Bhogaraju Venkata Janakirama Rao vs The Board Of Commissioners For Hindu Religious Endowment

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal Nos. 531 and 532 of 1961

Decision Date: 31 October 1963

Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, J.R. Mudholkar

On 31 October 1963 the Supreme Court of India delivered a judgment in the matter of Bhogaraju Venkata Janakirama Rao versus the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowment. The Bench consisted of Justice N Rajagopala Ayyangar, Justice P B Gajendragadkar, Justice K N Wanchoo and Justice J R Mudholkar. The petitioner was Bhogaraju Venkata Janakirama Rao and the respondent was the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowment. The case is reported at 1965 AIR 231 and 1964 SCR (5) 270. The dispute arose out of an order passed under section 57(9) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927, which sought to modify a scheme that had earlier been framed under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The central question was whether that order amounted to a decree and what effect, if any, a point not raised in the pleadings might have on the decree. The factual background is that certain worshippers of a temple filed a suit under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the settlement of a scheme to ensure proper management and administration of the temple. The subordinate judge framed the scheme and the High Court confirmed it. On 4 August 1947 the Board of Commissioners of Hindu Religious Endowments filed a petition under section 57(9) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act in the district court seeking modification of that scheme. Among many issues, two related to the remuneration of Archakas and of the Karnam, two categories of temple officials. The district judge held that no case was made out for varying the remuneration payable to Archakas and to the Karnam under the original scheme. On appeal the High Court substantially altered the remuneration provisions, holding that Archakas should receive only half of the Dibbi collections and a similar share of pumpkins and rice offered at the dedication of a calf to the deity, and no other perquisites or emoluments. Regarding the Karnam, the High Court held that he should be paid a salary of Rs 25 per month, could appoint a deputy acceptable to the executive officer, and was not entitled to any share of the Dibbi collections even if he performed his duties personally. After obtaining a certificate from the High Court, the appellants approached this Court. Their first contention was that because the present proceedings originated from an application filed under section 57(9) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, and because that Act provides no provision for an appeal by the aggrieved party, the appeal to the High Court was incompetent; consequently, the modifications made by the High Court were asserted to be beyond its jurisdiction. They further contended that there was no justification for interfering with the items of remuneration, emoluments and perquisites.

The Court observed that the remuneration for temple officials was sanctioned by custom and usage, a practice that had been recognised by courts through their decrees. The Court held that the appeal filed by the Board of Commissioners in the High Court against the order of the District Judge was competent and that the High Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal. The Court explained that a scheme framed under section ninety‑two of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is treated as a scheme under section seventy‑five of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927, constitutes a part of the decree in the scheme‑suit. Accordingly, section fifty‑seven(9) of the same Act provides for the modification or cancellation of such a scheme, which is incorporated in the decree, through an application filed under that provision. If, after hearing the application under section fifty‑seven(9), the scheme is cancelled, the original decree ceases to exist, and the cancellation itself amounts to a decree within the meaning of section two(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same result follows if the decree is merely modified rather than vacated. An order issued on an application under section fifty‑seven(9) therefore constitutes an amended decree, and an appeal against that order lies under section ninety‑six of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court further held that the High Court’s reasoning that the remuneration of the Archakas should be disallowed because the items were vague was not pleaded nor justified by the facts, and consequently the High Court erred in modifying the scheme on that basis. Likewise, the Court found that the High Court was wrong in altering the scheme concerning the Karnam. The application under section fifty‑seven(9) contained no prayer to abolish the office of Karnam or to withdraw his customary emoluments, and the High Court’s decision to deprive the Karnam of personally performing his duties and receiving his customary remuneration was not a relief that had been claimed. The reduction of the Karnam’s remuneration to a nominal amount was therefore unjustified, especially since the delegation of part of his accounting responsibilities to an executive officer did not warrant the virtual abolition of his office. The Court cited the decision in Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, I.L.R. 57 Mad. 271 (F.B.). The judgment was delivered in the civil appellate jurisdiction concerning Civil Appeals Nos. 531 and 532 of 1961, which were appeals from the judgment and decree dated 31 January 1957 of the Madras High Court in Appeal Suit No. 357 of 1951. Counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 531 of 1961 and for respondents numbered three, four, six, seven and ten to twelve in Civil Appeal No. 532 of 1961 appeared, as did counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 532 of 1961. Counsel for the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 531 of 1961 also appeared.

On 31 October 1963, the judgment for the appeals was delivered by Justice Ayyangar. The two appeals originated from a single decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and were filed by two different parties who claimed to be injured by that decision. Both parties sought the appellate relief on the basis of certificates of fitness that the High Court had issued under article 133 (1) of the Constitution. The matter concerned the village of Dwaraka Tirumalai, situated in the West Godavari district of Andhra Pradesh, where a temple dedicated to Sri Venkateswaraswami stood. The day‑to‑day running of that temple was carried out according to a scheme that had been settled on 28 August 1930 by the Subordinate Judge of Eluru in original suit number 1 of 1925, which was on the judge’s file. That original suit had been instituted by a group of worshippers of the temple under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code in order to obtain a scheme for the proper management and administration of the religious institution. The hereditary trustees of the temple, together with the persons holding official positions in the temple, especially the archakas and the Karnam, were named as defendants in that litigation. Even at that early stage there had been a dispute concerning the legal rights of the two office‑holders whose names were mentioned, as well as a dispute concerning the amounts of remuneration to which they claimed to be entitled. The Subordinate Judge examined those questions, recorded findings on them, and the scheme that he framed incorporated those findings. After the Subordinate Judge’s decision, both the worshipper plaintiffs and the Dharmakartas – who were members of the family of the Zamindar of Mylavaram and therefore the hereditary trustees of the temple – filed appeals before the High Court. The High Court dismissed both sets of appeals and affirmed the scheme as framed by the trial judge, thereby leaving the scheme in force.

While the suit was still pending before the Subordinate Judge, the Madras Legislature enacted the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, designated as Madras Act 11 of 1927, which the judgment subsequently refers to simply as “the Act.” The pre‑amble of the Act declared that its purpose was to provide for “the better administration and governance” of certain Hindu religious endowments. The Venkateswaraswami temple fell within the class of institutions to which the Act applied. Under the terminology used in the Act, the temple was classified as an “excepted temple,” a term that the Act defined to mean a temple wherein the right of succession to the office of trustee had been hereditary. As already noted, the family of the Zamindars of Mylavaram were the hereditary trustees of the temple. Section 75 of the Act stated that when the administration of a religious endowment was governed by any scheme settled under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, that scheme would, notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of the Act, be deemed to be a scheme settled under the Act and could be modified or cancelled only in the manner prescribed by the Act. Consequently, the scheme that had been framed by the Subordinate Judge and subsequently confirmed by the High Court was treated as a scheme “deemed to be a scheme settled under the Act,” thereby bringing it within the scope of section 57 (9) of the Act, which authorises modification or cancellation of such a scheme for sufficient cause upon application by the Board, a trustee, or any interested person.

In this case, the Court explained that the scheme created by the District Judge and confirmed by the High Court was treated as a scheme “deemed to be a scheme settled under the Act.” Consequently, the provisions of section 57(9) became applicable. Section 57(9) stated that any scheme of administration settled by a court, or deemed to be such a scheme under section 75, could be modified or cancelled at any time for sufficient cause by the court on an application made by the Board, the trustee, or any person having an interest, but not otherwise. Acting under those powers, the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments – the authority established to administer the Act – filed an original petition on 3 August 1947 (O.P. 76 of 1947) in the Court of the District Judge, West Godavari, seeking modification of the scheme. The petition raised numerous points for alteration, of which only two remained in dispute and formed the subject of the present appeals. Those two points concerned the remuneration that could be paid to two classes of temple officials – the archakas and the Karnam – both of whom held their offices by hereditary right. The learned District Judge had accepted the contention of these office‑holders that no case existed for varying the remuneration that the original scheme in O.S. 1 of 1925 had prescribed for them. The Board of Commissioners appealed this decision to the High Court. The High Court judges allowed the appeal in part and substantially altered the provisions relating to the remuneration payable to the two categories of officials. The archaka respondents subsequently filed a memorandum of cross‑objections to the Board’s appeal, but that memorandum was dismissed. The dismissal had become final, and the claims asserted in that memorandum could no longer be raised before the Supreme Court. Both the archakas and the Karnam then questioned the correctness of the High Court’s judgment by filing petitions for certificates of fitness under Article 133, which were granted. Their appeals are now before this Court. Civil Appeal No. 531 of 1961 was filed by the hereditary Karnam of the suit‑temple, while Civil Appeal No. 532 of 1961 was filed by the archakas. The Court first considered Civil Appeal No. 532 of 1961, which concerned the grievance of the archakas against the variation made by the High Court to the scheme as settled by the learned District Judge. The appellants asserted that they were entitled to several items of remuneration, the principal one being a half share of the votive offerings, such as cash, deposited by worshippers in the hudni or dibbi of the temple, a right they claimed on the basis of long‑standing usage and custom.

In this matter, the Court observed that the archakas asserted a right to receive a half share of the offerings deposited by worshippers in the Hudni, also known as the dibble, which was kept within the temple premises and to which they claimed entitlement based on long‑standing usage and custom. The Court noted that the total amount collected from the dibble was approximately Rs 50,000 each year. The procedure by which the dibble collections were gathered, recorded, and apportioned was detailed in the judgment in O S 1 of 1925, and from the contents of that judgment it was apparent that this customary practice had been acknowledged in several earlier court decisions involving the temple.

The Court further mentioned a point that was relevant solely to Civil Appeal 531 of 1961. It stated that, from the half share to which the temple itself was entitled, the Karnam of the temple, by long‑standing custom, received a token remuneration of one anna, equivalent to one sixteenth of a share, for his services. Regarding these matters, the learned Subordinate Judge in O S 1 of 1925 observed: “The archakas and the Karnam of the temple were allowed to take their respective shares in the collections in dibble for a long time and though the origin of such a right is not known, it cannot be said that it had no legal origin. It might have been recognised by the founder himself, of the temple.”

Beyond the dibble share, the archakas also claimed a share in the bhogam, fees for conducting marriages or Upanayanams, monies placed on the plate during Dweeparadhana, certain rights to Padaraksha Kanukalu, and specific pumpkins offered to the deity. They maintained that these additional entitlements were founded on custom and had historically been affirmed by courts whenever their right to any of these items had been contested. The Subordinate Judge who framed the scheme in O S 1 of 1925 did not enumerate these minor items within the scheme, although several of them were discussed and decided upon in the accompanying judgment, which served as a schedule to the scheme. The Court highlighted that, in accordance with section 79 of the Act, which was in force at the time of the judgment, “Save as otherwise expressly provided in or under this Act nothing herein contained shall affect any established usage of a math or temple or the rights, honours, emoluments and perquisites to which any person may by custom or otherwise be entitled in such math or temple.” Paragraph 23 of the scheme reiterated this principle by stating: “Nothing contained in the scheme shall affect established usage with regard to the rights, honours, emoluments and perquisites to which any person may by custom or otherwise be entitled in the temple.” Moreover, the scheme contained a specific reference in clause 12 to the division of dibble collections and the allocation of the half share to the archakas, which formed the basis for the modification sought under section 57(9) of the Act.

The Court noted that the scheme provided for the division of the dibbi collections and required that the archakas receive the half‑share to which they were entitled. The petition filed under section 57(9) of the Act sought modifications to those terms. While the petition, in paragraph 4(e), acknowledged the archakas’ right to the half‑share of the dibbi collections, it also asserted in paragraph 7(g) that the archakas claimed a half‑share exceeding Rs 18,000 per year and, despite that, continued to demand additional monies. The petition argued that granting such additional payments would be contrary to the temple’s interests and therefore proposed that the archakas should not be entitled to any remuneration, fee, share, land, or income from lands other than their share in the dibbi collection. In sub‑paragraph 7(b) the petition further contended that the practice of allocating a share of the bogums to certain temple servants was against the temple’s interests. The archakas, who were impleaded as respondents to the petition, opposed the proposed modification. In paragraphs 11 and 12 they maintained that their right to the bogums and other fees and perquisites, which they had been receiving and enjoying up to that time, were lawfully theirs and that there was no legal or equitable basis to deprive them of those items. The learned District Judge, after accepting several suggestions made by the Board concerning the manner in which the dibbi accounts should be kept and how the dibbi should be opened—matters that were no longer the subject of complaint—made observations regarding the archakas and the Karnam. He held that most of their rights were governed by decrees, usage, and custom and therefore should be adhered to. He explained that, irrespective of whether worshippers visited the temple, the archakas performed definite duties and were therefore paid their share in the dibbi collections. The person in charge of the deity at the time of worship was to be the archakas or those attached to the temple, and they might be required to perform special worship or conduct other ceremonies according to established usage and custom, for which they would be paid accordingly. The Judge warned that it was unnecessary and could be dangerous to disturb the established usage in the temple or to create misunderstandings that would adversely affect the worship‑paying public and the smooth functioning of an institution primarily intended for the propitiation of God. Concerning other donor offerings that were not placed in the dibbi, he stated that the archakas or others could lay no claim. He further observed that the archakas possessed certain rights in the prasadams, and that there was no reason for those rights to be commuted, leaving such matters to the good sense of the archakas and sthanikar.

The Court observed that the right to the prasadams could not be taken away or altered, stating that there was no justification for commuting that right. It emphasized that such matters should be governed by the sensible judgment of the archakas and the sthanikar. According to the evidence of PW 1, the quantities of offerings to be supplied for each bhogum were fixed and had never caused any difficulty. Consequently, the Court concluded that these quantities should remain unchanged. In the proceedings before the learned District Judge, although substantial alterations were made to the administrative details of the temple, the Judge deliberately refrained from disturbing the existing method or the amount of remuneration previously enjoyed by the archakas. The Board, dissatisfied with that decision, subsequently filed an appeal before the High Court seeking further modification of the scheme.

When the appeal reached the High Court, the learned judges altered the direction given by the District Judge. They held that the appellant’s request to modify clause (14) of the scheme was justified because the clause allowed the archakas to claim “only half the share of the income from the dibbi installed in the temple and such other emoluments, perquisites etc., allowed under the decrees of Courts, or usage.” The judges agreed with the counsel for the appellant that the reference to “other emoluments, perquisites etc., allowed…or usage” was overly vague and likely to cause confusion. Accordingly, they determined that the archakas’ entitlement should be limited to a half share of the dibbi collections and an equivalent half share of the pumpkins and rice offered at the dedication of a calf to the deity, a right that had long been recognized. The judges further concluded that the archakas should receive no additional perquisites or emoluments, and they ordered that this portion of clause (14) be modified to reflect those limits. Later, while addressing the cross‑objections raised in a memorandum, the judges noted that counsel for the archaka‑respondents, Mr Vishnurao, argued that the scheme required no alteration and that the archakas were entitled to a half share of all votive offerings made to the deity. The Court expressed dissatisfaction with that claim, observing that, in many temples across the region, archakas had historically asserted rights far exceeding what was proper, especially concerning lands belonging to the deity, where some had claimed full ownership. Such expansive claims had been rejected, and a recent arrangement in Andhra State permitted archakas to enjoy only a portion of the land as remuneration for their services. The Court was of the view that the present claim to a half share of every offering was analogous to those unreasonable claims and therefore could not be justified on the basis of ancient usage.

The Court observed that the claim made by the archakas for a half share of all offerings was without foundation and could not be supported by any ancient practice. It held that the remuneration provision already suggested for the archakas, in response to the appellant’s contentions, was sufficient. Accordingly, clause 14 of the scheme was altered to state that the archakas would be entitled, for their remuneration, to only one‑half of the dibbi collections and to an equivalent portion of the pumpkins and rice presented at the dedication of a calf to the deity, and that they would receive no other benefits or emoluments. The legality and correctness of this amendment to the scheme formed the basis of the appeal filed by the archakas, recorded as Civil Appeal 532 of 1961. Two arguments were presented by counsel for the appellant. The first argument contended that no appeal could be taken from the District Judge’s order modifying the scheme, and that the High Court judges had erred in hearing the appeal and in altering clause 14 concerning the permissible remuneration of the archakas. The second argument, conditional on the first, asserted that even if the Board’s appeal were permissible, the High Court judges had committed an error in the way they effected the modification.

The Court then turned to the first contention, namely that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the District Judge’s decision in the original petition that sought to modify the scheme under O.S. 1 of 1925. The Court explained that appeals are created by statute, and in the absence of a specific statutory provision authorising an appeal, an order of any authority is final. Although the proceedings were before the District Judge, which ordinarily would give rise to appellate rights, that principle could not be applied here because the proceeding under section 57(9) of the Act was initiated by an application, not by a suit. Consequently, the District Judge’s decision did not constitute a “decree” as defined by section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, which describes a decree as the formal adjudication by a court that conclusively determines the parties’ rights concerning the matters in dispute. Because the order issued in O.P. 76 of 1947 was an order rather than a decree, it did not fall within the ambit of section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, and therefore no appeal could arise from it under that provision. The Court noted that, in such circumstances, an appeal would only be possible if a special provision existed within the governing Act itself.

In this matter, the Court explained that the right to lodge an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code arose only when a special provision for appeal existed within the governing Act. Section 84 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act provided a mechanism for appeals from certain orders of District Judges when those orders were made on applications seeking to set aside or modify decisions of the Board. However, the Act contained no comparable provision for orders issued by a District Judge on an application filed under section 57(9). Consequently, the learned counsel argued that the order of the District Judge resolving the Board’s application could not be appealed. To support this contention, the counsel relied on the decision of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board.

Section 84(1) of the Act provided that any dispute as to whether a math or temple fell within the scope of the Act, or whether it was an excepted temple, would be decided by the Board. Acting on that power, the Board conducted an enquiry and concluded that the temple whose trustee was the appellant before the High Court was not an “excepted temple.” The aggrieved trustee then invoked the remedy set out in section 84(2), which allowed a trustee affected by a decision under subsection (1) to apply within one year to the Civil Court for modification or setting aside of that decision, while noting that, subject to the result of such an application, the Board’s order would be final.

The District Judge, hearing the application under section 84(2), declined to set aside or modify the Board’s order and instead confirmed it. At that time, section 84 as it stood did not contain any explicit provision permitting an appeal against an order of the District Court that was rendered on an application filed pursuant to subsection 84(2). Nevertheless, the dissatisfied trustee filed an appeal to the High Court. The High Court then raised a preliminary objection concerning the maintainability of the appeal and referred the question to a Full Bench for determination. The Full Bench upheld the preliminary objection, holding that the order of the District Court did not constitute a decree within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code because the proceeding that produced the order was an application, not a suit. Since the proceeding was not a suit, section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, which governs appeals from decrees, was not attracted. In the absence of a specific statutory provision granting a right of appeal against orders made under section 84(2), the Full Bench concluded that no appeal lay to the High Court.

Applying the reasoning of that Full Bench decision, the respondent contended before this Court that the present proceedings, which also originated from an application filed under section 57(9), similarly lacked any statutory provision conferring a right of appeal on the aggrieved party. Accordingly, the respondent maintained that the appeal to the High Court was incompetent.

The Court observed that the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. It further held that the reasoning adopted by the earlier Full Bench decision was not applicable to the present application and that, consequently, the appeal filed was within the competence of the Court. The Court then turned to an exposition of Section 57 of the governing Act, noting that the section categorises proceedings into two distinct classes. The first class comprises sub‑sections (1) through (7), each of which relates to the Board’s authority to devise, implement and regulate schemes concerning the administration of temples and their associated endowments. Sub‑section (1) authorises the Board to formulate a scheme for the proper management of a temple and its endowments and also prescribes the procedure by which such a scheme may be initiated. Sub‑section (2) enumerates the matters that may be incorporated into the scheme that the Board frames. Sub‑section (3) deals with ancillary issues concerning the identification and determination of temple properties that are to be incorporated into the scheme. Sub‑section (4) provides that, for a good and sufficient cause, the Board may suspend, remove or dismiss any executive officer appointed under a scheme made pursuant to sub‑section (1), or may direct the removal of such an officer. Sub‑section (5) states that the Board may at any time, by order and in the manner laid down in sub‑section (1), modify or cancel a scheme that has been settled under that sub‑section. Sub‑section (6) requires that the Board publish, in the manner prescribed, any order by which it settles, modifies or cancels a scheme. The Court explained that these provisions together constitute the entire legislative scheme governing the Board’s power to create and adjust schemes and all matters ancillary thereto, and that, up to this point, all proceedings remain before the Board itself. The Court then examined sub‑section (7), which provides that a trustee or any person with an interest may, within six months of the date of publication of the scheme, commence a suit in the Court seeking to modify or set aside the order. Subject to the outcome of such a suit and to the provisions of sub‑section (9), every order of the Board becomes final and binding on the trustee and all interested parties. From this, the Court concluded that where the Board itself frames a scheme, any aggrieved party has a statutory right to institute a suit, and that decrees issued in such suits are, by operation of law, appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court then turned to sub‑section (9), previously discussed, and posed the question whether a different rule regarding appeals was intended for proceedings brought under Section 57(9). The Court observed that a scheme framed under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, which is deemed to be a scheme under Section 75 of the Act, is created through a suit and the scheme forms part of the decree issued in that suit. The Court noted that Section 57(9) makes provision for the modification or cancellation of such a scheme‑decree, thereby bringing the matter within the ambit of the appeal provisions discussed earlier.

In this case, the Court explained that the procedure for an application under section 57(9) functioned as a legal mechanism, and if, after hearing such an application, the scheme was cancelled, the provision in section 57(9) contemplated that the earlier decree would cease to exist. Consequently, the Court held that it would be difficult to argue that the cancellation of a decree issued under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code did not itself constitute a decree within the meaning of section 2(2) of the same Code. The Court further observed that it made no substantive difference whether the decree was vacated by cancellation or was merely modified, and it considered both outcomes to be equivalent for the purposes of the statutory definition. The same point could be approached from another perspective: if the scheme‑decree contained a clause allowing a party to file an “application” for modification of the scheme under prescribed circumstances, then an order issued on such an application would be an amended decree. The Court clarified that an appeal against that amended decree would lie under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. It added that the validity of such a liberty clause had recently been affirmed by this Court. The Court concluded that, irrespective of whether the power to approach the Court for modification derived from the scheme‑decree itself or from an independent enactment such as the Act presently before it, the result was the same—an amendment that satisfied the definition of a decree under section 2(2). Accordingly, the Court found that the Board’s appeal to the High Court was legally competent and that the High Court judges possessed jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Turning to the merits of the High Court’s decision, counsel for the appellant described the traditional structure of the temple administration, noting that seven families of archakas held hereditary rights to the offices and divided the share of dibbi collections and other minor items among themselves. He explained that worship in the temple continued daily from five in the morning until nine in the evening, requiring four or five archakas to serve continuously, and that the temple observed between forty and fifty festivals each year, each demanding substantial work. The archakas used the remuneration and perquisites they received to employ Srivaishnavite cooks for preparing naivedyams and other foods for the deity, and they incurred additional similar expenses. In light of these facts and other circumstances highlighted, counsel argued that there was no justification for interfering with the customary remuneration, emoluments, and perquisites that had been recognized by previous court decrees, and that the High Court’s decision should therefore be upheld.

In this case, the Court observed that the remuneration and perquisites claimed by the archakas were based on long‑standing usage that had been confirmed by judicial decrees, and that the parties had presented this material to show that the compensation awarded by the learned District Judge was not excessively disproportionate to the duties performed in connection with temple worship. However, the Court noted that, because of the circumstances described later, it was unnecessary to continue pursuing this line of argument. The appellants had not denied that the share of dibbi collections and other perquisites fixed by custom and usage constituted remuneration for the services rendered, and the Court accepted that a substantial change in circumstances could justify revising that remuneration either upward or downward. This point was also not contested by the learned counsel.

The Court agreed with counsel that, based on the pleadings and the evidence adduced, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with paragraph fourteen of the scheme as framed by the learned District Judge. The District Judge, in that paragraph, after providing elsewhere for the protection of the temple’s interests and for the streamlining of its administration, allowed the archakas to receive the remuneration to which they were entitled by established custom and usage, a right that had been affirmed after contest in courts. The Court then referred to O.P. 76 of 1947, filed by the Board seeking modification of the scheme settled in O.S. 1 of 1925, and reproduced paragraph 7(g), which stated that the archakas claimed a half share in the dibbi collections, that such share exceeded Rs 18,000 per year, and that the archakas further claimed additional monies. The Board argued that granting these additional payments would be contrary to the temple’s interests and therefore proposed that the archakas should receive no remuneration, fee, share, or benefit from lands or land income beyond their half share in the dibbi collections.

From this passage, the Court derived two clear conclusions. First, the archakas’ claim to a half share in the dibbi collections was not contested, nor was the payment of that share deemed improper. Second, the archakas’ additional claims—to a share of lands or of land income beyond the half share in the dibbi collections—were disputed. The Court also noted that, in sub‑paragraph (h), an objection was raised to granting a share of the bhogams to temple servants, including the archakas, on the ground that such a practice was against the temple’s interests. The Court indicated that suitable rules and regulations could be framed by the trustees, subject to the Board’s confirmation, to address this concern.

In this case, the Board sought confirmation of its position concerning the remuneration of the temple servants. The archakas, who were respondents, filed a counter‑statement in which they asserted the rights that had already been recognised by previous court decrees, including their entitlement to a share of the bhogams. The learned District Judge examined the matter on the basis of the evidence that had been placed before him. After reviewing the material, he upheld the archakas’ claim to certain perquisites and recorded this finding in paragraph 14 of the scheme, which had been extracted earlier. Dissatisfied with this decision, the Board appealed to the High Court.

The Board’s appeal was confined to a single ground, identified as ground 13. That ground alleged that “the lower court erred in allowing the archakas as much as half of the dibbi collections.” Effectively, the Board raised no objection to the archakas’ continued enjoyment of their share in the bhogam or to the other miscellaneous items of remuneration that the archakas were receiving, some of which had been listed earlier in the judgment. When the appeal was heard, the learned judges of the High Court did not disturb the finding relating to the half‑share of the dibbi collections. In fact, they could not have altered that finding because the Board’s petition O.P. 76 of 1947 had not prayed for any interference with that share, despite the reliance on ground 13 in the memorandum of appeal.

To summarise the position that emerged at the High Court hearing, the Board, in its original application to the District Court, had conceded the archakas’ right to a half‑share of the dibbi collections and had not sought any amendment to that part of the scheme dated O.S. 1 of 1925. However, the Board did request a modification of the scheme insofar as it recognised a right of the archakas to a share in the bhogams. The District Judge, while confirming the undisputed half‑share of the dibbi collections, rejected the Board’s request for alteration of the bhogam provision, as reflected in paragraph 7(h) of the Original Petition. Consequently, the Board appealed this decision. No specific ground of appeal was raised concerning the archakas’ right to a share of the bhogams; therefore, the Board was not permitted, without leave of the Court, to question the propriety of the rejection of that relief. Nonetheless, the Board contested the archakas’ right to a half‑share of the dibbi collections, a contention that was not open to them based on the contents of their own petition. The learned judges altered paragraph 14 of the scheme by removing all items except the half‑share of the dibbi collections on the basis that the original paragraph was vague and could cause difficulties. In doing so, the judges failed to consider that (1) the items of remuneration had been previously claimed by the archakas and, after contest, had been upheld by court decrees that fixed their quantum and the circumstances of payment, meaning that the clause, though apparently vague, was in fact clear in practice.

In this matter the Court observed that the persons claiming remuneration had previously contested the amounts and that the courts had finally fixed both the quantum of the remuneration and the conditions under which it would be received by issuing decrees. Consequently, although the clause referring to custom and usage appeared at first glance to be vague, the existence of specific court‑determined amounts meant that there was, in reality, no uncertainty about those items of remuneration. The Court further noted that the scheme prepared by the Subordinate Judge in O. S. 1 of 1925 had been in operation for more than twenty‑five years without generating any difficulty, even though the scheme did not enumerate the individual items with exact precision. This practical experience was highlighted by the learned District Judge in the passage previously extracted and underlined by the Court. Moreover, the Court pointed out that in O. P. 76 of 1947, which had been filed by the Board, there was no allegation that the language used in the 1925 scheme caused any problem of interpretation or created confusion that required clarification or elimination; any suggestion that the scheme was ambiguous was therefore unsupported by the pleadings. For these reasons the Court concluded that the learned Judges’ reasoning—that the archakas should lose the remuneration they had previously enjoyed because the items were vague—was not founded on the pleadings and was not justified by the factual record. Accordingly, the Court held that the learned Judges erred in altering clause 14 of the scheme as framed by the District Judge. The appeal numbered 532 of 1961 was therefore allowed, the original wording of paragraph 14 was restored, and the appellants were awarded costs to be paid by respondents 1 and 2.

The second appeal, numbered 531 of 1961, concerned the remuneration payable to the Karnam, who occupies his position by hereditary right. Under the scheme created in O. S. 1 of 1925, the Karnam’s remuneration was defined as one‑sixteenth of the half share of the dibbi collections, a proportion that had been recognized as arising from long‑standing custom and ancient usage and was expressly set out in the scheme‑decree of that year. When the matter came before the District Court, the Board sought a modification of this fixed remuneration. The petition presented this request in paragraph 8(g), stating that the Karnam, who currently receives a share of the dibbi collections, never personally performs any service but instead employs a deputy whose salary bears no proportion to the amount the Karnam receives from the dibbi. The petition argued that the deputy’s work is inadequate, causing a loss to the temple, and therefore a provision should be inserted in the scheme to ensure that if the Karnam does not perform duties himself but employs a deputy, the temple would be required to pay out of the dibbi only the actual salary of the Karnam.

In the petition the Board argued that when the Karnam does not personally perform his duties but instead employs a deputy, the temple should be required to pay from the dibbi only the actual salary that the Karnam receives. The Karnam, who was impleaded as the ninth respondent, filed a counter‑statement in which he explained that the duties of the Karnam or his deputy consist of sitting at the dibbi and maintaining a chitta of the offerings deposited there by pilgrims. He further stated that, according to long‑standing custom, the dibbi collections are counted each day in the presence of the manager, the archakas and the Karnam or their representatives, after which the offerings are weighed and divided according to the shares that each is entitled to. In later paragraphs of his statement the Karnam objected to the mode of remuneration proposed for situations where a deputy is employed, contending that such a scheme would be contrary to the ancient usage and custom governing the temple. The learned District Judge, in his judgment on the matter, observed that the Karnam should preferably attend to the duty himself; however, if the Karnam wishes to engage in other work, he may be entitled to appoint a qualified deputy who must be accepted by both the executive officer and the managing hereditary trustee. The Judge clarified that the deputy would not be entitled to any share of the dibbi income; the responsibility for paying the deputy would remain with the Karnam, who could make his own arrangements for such payment. This principle was incorporated into paragraph 17 of the modified scheme prepared by the District Judge, which read: the Karnam should render duty himself and should not appoint a deputy; if he does appoint a deputy, the Karnam will not be entitled to any share of the dibbi income. Any deputy may be appointed only if approved by the Executive Officer, who will fix the deputy’s salary, and such appointment requires prior approval of the executive officer. The Board expressed dissatisfaction with this direction in its memorandum of appeal, asserting that the lower court should have recognized that the provision in clause 17 concerning the office of the Karnam was not in the interests of the institution. The learned Judges of the High Court subsequently altered paragraph 17, removing the Karnam’s entitlement to a share of the dibbi collections even when he performed the duties personally. After the amendment the paragraph provided that the Karnam shall be entitled to a salary of rupees twenty‑five per mensem and that he may appoint a deputy in his place, provided the deputy is acceptable to the Executive Officer. The High Court gave two reasons for this modification: first, as a result of the District Judge’s earlier modifications—against which no objection had been raised—a provision had been introduced for the appointment of an Executive Officer whose duty was to keep regular accounts.

The Court observed that the first reason for the modification was that, after the District Judge had altered the scheme without any objection, an executive officer was appointed to keep regular accounts. This officer would record the details of the offerings made in the dibbi, which would enable the calculation of the share due to the archakas. Consequently, the duties and responsibilities of the karnam were reduced, and in some circumstances might have been eliminated altogether. The second reason was that, as a matter of practice, the karnam ordinarily performed his duties through deputies whom he appointed. Because of this practice, the trustees did not need to require his personal attendance, and the temple could benefit from the practical abolition of this hereditary office. The counsel for the appellant challenged the correctness of this approach, arguing that the learned Judges had erred in modifying paragraph 17 of the scheme under the facts of the case. The Court agreed with that submission, holding that the Judges were indeed in error. It noted that the office of karnam was a hereditary right and, without deciding whether such an office could be abolished, observed that the Board’s application did not contain any prayer to abolish the office or to strip the karnam of his customary emoluments. The Court referred to paragraph 8(g) of the earlier record, which contained two distinct allegations: first, that the karnam employed deputies on a nominal salary paid by him and that the work of those deputies was unsatisfactory; second, that, as a consequence, a prayer was made that when the karnam entrusted his duties to a deputy, he should not be entitled to the customary remuneration of one‑sixteenth of the half share of the dibbi collections belonging to the temple, but only to the actual wages paid to the deputy.

The dispute that the District Court and, on appeal, the High Court were required to resolve concerned solely whether the scheme framed in O. S. 1 of 1925 should be altered to provide for a reduced remuneration when the karnam employed a deputy. The learned District Judge considered these matters and issued directions in paragraph 17 of the scheme. However, the High Court Judges did not address the pleadings or the single issue before them, namely: (1) whether the karnam should be permitted to appoint deputies to perform his duties, and if so, under what circumstances and conditions; and (2) in such an event, what remuneration the karnam should receive. Instead, the High Court effectively abolished the hereditary office and allowed only a nominal remuneration. The Court found it unnecessary to examine whether this drastic change was intended to be raised in the specific ground of appeal before the High Court, because it was clear that the Judges had erred in the manner they modified paragraph 17 of the scheme. The Court then indicated that it would examine the actual effect of paragraph 17 as framed by the learned District Judge.

The Court observed that the customary remuneration associated with the office of Karnam was duly recognised by the learned District Judge. However, that remuneration was not intended by custom to be a sine cure, allowing the Karnam to draw it while delegating duties to a deputy. Customarily, the Karnam was required to perform the duties himself, and only when unavoidable circumstances prevented him could a deputy be appointed at a nominal salary. The order issued by the District Judge acknowledged this practice and conditioned the entitlement to customary remuneration on the Karnam personally executing the duties. Consequently, the conditions articulated in paragraph seventeen were regarded as equitable for both the institution and its office‑holders, giving effect to established rights and obligations. Nevertheless, the High Court’s order removed the Karnam’s ability to perform his duties and thereby denied him the customary remuneration that historically accompanied the service. The Court noted that such a remedy was not among those sought in the original application, and it refrained from opining on whether it might have been available under section seventy‑nine of the governing Act. The learned Judges appeared to acknowledge that, because the office was hereditary, it could not be entirely abolished. Yet, the Court found it improper to virtually extinguish the office and to strip the holder of his customary remuneration. The Court pointed out that assigning an executive officer to handle part of the dibbi account responsibilities did not justify such deprivation. Counsel for the appellants argued that the appointment of an executive officer would not eliminate the necessity of a Karnam or the performance of duties prescribed by custom and usage. The Court concurred with that submission, agreeing that the presence of an executive officer did not obviate the role of the Karnam. In view of these considerations, the Court saw no justification for reducing the Karnam’s remuneration to a nominal amount. The Court held that the directions issued by the learned District Judge were proper, sound, and did not warrant any interference by the High Court. Accordingly, Civil Appeal five three one of nineteen sixty‑one was allowed, and paragraph seventeen of the modified scheme as framed by the District Judge was restored. The appellant was awarded the costs of the appeal, which were to be paid by the opposite party in this Court. The Court consequently allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court’s order, thereby reinstating the earlier scheme and confirming the Karnam’s entitlement to customary remuneration.