Vithal Krishnaji Nivendkar vs Parduman Ram Singh and Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 52 of 1960

Decision Date: 27 March, 1962

Coram: Not extracted

In this case the Court recorded that the parties were Vithal Krishnaji Nivendkar and the respondents Parduman Ram Singh and another, and that the matter was decided on 27 March 1962 by the Supreme Court of India. The appeal was listed as Criminal Appeal No. 52 of 1960 and had been taken up by special leave from a judgment and order dated 9 September 1959 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 916 of 1959. Counsel for the appellant was identified as R Gopalakrishnan. The Court noted that both the trial court and the High Court had concluded that the amount described as a “donation” was not a gratuitous gift to the Sangh but was a payment made by the first respondent and received by the appellant in consideration for letting premises to the first respondent. The Court observed that the record contained sufficient evidence to support this factual finding and saw no basis for setting aside the finding on the ground of any legal error.

The Court further explained that counsel for the appellant had drawn its attention to a letter dated 2 July 1958, which had been sent by the first respondent to the Secretary of the Sangh. In the first paragraph of that letter the respondent wrote, “…I became a tenant of one of your ground‑floor blocks by paying a donation of Rs.3251/‑ only and in return I was promised a clean new block.” The Court stated that this statement did not lend any support to the appellant’s contention that the sum was a free gift intended to advance the objectives of the Sangh. On the contrary, the passage plainly indicated that the respondent obtained tenancy by paying a donation of Rs.3251/‑. The Court emphasized that the mere use of the word “donation” did not negate the effect of the surrounding language, which clearly demonstrated that the payment was made for the purpose of acquiring the tenancy.

The Court also considered an argument that charitable trusts were exempt from the operation of the Act, relying on the provisions of section 4. It examined clause (ii) of sub‑section (2) of that section, which allows the State Government to direct that any or all provisions of the Act may not apply, subject to conditions, to premises held by a public trust for a religious or charitable purpose and let at a nominal or concessional rent. The Court found that the record contained no evidence of any such governmental direction, and that the rent charged to the first respondent could not be described as nominal nor shown to be concessional. Consequently, the Court rejected that contention.

Finally, the Court addressed the suggestion that the appellant did not fall within the definition of “landlord” under sub‑section (3) of section 5. It clarified that the term “landlord” includes any person who receives, or is entitled to receive, rent on behalf of another or as a trustee for another person. Since the appellant was a trustee of the Sangh and was receiving rent on its behalf, the Court concluded that the appellant indeed qualified as a “landlord” within the meaning of the statute.

The Court observed that the appellant was receiving rent on account and on behalf of the Sangh, and it therefore concluded that he fell within the meaning of “landlord” as defined in the Act. The Court explained that the statutory definition of landlord embraces a person who receives rent, whether for personal benefit or as a trustee for another entity, and that the appellant’s receipt of rent in his capacity as a trustee of the Sangh satisfied that definition. In support of this conclusion, the Court referred to Explanation 1 to sub‑section (4) of section 18, which provides that, for the purpose of sub‑section (1)(a), the receipt of rent in advance for more than three months in respect of premises let for residential purposes is excluded except as provided in sub‑section (3). The quoted passage also includes a citation to the decision reported in (1954) 56 Bom L.R. 619. The Court noted that the explanation clarifies the circumstances in which rent receipts are covered by the provision, and it found that none of the exceptions applied to the appellant’s situation. After considering the definition of landlord, the appellant’s role as trustee, and the relevant explanation, the Court expressed the view that the appellant had been correctly convicted under section 18(1) of the Act. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal, and the appeal was therefore dismissed.