Bai Achhuba Amar Singh vs Sri Kalidas Harnath Ojha and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 397 of 1962

Decision Date: 6 December 1963

Coram: J.R. Mudholkar, Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal

In this matter, the Supreme Court of India reported the case titled Bai Achhuba Amar Singh versus Sri Kalidas Harnath Ojha and Others, with the judgment dated 6 December 1963. The opinion was written by Justice J.R. Mudholkar, and the bench also included Justices Subbarao, K. Dayal and Raghubar Dayal. The petitioner was Bai Achhuba Amar Singh and the respondents were Sri Kalidas Harnath Ojha together with other parties. The case is cited in the law reports as 1967 AIR 651 and 1964 SCR (5) 853. The dispute concerned the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Act 67 of 1948), particularly sections 84 and 84A, whose scope was examined. Section 84A was described as prospective; it was said to affect adjudication only where a transfer had already been declared invalid, and an application under section 84 was required to be made by the landlord.

The factual background revealed that the appellant owned agricultural fields bearing survey numbers 231 and 260 in a village located in Gujarat. For a period, Respondent No. 1 acted as the manager of the appellant’s estate, and while holding that position he obtained from the appellant a sale deed concerning those fields. Believing that the sale violated sections 63 and 64 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, the appellant applied to the Mamlatdar for a declaration that the sale was invalid. In addition, a group of villagers filed an application before the Collector under section 84, seeking the summary eviction of Respondent No. 1 on the ground that the transaction was void for contravening the same statutory provisions. The Collector issued an order declaring the sale void and directed that the village records be corrected accordingly. That order was challenged, but the Revenue Tribunal dismissed the revision. The matter then proceeded to a writ petition in the High Court, which remanded the case back to the Collector. On remand, the Collector again declared the sale void, and the Revenue Tribunal confirmed that order. A further writ petition challenging the Revenue Tribunal’s order was dismissed by the High Court.

In 1956 the 1948 Act was amended by the insertion of section 84A. Subsequent to that amendment Respondent No. 1 initiated fresh proceedings under section 84A, and the Mamlatdar validated the transfer of the land in his favour. The Collector, however, set aside the Mamlatdar’s orders. The appellant again approached the High Court through a writ petition, and the High Court accepted the petition, holding that the provisions of section 84A applied to the case at hand. The appellant then obtained Special Leave to appeal to this Court. Accepting the appeal, the Court, per Justices Subbarao and Mudholkar, with a dissenting opinion from Justice Raghubar Dayal, held that the provisions of section 84A are prospective in nature. They bar any declaration or finding that a transfer is invalid after the provision came into force, but they do not disturb an adjudication in which the transfer had already been held invalid. Accordingly, the Collector’s earlier declaration of invalidity, which had been confirmed by the Revenue Tribunal and for which the writ petition had been dismissed, remained effective and could not be questioned after the enactment of section 84A.

The Court observed that once the Collector’s order had become final, it could not be challenged after section 84A was incorporated into the Act in 1956. The Court further held that invoking the provisions of section 84 does not require an application to be made solely by the landlord; any interested person may invoke the remedy, and the Collector is then obligated to determine whether the person sought to be evicted is in possession as a result of an invalid transfer. According to the dissenting judge, the Collector, in proceedings under section 84, may be required to record a finding that a particular sale is invalid and consequently that the possessor is in unauthorised possession, but the Collector does not possess the power to make a formal declaration that the sale deed itself is invalid. Such a formal declaration, the Court noted, ordinarily lies within the jurisdiction of a civil court. The Court noted that the Collector’s order declaring the sale deed invalid had not become final at the time section 84A was introduced on 1 August 1956; therefore the respondent was entitled to rely on the provisions of section 84A. The respondent could have obtained validation of the sale deed by paying the prescribed penalty under section 84A. Consequently, the Mamlatdar’s issuance of a certificate of validity and the High Court’s order setting aside the Collector’s and the Revenue Tribunal’s orders and restoring the Mamlatdar’s order were held to be correct and in accordance with law.

This appeal, numbered Civil Appeal No. 397 of 1962, was filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated 1 July 1959 of the Bombay High Court (now the Gujarat High Court) in Special Civil Application No. 302 of 1959. Counsel for the appellant were instructed, while counsel for the first respondent and counsel for the second respondent were also named. The judgment was delivered on 6 December 1963. The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Mudholkar, with Justice Raghubar Dayal dissenting. The case concerned a dispute under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The appellant was the acknowledged owner of Survey Nos. 231 and 260 in the village of Duchakwada, Taluka Deodar, District Banaskantha, State of Gujarat. Survey 231 had been leased to a tenant named Vira Pana, and Survey 260 had been reserved by the appellant in 1950 for grazing cattle, a use that may also have been extended to other village cattle due to limited grazing facilities. The appellant, described as a jagirdar with considerable property holdings, was the original owner of the lands in question.

The appellant owned two fields in the village of Duchakwada and had employed respondent No 1 as the karbhari, that is, the manager of her estate, for a period of time. While serving in that capacity, respondent No 1 obtained from the appellant a sale deed dated 31 October 1950 covering both fields. The appellant asserted that she received no monetary consideration for the conveyance, although she observed that this fact was not material to the point in issue. Soon after executing the deed, the appellant filed an application before the Mamlatdar of Deodar seeking a declaration that the sale deed was invalid because it contravened sections 63 and 64 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. At roughly the same time, several villages in the Duchakwada area submitted an application to the Collector of Banaskantha under section 84 of the same Act, requesting the summary eviction of respondent No 1 on the ground that the transaction was void under sections 63 and 64, and also asking that Survey No 260 be reserved for grazing. The appellant’s application also came before the Collector, whose order addressed the appellant’s contention. The Collector’s order stated: “Taking into consideration all the circumstances it is hereby ordered that the sale made by Shrimati Achhuba in respect of two fields Vidvalu and Vaghdelavalu should be treated as void under section 64(3) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and the village records corrected accordingly. Shrimati Achhuba should be persuaded to set apart these two fields as grazing area for the grazing of village cattle of Dudhakwada in order to maintain the standard as fixed by the Government. If she agrees, the persons in the present occupation of the land should be evicted and the fields kept open for free grazing of village cattle.”

An application for revision of the Collector’s order was filed by respondent No 1 before the Bombay Revenue Tribunal, but the Tribunal dismissed the revision. Consequently, respondent No 1 instituted a writ petition before the High Court. The High Court affirmed the Tribunal’s order with respect to Survey No 231, but it remanded the proceedings to the Collector for determination of two specific issues: first, whether respondent No 1 qualified as an agriculturist, and second, whether a tenant existed on the land and, if no tenant was found, whether the Collector was justified in declaring the sale void under section 63(1). After remand, the matter returned to the Revenue Tribunal, where respondent No 1’s counsel argued that the Collector lacked jurisdiction to declare the sale void without issuing a consequential order under section 84. The Tribunal held that this point could not be raised because it had not been raised at earlier stages of the proceedings nor before the High Court. The Tribunal further concluded that respondent No 1 was not an agriculturist and that the Collector was justified in declaring the sale of Survey No 260 void as well. Following these findings, a second writ petition was filed by respondent No 1 against the Tribunal’s order.

A writ petition had been filed by respondent No. 1 challenging the order, but the High Court dismissed that petition. Consequently, the record showed that the proceedings in which respondent No. 1 participated finally concluded that the whole transaction that favored him was void. The finding further indicated that he was occupying without authority not only Survey No. 231 but also Survey No. 260. In 1956 the Act governing the matter underwent extensive amendment, and the amended provisions came into force in August 1956. Among the new provisions introduced by the amendment was Section 84A. Section 84A(1) provides that a transfer of any land made in contravention of Section 63 or Section 64, as those sections stood before the commencement of the Amending Act of 1955, and made after 28 December 1948 and before 15 June 1955, shall not be declared invalid merely because it violated those sections, provided that the transferee pays to the State Government a penalty equal to one per cent of the consideration or Rs 100, whichever is less. A further proviso states that if the landlord makes such a transfer in favour of the tenant who is in actual possession, the penalty shall be one rupee. An additional proviso adds that where the landlord transfers the land to any person other than the tenant in actual possession, and the transfer either follows an unlawful eviction of that tenant or results in the eviction of the tenant in actual possession, the transfer shall not be deemed validated unless that tenant fails to apply for possession of the land under Section 29(1) within two years from the date of his eviction. Section 84A(2) directs that upon payment of the prescribed penalty, the Mamlatdar shall issue a certificate to the transferee stating that the transfer is not invalid. Section 84A(3) provides that if the transferee fails to pay the penalty within the period prescribed, the Mamlatdar shall declare the transfer invalid and the provisions of sub‑sections (3) to (5) of Section 84C shall then apply.

Seeking to rely on this provision, respondent No. 1 made an application before the Mamlatdar at Deodar for validation of the transfer that favored him. The Mamlatdar granted the application and issued the required certificate. Shortly thereafter, the Collector of Banaskantha, acting on his own initiative, revisited the matter and set aside the Mamlatdar’s order. A revision application filed against the Collector’s order was dismissed by the Revenue Tribunal. Following that dismissal, respondent No. 1 filed another writ petition before the High Court, which constituted his third writ petition in these proceedings. The High Court allowed that petition. As a result, the appellant approached this Court by way of special leave, and the High Court, in allowing the petition, had reached the conclusions outlined above.

In its decision, the High Court held that the earlier determination stating that the transaction on which respondent No 1 relied was invalid did not, with respect to Survey No 260, prevent the application of sub‑section (1) of section 84A. The Court explained that a transfer that contravenes sections 63 and 64 becomes invalid automatically by operation of law and therefore does not need to be formally declared invalid. Consequently, the mere fact that the Collector had declared a transfer invalid because it violated either of those sections did not make the newly enacted provisions inapplicable. In reaching this conclusion, the High Court appeared to overlook the provisions of section 84 as well as the circumstance that both the appellant and the villagers had approached the Collector under that provision, contending that the sale deed on which respondent No 1 based his claim to possession was contrary to sections 63 and 64. The present dispute no longer concerned Survey No 231; it concerned only Survey No 260. While sections 63 and 64 do render certain transactions invalid, whenever a party seeks relief under section 84 on the ground that a transaction is invalid because it breaches those sections, it becomes necessary for the Collector to examine the dispute and decide whether the transaction is indeed invalid under either provision. That necessity explains why the Collector proceeded to adjudicate the validity of the transaction. It was asserted before us that the only matter before the Collector was an application filed by certain residents of Duchakwada who had been deprived of their grazing rights over Survey No 260. That assertion was inaccurate because respondent No 1 himself admitted in his writ petition before the High Court, dated 17 February 1959, that the villagers had sought cancellation of the sale deed covering the fields and that the appellant had also filed an application for cancellation of the deed in his favour. Even if one assumes that the appellant had not approached the Collector under section 84 or that his application was not properly before the Collector, it is important to note that section 84 does not require an application to be made solely by the landlord. The language of the provision allows any interested person to invoke the remedy, and once that remedy is invoked, the Collector is obligated, under clause (a), to determine whether the person sought to be evicted is in possession pursuant to an invalid transfer.

It was next argued on behalf of the respondent that, with respect to Survey No. 260, the Collector had declined to pass an order of eviction; consequently, the Collector’s declaration that the sale of Survey No. 260 was invalid could not prevent the operation of section 84A. This argument was rejected as lacking any merit. The judgment already reproduced the portion of the Collector’s order that dealt with the appellant’s prayer for the eviction of respondent No. 1 from Survey No. 260. That excerpt made clear that the Collector had, in fact, granted a conditional relief concerning this field. In order to grant such relief, the Collector was obliged to examine and decide upon the validity of the transfer in question. The Collector’s order was subsequently affirmed by the Revenue Tribunal, and the writ petition in which the respondent challenged the order was dismissed by the High Court. Accordingly, the entire controversy, including the question of the Collector’s order’s validity, must be regarded as having become final and conclusive between the parties.

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the jurisdiction of the Collector to declare the sale transaction void could still be examined, there was little doubt that the Collector acted within his jurisdiction. Neither section 63 nor section 64, nor even section 84, expressly require the Collector to make a formal declaration that a transaction is void because it contravenes either of those sections; such a requirement cannot be ignored by the transferor. Some authority must determine whether, in fact, the transfer violates either provision. That need for determination arises when the transferor has been deprived of possession as a result of an invalid transfer. The Act enables the transferor to invoke the provisions of section 84 to regain possession. Under section 84, the Collector must ascertain whether the transfer is indeed in contravention of section 63 or section 64. The Collector’s finding on that point functions as a declaration that the transfer is invalid.

It is important to note that the Act contains no provision that expressly authorises any Revenue Authority to issue a formal declaration that a transfer violating sections 63 or 64 is invalid. When the legislature introduced section 84A, stating that a transfer in contravention of either of those two sections shall not be treated as invalid, the intention was merely to provide that the transfer would not be regarded as invalid even if it were found to breach section 63 or 64. This is precisely the approach the Collector adopted in the present case. Unless these words are given that meaning, they would be meaningless. The Court further held that...

Section 84A was held to operate only prospectively. A simple reading of that provision showed that its purpose was to place a bar on any declaration that a land transfer was invalid because it violated sections 63 or 64 of the Act. In other words, the effect of section 84A was to prevent any new finding or declaration of invalidity after the date on which the provision became effective. The provision, however, did not disturb any earlier adjudication in which a transfer had already been declared invalid. Consequently, the Court observed that section 84A could not apply to the present dispute because the Collector had already declared the transfer invalid and had issued a conditional eviction order. As a result, the Mamlatdar was found to lack authority to issue the certificate that had been served on respondent No. 1. On this basis, the Court concluded that the High Court had erred in overturning the Revenue Tribunal’s order which had upheld the Collector’s decision. Accordingly, the Court set aside the High Court judgment and reinstated the Revenue Tribunal’s order, directing that all costs of the proceedings be borne by respondent No. 1.

The judgment was delivered by Justice Raghubar Dayal J., who expressed the view that the appeal should be dismissed. The factual background was then recounted. The appellant, identified as the Jagirdar of the village of Duchakwada, had executed a sale of two parcels of land bearing Survey Numbers 231 and 260 to respondent No. 1, Kalidas Harnath Ojha, on 28 October 1950. Subsequently, on 24 November 1952, the Collector of District Banaskantha issued an order after conducting an inquiry based on applications filed by certain villagers. The order stated that the deed of sale for the two parcels was invalid because it contravened sections 63 and 64 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Act LXVII of 1948). The Collector directed that the appellant be evicted from Plot 231, having found that one of the applicants, Harijan Vira Pana, was the tenant of that plot. The Court noted that it would not consider the eviction order relating to Plot 231 any further.

Regarding Plot 260, the Collector’s order was motivated by a shortage of grazing land for the village cattle. The order quoted, “Shrimati Achhuba should be persuaded to set apart these two fields as grazing area for the grazing of village cattle of Duchakwada in order to maintain the standard as fixed by the Government. If she agrees, the persons in the present occupation of the land should be evicted and the fields kept open for free grazing of village cattle.” The Court observed that the Collector had erred in referring to “both fields” in this directive, because one of the fields under dispute, Field 231, had already been the subject of a separate order directing the Prant Officer to restore that field to Harijan Vira Pana immediately. This mistake formed part of the reasoning for setting aside the High Court’s decision and reinstating the Revenue Tribunal’s original order.

In this case the respondent appealed the Collector’s order before the Bombay Revenue Tribunal, and the Tribunal dismissed the appeal on 27 October 1955, treating the Collector’s direction as an order made under section 84 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. Following that dismissal the respondent instituted Special Civil Application number 2817 of 1955 before the High Court of Bombay. The High Court examined the application and, on 2 July 1956, granted relief with respect to plot number 260; it set aside the Tribunal’s order and directed that the dispute concerning that plot be referred back to the Tribunal for a fresh determination in accordance with the law. Acting on the High Court’s remand, the Revenue Tribunal reconsidered the matter and again rejected the respondent’s appeal on 3 June 1957. Unwilling to accept this second rejection the respondent filed another petition, Special Civil Application number 2220 of 1957, before the same High Court. The High Court reviewed the fresh petition and, on 18 December 1957, dismissed it, leaving the Tribunal’s earlier decision in place.

During the pendency of these proceedings the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Act XIII of 1956) came into force on 1 August 1956. The amendment added a new provision, section 84A, to the parent Act. Section 84A provides that a transfer of land made in violation of sections 63 or 64, as they existed before the commencement of the Amending Act of 1955, and that occurred after 28 December 1948 but before 15 June 1955, shall not be declared invalid merely for contravening those sections if the transferee pays a penalty to the State Government equal to one per cent of the consideration or rupee 1, whichever is lower. A further condition states that if the landlord transfers the land to the tenant who is in actual possession, the penalty is fixed at rupee 1. The provision also adds that where the landlord transfers the land to any person other than the tenant in actual possession, and such transfer is made either after an illegal eviction of the tenant or results in the tenant’s eviction, the transfer will not be deemed validated unless the evicted tenant fails to apply for possession under sub‑section (1) of section 29 within two years from the date of eviction. Sub‑section (2) directs the Mamlatdar, upon receipt of the penalty, to issue a certificate confirming that the transfer is not invalid. Sub‑section (3) provides that if the transferee does not pay the prescribed penalty within the time prescribed, the Mamlatdar shall declare the transfer invalid, and the provisions of sub‑sections (3) to (5) of section 84C shall then apply.

Taking advantage of the newly inserted section 84A, the respondent paid a fine of rupees 35 on 9 December 1957. On the same day the Mamlatdar Tenancy Aval Karkun issued an order recognizing the sale of plot number 260 under the sale deed dated 1950, thereby issuing a certificate that the transfer was valid subject to the payment of the penalty.

In this case the Court first set aside the Mamlatdar’s order that section 84A did not apply to the sale of plot no 260 because the Collector had already declared that sale invalid before section 84A came into force. The respondent then sought revision of that decision before the Bombay Revenue Tribunal, but the Tribunal rejected the revision. Subsequently the respondent filed Special Civil Application No. 302 requesting that the Tribunal’s order be quashed and set aside. The High Court later reversed the Tribunal’s decision, holding that section 84A did indeed apply to the sale of plot no 260 in favour of the appellant, that the sale was void by operation of law and therefore did not require a separate declaration of invalidity from the Collector, and that nothing in section 84A justified excluding from its operation those transfers that had been declared invalid before the provision was enacted. Accordingly, the High Court reinstated the Mamlatdar’s order dated 9 December 1957, by which the Mamlatdar had issued a certificate to the respondent stating that the transfer of plot no 260 was not invalid. The present appeal was filed by Bai Achhuba against that reinstated order after she obtained special leave from this Court. The appellant had been a party to all proceedings that followed the Collector’s order of 24 November 1952; she appeared before the Collector during his inquiry. At the hearing of the appeal it was asserted that she had also filed an application to the Collector, a claim that the respondent disputed. Because the respondent contended that earlier orders based on the villagers’ applications operated as res judicata, the Court deemed the matter of some significance and on 19 March 1963 directed the appellant to produce certified copies of the documents referred to in that order. Those documents were to include the alleged application submitted to the Collector and an affidavit by the appellant demonstrating her participation in the Collector’s proceedings. The appellant produced copies of certain orders of various courts and a copy of Special Civil Application No. 2220 of 1957, but she failed to produce a certified copy of the application that she claimed to have lodged with the Collector together with the other villagers. Nagarlal Dalpatram Vyas, describing himself as a Karbhari of the appellant, affirmed in his affidavit that he had personally approached the Mamlatdar of Deoda Prant, the Officer of Radhanpur, the Collector of Banaskantha, the Bombay Revenue Tribunal and the Gujarat High Court in order to obtain a certified copy of the applicant’s application to the Collector of Banaskantha, which had resulted in the Collector’s order of 24 November 1952; however, he was told that none of those courts or authorities possessed the record. He further stated that the Collector of Banaskantha informed him that the case record had been sent to the Bombay High Court. On inquiry it is

The Court examined the record and observed that the Gujarat High Court did not possess the document, although under normal circumstances it should have received the document from the Bombay High Court. The respondent submitted a counter‑affidavit asserting that the appellant had never filed any petition or application before the Collector under section 84 of the Act seeking eviction. Relying on that allegation, the Court expressed that it was not convinced that the appellant had applied to the Government or to the Collector at the same time as the other villagers whose applications prompted the Collector to conduct an inquiry and issue the order dated 24 November 1952. The order issued by the Collector made no reference to any application by the appellant; instead, it recorded that certain persons from the village of Duchakwada, including agriculturists and tenants of Duchakwada Jagir, had submitted applications requesting that the sale deed identified as 1/SCI/64‑55 be declared void and that the village records be corrected accordingly. Moreover, none of the other judicial orders referred to an application by Bai Achhuba to the Collector, even though some of those orders clearly mentioned her application to the Mamlatdar. The Revenue Tribunal’s order dated 3 June 1957 stated: “The original proceeding started on an application made to the Collector of Banaskantha by some villagers of Duchakwada.” The High Court, in its order on Special Civil Application No. 2220 of 1957, referred to the appellant’s application to the Mamlatdar and added: “It would appear that shortly before this application, an application had been made by certain villagers of the place and by the application the villagers claimed that the sale deed should be declared void and the village records should be corrected accordingly.” From these facts, the Court identified four issues for determination. First, whether any proceedings that were initiated on the villagers’ application for setting aside the sale deed and correcting the record could be characterised as proceedings under section 84 of the Act. Second, whether the Collector, in such proceedings, could issue a declaration—distinct from a decision—concerning the invalidity of the sale deed, or whether the Collector could only decide on the invalidity in order to form an opinion on whether the person against whom the proceeding was taken was in unauthorised or wrongful possession and therefore subject to eviction. Third, whether the Collector’s order—whether it was a declaration or merely a decision on the invalidity of the sale deed relating to plot no. 260—had become final before the provisions of section 84A of the Act came into force on 1 August 1956. Fourth, if such an order had indeed become final, whether that finality affected the operation of section 48A in the present case. Regarding the first issue, the Court noted that it could be presumed that the proceedings before the Collector in 1952 were proceedings under section 84 of the Act, as they had been treated by both the Revenue Tribunal and the High Court in the various proceedings before them. Concerning the second issue, the Court indicated that its opinion was that no provision of the Act empowered the Collector to make a declaration that the sale deed was invalid or void for contravening sections 63 and 64 of the Act.

The Court observed that none of the provisions of the Act confer upon the Collector the authority to issue a formal declaration that a sale deed is invalid or void on the ground that it breaches sections sixty‑three or sixty‑four of the Act. In a judgment dated 2 July 1956 in Special Civil Application No 2817 of 1955, dealing with plot number 231, the Court stated that an order issued by a Collector directing the summary eviction of a person who, in the Collector’s view, is occupying the land without authority or is in wrongful possession does not finally resolve any question of title. The Court further agreed with the Revenue Tribunal that the petitioner, Kalidas Oza, remains free to commence a civil suit in a Civil Court for determination of his title. Subsequently, in another judgment dated 18 December 1957 in Special Civil Application No 2220 of 1957, the Court considered the argument presented by counsel that a Tenancy Court lacks the power to declare a sale, which contravenes either section sixty‑three or section sixty‑four, to be invalid. The Court agreed that a Tenancy Court is not competent to make such a declaration; that power resides with a Civil Court in accordance with section forty‑two of the Specific Relief Act. However, the Court rejected the contention that a Tenancy Court cannot decide whether a breach of section sixty‑three or section sixty‑four has occurred, noting that the Collector and the Bombay Revenue Tribunal had already decided that question. From these pronouncements, the Court concluded that although, in certain proceedings under section eighty‑four of the Act, the Collector must record a finding that a particular sale deed is invalid and consequently that the possessor is occupying the land without authority, the Collector does not possess the power to issue a formal declaration of invalidity. Such a formal declaration is ordinarily the domain of a Civil Court unless a specific statute expressly authorises another officer or court to make that declaration. Accordingly, the Collector could not, in proceedings under section eighty‑four, declare a sale deed to be invalid. The only determination made by the Collector in his order of 18 November 1952 was that, according to the law, the sale deed in favour of respondent number 1 was invalid. The appellant evidently understood that the Collector’s decision did not amount to the setting aside or formal declaration of the deed as void, and therefore initiated a civil suit in 1953 seeking a declaration that the sale deed was null and void and also seeking possession of the properties covered by the deed.

The civil suit that had been filed to declare the sale deed null and void was dismissed pursuant to Order IX Rule 8 read together with Order XVII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order issued by the Collector, which held that the sale deed was invalid, had not become final at the time when section 84A of the Act came into force on 1 August 1956. Earlier, on 2 July 1956, the High Court had remanded the dispute to the Revenue Tribunal, directing that a decision be rendered in accordance with the law. The Revenue Tribunal subsequently delivered its order on 3 June 1957. Consequently, in addition to the earlier observation that the Collector possessed no authority to declare a sale deed invalid while acting under section 84 of the Act, it was also evident that the Collector’s declaration had not attained finality before the commencement of section 84A. Because the declaration was not final, the respondent was entitled to rely upon the provisions of section 84A, which permitted validation of the sale deed executed between 28 December 1948 and 15 June 1955 upon payment of the prescribed penalty under sub‑section (1) of that section.

Section 84A confers upon the Mamlatdar the power to issue a certificate of validity for a transfer deed, while sub‑section (3) provides that the Mamlatdar shall declare the transfer invalid if the transferee fails to pay the stipulated penalty. Thus, the question of whether a transfer deed is valid or invalid falls within the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar under the said provision. Exercising this jurisdiction, the Mamlatdar issued a notice on 7 October 1957 to the respondent, directing payment of a penalty of Rs 100, which was calculated at a rate of five per cent on the consideration stated in the sale deed. Subsequently, on 9 December 1957, the Mamlatdar issued the required certificate confirming the validity of the sale deed after the respondent had paid Rs 35. The record does not necessitate an adjudication on the issue of whether the Mamlatdar could certify a transfer as valid when a competent court had previously declared it invalid.

The Court held that the order of the High Court that was under appeal was correct, and accordingly dismissed the appeal. In the final order, the Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored the order of the Revenue Tribunal. The costs of the proceedings were directed to be borne by Respondent No. 1.