Chander Bhan Gosain vs State Of Orissa and Ors

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Misc. Petition No. 1398 of 1962

Decision Date: 5 April 1963

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, S.K. Das, M. Hidayatullah

In the matter titled Chander Bhan Gosain versus State of Orissa and others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the fifth day of April, 1963. The case was authored by Justice A. K. Sarkar and was heard by a bench consisting of Justice A. K. Sarkar, Justice S. K. Das and Justice M. Hidayatullah. The petitioner was Chander Bhan Gosain and the respondents were the State of Orissa and additional parties. The citation for the decision appears in the 1967 volume of the All India Reporter at page 767 and also in the 1964 Supreme Court Reports, second series, page 879. The matter arose under the procedural provisions governing the practice of appeals before the Supreme Court, specifically concerning the payment of court fees. A petition had been filed under article 226 of the Constitution to challenge a series of assessment orders, and the High Court issued a single order on that petition. Following that decision, an appeal was lodged before this Court, designated as Civil Miscellaneous Petition number 1398 of 1962, seeking review of the order of the Deputy Registrar dated 28 March 1962, which had directed that the appeal be registered as nine separate appeals and that the appellant should pay nine sets of court fees. The appellant was represented by counsel, while the respondents were represented by the Attorney‑General of India and additional counsel. The matter was taken up for consideration on 5 April 1963, and the judgment was delivered by Justice Sarkar.

The Court examined the Deputy Registrar’s reliance on two earlier decisions of this Court—namely, the case of Lajwanti Sial, Petition for Special Leave No. 673 of 1959, and the case of Kishinchand Chellaram, Civil Appeals Nos. 462 to 465 of 1960. In the Lajwanti Sial case, multiple applications under section 66(2) of the Income‑Tax Act had been made for reference of the same question; although there were several separate references, they were ultimately addressed by a single judgment, and each reference gave rise to a distinct appeal, a situation different from the present facts. In the Kishinchand Chellaram case, four separate assessees had filed applications for reference of three identical questions arising under section 66(1) of the Income‑Tax Act, resulting in multiple references that again did not correspond to the circumstances before this Court. The Court found that those precedents did not apply because the present case originated from a single petition under article 226 that challenged a number of assessment orders collectively. Consequently, there was only one proceeding before the High Court, and only one appeal could be taken to the Supreme Court. The Court therefore held that the appellant was required to pay only one set of court fees and the associated charges, as would be appropriate for a single appeal, and ordered that any excess fees previously demanded be refunded.

In this matter, although the record shows that a single order directed the reference of the matter to the High Court and the High Court itself considered the reference as a single case, it can nevertheless be said that, in substance, there were several distinct references involved. The present dispute, however, arose from a solitary petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, in which the petitioner challenged the legality of a number of assessment orders. Consequently, only one proceeding was instituted before the High Court. It would therefore be incorrect to assert that there were separate proceedings corresponding to each assessment order, because the petitioner had raised all of those orders together in one petition. When an appeal is subsequently filed before this Court from the High Court’s judgment on that petition, it is not possible to argue that the appeal represents more than one distinct appeal. Accordingly, the appellant before us is required to pay only a single set of court fees and the related charges, as would be appropriate for a single appeal. The appropriate office may, if necessary, undertake the necessary steps to refund any excess fees that were paid.