction of his master, Bidhu Bhusan Sarkar, an enemy of respondent No. 1. After examining Mahendra Singh on oath and reviewing the police documents, the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate directed Magistrate N. M. Chowdhry, First Class, to conduct a judicial enquiry into Mahendra Singh’s allegations and to submit a report by a specified date.
While that enquiry was pending, Chandra Deo Singh, the nephew of the deceased, filed a complaint before Magistrate Chowdhry on 30 December 1958, stating that respondent No. 1 had fired a shot at Nageswar Singh at point‑blank range, thereby murdering him. After taking Chandra Deo Singh’s testimony on oath, the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate again referred the matter to Magistrate Chowdhry for enquiry and required a report by a further date.
During the subsequent enquiry, respondent No. 1 was permitted to appear through counsel. The complainant, Chandra Deo Singh, produced seven witnesses who were examined by the magistrate. In addition, the previously arrested associates Pannalal Saha and Sankar Ghosh were examined as court witnesses, and it was suggested that the magistrate’s actions had been taken at the instance of the counsel for respondent No. 1.
Pannalal Saha and Sankar Ghose, who were alleged associates of respondent No. 1, were examined as court witnesses, and it was suggested that the magistrate acted at the request of respondent No. 1’s counsel. On 9 February 1959, Magistrate N. M. Choudhry submitted a report to the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate stating that a prima facie case existed against Upendra Neogi, Asim Mondal and Arun Mondal under sections 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. On the same day he filed a second report indicating that no prima facie case could be established against respondent No. 1. Relying on the first report, the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate ordered summons to be issued against the three named persons and initiated committal proceedings against them. After reviewing the second report, the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate dismissed the complaint filed by Chandra Deo Singh without providing any explanation. Chandra Deo Singh then applied for revision before the Sessions Judge at Alipore, who issued notice to respondent No. 1, heard his counsel, and directed the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate to conduct a further enquiry against respondent No. 1. Subsequently respondent No. 1 filed a revision application before the High Court, where a single judge heard the matter. The three individuals against whom summonses had been ordered also filed revision applications before the High Court, and both sets of applications were heard together. The High Court judge subsequently granted relief by allowing the revision applications filed by respondent No. 1 and by Upendra Neogi. Counsel for respondent No. 1 later informed the Court that two of the three persons whose summonses had been issued were committed for trial before the Sessions Court, but could not confirm whether the trial had taken place or what its outcome was.
Dissatisfied with the single judge’s order, appellant Chandra Deo Singh filed an application under Article 134 of the Constitution seeking a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court, and the High Court granted that certificate. The application was premised on four distinct grounds that the appellant claimed demonstrated errors in the lower courts’ proceedings. The first ground asserted that respondent No. 1 lacked locus standi to appear and contest a criminal case before any process had been issued. The second ground contended that the test formulated by the single judge to decide whether any process should be issued was erroneous. The third ground argued that a magistrate conducting an enquiry under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not have jurisdiction to weigh the evidence in the manner that occurred in the present case. The fourth and final ground maintained that the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate had acted contrary to section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by dismissing the complaint without recording any reason. After reviewing the four grounds submitted by the appellant, the High Court decided to grant the certificate of fitness permitting an appeal to the Supreme Court.
In this case, the Court observed that the High Court had granted a certificate of fitness on all the grounds except the first ground pleaded by the appellant. The Court held that the High Court could not restrict its own certificate in that manner, and therefore it decided to examine each of the four grounds relied upon by the appellant. Concerning the first ground, the Court found that the entire scheme of Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes it clear that an accused individual does not become part of the proceedings until a formal process is issued against him. This principle does not mean, however, that the accused is barred from being present while a Magistrate conducts an enquiry. The accused may be present in person, or may be represented by counsel or an agent, solely for the purpose of being informed about the progress of the enquiry. Because the central question before the Magistrate is whether the accused should be called upon to face an accusation, the accused has no right to participate in the enquiry, and the Magistrate does not possess jurisdiction to permit such participation. Consequently, the Magistrate may not put any question to witnesses at the request of the person named as accused when no process has been issued, nor may he examine any witness at the request of such a person. The Magistrate, however, is free to address questions to witnesses produced by the complainant if he considers it appropriate in the interests of justice, but he may not go beyond that authority. Counsel for respondent No. 1 argued that the purpose of the provisions of Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to protect an accused from harassment by a frivolous complaint, and that the statute empowers a Magistrate who receives a complaint to postpone issuing summons to the accused pending the result of an enquiry conducted either by himself or by a subordinate Magistrate. Counsel further maintained that the privilege conferred by these provisions may be waived by the accused, allowing the accused to take part in the proceedings. The Court acknowledged that one object of section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is indeed to enable the Magistrate to scrutinise carefully the allegations contained in the complaint so as to prevent a person named as accused from being called upon to face an evidently frivolous complaint. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that a second object of the same provision is to discover what material exists to support the allegations. It is therefore the bounden duty of the Magistrate, while conducting an enquiry, to elicit all relevant facts, not merely to safeguard the interests of an absent accused, but also to bring to account any person against whom serious allegations have been made. At that stage, the determination of whether the complaint is frivolous must necessarily be made on the basis of the material placed before the Magistrate by the complainant.
In this case the Court explained that any defence which the accused might raise can be examined only at the trial and not during the enquiry prescribed in section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because an enquiry under that provision cannot be described as a trial; the law permits only one trial for any offence. The Court further observed that permitting the accused to intervene in the enquiry would defeat its very purpose, and that is why the legislature did not create any specific rule allowing an accused person to take part in such an enquiry. Although the record contains no direct evidence that the two individuals examined as court witnesses were called by the request of respondent number one, the Court noted that those persons were described in the first information report filed by Panchanan Roy as associates of respondent number one and as having been arrested on the spot by local residents; consequently, they would not have been summoned by the Magistrate unless counsel appearing for respondent number one had suggested their examination. The Court found that inference unavoidable and therefore held that, on this basis, the enquiry conducted by the Magistrate was vitiated. In support of this conclusion the Court quoted its earlier observations in Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigsonkar, stating that the enquiry is intended to determine the truth or falsehood of the complaint, that is, to ascertain whether there is evidence in support of the complaint sufficient to justify the issue of process and the commencement of proceedings against the person concerned. The provision does not require a regular trial for adjudicating the guilt of the accused at that stage, and the accused may be required to answer the accusation only after a process has been issued and he is placed on trial. Turning to the second ground of argument, the Court said there was no hesitation in rejecting the test formulated by the learned single judge of the High Court as wholly erroneous. For the purpose of deciding whether any process should be issued, the magistrate must be satisfied that there is “sufficient ground for proceeding,” not that there is sufficient ground for a conviction. The adequacy of the evidence to support a conviction can be examined only at trial, not at the enquiry stage. The Court then referred to a number of authorities cited by counsel which examined the scope of the enquiry under section 202, namely Parmanand Brahmachari v. Emperor, Radha Kishun Sao v. S. K. Misra, Ramkisto Sahu v. The State of Bihar, Emperor v. J. A. Finan and Baidya Nath Singh v. Muspratt. In each of those decisions the Court held that the object of the provisions of section 202 is to enable the magistrate to form an opinion as to whether process should be issued, and not to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction.
In discussing the purpose of section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court explained that the provision was intended to enable a Magistrate to form an opinion on whether a process should be issued, and to dispel any hesitation that might arise merely from reading the complaint and considering the complainant’s oath‑made evidence. The Court cited several authorities, namely A.I.R. (1949) Pat. 36. (5), A.I.R. (1931) Bom. 524. (2), A.I.R. (1930) Pat. 30. (4), A.I.R. (1952) Pat. 125. (6) and I.L.R. 14 Cal. 141. (1886), to illustrate that the Magistrate must look for evidence that supports the complainant’s allegations, not for evidence sufficient to secure a conviction. The learned judges in those cases stressed that an enquiry under section 202 was not a trial, which could commence only after a process had been issued, and that there could be only one trial. While sub‑section (1) of section 202 expressly states that the enquiry’s object is to discover the truth or falsehood of the complaint, the Court clarified that the Magistrate must base this determination on the intrinsic quality of the statements presented at the enquiry, namely the complaint itself, the complainant’s oath‑made statement, and the statements of persons examined at the complainant’s request.
The Court then turned to section 203, which empowers a Magistrate to dismiss a complaint. The provision reads: “The Magistrate before whom a complaint is made or to whom it has been transferred may dismiss the complaint if, after considering the statement on oath (if any) of the complainant and the witnesses and the result of the investigation or inquiry, if any, under section 202, there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding. In such case he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing.” The power to dismiss rests solely with a Magistrate who has taken cognizance of the complaint. If, before issuing process, the Magistrate had referred the complaint to a subordinate Magistrate for an enquiry, he retained the authority to dismiss the complaint provided he was satisfied that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding. A necessary condition for exercising this power is that the Magistrate must consider the oath‑made statements of the complainant and witnesses, together with the result of any investigation or enquiry ordered under section 202.
In the present case, the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate had not ordered an investigation by a police officer; instead, a First‑Class Magistrate conducted an enquiry. Accordingly, the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate was required to consider the result of that enquiry. The Court observed that it was not permissible for the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate to rely on statements recorded during a police investigation, because such statements were extraneous to the proceedings before him. The only material he could consider were the statements on oath and the findings of the magistrate‑conducted enquiry under section 202.
In this matter the Court observed that the Magistrate was not authorised to consider statements made by the police on the basis of the first‑information report lodged by Panchanan Roy, nor to rely upon any evidence that was presented before him during the enquiry that originated from the complaint made by Mahendra Singh. All of those matters were extraneous to the proceedings that were before him. The Court further noted that the learned Magistrate had failed to give any reasons for his decision to dismiss the complaint, and consequently the Court could not ascertain what considerations had actually influenced his dismissal.
The Court then turned to the analysis of the single judge of the High Court, who had examined the case in detail. It was pointed out that the High Court judge had not kept the evidence adduced in the two separate complaints distinct, and seemed to have been influenced by the testimony of witnesses in one complaint when deciding the other. Specifically, the High Court relied upon the evidence of Pannalal Saha and Sankar Ghose, although those witnesses should never have been examined by the enquiring Magistrate. In addition, the High Court relied upon the police investigation that had been conducted in the complaint of Panchanan Roy.
The Court quoted the High Court’s reasoning, which stated that the version of the two witnesses, Pannalal Saha and Sankar Ghose, was supported by the fact that the police, when they visited the locality, had found a dead bird, a pair of shoes and a pair of black half‑pants in a wet condition. That discovery, however, was not explained by the version given by Panchanan Roy, Upendra Mondal and Tarapado Naru. The Court further recorded that Mr Ajit Kumar Dutt had argued that the enquiring Magistrate was not justified in examining Pannalal Saha and Sankar Ghose at the suggestion of counsel for the accused, Chabbi Bose, and that those witnesses should not have been permitted to testify at the inquiry.
The Court emphasized that, since a full investigation into the case had already been carried out by officers under the supervision of the Superintendent of Police, it was appropriate for the enquiring Magistrate to conduct a careful and balanced inquiry rather than a one‑sided inquiry that examined only those witnesses who might have been produced by an interested party. Moreover, because the Magistrate was simultaneously inquiring into both complaints, he could and should have considered the evidence as a whole. In fact, the Court held that two separate inquiries ought not to have been instituted at all, even though there were two separate complaints presenting different versions. Both complaints were essentially petitions challenging the final police report, and there was only one incident in which Nageswar Singh lost his life. Consequently, on the basis of the two petitions, it would have been proper to hold a single inquiry rather than two separate yet simultaneous inquiries.
Finally, the Court concluded that the actions which the Magistrate could not lawfully perform were also beyond the competence of the High Court. Therefore, the High Court’s order that reversed the decision of the Sessions Judge could not be sustained. The Court noted that Mr Sethi had placed reliance on a further authority, but that portion lay outside the present discussion.
In this case the Court referred to its earlier decision in Vadilal’s case (1961) at page 10 of the report. The earlier decision examined whether, as a matter of law, a magistrate could reject the plea of private defence when his only function was to decide whether to issue process. The learned judges held that a magistrate was indeed competent to consider such a plea. They observed that “If the Magistrate has not misdirected himself as to the scope of an enquiry under s. 202 and has applied his mind judicially to the materials before him, we think that it would be erroneous in law to hold that a plea based on an exception can never be accepted by him in arriving at his judgment. What bearing such a plea has on the case of the complainant and his witnesses, to what extent they are falsified by the evidence of other witnesses, all these are questions which must be answered with reference to the facts of each case. No universal rule can be laid in respect of such questions.” On the basis of these observations counsel argued that the Court had held that a magistrate possessed the power to weigh the evidence presented at the enquiry. The Court’s decision, however, did not impose a rigid rule; it merely indicated that while assessing the evidence tendered at the enquiry a magistrate could also contemplate whether the accused might have acted in self‑defence. In the present matter that specific issue did not arise, but the Court pointed out that the purpose of an enquiry under section 202 is to determine whether the allegations in the complaint are intrinsically true. Consequently, a magistrate acting under section 203 must be satisfied that sufficient ground exists for proceeding. To reach that satisfaction the magistrate may consider the evidence he himself took or that which was recorded in an enquiry under section 202, or statements made in an investigation under that section, as the circumstances require. He is not authorised to rely on any material beyond those sources. By the phrase “evidence of other witnesses” the earlier judges apparently meant the statements of persons examined by the police during the investigation conducted under section 202. Section 203 permits the magistrate to consider such police‑taken statements together with the complainant’s statements recorded by the magistrate and, on that basis, decide whether to issue process or dismiss the complaint. In the cited investigation the police acted under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the behest of the Presidency Magistrate. The statements obtained from the various witnesses during that police investigation were found to be self‑contradictory. Accordingly, it was within the Presidency Magistrate’s discretion to decide which statements to accept and which to reject. The enquiring magistrate, however, has not stated nor
The High Court found in the case before this Court that the evidence presented on behalf of the complainant and the complainant’s own evidence were self‑contradictory, and therefore it could not be said that the allegations in the complaint were intrinsically false. Counsel for the appellant then referred this Court to its earlier decision in Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia v. The State of Bombay (1). In that earlier decision, after quoting a passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 10, third edition, article 666 at page 365, which sets out the law on commitment for trial, this Court observed:
“In each case, therefore, the magistrate holding the preliminary inquiry has to be satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against the accused by the evidence of witnesses entitled to a reasonable degree of credit, and unless he is so satisfied, he is not to commit.” Applying that test to the present case, the Court asked whether it could be said that there was no evidence to make out a prima facie case, or whether the voluminous evidence adduced was so incredible that no reasonable person could rely upon it. The Court noted that the present case contains a large volume of documentary evidence, the latter consisting wholly of books, registers and other documents kept or used by the mills themselves. Those documents could be interpreted either to support an inference of guilt against the accused or to lead to the opposite conclusion.
The High Court had emphasized that the present matter was one of those where much could be said on both sides, and that it would ultimately be for a jury to decide which of the two conflicting versions would be accepted. The Court observed that the matter was pre‑eminently one that should have been committed to the Court of Sessions for trial, and it expressed surprise that the learned Presidency Magistrate had been convinced otherwise. Consequently, the Court held that where a prima facie case exists, even though there may be arguments on both sides, a magistrate who conducts the preliminary inquiry is bound to commit the accused for trial. The Court further explained that even if the accused raises a defence that the offence was committed by some other person or persons, the issue must be left for determination by the appropriate forum at the appropriate stage, and the issue of process cannot be refused.
The Court also pointed out that the offence with which respondent No. 1 had been charged was triable by a jury. By handling the evidence in the manner it did, the High Court had, in effect, sanctioned the usurpation by the magistrate of the functions of a jury—functions for which the magistrate was wholly incompetent. In view of the foregoing observations, the Court concluded that it was unnecessary to elaborate further on the remaining ground.
Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure required a magistrate who dismissed a complaint on the ground that, in his judgment, there was no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial, to record the reasons for such dismissal. In the present case the magistrate had examined the report of the enquiring magistrate and then ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Respondent No 1 argued that the magistrate’s order was at best erroneous because it did not contain any stated reasons, and therefore the defect could be rectified under section 537(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To support this contention, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Willie (William) Slaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1). The Court observed that the error went to the root of the matter, since providing reasons is a prerequisite for a valid order of dismissal and the absence of reasons would render such an order a nullity. Even if the rule announced in Slaney’s case applied, the complainant would suffer considerable prejudice on the face of the order. The complainant was entitled to know why his complaint had been dismissed so that he could decide whether to approach a revisional court. Depriving him of that information impaired his right to move the revisionary court and, if he chose to do so, made his task before that court difficult, especially because sections 438 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure afford only limited scope for revisional relief. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the High Court was in error when it set aside the order of the Sessions Court, and it directed that a further enquiry be made into the appellant’s complaint against respondent No 1.
Mr Sethi, however, contended that because only one offence – the murder of Nageswar Singh – existed, there could be only one trial, and since other persons were already being tried for that offence, no further enquiry could be pursued. The Court noted that there was no material on record to determine what had happened to the enquiry against Asim Mondal and Arun Mondal after the High Court dismissed their application for revision. Consequently, the Court ordered a report from the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate of 24 Parganas. The report indicated that on 22 March 1961 the High Court had directed that the commitment proceedings against Asim Mondal and Arun Mondal be stayed pending the disposal of the present appeal before this Court. The Court could not accept the argument that an enquiry against a different person, relating to the same offence, could not be undertaken. It held that the court before which the commitment proceedings against Asim Mondal and Arun Mondal were pending was free to consider whether those proceedings should be stayed pending the result of the enquiry into the respondent before this Court.
The Court observed that, notwithstanding the arguments presented, there was no statutory or procedural barrier that prevented the initiation of an enquiry against the respondent. In other words, the Court found that the law did not forbid a separate investigation to be launched with respect to the respondent, even though other related proceedings were already in progress. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the appeal filed by the respondent could be sustained. On that basis, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the earlier order that had been adverse to the respondent. Further, the Court directed that a fresh enquiry be conducted with respect to the matters raised against the respondent, and that this enquiry be proceeded with in accordance with the applicable procedural requirements. The direction for a further enquiry was intended to ensure that all relevant facts could be fully examined and that a proper determination could be made on the issues raised. Thus, the judgment concluded by granting the relief sought in the appeal and by ordering that the necessary investigative steps be taken against the respondent.