Chaliagulla Ramachandrayya vs Boppana Satyanarayana and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 331 of 1961

Decision Date: 10 May 1963

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo

In the case titled Chaliagulla Ramachandrayya versus Boppana Satyanarayana and others, which was decided on 10 May 1963, the Supreme Court of India heard the matter before a bench comprising Justice K C Das Gupta, Justice P B Gajendragadkar and Justice K N Wanchoo. The petition was filed by Chaliagulla Ramachandrayya and the respondents were Boppana Satyanarayana together with several other parties. The judgment was recorded on the same date, 10 May 1963, and the bench is identified as Gupta, K C Das. The citation for this decision appears as 1964 AIR 877 and 1964 SCR (3) 985. The legal issue concerned the doctrine of part performance under English equity and its applicability under the Indian statutory framework, specifically in relation to the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Act 4 of 1882), section 53A. The headnote explains that the plaintiffs instituted a suit for partition, asserting that two of them were reversioners of Chandrappa and that a third plaintiff had purchased the interest of certain reversioners, namely defendants 4, 5 and 7. According to the plaint, these three plaintiffs were entitled to a five‑sixths share of the property, while the sixth defendant, as a reversioner of Chandrappa, claimed the remaining one‑sixth share. The property, however, was actually possessed by the three sons of Nagayya, who were the first three defendants. Those defendants denied that the property ever belonged to Chandrappa and also contested the claim that plaintiffs 1 and 2 or defendants 4 to 7 were Chandrappa’s reversioners. The principal defence asserted that, even if the property had belonged to Chandrappa, Nagayya, as Chandrappa’s son‑in‑law by an arrangement that required Nagayya to marry Mangamma, the sister‑daughter of Chandrappa’s wife, would become entitled to the entire property upon Chandrappa’s death. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the High Court on appeal set aside that order and decreed in favour of the plaintiffs. On a certificate to the Supreme Court, the sole contention raised by the appellant was that, although specific performance had not been sought, the contract itself operated to transfer an interest in the property to Nagayya upon Chandrappa’s death.

The Supreme Court held that after the enactment of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, the English equitable doctrine of part performance could be invoked in India only when the statutory requirements of section 53A were fulfilled. In the present case, the conditions of section 53A were not satisfied, and consequently the doctrine could not be applied. The Court observed that equity could not confer upon Nagayya or his heirs any title to the lands that, under the statute, could be transferred only through a registered instrument. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The judgment also referenced several earlier authorities, including Challa Papi Reddi v Challa Koti Reddi (1872) 7 Mad. HC R 25; Bha’a Nahana v Parbhu Hari (1877) 2 ILR Bom 67; Asita, Mohan Ghosh Moulik v Mohan Ghosh Moulik (1916) 20 GWN 901; Venkatayyamma Rao v Appa Rao (1916) L R 43 1 A 138; and Ariff v Jadunath Majamdar (1930) ILR 58 Cal 1235, which the Court found inapplicable, while relying on Ariff v Jadunath Majumdar (1931) LR 58 IA 91. The decision concerned Civil Appeal No 331 of 1961, an appeal from the judgment and decree dated 29 March 1956 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal Suit No 182 of 1950.

The appeal, filed on May 10 1963, was taken from the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court rendered in Appeal Suit No 182 of 1950. The appellants were represented by counsel B Manavala Chowdhry and B K B Naidu, while the respondents numbered 1, 2 and 8 were defended by Narasiah Chowdhry and R Gopalakrishnan. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Justice Das Gupta. This appeal arose on a certificate granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and challenged the High Court’s reversal of an earlier order of the Subordinate Judge at Masulipatnam, who had dismissed a suit for partition of certain lands.

Three plaintiffs had instituted the suit. Two of them claimed to be the reversioners of Boppanna Chandrappa—hereafter referred to as Chandrappa—and the third plaintiff asserted that he had purchased the interests of some of those reversioners, specifically the interests of defendants 4, 5 and 7. According to the plaint, the three plaintiffs asserted a right to five‑sixths of the disputed property, while the sixth defendant, also claiming to be a reversioner of Chandrappa, asserted a right to the remaining one‑sixth share. In fact, the possession of the land was held by the three sons of Nagayya, who were impleaded as the first three defendants in the suit.

The defendants, in their written answer, denied that the lands ever belonged to Chandrappa. They further denied that plaintiffs 1 and 2, nor defendants 4, 5, 6 and 7, were his reversioners. The principal defence put forward by the defendants was that, even assuming the properties did belong to Chandrappa, Nagayya—the father of the three defendants—had become entitled to those lands by virtue of being Chandrappa’s “illatom” son‑in‑law. The basis of this claim was that Chandrappa had allegedly brought Nagayya into his family under an arrangement whereby Nagayya would marry Mangamma, the daughter of Chandrappa’s wife’s sister, and would assist Chandrappa in cultivating and managing the estates. In consideration of that arrangement, it was claimed, Nagayya would inherit the entire property upon Chandrappa’s death.

The Trial Court examined the evidence and concluded that, except for a small portion, the suit properties indeed belonged to Chandrappa. Accordingly, the Court held that the three plaintiffs were entitled to five‑sixths of Chandrappa’s estate and that the sixth defendant, as Chandrappa’s reversioner, was entitled to the remaining one‑sixth, the interest arising on the death of Chandrappa’s widow, Ramamma. However, the Trial Court also accepted the defendants’ argument that Nagayya had acquired a right to the property upon Chandrappa’s death by virtue of the alleged “illatom” son‑in‑law relationship, and therefore dismissed the suit.

On appeal, the High Court scrutinized the custom of an “illatom” son‑in‑law inheriting property. The Court held that this custom could not be extended to a situation where the marriage was not to the daughter of the owner of the property but to another relative of the owner. The High Court also considered an alternative contention raised before it, namely that Nagayya’s entitlement might have arisen from a contract between him and Chandrappa. The High Court rejected that alternative pleading, finding that no such contract conferred a right to inherit. Consequently, the High Court set aside the Trial Court’s order and decreed in favour of the plaintiffs, granting them the shares claimed in the plaint.

Before the present Court, it is no longer in dispute that the rights of an “illatom” son‑in‑law cannot be claimed by a person who, under a promise from the owner of the property, marries not the daughter but some other relation of the owner. The present appeal therefore concerns the correctness of the High Court’s interpretation of the custom and its application to the facts of this case.

It was argued before the High Court, and the same argument was again raised before this Court, that a genuine and enforceable contract existed between Chandrappa and Nagayya. According to that contention, Chandrappa had promised that, in return for Nagayya’s marriage to Mangamma and for Nagayya’s undertaking to look after Chandrappa’s property, Chandrappa would designate Nagayya as his heir. The effect of that alleged agreement, the argument says, was that Nagayya became the heir of Chandrappa by virtue of the contract. The Court observed that the issue was not whether, after Chandrappa’s death, Nagayya could have obtained specific performance of the alleged contract. Even if the contract were proven to exist, to be valid, and to be enforceable at law, the appropriate remedy for the appellant would have been to seek specific performance through the appropriate court proceedings. The appellant’s position, however, was that the contract itself, irrespective of any decree of specific performance, operated to transfer an interest in the property to Nagayya upon Chandrappa’s death. To support that position, counsel for the appellant relied upon three decisions of Indian High Courts and one decision of the Privy Council. The first precedent cited was the case of Challa Papi Reddi v. Challa Koti Reddi (1). In that case the father of the defendant had been chosen by Musalireddi, in accordance with a special custom, to act as a son‑in‑law who would take the property as if he were a son. The father entered into possession of the property on Musalireddi’s death and then involved the plaintiff in the management of the estate on the promise of a share. The plaintiff managed and improved the property for many years until, shortly before the suit was filed, the first defendant expelled the plaintiff and refused to give him the promised share. The High Court of Madras held that the agreement made by the father was intended to admit the plaintiff as a co‑sharer in the property and, because the first defendant had fully adopted or ratified his father’s contract, the plaintiff was entitled to be treated as a co‑sharer. The judgment also noted that the decision was rendered before the enactment of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and therefore the question of whether a written instrument was required for the transfer was not considered.

The second decision cited by counsel was Bhalla Nahana v. Prabhu Hari (2). In that case Ramji induced the parents of the defendant, Prabhu Hari, to adopt him by way of an express promise that he would settle his property upon the child. Ramji died before the promised settlement could be carried out. Nearly thirty years after his death, Ramji’s widow, Bhani, gave effect to her husband’s undertaking by executing a deed of gift of the property in her possession in favour of Prabhu Hari. The reversioner to Ramji’s estate challenged the validity of that alienation in a suit. The High Court of Bombay, in holding that the alienation was valid, observed that the performance of a husband’s contracts was among the proper and necessary purposes recognised by Hindu jurists, thereby allowing a widow to alienate property. The Court further stated that the equitable principle compelling the heir and legal representative of the adoptive father to specifically perform his contracts survived, and that the property held by the widow remained bound by that contract. The Court did not consider whether Prabhu Hari would have been entitled to the property in the absence of the deed of gift. It was also noted that this decision, like the earlier precedent, pre‑dated the Transfer of Property Act, and therefore the statutory requirements concerning written conveyance were not part of the analysis.

Several years after Ramji’s death, his widow Bhani carried out her husband’s promise by executing a deed of gift that transferred the property in her possession to Prabhu Hari. The reversioner of Ramji’s estate, Gosai Ramji, contested the validity of this alienation in a suit he filed. The High Court of Bombay, in holding that the alienation was valid, observed that Hindu jurists recognised the performance of a husband’s contracts as one of the proper and necessary purposes that permitted a widow to alienate property. The Court further explained that the equitable principle allowing the heir and legal representative of the adoptive father to be compelled to fulfil his contracts continued to operate, and consequently the property held by the widow remained bound by that contract. The Court did not consider whether Prabhu Hari would have been entitled to the property had the deed of gift not been executed, and it noted that the decision was rendered several years before the Transfer of Property Act came into force. In the case of Asita Mohon Ghosh Moulik v. Mohan Ghosh Moulik, the dispute centred on whether an adopted son could share equally with a biological son. The Calcutta High Court answered affirmatively, holding that under Hindu law the adopted son was entitled to an equal share, and it also referred to an Ikrarnama executed by the adoptive father‑land, declaring the Ikrarnama valid and operative and stating that the adopted son was entitled to the share irrespective of the statutory provisions. The Court observed that this authority did not assist in resolving the present issue. The learned counsel then relied on the Privy Council decision in Malraju Lakhmi Venkayyamma v. Ventaka Narasimha Appa Rao, where the primary question was whether a completed contract existed by which the former owner, the Rani, had agreed to surrender possession of the property to her niece Venkayyamma Rao immediately upon the termination of the Rani’s life interest. The Privy Council held that such a contract was indeed completed and ordered the Receiver to deliver possession “upon the terms of the contract now affirmed”. It was noted that this decision was among the authorities cited by the Calcutta High Court in Ariff v. Jadunath Majumdar. In that case, the High Court applied equitable principles, as employed in English law and in the Venkayyamma Rao case, to conclude that the defendant had acquired the rights of a permanent tenant. However, when the matter was appealed to the Privy Council, the High Court’s decision was reversed. The Privy Council clarified that the dicta in Venkayyamma Rao’s case did not mean that equity could override the provisions of a statute.

The Court observed that where no registered document exists and no document capable of registration can be obtained, the statute provides that a right created by legislation may be conferred only by a registered instrument. This principle was articulated by the Privy Council in the case of Ariff v. Jadunath Majumdar, reported in 1930, with the judgment delivered in January 1931. The Court noted that nearly two years before this decision, section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act had been enacted, thereby introducing, in a limited form, the equitable doctrine of part performance.

The Court expressed the view that, following the enactment of section 53A, the English doctrine of equity of part performance could be applied in India only when the statutory requirements of section 53A are satisfied. To support this view, the Court referred to the authorities: (1) (1916) L. R. 43 I.A. 138; (2) (1930) 1 L.R. 58 Cal. 1235; and (3) (1931) L. R. 58 1 A. 91. The Court then concluded that section 53A does not apply to the facts of the present case.

Accordingly, the Court held that considerations of equity cannot confer on Nagayya or his heirs any title in the land, because under the statute such title can be created only by a registered instrument. The Court therefore affirmed that the High Court was correct in holding that Nagayya or his heirs had acquired no right in the property. In the circumstances of the case, the Court made no order as to costs and dismissed the appeal.