Bachchoo Lal vs State Of Uttar Pradesh and Anr

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 126 of 1961

Decision Date: 25 April, 1963

Coram: Raghubar Dayal J.

In this case the Supreme Court of India issued its judgment on 25 April 1963 concerning an appeal filed by Bachchoo Lal against the State of Uttar Pradesh and another respondent. The matter arose under the United Provinces District Board Act, 1922 (Act X of 1922), specifically section 107, which deals with the penalty for obstructing persons employed by the District Board. The factual background involved a lease taken by a Raja Sahib from the District Board of Allahabad for the purpose of collecting market dues, known as “Tah Bazari” dues, arising from the sale of commodities in the local bazaar. The appellant, Bachchoo Lal, was employed by the Raja to collect these dues on his behalf.

According to the evidence, a peon employed by the Raja approached Shyam Lal, who had sold linseed to Mewa Lal (the second respondent). The peon requested Shyam Lal to appear before the Munim and to pay the market dues that were due. Mewa Lal instructed Shyam Lal not to make the payment. When Shyam Lal complied with the peon’s request, the peon escorted him to the appellant. At that point, Mewa Lal, armed with a lathi, arrived and, when the appellant questioned him about the disturbance of the dues collection, he verbally abused the appellant in a filthy manner and threatened to kill him.

Subsequently, the appellant obtained sanction from the District Magistrate and lodged a complaint against Mewa Lal, seeking prosecution under section 107 of the United Provinces District Board Act. The trial magistrate convicted Mewa Lal of offences under sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code as well as under section 107 of the Act. The conviction was appealed to the Sessions Court, which acquitted Mewa Lal of all charges. The appellant then appealed to the High Court, but the High Court dismissed the appeal.

On further appeal by certificate to this Court, the appellant raised three contentions: (i) that the Sessions Court’s order of acquittal was defective because the appellant had not been given notice of the hearing of the appeal; (ii) that the High Court erred in holding that the Raja could not collect the market dues through his agents; and (iii) that the appellant possessed the necessary sanction under section 182 of the Act to prosecute Mewa Lal.

The Court examined the scope of section 107 and held that the provision does not create an offence for obstructing or molesting an employee of a person who is under contract with the Board. The section expressly refers to two categories of persons: those employed directly by the District Board and those who are under contract with the Board. The Court observed that the Raja, and not the appellant, falls within the second category, while the appellant is merely an employee of the Raja and not an employee of the District Board. Consequently, the Court concluded that the acquittal of the second respondent could not be disturbed on the merits. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

In this case, the Court concluded that the appeal must be dismissed. The appeal was not examined on its merits. The Court considered it unnecessary to decide the first contention raised by the appellant. It also refrained from expressing any view on the second contention because the specific terms of the lease were not known to the Court. The Court, however, found the third contention to be correct and accordingly affirmed the position taken on that point. The judgment was rendered in the criminal appellate jurisdiction under Criminal Appeal No 126 of 1961. The appeal arose from a judgment and order dated 3 May 1961 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No 381 of 1960. Counsel for the appellant was instructed, while the respondent did not appear before the Court. The judgment was delivered on 25 April 1963 by Justice Raghu Bar Dayal. The factual background involved Raja Kamlakar Singh of Shankargarh, Uttar Pradesh, who had obtained a lease from the District Board, Allahabad, for the purpose of realizing bayai and bazaar dues arising from the sale of commodities in the Shankargarh bazaar. Bachchoo Lal was employed by the Raja to collect these dues. On 13 April 1959, Bahadur Singh, a peon serving the Raja, requested Shyam Lal Kurmi, the second prosecution witness, who had sold two bullock‑loads of linseed to Mewa Lal (respondent 2) in that bazaar, to accompany him to the Munim so that the bayai dues could be paid. Mewa Lal instructed Shyam Lal not to make the payment. Nonetheless, the peon escorted Shyam Lal to Bachchoo Lal at the grain godown. At that location, Mewa Lal, armed with a lathi, confronted Bachchoo Lal after being asked why he was obstructing the collection of dues. Mewa Lal then verbally abused Bachchoo Lal in a vulgar manner and threatened to break his hands and feet and to kill him. Following this incident, Bachchoo Lal lodged a complaint against Mewa Lal after obtaining sanction from the District Magistrate to prosecute Mewa Lal for an offence under section 107 of the United Provinces District Board Act, 1922 (U.P. Act No X of 1922). The trial court, a second‑class Tashildar Magistrate of Karchana, convicted Mewa Lal of offences under sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and also under section 107 of the Act. On appeal, the Sessions Judge at Allahabad set aside the conviction, holding that the proper authority for prosecution under section 107 of the Act in favour of Bachchoo Lal had not been established, that the trial magistrate lacked jurisdiction to try an offence under section 506, which required a first‑class magistrate, and that the prosecution case under section 504 was suspicious.

Thereafter, Bachchoo Lal filed an appeal against the Sessions Judge’s acquittal of Mewa Lal after securing permission from the High Court under subsection (3) of section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court dismissed the appeal, rejecting the appellant’s contentions that, being the complainant and therefore a party to the criminal case against Mewa Lal, he should have been served notice of the appeal by the Sessions Judge and should also have been afforded an opportunity to be heard, as required by the principles of natural justice and the substantive right of appeal conferred by section 417(3) of the Code.

In this case, the Court observed that the principles of natural justice required that the appellant be given notice of the appeal and an opportunity to be heard, because section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure granted a substantive right of appeal to the complainant. The High Court had previously held that, although the Sessions Judge was incorrect in concluding that the sanction required under section 182 of the Act had not been produced, the sanction that was produced bore the name of the Raja Sahib of Shankargarh and not that of Bachchoo Lal. Consequently, the High Court found the complaint to be invalid and held that the Raja Sahib could not collect Tah Bazari through his agents. The High Court also concluded that the acquittal of the accused on the charge under section 506 of the Indian Penal Code was justified, and that the acquittal on the charge under section 504 of the Indian Penal Code could not be said to be erroneous. Moreover, the High Court expressed the view that the matter was too trivial to warrant interference with the order of acquittal, even if a different view of the facts had been taken by the Sessions Judge. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the appeal. After obtaining the necessary certificate under article 134(I)(c) of the Constitution, Bachchoo Lal filed the present appeal. The State of Uttar Pradesh was listed as the first respondent and Mewa Lal, the accused, was respondent No. 2.

The appellant raised three specific questions. The first question contended that the Assistant Sessions Judge should have issued notice of the appeal hearing to the appellant, whose complaint had led to the conviction of Mewa Lal by the Magistrate and against which order of conviction the appeal had been filed; no such notice was given, and therefore the order of acquittal was deemed unsound. The second question challenged the High Court’s conclusion that the Raja of Shankargarh could not collect the Tah Bazari dues through his agents. The third question asserted that Bachchoo Lal possessed the required sanction under section 182 of the Act for prosecuting Mewa Lal, and that the High Court’s finding to the contrary was erroneous. The Court held the third contention to be correct, stating that the authority under section 182 extended not only to the Raja of Shankargarh but also to several of his employees, including the appellant. The Court declined to express an opinion on the second contention because the terms of the lease executed by the District Board in favour of the Raja were unknown, and the Court was not concerned with the civil rights regarding the method of collecting dues under that lease. However, the Court expressed the view that section 107 of the Act does not make the obstruction or molestation of an employee of the person under contract with the Board an offence. Section 107 of the Act reads: “Whoever obstructs or molests a person employed by, or under contract with, the”.

The Court reproduced the relevant provision, stating that “Board under this Act in the performance of his duty or in the fulfilment of his contract, or removes a mark set up for the purpose of indicating any levels or direction necessary to the execution of works authorised by this Act, shall be liable on conviction to a fine which may extend to fifty rupees.” The provision expressly mentions obstruction or molestation of two distinct categories of persons. The first category comprises persons who are employed by the District Board under the Act. The Court observed that neither the Raja of Shankargarh nor the appellant, Bachchoo Lal, falls within this category because they are not employees of the District Board. The second category consists of persons who are engaged under a contract with the Board pursuant to the Act. The Court affirmed that, in this context, the person who is under contract with the Board is the Raja of Shankargarh and not Bachchoo Lal, who is merely an employee of the Raja. The Court further noted that it did not hear any argument from counsel on the merits of the case invoking section 504 of the Criminal Procedure Code and therefore accepted the trial court’s finding as recorded below. Considering all the material placed before it, the Court held that there was no ground to interfere with the acquittal of respondent number 2 on the merits of the case. Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to address the first question raised by the appellant and dismissed the appeal.