The State Of Rajasthan vs Mst. Vidhyawati And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 263 of 1958

Decision Date: 02/02/1962

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, J.R. Mudholkar

In this case, the Supreme Court of India recorded the matter titled The State of Rajasthan versus Mst. Vidhyawati and Another, which was decided on 2 February 1962. The opinion was authored by Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and was delivered by a bench composed of Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice J. L. Kapur, Justice M. Hidayatullah, Justice J. C. Shah and Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The petitioner in the proceedings was the State of Rajasthan and the respondents were Mst. Vidhyawati and another individual. The judgment was pronounced on 2 February 1962. The case citation appears in the 1962 All India Reporter at page 933 and also in the 1962 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports at page 989. Subsequent citator references include citations in the Reporters of 1965, 1967, 1978, 1990 and related law reports. The substantive issue concerned a tort suit for damages arising from the liability of the State for a tortious act committed by one of its servants while acting in that capacity. The Court considered the relevant constitutional provisions, specifically Articles 300(1), 294 and 295 of the Constitution of India, together with statutory provisions from the Government of India Act of 1935 (section 176(1)), the Government of India Act of 1915 (section 32) and the Government of India Act of 1858 (section 65). The headnote recorded that the husband of the first respondent and the father of the minor second respondent had been knocked down on 11 February 1952 by a government jeep that was driven rashly and negligently by an employee of the State of Rajasthan while the vehicle was being transferred from a repair shop to the Collector’s residence. The victim subsequently died in hospital. The respondents filed a suit for damages. The trial court ruled ex parte against the driver but dismissed the claim against the State, reasoning that the vehicle was being kept for the Collector’s official use and that, although it was not being employed for any State purpose at the moment of the accident, this fact was enough to relieve the State of vicarious liability as the employer. On appeal, the High Court disagreed with the trial court’s finding and decreed the suit against the State as well. The Supreme Court thereafter held that the liability of the State for damages caused by a tortious act of its servant, when the act occurs within the scope of the servant’s employment, is the same as the liability of any other employer. The Court explained that the appropriate provisions for determining the extent of that liability were not Articles 294 and 295, which dealt primarily with the devolution of rights, assets and liabilities, but rather Article 300(1) of the Constitution, which, by employing the phrase “in like cases,” defined the liability and referred back to the legal position that existed before the Constitution was promulgated. Reading Article 300(1) in conjunction with section 176(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, section 32 of the 1915 Act and section 65 of the 1858 Act left no doubt that the extent of a State’s liability must be

The Court observed that the liability of the State was to be treated in the same manner as the liability of the East India Company, as had been decided by the Supreme Court of Calcutta in the case of Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. The Secretary of State for India, reported in 1868‑69 at 5 Bom. H. C. R. 1 and approved therein. Considering the historical phases through which the State of Rajasthan was formed, the Court held that for the purpose of assessing liability under Article 300(1) it was not permissible to look beyond the final stage of integration that resulted in the creation of the Rajasthan Union on the eve of the Constitution. That Union, the Court said, corresponded to the “State” contemplated by Article 300(1). Consequently, in the absence of any statutory provision providing a different rule, the Union of Rajasthan, just as the Dominion of India or any of its constituent provinces, would be vicariously liable for the acts of its servants. The Court further noted that, when viewed from first principles, no alternative conclusion was possible. It recalled that since the days of the East India Company the sovereign had been deemed liable to be sued in tort or in contract, and that the common‑law immunity that existed in England before the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 never applied in India. With the advent of the Constitution and the establishment of the Republic, aimed at creating a socialist state with extensive industrial and other activities employing large numbers of persons, the Court found no justification, either in principle or in the public interest, for exempting the State from vicarious liability for the tortious acts of its servants. The Court cited State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid, [1254] S.C.R. 786, in support of this view. As neither Parliament nor any State Legislature had enacted a law on the subject, a matter saved by Article 300 of the Constitution, the Court held that the law must continue to be the same as it had been since the era of the East India Company. The judgment then proceeded to list the case details: Civil Appellate Jurisdiction, Civil Appeal No. 263 of 1958, an appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 22, 1957 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil First Appeal No. 36 of 1954. The appellant was represented by the Advocate‑General of Rajasthan together with counsel, while the respondents were represented by counsel for the appellant. The date of the decision was 2 February 1962. The judgment was delivered by Chief Justice Sinha, C.J. The Court explained that this appeal, issued on a certificate granted by the Rajasthan High Court under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution, raised a question of considerable importance, namely, the extent of the vicarious liability of the Government for tortious acts committed by its employees in the course of their employment. The trial court had dismissed the claim for compensation against the State of Rajasthan, which was the second defendant in the suit for damages arising from the tortious act of the first defendant, Lokumal, who was not a party to this appeal. The appeal was therefore filed by the plaintiffs against the trial court’s judgment and decree.

The High Court of Rajasthan issued a decree in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them a compensation of fifteen thousand rupees against the State of Rajasthan, which was the appellant in this proceeding. The material facts of the case may be summarized as follows: the first defendant, Lokumal, was engaged on a temporary basis by the State as a motor driver on probation. In February 1952 he was appointed driver of a government jeep bearing registration number RUM 49, which was assigned to the Collector of Udaipur. The vehicle had been sent to a workshop for necessary repairs. After the repairs were completed, Lokumal drove the jeep back along a public road on the evening of 11 February 1952. While doing so, he struck Jagdishlal, who was walking on the footpath beside the road in Udaipur city. The impact caused multiple injuries to Jagdishlal, including fractures of the skull and the spine, and he subsequently died three days later in the hospital where he had been taken for treatment. The plaintiffs, who were Jagdishlal’s widow and his three‑year‑old daughter (the daughter being represented by her mother as next friend), instituted suit against both Lokumal and the State of Rajasthan claiming damages of twenty‑five thousand rupees from each defendant. The first defendant did not appear and remained ex parte. The suit was opposed only by the second defendant on several grounds. However, because both the trial court and the High Court below had concurred in their finding that Lokumal had driven the jeep rashly and negligently, causing the accident and the death of Jagdishlal, it was unnecessary to consider all the answers raised to the suit; only the issue on which the present appeal was filed required further analysis. The State, as the second defendant and appellant before this Court, contested the suit principally on the contention that it could not be held liable for the tortious act of its employee. After a detailed examination of the evidence, the trial court decreed the suit against the first defendant ex parte and dismissed the claim against the State without costs. On appeal, the Rajasthan High Court (with Chief Justice Wanchoo and Justice D S Dave presiding) allowed the plaintiffs’ appeal, decreed the suit against the State as well, and ordered costs against the State in both courts. The State of Rajasthan subsequently obtained a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution, confirming that the case raised a question of law of general public importance, namely, the extent of governmental liability in tort. In support of the appeal, counsel for the appellant raised two principal questions: first, that under Article 300 of the Constitution the State of Rajasthan could not be liable because an analogous Indian State would not have been liable before the Constitution came into force; and second, that the jeep involved was being maintained “in the exercise of sovereign powers” rather than as part of any commercial activity of the State.

In this appeal the State of Rajasthan raised two principal questions. The first question asserted that, according to article 300 of the Constitution, the State could not be held liable for a tort that had arisen before the Constitution came into force. The second question contended that the jeep involved in the accident was being used in the exercise of sovereign powers and therefore was not engaged in any commercial activity of the State. The Court indicated that the second question would be disposed of briefly before turning to the first, more serious question. The Court examined whether the jeep, while being driven back from a repair shop to the Collector’s residence at the time of the accident, was performing any function connected with the exercise of the State’s sovereign powers. It was noted that the injuries which caused the death of Jagdishlal did not occur while the jeep was being used for any purpose that could be described as an exercise of sovereign powers. The findings of the lower courts showed that the tortious act complained of had been committed by the first defendant in circumstances that were completely separate from any exercise of sovereign powers. The Trial Court had held that because the car was maintained for the Collector’s use in the performance of his official duties, that fact alone removed the case from the category in which vicarious liability of the employer could arise, even though the car was not being used at the moment of the accident for any purpose of the State. The Trial Court accepted the State’s contention and, after discussing the legal position, stated in its reasoning: “Therefore it follows that the constitution and control of the Collector’s office at Udaipur is an instance of exercise of sovereign powers.” On appeal, the High Court disagreed with the Trial Court’s legal view. The High Court observed that the State was no better placed simply because it supplied cars and employed drivers for its civil service, and clarified that the matter did not involve drivers employed for military or public‑service vehicles. Consequently, the High Court awarded a decree in favour of the plaintiffs against the second defendant for the amount of fifteen thousand rupees. The Court considered that the High Court had adopted the correct legal position in view of the circumstances surrounding the occurrence. The remaining, more important question on this appeal concerned the true construction and effect of article 300(1) of the Constitution, which provides: “The Government of India may sue or be sued by the name of the Union of India and the Government of a State may sue or be sued by the name of the State and may, subject to any provisions which may be made by Act of ….”

It will be noticed that Article 300 of the Constitution is expressed in three separate components. The first component deals with the form of the suit and the cause‑title, and it provides that a State, without any reference to the Government of India, may sue or be sued in its own name. The second component states that a State may sue or be sued in relation to its own affairs in the same kinds of cases in which the corresponding Provinces or the corresponding Indian States could have sued or been sued if the Constitution had not yet been enacted. The third component makes clear that the operation of the second component is subject to any provisions that may be enacted by an Act of the Legislature of the State concerned, acting within its legislative powers conferred by the Constitution.

The learned Advocate‑General for the State of Rajasthan submitted that the second component of the article directly refers to the extent of a State’s liability to be sued, and therefore the question of the State’s liability in the present case must be determined on the basis of Article 300. Conversely, counsel for the plaintiffs‑respondents argued that Chapter III of Part XII of the Constitution, which is titled “Property, Contracts, Rights, Liabilities, Obligations and Suits”, contains other provisions—specifically Articles 294 and 295—that deal with rights and liabilities. According to this argument, Article 300 is confined solely to the issue of whose name may appear as plaintiff or defendant in a suit and does not define the scope of a State’s liability. In other words, the plaintiffs‑respondents contended that Article 300 is irrelevant to the question of vicarious liability of the defendant State in the present matter, and that the article contains no definitive statement on that liability.

In the Court’s opinion, it is not correct to hold that the provisions of Article 300 are wholly irrelevant to the determination of the appellant State’s liability. While it is true that Articles 294 and 295 address the rights to property, assets, liabilities and obligations of the former Governor’s Provinces or of the Indian States listed in Part B of the First Schedule, those articles are primarily concerned with the devolution of such rights, assets and liabilities. Generally, they provide for the succession of a State with respect to the rights and liabilities of an Indian State, meaning that they do not define those rights and liabilities but only provide for the substitution of one Government in place of the

It was observed that the first part of Article 300 dealt solely with the naming of the parties to a suit or other proceeding, while the second part of the same article defined the scope of liability by employing the expression “in the like cases” and by directing reference to the legal position that existed before the Constitution was enacted. The relevant pre‑constitutional legal position was set out in the Government of India Act, 1935 (25 & 26 Geo V c. 42), section 176(1), which read: “The Federation may sue or be sued by the name of the Federation of India and a Provincial Government may sue or be sued by the name of the Province, and, without prejudice to the subsequent provisions of this chapter, may subject to any provisions which may be made by Act of the Federal or a Provincial Legislature enacted by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Act, sue or be sued in relation to their respective affairs in the like cases as the Secretary of State in council might have sued or been sued if this Act had not been passed.” The Court noted that the wording of Article 300(1) and that of section 176(1) were substantially the same, mutatis mutandis. Section 176(1) itself referred back to the legal situation that prevailed before that Act, namely the position created by section 32 of the Government of India Act, 1915 (5 & 6 Geo V c. 61). The two sub‑sections of section 32, which were pertinent to the present discussion, stated: “(1) The Secretary of State in Council may sue and be sued by the name of the Secretary of State in Council, as a body corporate. (2) Every person shall have the same remedies against the Secretary of State in Council as he might have had against the East India Company if the Government of India Act, 1858, and this Act had not been passed.” Comparing these provisions with Article 300, the Court observed that sub‑section (1) of Article 300 corresponded to sub‑section (1) of section 32, that sub‑section (2) of the Article roughly, though not exactly, matched sub‑section (2) of section 32, and that sub‑section (3) of Article 300 had no counterpart in section 32. Moreover, sub‑section (2) of section 32 specifically mentioned “remedies” and provided that the remedies available against the Secretary of State in Council were to be the same as those that could be pursued against the East India Company, assuming that neither the Government of India Act of 1858 nor the Government of India Act of 1915 had been enacted. Consequently, the analysis required a further step back to the Act of 21 & 22 Victoria chapter CVI, titled “An Act for the better Government of India.” Because that earlier Act transferred the Government of India to Her Majesty, it necessarily contained provisions dealing with the succession of power, authority, rights and liabilities. Section 65 of that Act was then identified as the next source for tracing the continuity of legal responsibility.

The Court explained that the Act of 1858 provided that “The Secretary of State in Council shall and may sue and be sued as well in India as in England by the name of the Secretary of State in Council as a body corporate; and all persons and bodies politic shall and may have and take the same suits, remedies and proceedings, legal and equitable, against the Secretary of State in Council of India as they could have done against the said Company; and the property and effects hereby vested in Her Majesty for the purposes of the Government of India, or acquired for the said purposes, shall be subject and liable to the same judgments and executions as they would while vested in the said Company have been liable to in respect of debts and liabilities lawfully contracted and incurred by the said Company.” The Court noted that, through the successive enactments beginning with the 1858 Act and culminating in the Constitution, the phrase “shall and may have and take the same suits, remedies and proceedings” in section 65 incorporated the Government of the State with the same legal reach that previously applied to the East India Company. Consequently, the Court turned to the fundamental question of the extent to which the East India Company had been liable for tortious acts committed by its servants in the course of their employment. The precise issue before the Court arose from a decision of the Supreme Court of Calcutta in the case of The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company v. The Secretary of State for India. That Calcutta judgment, although not recorded in any Calcutta legal journal, had been cited before the High Court of Bombay in the matter of Narayan Krishna Land v. Gerard Norman, Collector of Bombay. The Bombay dispute involved an action of trespass brought by a plaintiff against the Collector of Bombay concerning land the Collector believed to belong to the Government. The crucial element for the present case was the reported Calcutta decision, which the Court regarded as the leading authority on the subject. The Calcutta case had been decided by a Full Bench comprising Chief Justice Peacock and Justices Jakson and Wells. It originated from a reference made by a Small Cause Court Judge under section 55 of Act IX of 1850. According to the record, a servant of the plaintiff was driving a carriage on a Calcutta highway, the carriage being drawn by a pair of the plaintiff’s horses. The accident occurred when servants of the Government, employed at the Government dockyard at Kidderpore, were transporting an iron funnel in a rash and negligent manner on the same highway, causing one of the plaintiff’s horses to be injured. The plaintiff company thereafter sought damages from the Secretary of State for India for the injury caused to its horse. The Small Cause Court Judge found that the Government servants were at fault for carrying the iron funnel across the centre of the road and consequently were liable for the resulting damage. However, the Judge expressed doubt as to whether the Secretary of State could be held liable for the tortious conduct of those Government servants. The matter was therefore referred to the Full Bench for determination of whether the Secretary of State would be liable for the damage caused by the negligent Government servants, assuming that such negligence would render an ordinary employer liable.

The factual background involved Government employees working in the dockyard who were transporting a piece of iron funnel across the road. While doing so, one of the horses attached to the plaintiff’s carriage was injured by the iron funnel. The company that owned the carriage consequently filed a claim for damages against the Secretary of State for India, asserting that the injury to its horse gave rise to liability. The Small Cause Court judge determined that the servants of the Government were at fault for carrying the iron funnel in the centre of the road and therefore were responsible for the resulting damage. Nevertheless, the judge expressed uncertainty about whether the Secretary of State could also be held liable for the tortious acts of those Government servants that caused the injury to the plaintiff’s horse. Accordingly, the matter was referred to a higher court for decision on the question of whether the Secretary of State should be liable for damage caused by the negligence of the Government servants, assuming that such negligence would ordinarily attract employer liability.

In its judgment, the court first examined whether the proviso attached to the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Courts barred the suit. The proviso, extracted from section 25 of the Small Cause Court Act, stipulated that the court would have no jurisdiction over matters concerning revenue, any act ordered or performed by the Governor, the Governor‑General, any member of the Council of India, any Presidency in a public capacity, any act done by persons acting on the order of the Governor‑General or the Governor in Council, any act ordered or performed by a judge or judicial officer in the discharge of official duties, any act carried out by a person in execution of a judgment or order of any court, or any suit for libel or slander. After careful consideration, the court concluded that this proviso did not preclude the present suit. Having resolved this preliminary issue, the court turned to the substantive controversy, describing it as a matter of considerable importance and some difficulty. The court then considered the provisions of section 65 of the 1858 Act, noting that because the Crown could not be sued in its own courts, the Act provided a mechanism for enforcing the liabilities previously borne by the East India Company, now transferred to the Secretary of State. The court contemplated whether the East India Company would have been liable in the present action had the 1858 Act (21 & 22 Vict. ch. 106) not been enacted. Referring to the statutes of 3 & 4 William IV, chapter 85, the court observed that the Company exercised governmental powers as well as conducting commercial trade as a merchant. The judgment proceeded to a detailed analysis of the relevant Act, highlighting the statutory provisions that governed the transition of liability from the Company to the Secretary of State.

In the judgment the Court observed that the Act of 1858 required the East India Company to terminate its commercial operations and to relinquish any interest in the territories it had acquired in India, interests which were to be held by the Company only until 30 April 1854 as a trust for the Crown. The Court explained that Section 10 of the earlier Act, which can be regarded as the predecessor of Section 65 of the 1858 Act, set out that while the Company continued to possess and govern the territories, every individual and public body could maintain the same legal and equitable suits, remedies and proceedings against the Company in respect of debts and liabilities, and that property held in trust by the Company would be subject to the same judgments and executions as if the property were still owned by the Company for its own use. The Court noted that the wording of Section 10 is substantially the same as the later portion of Section 65 of the 1858 Act. Accordingly, relying on Section 10 and the subsequent Section 65, the Court held that the Secretary of State for India assumed the same liabilities that had previously attached to the East India Company. Before the Supreme Court of Calcutta, counsel for the defendant argued that the State could not be held liable for damages caused by the negligence of its officers or other persons in its employ. In response, the Court highlighted that it is a fundamental principle of sovereignty that a State may not be sued in its own courts without its consent, and that, as had been stated in England, the Crown could not be made liable for the tortious acts of its servants either by petition of right or any other method, a principle articulated by Lord Lyndhurst in Viscount Canterbury v. Attorney‑General. That precedent was based on the doctrine that the King cannot be personally negligent or at fault, and therefore cannot be held responsible for the negligence of his servants. The Court further observed that because of these obstacles to obtaining redress, the legislation specifically provided that the Secretary of State would bear liability in place of the Company, as set out in Section 10. The East India Company, unlike the sovereign, could not claim the immunity enjoyed by the Crown. This position was supported by the opinion of Grey, C.J. in Bank of Bengal v. East India Company, which held that the Company’s possession of powers ordinarily described as sovereign did not make it a sovereign, a view also grounded in the declaration of 53 George III, chapter 155, which confirmed that the territories held and governed by the Company were vested in it without prejudice to the unquestioned sovereignty of the Crown.

The Court observed that Chapter 155 vested the territories administered and possessed by the East India Company in that Company without prejudice to the undisputed sovereignty of the Crown. It further explained that the liability of the Secretary of State was not a personal liability; rather, any liability owed by the Secretary of State had to be satisfied out of the revenues of India. The Court noted that this case also fell within the second branch of the argument that the State could not be held liable for tortious acts of its servants when those servants were engaged in activities connected with the affairs of the State. In making this observation the Court reminded that, under the Constitution, India has been established as a welfare State whose functions are not confined solely to maintaining law and order but extend to participating in a wide range of activities such as industry, public transport, and state trading, among others. Because State activities therefore have such wide ramifications, involving not only the exercise of sovereign powers but also the State’s role as an employer in many public sectors, the Court considered it unreasonable to claim that the State should be immune from the consequences of tortious acts committed by its employees in the ordinary course of their employment. In this respect the Court found the present arrangement of the Government to be analogous to the position of the East India Company, which not only acted as a government with sovereign powers and as a delegate of the British Government, but also engaged in trade and commerce and operated public transport services such as railways, posts, telegraphs and road transport. It was in the context of those facts that the Supreme Court of Calcutta rejected the argument put forward on behalf of the Secretary of State. The Calcutta Court said: “It was contended in argument that the Secretary of State in Council, as regards his liability to be sued, must be considered as the State, or as a public officer employed by the State. But, in our opinion his liability to be sued depends upon an express enactment in the 21st & 22nd Vict. c. 106, by which he is constituted a mere nominal defendant for the purpose of enforcing payment, out of the revenues of India, of the debts and liabilities which had been contracted or incurred by the East India Company, or debts or liabilities of a similar nature, which might afterwards be contracted or incurred by the Government of India. We are further of opinion that the East India Company were not sovereigns, and therefore, could not claim all the exemption of a sovereign; and that they were not the public servants of Government, and, therefore, did not fall under the principle of the cases with regard to the liabilities of persons; but they were a company to whom sovereign powers were delegated, and who traded on their own account and for their own account and for their own benefit, and were engaged in transactions partly for the purposes of government, and partly.”

In this matter the Court explained that the East India Company carried on activities on its own account, without any delegation of sovereign authority, in a manner that could have been undertaken by private individuals. The Court stressed a clear distinction between actions performed in the exercise of what are normally called sovereign powers and actions undertaken in the conduct of enterprises that private persons could carry out without any sovereign delegation, citing the cases Moodaley v. The East India Company and The Same v. Morton (1 Bro. C. C. 469). It was contended before the Court that, because the Company possessed a dual character as both a holder of sovereign powers and a trading company, it would be difficult to ascertain whether a particular act was performed under sovereign authority or as part of its commercial business. In response, the Court observed that the Company would not be liable for any act committed by its officers or soldiers while engaging in hostilities, seizing prize property, or performing military or naval actions; in such circumstances no suit could be brought even against the officers themselves. Conversely, the Court held that the Company would be liable for the negligence of its servants or officers in matters such as navigating a river steamer, repairing the vessel, or performing any act connected with such repairs. The Court also rejected the argument that a separation should be drawn between liability arising under a contract and liability arising from a wrongful act, with the latter allegedly falling outside the scope of section 65. By referring to the statutory language that spoke of “debts lawfully contracted and expenses or liabilities incurred,” the Court concluded that the phrase “liabilities incurred” unquestionably encompassed liability resulting from tortious conduct. After a thorough examination of every argument presented on behalf of the Secretary of State, the Court arrived at the conclusion summarized in the headnote: the Secretary of State in Council of India was liable for damages caused by the negligence of government servants when such negligence would render an ordinary employer liable. Further submissions invoked Article 300, which referred to comparable cases concerning the liability of the corresponding Indian States. In that context, it was argued that the plaintiff, to succeed in his claim against the State of Rajasthan, must demonstrate that the State of Udaipur—deemed the corresponding State—would have been liable under similar circumstances before the Constitution was enacted. The Court noted that the historical evolution leading to the formation of the State of Rajasthan was relevant, and referred to the Government publication “The White Paper on Indian States,” specifically paragraphs 134 to 138 on pages 53‑55, which detailed the step‑by‑step integration of the Rajasthan States.

In the course of forming the present State of Rajasthan, the territory was assembled through a series of mergers that occurred over several stages. Initially, the smaller princely States combined to create the Rajasthan Union, which subsequently united and established the United State of Rajasthan on 25 March 1948. A short interval later, larger States acceded to this arrangement, leading to the inauguration of a second Rajasthan Union on 18 April 1948. Further consolidation of additional larger States produced another United State of Rajasthan, which was inaugurated on 30 March 1949. An additional territorial accession was effected by the agreement set out in Appendix XLI on 10 May 1949, expanding the original United State of Rajasthan, which had covered 16,807 square miles, into a substantially larger entity covering 1,28,424 square miles. This enlarged formation, known as the Rajasthan Union before the Constitution came into force, subsequently became the State of Rajasthan, classified as one of the Part B States at the moment the Constitution was inaugurated. The Court observed that for the purpose of assessing liability, it was unnecessary to consider any stage of integration beyond the final formation that existed immediately prior to the Constitution’s commencement.

The Court then turned to the legal issue concerning liability for the tortious act of Defendant No. 1. It noted that the provisions of the second part of Article 300 must be traced back to the Government of India Act 1858, specifically section 65, which itself was grounded in section 10 of the Act of 1858 (3 & 4 Will. IV c. 85). From the outlined history of Rajasthan’s formation, the Court concluded that it was not required to go beyond the point at which the Rajasthan Union existed on the eve of the Constitution. No evidence had been presented to show that the Rajasthan Union would have been exempt from liability for the employee’s wrongful act in the circumstances of the present case. The trial had framed Issue No. 9 as follows: “Whether the State of Rajasthan is not liable for the act of Defendant No. 1?” The State of Rajasthan had failed to demonstrate that its predecessor, the Rajasthan Union, was absolved of liability by any statutory rule or by common law. The Court indicated that, based on the earlier discussion, the Dominion of India or any of its constituent provinces would have been liable under the provisions of the Government of India Act 1858. No statutory or other legal provision was shown that would relieve the Rajasthan Union of vicarious liability for the acts of its servant, in a manner similar to the common law position in England. While the maxim “The King can do no wrong” had historically barred suits against the Crown for the torts of its agents, the United Kingdom had later recognized the rule as outdated and Parliament had passed the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, which became effective on 1 January 1948, thereby removing the absolute immunity of the sovereign.

In this judgment the Court observed that the once‑inviolable doctrine granting the sovereign absolute immunity had been dismantled. Section 2(1) of the Crown Proceedings Act was quoted, which states that the Crown is liable in tort to the same extent as a private person of full age and capacity for torts committed by its servants or agents, subject to the other provisions of the Act. The Court noted earlier that, even before the enactment of that 1947 statute, the law applicable in India to torts committed by a government servant was already more advanced than the common law position that existed in England. No submission before the Court claimed that the pre‑1948 English common law, before its amendment by the Crown Proceedings Act, ever applied to the Rajasthan Union in 1949 or at any earlier date. Consequently the Court held that the State of Rajasthan had not met the evidential burden required to establish the case identified as Issue No 9. Looking at the matter from basic legal principles, the Court found no obstacle to holding the State liable in tort for a wrongful act performed by its servant within the scope of his employment, just as any other employer would be. The Court explained that the Crown’s immunity in England had historically rested on feudal concepts of justice, which asserted that the King could not do wrong, could not authorize a wrong, and could not be sued in his own courts. By contrast, Indian jurisprudence, dating from the period of the East India Company, had consistently permitted the sovereign to be sued in tort and in contract, and the English common‑law immunity had never been operative in India. With the adoption of a republican form of government under the Constitution, and with the constitutional goal of creating a socialist state that employs a large number of public servants, the Court saw no principle or public‑policy reason to deny vicarious liability for the State for the tortious conduct of its servants. The Court further pointed out that it had expressly departed from the old common‑law rule that a civil servant could not bring a suit against the Crown. In State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid the Court had already recognized a government servant’s right to sue the Government for unpaid salary. Since the English Crown’s immunity based on common law had been abolished in the United Kingdom, the Court concluded that there was no legal justification for preserving that rule in India, especially after the Constitution came into force. Because the cause of action in the present case arose after the Constitution became effective, the Court opined that upholding the old rule would merely perpetuate an antiquated principle.

The Court observed that an established rule, which has existed for at least one hundred years, would be upset if the principle of vicarious liability were extended to the State. Article 300 of the Constitution, however, expressly preserves the authority of Parliament or a State Legislature to make any law that it deems appropriate for this purpose. Consequently, unless the legislative body has specifically enacted a provision that reverses the long‑standing rule, the law remains exactly as it was during the era of the East India Company. The Court therefore concluded that there is no legislative intent to depart from the historic principle and that the existing legal position must continue unchanged. In light of these considerations, the Court held that the appeal lacked any substantive merit and therefore warranted dismissal. The order further directed that the appellant be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs as directed by the Court. Thus, the long‑standing rule continues to govern the relationship between the State and its servants in the absence of contrary statutory provision. The dismissal reinforces the principle that legislative silence should be interpreted as preserving the historical common law position. Accordingly, the decision does not create any fresh precedent on the issue of State vicarious liability, but merely confirms the existing rule.