Addanki Tiruvenkata Thata Desika... vs State Of Andhra Pradesh and Anr

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Appeal (civil) 375 of 1961

Decision Date: 07 November 1963

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, N.R. Ayyangar, K. Subbarao, J.R. Mudholkar

In the matter titled Addanki Tiruvenkata Thata Desika … versus State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 7 November 1963. The case was recorded as Appeal (Civil) 375 of 1961. The petitioner was Addanki Tiruvankata Thata Desika Charyulu and the respondents were the State of Andhra Pradesh and another party. The bench hearing the appeal comprised P B Gajendragadkar, K Subbarao, K N Wanchoo, N R Ayyangar and J R Mudholkar, and the judgment was authored by Justice N R Ayyangar. The appeal challenged a decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and was taken up under a certificate of fitness issued pursuant to Article 133(1) of the Constitution on the ground that the issues raised involved substantial questions of law. The appellants were the heirs and legal representatives of the late Addanki Desikacharyulu, who for convenience is referred to as the appellant. The appellant had been the proprietor, also described as an inamdar, of the village of Shrotriem located in East Thakkellapadu. The Madras Legislature had enacted two statutes that were relevant to the dispute: the Madras Estates (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947) and the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Act XXVI of 1948). The former, commonly called the Rent Reduction Act, was intended, as its title suggests, to reduce the rent payable by tenants (ryots) in those estates to which the Act applied. The latter, referred to as the Abolition Act, was designed to abolish the intermediary estates owned by proprietors of the type defined in the legislation and to replace them with a direct relationship between the tenants and the Government. Acting under the authority conferred by the Rent Reduction Act, the Government of Madras appointed a Special Officer to investigate the exact amount by which the rent payable to the appellant by cultivators of his lands in Shrotriem should be reduced. After reviewing the officer’s report, the Government issued a notification dated 2 May 1950 directing the reduction of rents. At roughly the same time, a Settlement Officer, appointed under the Abolition Act, initiated proceedings to determine whether the Shrotriem estate should be taken over by the Government; the officer concluded that it should not remain in the appellant’s possession and issued a decision adverse to the appellant. The appellant then appealed this decision to the Tribunal constituted under the Abolition Act, but the Tribunal dismissed the appeal. Consequently, the appellant approached the High Court of Madras invoking its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking to set aside both the government’s rent‑reduction notification and the Settlement Officer’s decision. The appellant’s principal argument was that the Shrotriem estate he owned did not fall within the category of “estates” contemplated by either the Rent Reduction Act or the Abolition Act, and therefore the governmental actions taken under those statutes were without jurisdiction.

The Court observed that the Tribunal created under the Abolition Act had no authority to entertain the matters raised by the appellant, and therefore the proceedings before that Tribunal were wholly without jurisdiction. The appellant subsequently withdrew the writ petition, explaining that a suit in an ordinary civil court would be a more suitable forum for resolving the mixed questions of fact and law that arose. The Advocate‑General, who appeared on behalf of the State to oppose the writ, consented that the notice required under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code could be waived.

After withdrawing the writ, the appellant instituted a suit before the Subordinate Judge at Ongole in Guntur District. The suit sought a declaration that the Shrotriem of East Thakkellapadu did not constitute an “estate” within the meaning of the Rent Reduction Act, a characterization that formed the basis of the Government notification dated 2 May 1950. The suit also pleaded that the Shrotriem was not an “inam estate” under the Abolition Act, a description upon which the Settlement Officer’s decision and the Tribunal’s order were founded. In addition, the appellant requested an injunction restraining the State from taking any action under either of the two statutes in respect of the lands situated in the Shrotriem. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. Upon appeal, the High Court affirmed the dismissal but, recognizing the appellant’s right to pursue a further appeal, granted a certificate of fitness, thereby permitting the present appeal to be filed.

From this concise history, the Court identified three principal issues for determination. The first issue concerned whether the Shrotriem village could be said not to be an “estate” within the Rent Reduction Act. The second issue examined whether the Shrotriem could be said not to be an “inam estate” under the Abolition Act. Both the Subordinate Judge and the High Court answered the first issue in the affirmative, holding that the Shrotriem was not an “estate” within the scope of the Rent Reduction Act. Regarding the second issue, the Subordinate Judge also answered in the affirmative, but the High Court declined to explore that question, holding that it could not be raised in a civil suit. The Court therefore regarded the High Court’s refusal to consider the second issue as a separate, third question that required its own analysis.

The Court then proceeded to address the first question – whether the Shrotriem qualifies as an “estate” under the Rent Reduction Act – by referring to the relevant statutory provisions. The preamble of the Rent Reduction Act declares, among other objectives, that the Act was enacted to provide for the reduction of rents payable by ryots in estates governed by the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, bringing those rents approximately in line with the assessments levied on lands in ryotwari areas nearby, and to vest the collection of such rents exclusively in the State Government. Consistent with that purpose, section 1(2) of the Act provides that the enactment applies to all “estates” as defined in section 3, clause (2), of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. Moreover, the second section of the Rent Reduction Act empowers the State Government to appoint a special officer for any estate or estates, for the purpose of recommending fair and equitable rates of rent for the ryoti lands situated therein. These provisions form the basis for determining whether the Shrotriem falls within the statutory definition of “estate”.

After the Special Officer completed his enquiry, he was required to determine, following the prescribed procedure, the fair and equitable rates of rent payable by the ryot and to fix the amount by which the previously prevailing rates in the estate should be reduced. The Government then examined the officer’s report and issued a notification in the official Gazette that established the rates of rent to apply in the particular estates. Section 3(2) of the Rent Reduction Act made those notified rates final and binding on the parties. In the matter presently before the Court, the State Government adhered to that procedure and, on 2 May 1950, issued a notification under Section 3(2) of the Rent Reduction Act that fixed the rent rates payable by ryots in the Shrotriem of East Thakkellapadu, treating that area as an “estate.” At the time of these proceedings, the Rent Reduction Act contained no provision or prescribed procedure for conducting an inquiry to decide whether any village, villages, or other property for which rent rates were to be fixed by a special officer appointed by the Government, qualified as an “estate.” Consequently, it was evident that the Government’s authority to issue the notification appointing a special officer, as well as the validity of the officer’s subsequent determinations of fair and equitable rent for the ryots in those villages, and the Government’s issuance of a notification under Section 3 of the Rent Reduction Act, all hinged upon whether the property concerned was an “estate” as defined in Section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act. If the property was not an estate, the Government would plainly lack the power to apply the Act to it, and any orders resulting from the special officer’s inquiry would be beyond the Government’s jurisdiction. This precise argument was advanced by the appellant when he challenged the legitimacy of the Government’s proceedings and the notification issued under the Act in relation to the Shrotriem. The pivotal issue, therefore, was whether the Shrotriem constituted an “estate” within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, because only such estates fell within the ambit of the Rent Reduction Act. Section 3(2) of the Estates Land Act, 1908, essentially enumerates four categories of tenures under which land may be held. The Court’s attention was directed to clause (d) of that definition, which deals with “inams.” Clause (d) states that an “estate” includes any inam village whose grant has been made, confirmed, or recognised by the Government, even if, after the grant, the village has been divided among the grantees or their successors in title.

The statute contains a sub‑section that is followed by three explanatory notes, but for the present appeal only the first explanation is material. That first explanation states: “Where a grant as inam is expressed to be of a named village, the area which forms the subject‑matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purpose.” The appellant, before the lower courts and before this Court, argued that the Shrotriem grant did not satisfy this definition. The appellant’s contentions were set out in four overlapping points: first, that the grant was not made of a named village, so the opening words of the explanation did not apply; second, that the grant did not cover the whole village of East Thakkellapadu but only a specific portion of land within the village, and therefore it failed to meet the requirements of clause (d) of Section 3(2); third, that there was no proof that other parcels of land within the village, which had been granted inam to other parties, were granted at a date earlier than the Shrotriem grant to the appellant’s ancestors, and consequently the second limb of the explanation was not triggered; and fourth, that the lands left out of the inam were reserved by the grantor, but the reservation was not for communal purposes, rendering the concluding part of the explanation inapplicable.

Before addressing each of these submissions, the Court first needed to determine the effect of the documentary material that had been placed on record concerning the nature and extent of the grant. The definition of “estate” in Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, read together with the explanatory note, makes it clear that the decisive factor is the precise terms of the grant, both in its form and in the quantum of interest conferred. In other words, the grant itself is the primary source for deciding whether an inam grant constitutes an “estate.” In the present case the original grant document is not available. In the absence of the grant, the usual source for ascertaining its terms is the entry made in the various columns of the Inam Fair Register. The Inam Fair Register for the village that is the subject of the suit is, however, on record, and the appellant’s counsel has based his arguments on the entries that appear in that register.

The Court noted that a certified copy of the relevant extract from the Inam Fair Register of the village has been marked as Exhibit A‑2. While examining this exhibit, the Court observed that the register also shows two minor inams in the village, a fact that will be considered later in the analysis of the third contention raised by the appellant.

The reference to the village concerned the basis of the third contention previously mentioned, and the Court noted that the analysis of two minor inams would be addressed subsequently. In column number two of the Inam Fair Register, the Shrotriem under discussion is characterised as a personal grant. Column three, headed “Survey No. etc. of the fields comprised in the grant,” enumerates both the dry lands and the Poramboke, with their respective sizes recorded in columns four and five. The dry lands are measured at 585.62 acres in English units, while the Poramboke measures 101.35 acres, giving a combined total of 686.97 acres. Considering the heading of column five, the Court held that the whole area of 686.97 acres should be treated as the subject matter of the grant.

The Court then set out the particulars of the Poramboke, which in local measurement is shown as 32‑7‑0, equivalent to 101.35 acres. Counsel for the appellant relied on this figure to argue that the grant did not encompass the entire village but only specific portions, and further contended that the grantor had reserved certain lands. At the lower part of column four, the register lists the components of the Poramboke as the village site, ponds, vagus, paths and tsavudu (saline land unsuitable for cultivation), all together amounting to the 32‑7‑0 local measure (101.35 acres). In addition, the register’s column thirteen refers to two minor inams that are documented by separate title deeds, the certified extracts of which are presented as Exhibits A‑3 and A‑4. These minor inams are said to have been excluded from the Shrotriemdar’s property. Exhibit A‑3 relates to a personal grant covering 13.13 acres, while Exhibit A‑4 concerns a grant of 26.34 acres for which a jodi of twelve rupees was payable. Column nine of Exhibit A‑2 shows that the jodi payable by the Shrotriemdar was calculated after deducting the twelve rupees owed for the two minor inams. The Court indicated that it would later examine the legal significance of the existence of these minor inams when addressing the third point raised by counsel.

Turning to the observations of the Deputy Collector, the Court found that his comments shed further light on the controversy. The Deputy Collector remarked that the present accounts record the Shrotriem of the present village together with the Shrotriem of Chekrayapalem as a single entry, even though they are distinct villages located ten miles apart. He explained that in the Inam Book of Fasli 1211 the two villages are entered as one and the jodi for both villages is combined, yet the Karnams of the two villages differ, and the sharers who enjoy the Shrotriem of Thakkellapadu do not enjoy Chekrayapalem. Consequently, the Deputy Collector suggested that it would be appropriate for the two Shrotriems to be confirmed separately.

The Court observed that the value of Chekrayapalem was generally considered to be half of the value of the Shrotriem in question, and that each village’s jodi was entered separately in the Karnam’s accounts, which showed the Shrotriem’s jodi as Rs 269‑8‑0. It further noted that in the Fasli 1212 accounts an amount of Rs 29‑15‑0 was entered as the then‑existing inam, and that this inam was said to be older than the Shrotriem. The Court recorded that certain inamdars, identified as Desamadams, paid a jodi of Rs 12 to the Shrotriemdars, and that the Desamadam inams were described as being of immemorial origin, a fact which the Shrotriemdars themselves admitted, suggesting that the jodi might have originally been imposed by the Shrotriemdars. It was explained that the village of Chekrayapalem, being equal to one‑half of the Shrotriem, was rented at a value of Rs 213, and that, consequently, the value of the Shrotriem should be presumed to be Rs 426, a figure that approximated the average income of the ten years preceding Fasli 1221. The Court then turned to the issues raised by learned counsel, beginning with the question of whether the grant concerned a specifically named village. The Court found that the Deputy Collector’s earlier remarks strongly supported the view that the grant was indeed of the named village of Thakkellapadu, and it observed that the heading in the Register of Inams (Ex‑A2) used the phrase “in the village,” a wording that, according to established case law, does not preclude the grant of an entire village. The second question presented was whether the entire lands of the village were granted, and if any portion was reserved. In addressing this, the Court noted that Column 3 of Ex‑A2 listed both the dry land and the Poramboke, totalling 686.97 acres as shown in Columns 4 and 5, as the extent of the inam. While the grant of all dry lands was undisputed, counsel argued that the Poramboke was excluded; however, the Court found that the entries in Columns 3 and 4 of the Inam Fair Register clearly indicated that the Poramboke formed part of the grant, rendering any contention that it was reserved by the grantor untenable. The Court also referred to precedent, observing that even when the expression “deduct Poramboke” is used, it is intended merely to indicate deduction for assessment purposes, not exclusion from the grant.

The Court explained that the expression “deduct poramboke” was not used to exclude the poramboke from the grant but merely to show that it was being subtracted for the purpose of assessment, because waste land is not assessed, as stated in Krishnaswami v. Perumal Goundan, 1950 AIR(PC) 105 at p. 108. The present case was even stronger, since Column 3 of the register demonstrated that the poramboke was included within the grant. The Court then turned to the effect of the two minor inams. Counsel had drawn attention to a deduction of two minor inams covering 29.1 local units—approximately 90 acres—illustrated in Exhibits A‑3 and B‑4 in Column 13 of Exhibit A‑2. According to the remarks of the Deputy Collector, the two inams, described as Desamadam, were of immemorial origin and the shrotriemdars had, in 1862, acknowledged that they pre‑dated the shrotriem. The Deputy Collector’s record also noted that a levy called jodi was payable by the holders of the Desamadam to the shrotriemdars, and suggested that the jodi might have been imposed by the shrotriemdars themselves. These statements imply either that the minor inams existed before the shrotriem grant and that the shrotriemdars subsequently collected jodi from them, or that the minor inams were created by the shrotriemdars. In either circumstance, the Court held that their existence did not diminish the character of the shrotriem as an “estate” within Section 3(2)(d) read with Explanation (1) of the Estates Land Act. Accordingly, on the facts, there was no reservation of any portion of the village at the time the named village was granted to the shrotriemdars; the entire village, except for the small area occupied by the two pre‑existing minor inams, was granted as shrotriem. Consequently, the presence of these earlier minor inams did not indicate any reservation by the grantor and did not negate the classification of the shrotriem grant as an inam within Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act. The Court then considered the contention that portions of the land listed under “Poramboke” in Column 4 comprised not only village sites, ponds, vagus and paths used communally but also “tsavadu”, meaning saline land unsuitable for cultivation, amounting to more than fifty acres, and that because this saline land was reserved, the case fell outside the last part of the first explanation to Section 3(2)(d). The Court reiterated that the whole poramboke area of 101.35 acres, together with the dry land measuring 585.62 acres, had been granted, which was sufficient to reject the argument. Apart from the entry in Column 3 read with Columns 4 and 5, which formed the basis of the Court’s conclusion, …

Based on the material before it, the Court observed that it was inconceivable for the grantor, while transferring the dry lands situated in the village, to retain for his own use or for a future grant the saline land that was completely unsuitable for cultivation. The Court therefore concluded that the last contention raised by the party lacked any substantive merit. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the learned Judges of the High Court were correct in holding that the Government’s notification issued under the Rent Reduction Act was valid. The Court then indicated that the next issue to be examined was whether the shrotriem qualified as an “inam estate” within the meaning of the Abolition Act. The Court proceeded to recapitulate the short factual background relevant to this particular point. It noted that the Government had published a notification in the Official Gazette directing the reduction of rents in the suit‑village pursuant to the Rent Reduction Act, and that while the process of effecting that reduction was underway, the Settlement Officer, exercising powers under Section 9 of the Abolition Act, initiated suo motu proceedings to inquire into and determine whether the shrotriem constituted an “inam estate.” After completing the inquiry, the Settlement Officer issued an order dated 20 February 1950, finding that the shrotriem was indeed an “inam estate.”

The plaintiff, identified as the predecessor of the present appellants, subsequently appealed to the Tribunal established under Section 8 of the Abolition Act, an authority vested with appellate powers by that Act. That appeal was dismissed on 25 June 1951. In response, the plaintiff instituted a writ petition before the High Court of Madras, contending that the shrotriem was not an “inam estate” and that the orders of both the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal, which held otherwise, were affected by error and were otherwise illegal. The High Court of Madras refrained from deciding the merits of those contentions, observing that they involved disputed questions of fact, and consequently directed the plaintiff to pursue a civil suit to obtain the relief to which he claimed entitlement. That civil suit formed the basis of the present appeal. Within that suit, the plaintiff advanced two distinct contentions. The first, characterising the merits of the case, asserted that the shrotriem could not be described as an “inam estate” within the definition contained in the Abolition Act because the original inam grant comprised both the warams, and therefore the grant did not constitute an “estate” as defined in Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act as it existed prior to its 1936 amendment. The second contention challenged the procedural validity of the Tribunal’s dismissal of the appeal, arguing that the Tribunal’s order was invalid because it had been rendered by only two members, whereas the Abolition Act required a three‑member appellate Tribunal. The learned trial Judge, while upholding the second, procedural contention, also proceeded to consider the substantive merit issue concerning the status of the shrotriem.

In the original suit, the trial judge ruled against the plaintiff and confirmed the finding of the Settlement Officer that had been reached in the enquiry conducted under section 9 of the Abolition Act. When the plaintiff appealed this decision to the High Court, the presiding High Court judge reached the same view as the trial judge on the second issue, namely the validity of the Tribunal’s dismissal of the appeal. The High Court, however, held that because the dismissal was invalid, the appeal should be deemed to remain pending before the Tribunal and not to have been finally disposed of. Moreover, the High Court concluded that a construction of the Abolition Act gave exclusive jurisdiction over the question of whether the shrotriem constituted an “inam estate” to the Settlement Officer and, on further appeal, to the Tribunal, leaving the civil courts without jurisdiction to determine that question. On the basis of that determination the High Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The appellant then submitted that the High Court judges were mistaken in holding that the civil courts were barred by the Abolition Act from hearing his complaint that the shrotriem was not an inam estate. The appellant further argued that the trial judge’s merit judgment, which, after considering the evidence presented by the appellant, held that the shrotriem was an “inam estate”, was extremely unsatisfactory. It was contended that the High Court judges hearing the appeal should either have set aside the trial judge’s finding and decided the matter themselves or have remanded the case for further investigation by the trial court. The Court agreed that the trial judge’s finding on the status of the shrotriem as an “inam estate” was not satisfactory. Nonetheless, the Court held that if the civil courts possessed jurisdiction to decide the issue, the High Court should have followed one of the two courses suggested by counsel. The Court, however, was of the opinion that the High Court judges were correct in concluding that the civil courts’ jurisdiction was barred by the provisions of the Abolition Act, a point to which reference would be made. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code states, omitting the non‑material explanation, that “The Courts shall, subject to the provisions herein contained, have jurisdiction to try all suits of the civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.” There is no doubt that a suit seeking a declaration that the shrotriem owned by the plaintiff does not fall within a particular tenure, and that such a declaration would subject the land to statutes that severely restrict the plaintiff’s rights, is a suit of a civil nature. It is also clear that the exclusion of civil‑court jurisdiction cannot be assumed lightly or inferred without proper analysis. Consequently, the question arose as to whether the jurisdiction of the civil courts in this matter was clearly barred, either expressly or by necessary implication.

The Court considered whether the jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain the present suit was expressly barred or whether it could be excluded by necessary implication. It observed that the Abolition Act contained no explicit provision that prohibited civil courts from hearing suits of this character or from trying them. Nevertheless, the Court held that a bar might arise by necessary implication, and therefore it was essential to examine the relevant provisions of the Act to determine whether the continued existence of civil‑court jurisdiction was compatible with those provisions. The Court turned to Section 2 of the Act, which defines the expressions used therein. The only definition required for this enquiry was that of “estate,” the principal term employed in the Act to denote the tenure of holding that was to be abolished and replaced by the Ryotwari system. Section 2 defined “estate” as “a zamindari or an under‑tenure or an inam estate.” The Court clarified that the present matter did not involve the first two categories of land holding but concerned the third category, namely inam estates. The definition of “inam estate” was found in Section 2(7) of the Abolition Act, which described it as “an estate within the meaning of Section 3, clause (2)(d), of the Estates Land Act, but does not include an inam village which became an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936.” The Court then noted that Section 5 of the Act dealt with the appointment and functions of Settlement Officers, while Section 8 provided for the constitution of Tribunals. The pivotal provision for the present case was Section 9, titled “Determination of inam estate.” Section 9 laid down that, as soon as practicable after the enactment of the Act, the Settlement Officer could, either suo motu or on an application, inquire and determine whether any inam village within his jurisdiction constituted an inam estate. Before conducting the inquiry, the Settlement Officer was required to publish a notice in the village, in the prescribed manner, calling upon all persons claiming an interest in any land in the village to file statements before him relating to the question of whether the village was an inam estate. The Settlement Officer was then obligated to hear the parties, to give them a reasonable opportunity to adduce oral or documentary evidence, to examine any documents he believed were in the Government’s possession and relevant to the issue, and finally to render his decision in writing. The statute further provided that any person dissatisfied with the Settlement Officer’s decision could, within two months of the decision—or within any additional period that the Tribunal might allow—appeal to the Tribunal. Upon such an appeal, the Tribunal was required to publish a notice in the village, in the prescribed manner, requiring all persons who had applied to the Settlement Officer or filed statements to appear before the Tribunal.

In this case, the Tribunal was required, after hearing the parties and providing them with a reasonable opportunity to be heard, to render its decision. The judgment of the Tribunal under this provision was declared final and not subject to challenge in any court of law. Moreover, the Court held that any decision made by the Settlement Officer under subsection (3) or by the Tribunal under subsection (4) could not be declared invalid merely because of a defect in the form of the notice mentioned in subsection (2) or subsection (4), nor because of any irregularity in the manner of its publication. The Court further explained that every decision issued by the Tribunal, and, subject to that, every decision made by the Settlement Officer under this Section, would bind all persons claiming an interest in any land within the village. This binding effect applied even to those individuals who had not filed any application, submitted any statement, presented any evidence, or otherwise taken part in the proceedings before the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal. Additionally, the Court noted that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, both the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal were entitled to presume that an inam village constituted an inam estate.

Turning to the broader statutory framework, the Court began by acknowledging that, under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, there exists a presumption against the removal of the ordinary courts’ jurisdiction; however, this presumption could be displaced by the combined effect of the various provisions contained in Section 9 of the Act. First, subsection (1) empowered the Settlement Officer to “enquire and determine” whether any “inam village” was an “inam estate.” Subsections (2) and (3) then laid down the procedural steps for that enquiry and determination, expressly requiring that every person with an interest in the outcome be given a chance to participate and to adduce evidence supporting his or her position. Subsection (4)(a) subsequently provided for an appeal from the Settlement Officer’s decision to a Tribunal, and the nature of that Tribunal was made significant by Section 8(2), which stipulated that each Tribunal would consist of three members: a Chairman who was a District Judge or an officer eligible for appointment as a District Judge, a second member who was a Subordinate Judge or an officer eligible for appointment as a Subordinate Judge, and a third member who was a Revenue Divisional Officer or an officer eligible for appointment as a Revenue Divisional Officer. Clause (c) of subsection (4) then conferred finality on the Tribunal’s decision and insulated it from being questioned in any court of law. Finally, as a direct consequence of these provisions, subsection (6) rendered the decisions of both the Tribunal and, subject to them, the Settlement Officer binding on all persons who either participated in the proceedings or were legally entitled to do so, regardless of whether they actually engaged in the process.

In the present case the Court examined a situation in which a party dissatisfied with the determination of a Settlement Officer exercised the statutory right to appeal to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal subsequently issued its own decision. Section 9(4)(c) of the Act expressly prohibited a Civil Court from entertaining any challenge to the correctness of such an appellate decision. Accordingly, the Court observed that there existed a clear statutory bar preventing the Civil Court from adjudicating the specific question of whether “any inam village” constituted an inam estate. The issue then raised before the Court was whether this bar extended to a circumstance in which the Settlement Officer, after conducting an enquiry, had resolved the same question and no further appeal to the Tribunal had been filed. Counsel for the appellant contended that the statutory prohibition applied only to orders of the Tribunal and could not be read to cover the orders of a Settlement Officer. The appellant relied on the observation that Section 9(4)(c) seemed to confer finality solely on Tribunal orders, and therefore argued that a Civil Court could entertain a suit challenging a Settlement Officer’s determination in the absence of an appeal.

The Court rejected this contention as untenable. It held that clause (c) must be read together with the positive provision contained in sub‑section (6), which declares the Tribunal’s decision to be binding on all interested persons and accords a similar binding effect to the decisions of a Settlement Officer when no appeal has been filed against them. The statute, the Court explained, did not intend to draw any distinction between orders affirmed by a Tribunal and those that attained finality because they were not appealed within the prescribed period. If the appellant’s argument were accepted, the consequence would be that, after a Settlement Officer rendered a decision under Section 9(1), an aggrieved party could either appeal to the Tribunal within the stipulated time or, alternatively, file a suit in a Civil Court within the limitation period prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act. Such a dual route would permit multiple parties with similar interests to pursue different remedies—one filing a suit, another seeking a Tribunal appeal—thereby undermining the statutory scheme that established a hierarchical adjudicatory process. The Court concluded that, given the purpose of the Act to create an exclusive mechanism for determining the question of an inam estate, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to try or retry the same question was barred.

The Court considered the provision contained in Section 9(4)(c) read together with Section 9(6), which had already been examined. In light of those provisions, the Court stated without hesitation that, insofar as the question framed in Section 9(1) is concerned, the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and of the Tribunal is exclusive, and consequently the Civil Courts are prohibited from trying or retrying that same question. Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that this exclusion of jurisdiction is subject to two qualifications. The first qualification derives from the reservation expressed by Lord Thankerton in the case of Secretary of State v. Mask and Co., reported in 67 Ind App 222 at page 236 (also 1940 AIR (PC) 105 at page 110). After concluding that the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, which established a special mechanism for determining the correct duty payable under that Act, barred any recourse to the Civil Courts to question the correctness of the authorities’ decisions, Lord Thankerton added that it is well settled that even when jurisdiction is excluded, the civil courts retain the authority to examine cases where the provisions of the Act have not been observed, or where the statutory tribunal has failed to act in accordance with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The scope of this exception was later examined by this Court in the matter of Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 315 of 1962 decided on 25 January 1963 and reported in 1964 AIR (SC) 322. Speaking for the Court, Justice Gajendragadkar explained that non‑compliance with the statutory provisions referred to by the Privy Council must be understood as non‑compliance with those fundamental provisions whose breach would render the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and devoid of jurisdiction. Likewise, if an authority acts in violation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, such a breach may render the proceedings illegal and void, thereby affecting the validity of the order issued by that authority. In cases where the defect goes to the root of the order and makes it legally invalid, these observations may be invoked to support the contention that a civil court may exercise its jurisdiction notwithstanding a contrary statutory provision. The Court noted that none of the questions raised by Lord Thankerton or discussed by Justice Gajendragadkar is presented in the appeal before it, and therefore it is unnecessary to explore the precise limits of that exception in the present case. The second qualification concerns the precise extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. On this point, the Court referred to the formulation given by Lord Esher in The Queen v. The Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income Tax, reported in 1888 21 QBD 313 at pages 319‑320, where it was observed that when an inferior court or tribunal is created by an Act of Parliament, the legislature must determine the scope of the powers it confers on that tribunal or body.

In the judgment, the Court explained that when a body was established by an Act of Parliament to decide facts, the legislature had to specify the exact powers that it would confer on that body. The legislature could, for example, state that the body would have jurisdiction to act only if a particular state of facts existed and was shown to it before it proceeded, and that the body would not have authority otherwise. In such a situation the body was not permitted to decide conclusively whether that factual state existed; if it exercised jurisdiction without the existence of the required fact, its actions could be challenged and would be held to be beyond its jurisdiction. The Court further observed that the legislature might alternatively vest the tribunal with the power to determine whether the preliminary facts existed and, upon finding that they did, to continue with further action. When the legislature gave a tribunal limited jurisdiction, it also had to decide whether any appeal would be available from the tribunal’s decisions, because in the absence of a statutory provision for appeal, none would exist. The Court rejected the view that a tribunal could never create its own jurisdiction by mistakenly finding certain facts to exist, noting that where the statute expressly authorised the tribunal to determine all facts, including the preliminary ones on which further jurisdiction depended, and where the statute provided no right of appeal, no appeal could arise from that exercise of jurisdiction.

The Court then noted that deciding whether a particular case fell into the first or the second category depended on the purpose of the statute, its overall scheme, the scope of enquiry assigned to the tribunal, and other relevant considerations. In the present matter, the relevant provision was Section 9(1) of the Act, which prescribed and limited the functions of the Settlement Officer and, by implication, of the appellate forum. Section 9(1) empowered the Settlement Officer to determine whether any “inam village” was “an inam estate” and the object of the Act was to abolish only “inam estates”. This determination involved two distinct inquiries because not every “inam village” necessarily qualified as an “inam estate”. The first inquiry concerned whether a particular property was an “inam village”, and the second inquiry concerned whether that village satisfied the definition of an “inam estate” found in Section 2(7). The Court observed that the first question—whether the grant concerned an “inam village”—was itself described in Section 9(1) as an extrinsic fact that had to exist before the Settlement Officer could embark on the enquiry contemplated by that provision. Consequently, any determination by the Settlement Officer of this preliminary question would be essential before he could exercise the jurisdiction conferred on him.

In this case the Court observed that the Abolition Act, as it stood on the date relevant to the appeal, contained no provision that permitted the Settlement Officer to inquire into the preliminary question of whether the land in dispute qualified as an “inam village.” Consequently, when parties opposed to the proceedings initiated before the Settlement Officer under Section 9 contended that the property did not fall within the description of an “inam village,” the Officer was obliged to decide that issue. He could not commence the further inquiry mandated by Section 9(1) until he was satisfied that the prerequisite condition – that the property was indeed an “inam village” – was met. Section 9(1) treats the existence of an “inam village” as a factual assumption on which the Officer’s jurisdiction to determine matters within his remit depends. Because the statute contains no language authorising the Officer to finally decide that preliminary classification, he could not create jurisdiction for himself by erroneously ruling on that condition. Accordingly, any determination by the Officer on whether the property is an “inam village” was binding on the parties only for the purposes of the proceedings under the Act and remained subject to review by the Tribunal. That preliminary finding could be challenged later in an ordinary court if the question arose again. By contrast, the second question – whether an “inam village” qualifies as an “inam estate” within the meaning of the Act – fell squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer, thereby excluding civil courts from intervening. The Court referred to the Madras High Court decision in Venkatanarasayya v. State of Madras, where Chief Justice Rajamannar explained that when the grant does not comprise a village, the provisions of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 are inapplicable and the aggrieved party retains a right of suit because the statute does not govern the facts. This pronouncement correctly distinguished the two related questions and explained the effect of the preliminary determination. In the matter before it, the Court noted that the inquiry under the Rent Reduction Act had already concluded that the shrotriem was an “inam village.” Thus the preliminary condition was satisfied, rendering the Settlement Officer competent to record a finding that the “inam village” of East Thakkellapadu was an

On February 20, 1950 the Settlement Officer concluded, after conducting an inquiry, that the shrotriem constituted an “inam estate” within the meaning of the Abolition Act. The appellant’s predecessor then filed an appeal to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal dismissed that appeal on June 25, 1951. The dismissal became one of the orders contested in a writ petition before the High Court, and the appellant was subsequently directed to pursue a civil suit for determination of his rights. In the civil suit the appellant challenged both the Settlement Officer’s proceedings and the Tribunal’s dismissal on two distinct grounds. First, the appellant contended that even if the original grant of the shrotriem covered the entire village, it could not be treated as an “inam estate” under the Abolition Act because, prior to the 1936 amendment of the Madras Estates Land Act 1908, the definition of an estate required a grant of only land revenue or melvaram to a person who did not own the Kudivaram. The appellant argued that the present grant conveyed the entire interest in the land, not merely the melvaram, and therefore fell outside the Act’s provisions. Second, the appellant asserted that the Tribunal’s decision was legally incompetent because Section 8 prescribed a three‑member tribunal, yet the appeal had been heard and disposed of by only two members.

The learned Judges accepted the authority of the Madras High Court decision in Kama Umi Isa Ammal v. Ramakadamban, which held that a tribunal decision made by an insufficient number of members was void and could not constitute a proper dismissal of an appeal. Accordingly, the Judges concluded that the Tribunal’s order dismissing the appellant’s appeal was a nullity. However, they also held that this nullity did not automatically overturn or vacate the Settlement Officer’s determination made under Section 9, nor did it invalidate his finding that the village in question was an “inam estate.” Instead, the effect of the void Tribunal order was merely to leave the appeal pending, as it had not been validly disposed of by the properly constituted tribunal.

The Court observed that because only two members were available, they could not constitute a lawful Tribunal. Applying the principle set out by the Madras High Court, the Court explained that the procedural history comprised a valid order issued by the Settlement Officer followed by an appeal that had been lodged with the Tribunal, but that appeal had not yet been disposed of in a manner recognised as valid. Consequently, the Court held that the Tribunal’s order was void, and that legal effect was that the appeal remained pending before the Tribunal. On this basis, the Court stated that the appellant could obtain no benefit in the present civil suit from the alleged invalid dismissal of his appeal. The appellant could not invoke the civil Court’s jurisdiction to determine whether the “inam village” qualified as an “inam estate.” Nevertheless, the appellant retained the ability to continue prosecuting the appeal before the Tribunal should he consider that such further prosecution would serve his interests. Turning to the substantive merits of the appellant’s claim, the learned Judges had concluded that the civil Court’s jurisdiction was implicitly excluded by the provisions of the Abolition Act, which created the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal as the exclusive authorities empowered to decide the issue, thereby vesting in them the necessary jurisdiction and prescribing the procedure to be followed. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s conclusions and, in a communication to counsel for the appellant, indicated that it would not be permissible for the appellant to rely on the evidence presented before the Settlement Officer that the original grant comprised both warams. The Court further noted that the Settlement Officer and the Subordinate Judge, who had tried the suit, had erred in recording that the shrotriem grant of the village concerned only the melvaram. Counsel for the State highlighted that the Andhra Pradesh legislature had amended the Abolition Act in 1956 and 1957, rendering any argument concerning the original grant’s inclusion of both warams merely academic. The Court considered this observation unnecessary to address, as it was not relevant to the points that needed resolution in the appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal, ordered that it fail, and awarded costs against the appellant.