The High Court, Calcutta vs Amal Kumar Roy

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 193/1961

Decision Date: 9 April 1962

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.R. Mudholkar

In this matter the petitioner was the High Court of Calcutta and the respondent was Amal Kumar Roy. The judgment was delivered on 9 April 1962 by a bench of the Supreme Court consisting of Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha as Chief Justice, Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, and Justice J.R. Mudholkar. The case arose from an appeal by special leave filed by the judges of the Calcutta High Court against a decree of the City Civil Court at Calcutta. The City Civil Court had granted a decree in favour of the respondent, who was a Munsif serving in the West Bengal Civil Service (judicial). While acting as plaintiff in a separate suit the respondent had obtained an injunction in his own favour; that injunction was subsequently set aside by the appellate court. When the High Court was considering the names of several Munsifs for inclusion in the panel of officers authorized to act as Subordinate judges, the respondent’s name was omitted from the list. The Registrar of the Court, acting on a representation made by the respondent, informed him that the Court had decided to revisit his case after a period of one year. Because of this exclusion, the respondent, who at that time was the most senior Munsif on the list, lost eight positions in the seniority ranking of the Subordinate judges before he was eventually appointed to act as an Additional Subordinate judge. The respondent contended that this exclusion amounted to a penalty of “withholding of promotion’’ without affording him an opportunity to show cause. Consequently, he prayed that a declaration be made that his seniority in the cadre of Subordinate judges should be the same as it would have been had no supersession occurred, and he also claimed arrears of salary that would have been payable to a Subordinate judge.

The trial court had decreed the suit in favour of the respondent. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellants raised a preliminary objection asserting that the controversy raised was not justiciable. The Court held that there was no cause of action for the suit and that the appeal must therefore succeed. The Court observed that Article 235 of the Constitution vested the sole authority in the High Court to determine the fitness of a Munsif for appointment as a Subordinate judge, and that the exercise of this authority was not subject to judicial review. Read together with the applicable service rules, Article 235 made clear that a Munsif possessed no enforceable right of promotion that could be compelled through the courts. The Court therefore concluded that the High Court’s decision to exclude the respondent from the panel and to defer consideration of his case was an exercise of its constitutional power under Article 235, and that such an exercise could not be challenged in a suit for infringement of a right to promotion.

The Court observed that a right to promotion could not be enforced through a court of law. It held that Rule fifty‑five‑A of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules did not apply to the State of West Bengal. The Court further explained that Rule forty‑nine did not create any entitlement to promotion. Rather, Rule forty‑nine acted only as a safeguard against the imposition of punishment by withholding promotion when the employee was not given an adequate opportunity to show cause, and it operated only in the context of a disciplinary proceeding. The Court rejected the contention that the High Court was required to consult the State Public Service Commission, noting that Article three‑hundred‑twenty, clause three‑c of the Constitution also contemplated disciplinary matters. The Court also rejected the argument that the respondent had been reduced in rank as a result of the High Court’s action within the meaning of Article three‑eleven, sub‑paragraph two of the Constitution. The Court clarified that the term “rank” in Article three‑eleven, sub‑paragraph two refers to classification, not to a particular position within the same cadre or hierarchy of a service. The Court pointed out that all Subordinate judges belong to the same cadre and therefore hold the same rank regardless of seniority. Consequently, the loss of a few places in the seniority list did not constitute a reduction in rank. The Court further held that Articles fourteen and sixteen, sub‑paragraph one, were not violated. It explained that equal opportunity does not guarantee that a person will obtain a particular post for which several candidates are being considered. As long as a person is considered on an equal basis with others, there can be no denial of equal opportunity even if the person is not ultimately selected ahead of the other candidates.

The judgment was recorded as Civil Appeal No. one hundred ninety‑three of 1961, filed by special leave against the decree dated seventeen February 1960 of the City Civil Court, Calcutta, in Title Suit No. 409 of 1958. Counsel for the appellants appeared on behalf of appellants numbered two and one (a) to one (t). Counsel for appellant number two was assisted by the Attorney General of India. Counsel for the intervenor numbered one was assisted by the Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh and another advocate. Counsel for intervenor two was represented by a single advocate. Counsel for intervenor three was assisted by the Advocate‑General of Punjab together with an additional advocate. Counsel for intervenor four was assisted by the Advocate‑General of Rajasthan together with another counsel. Counsel for intervenor five was assisted by the Advocate‑General of Mysore together with another counsel. Counsel for intervenor six appeared through a sole advocate. The judgment was delivered on nine April 1962 by the Chief Justice, who identified himself as Sinha, C.J. The Court noted that the appeal, granted by special leave, challenged the decree of the City Civil Court at Calcutta which had granted the plaintiff a declaration and consequential reliefs, as will be described later. The Court emphasized that the appeal presented very unusual circumstances. The most striking feature was that the matter reached the Supreme Court directly from the trial court without undergoing the normal appellate route through the High Court of Calcutta. This unusual route was explained by the fact that the High Court of Calcutta and the sitting judges of that Court were themselves the appellants and the principal parties in the trial, making it inappropriate for them to entertain an appeal. Accordingly, special leave was granted to permit the appeal directly from the trial court.

The Court observed that the defendants in the trial were the judges of the Calcutta High Court, and consequently those judges could not properly entertain an appeal from the trial court decision. Because of this conflict, special leave was granted to permit a direct appeal from the trial court judgment and decree. To set out the matters in dispute, the Court found it necessary to recount the relevant facts. The plaintiff, who at the time of filing the suit on 4 September 1958 was serving as an Additional District and Sessions Judge, had been a member of the West Bengal Civil Service (Judicial) on the date the suit was instituted. He had entered the service on 1 April 1937 as a Munsif and had received confirmation of his appointment on 1 April 1939. The West Bengal Civil List, as corrected up to 1 January 1954, recorded his name at serial number 53 in the list of Munsifs. Directly above him, at serial number 52, was the name of Shri Bibhutosh Banerjee, while serial number 54 listed Shri Jagadindranath Hore, who later became Respondent No. 2. Over the years, every Munsif whose name appeared up to serial number 52 in that Civil List was promoted to the position of Subordinate Judge in accordance with the seniority shown in the list. In February 1955 the plaintiff stood at the top of the Munsif list. In April 1955 he noticed that the second respondent, Shri Jagadindranath Hore, had been appointed a Subordinate Judge, a fact that was published in the Calcutta Gazette on 28 April 1955, while the plaintiff himself had not received any order appointing him to that post. The plaintiff made a representation to the High Court, and the Registrar informed him that the Court had decided to reconsider his case in December 1955. Meanwhile, several other Munsifs whose names were placed below the plaintiff’s in the Civil List were successively appointed as Subordinate Judges. The plaintiff then filed a petition of appeal to the Governor of West Bengal, challenging the High Court’s failure to appoint him as a Subordinate Judge. The High Court withheld that appeal, stating that the matter did not constitute disciplinary action and therefore no appeal lay. Undeterred, the plaintiff submitted another petition to the Governor, requesting that the previously withheld appeal be called for, but the High Court again refused, asserting that, in its opinion, no such petition existed. In April 1956 the plaintiff was finally appointed to act as an Additional Subordinate Judge by an order of the High Court. Nevertheless, eight Munsifs, who had been listed below the plaintiff in the Civil List and were named as pro forma defendants in the suit, were appointed and posted as Subordinate Judges one after another, following the order of their names in the list. In May 1956 the plaintiff addressed a memorial to the Governor of West Bengal, which the High Court also withheld on the ground that no such memorial lay. He subsequently sent a copy of the memorial to the Secretary of the Government of West Bengal (Judicial Department) and was informed that the Governor had declined to intervene.

The High Court rejected the plaintiff’s memorial on the basis that no such memorial was deemed to exist. Undeterred, the plaintiff forwarded a copy of the memorial to the Secretary of the Government of West Bengal, Judicial Department, and received information that the Governor had refused to intervene. Consequently, the plaintiff instituted a suit, initially naming the State of West Bengal as the principal defendant and the eight Munsifs who had been appointed Subordinate Judges in place of the plaintiff as pro‑forma defendants. Subsequently, on a plea raised in the State’s written statement concerning a defect of parties, the High Court of Calcutta and its sitting judges were added as defendants numbered 1(a) to 1(x) within the category of principal defendants. The plaintiff’s cause of action was built on the contention that the High Court had never pronounced the plaintiff unfit to serve as a Subordinate Judge, nor had it required the plaintiff to show cause under Article 311(2) of the Constitution or rule 55‑A of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules as to why his promotion should be withheld. In fact, the High Court did not declare any intention to withhold his appointment as a Subordinate Judge. On the contrary, two months before April 1955, the plaintiff was vested with special powers by an order of the High Court that gave him pecuniary jurisdiction to try suits valued up to rupees 3,500 and to hear small‑cause court suits up to rupees 300—powers that ordinarily serve as stepping‑stones to a Subordinate Judgeship. Moreover, the plaintiff was permitted to clear the higher‑level efficiency bar at the appropriate time in April 1956 and was subsequently recommended for appointment as an Assistant Sessions Judge shortly after being posted as a Subordinate Judge. The plaintiff further emphasized that, although the High Court expressly stated that its decision not to appoint him a Subordinate Judge in the ordinary course was not a disciplinary action or a penalty within the meaning of clause (ii) of rule 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, the High Court in practice withheld his promotion, denied his appeal to the Governor, and failed to consult the West Bengal State Public Service Commissioner. The plaint also asserted that the Munsifs and Subordinate Judges belong to the same service, namely, the West Bengal Service (Judicial), and that a number of officers in that service are entitled to promotion on the basis of seniority to the West Bengal Judicial Service. In light of these facts, the plaintiff prayed for a declaration that he occupies the same position, with the same privileges and benefits, as if he had been appointed a Subordinate Judge immediately before the second respondent, and requested that his name be entered in the West Bengal Civil List.

The plaintiff sought to be placed in the next relevant gradation list that is kept for Subordinate Judges, specifically in the position immediately below Shri Bibhutosh Benerjee and immediately above Shri Jagadindra Nath Hore. He also claimed arrears of salary due to him as a Subordinate Judge, together with dearness allowance, calculated with interest at six per cent per annum, amounting to a total of Rs 1,090. In addition to the monetary claim, the plaintiff prayed for a permanent injunction directing the principal defendants to insert his name in the Civil List in accordance with the declaration he sought, and he asked for other reliefs that are not necessary to enumerate here.

The suit was chiefly contested by the defendants who were added later. The first defendant, the State of West Bengal, disclaimed any knowledge of the action taken by the High Court or the reasons for that action, and it denied that the plaintiff had a cause of action or that he was entitled to any relief. The principal defence raised by the High Court was that, in December 1951, the High Court examined whether the names of certain Munsifs should be included in the panel of officers authorized to act as Subordinate Judges. The plaintiff’s name was omitted from that panel, and the Court decided that his case would be reconsidered a year later after receiving a special report from the concerned District Judge. At that time, the High Court held that the plaintiff was not fit to act as a Subordinate Judge. The High Court further referred to an incident in which the plaintiff had obtained an injunction in his own favour in a matter in which he was himself the plaintiff; that injunction was later examined on appeal and was set aside. The matter was subsequently placed before a Full Court of the High Court for administrative consideration, leading to the formation of a three‑Judge Committee to examine the plaintiff’s conduct. After hearing the plaintiff’s explanation, the Committee concluded that his explanation was unsatisfactory and that his conduct amounted to a total disregard of judicial propriety. The High Court denied that the plaintiff’s case fell within the scope of Article 311(2) of the Constitution or Rule 55‑A of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. It asserted that, under the Constitution and otherwise, the High Court alone possessed the administrative authority to decide matters of promotion of Munsifs to the grade of Subordinate Judge. Exercising that sole authority, the High Court evaluated the plaintiff’s service record and acted in what it considered the best interests of the State’s judicial administration. The High Court also denied that the matter should have been referred to the State Public Service Commission, and it affirmed that the suit, as framed for the reliefs described, was not maintainable. In reaching this conclusion, the High Court relied upon the provisions of Article 235 of the Constitution, which vest complete control in the Court over such promotion matters.

The Court observed that the High Court possessed the authority, jurisdiction and discretion to assess the fitness of a Munsif for promotion to the grade of Subordinate Judge, and that its decision not to promote the plaintiff after a proper review of his service record was neither a disciplinary measure nor a penalty. Consequently, the order did not fall within the jurisdiction of the State Public Service Commission, and the plaintiff had no right of appeal against the High Court’s order because the matter was not governed by the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules that the plaintiff relied upon. On this basis, it was contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit or to grant any of the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff. After recording the plaintiff’s pleadings and examining the documentary evidence presented by both parties, the learned Judge of the City Court noted at the outset that, although the plaint referred to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the plaintiff’s counsel did not rely on that provision at trial. Instead, the counsel invoked Article 235 of the Constitution together with Rules 49, 55‑A and 56 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, concluding that the High Court had deliberately postponed consideration of the plaintiff’s promotion in order to punish him for past conduct and that the High Court was not authorized under Article 235 to withhold the promotion without observing the said rules. Accordingly, the suit was decreed with costs, the declaration sought was granted, and a monetary decree of Rs 1,060 was awarded as arrears of salary and dearness allowance. The judgment and decree of the Civil Court were dated 17 February 1960. On 12 April 1960 an application for special leave to appeal directly from that judgment was filed, and this Court granted the special leave on 26 April 1960. At the commencement of the proceedings before this Court, the learned Standing Counsel for the Government of West Bengal candidly admitted that, owing to erroneous instructions, he had failed to inform the trial judge that Rule 55‑A, enacted in 1948 by the Governor‑General, did not apply to the Judicial Service in Bengal. The plaintiff‑respondent, who pleaded his case personally with notable ability and perseverance, was unable to demonstrate the contrary. Accordingly, the Court proceeded on the basis that this rule was inapplicable to the present case and was entirely irrelevant. The counsel for the appellants further maintained that the suit was not maintainable because the matters raised by the plaintiff were not justiciable.

The Court set out to decide whether the matters presented in the parties’ pleadings were capable of judicial determination. It held that answering this required first establishing whether the plaintiff possessed a legal right to promotion that had been denied, thereby creating a cause of action. The Court then listed the various factual and legal inquiries that needed resolution: whether the plaintiff had been subjected to a penalty without the procedural safeguards contemplated by article 311 paragraph 2 of the Constitution or by the applicable Service Rules; whether any statutory procedure had been breached in ascertaining the plaintiff’s entitlement, if any; whether the High Court’s decision to defer consideration of the plaintiff’s promotion to Subordinate Judge for one year exceeded its jurisdiction; whether the powers delegated under article 235 of the Constitution to the English Committee, as alleged by the plaintiff, were valid; whether the provisions of article 320 sub‑paragraph 3 (c) of the Constitution had been violated; and whether the plaintiff had been “reduced in rank” within the meaning of article 311 paragraph 2. Because these questions were interrelated, the Court recognized that they had to be examined together.

To determine the plaintiff’s alleged right to promotion, the Court referred to the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act of 1887, hereafter called the Civil Courts Act, together with the Civil Service Rules governing the judicial branch of the Provincial Civil Service of West Bengal. The Civil Courts Act consolidated the law relating to civil courts in Bengal and other parts of India. Section 3 of the Act defined four classes of civil courts: the Court of the District Judge; the Court of the Additional District Judge; the Court of the Subordinate Judge; and the Court of the Munsif. Under section 21, appeals from a Munsif were to be taken to a District Judge, who could assign the appeal to a Subordinate Judge, establishing that within the district hierarchy the Subordinate Judge’s court ranked higher than the Munsif’s court, which occupied the lowest position. However, the Act contained no provision regarding promotion from the rank of Munsif to Subordinate Judge, nor any mechanism by which a Munsif could become a Subordinate Judge. The Court then considered section 255 of the Government of India Act 1935, which authorized the Governor of a province, after consulting the Provincial Public Service Commission and the relevant High Court, to make rules for recruitment to the Subordinate Civil Judicial Service—posts subordinate to the District Judge. Sub‑section 3 of that section vested the High Court with the authority to post, promote and otherwise manage persons belonging to that service, subject to the conditions of service laid down by the Governor. After the Constitution came into force, article 235 conferred upon the High Court the control over district courts and subordinate courts, including the power of posting and promotion for members of the state judicial service holding any post inferior to that of a District Judge. Consequently, the High Court was identified as the proper authority for promotions from Munsif to Subordinate Judge, and no alternative authority was claimed by the plaintiff‑respondent.

In this matter the Court explained that Article 235 of the Constitution gave the High Court control over district courts and all courts subordinate to them, and that control included the authority to post and promote persons who were members of the State Judicial Service in any position below that of a District Judge. The Court noted that this High Court power was subject to any right of appeal that a service member might have under the law governing his conditions of service, as well as to any other rights afforded by that law. Consequently, after the Constitution became operative, the High Court alone possessed the power to promote members of the State Judicial Service who held posts inferior to a District Judge. The plaintiff‑respondent did not argue that any other authority could have dealt with his promotion from the rank of Munsif to that of Subordinate Judge. Rather, he contended that the High Court’s authority, which derived solely from Article 235, was nonetheless constrained by the service rules that regulated promotions. The plaintiff‑respondent did not claim that those rules gave him an unconditional right to promotion regardless of whether a vacancy existed in the higher cadre or whether he was the senior-most Munsif. Instead, he relied upon Rule 49(2) of the Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, asserting that this rule embodied a negative right: promotion could not be withheld except in accordance with the procedures prescribed by that rule and the subsequent rules that followed it. In other words, the plaintiff‑respondent was not seeking an absolute entitlement to be promoted at any time; he was arguing that, if a vacancy for a Subordinate Judge arose, he should have been appointed to that vacancy because he was the senior Munsif, and that a junior Munsif should not have been appointed in his place unless there were good and sufficient reasons and unless the plaintiff‑respondent had been given the opportunity to appeal. He therefore alleged that his being superseded by a junior Munsif amounted to a withholding of promotion within the meaning of Rule 49. The Court pointed out that Rule 49 listed several categories of penalties that could be imposed on a service member for good and sufficient reasons, one of which was “withholding of increments or promotion … including stoppage at an efficiency bar.” Moreover, Rule 55‑A provided that such a penalty, including the withholding of promotion, could not be imposed on a service member unless he had been afforded an adequate opportunity to make any representation he desired, and unless that representation had been taken into consideration before the order imposing the penalty was passed.

The Court observed that the service rules required that a public servant could be penalised, for example by withholding promotion, only after he had been given a sufficient opportunity to make any representation he desired and after such representation, if any, had been taken into consideration before the penal order was passed. The Court then turned to Article 235 of the Constitution, read together with the service rules, and held that there was no enforceable right of promotion that the plaintiff could claim before a court. The plaintiff’s reliance on Rule 49 to assert a right to be considered for appointment as a Subordinate Judge was rejected because Rule 49 was not a substantive right but a safeguard. It merely protected a public servant from a penalty of withholding promotion unless the servant had been afforded a proper chance to show cause against the proposed action. Moreover, the Court clarified that Rule 49 became relevant only in the context of disciplinary proceedings initiated against a public servant. In such disciplinary proceedings the servant had a right to insist that the prescribed procedure be strictly followed. In the present case, however, no disciplinary proceeding had been instituted against the plaintiff, and therefore Rule 49 could not be invoked. By the same reasoning, Rule 55‑A could not be applied to the plaintiff even if it were applicable to members of the State Judicial Service. Consequently, the Court found that no penalty had been imposed on the plaintiff, and hence there could be no breach of the procedural requirements laid down for proceedings against a government servant. The plaintiff argued that the postponement of consideration of his promotion as a Subordinate Judge was beyond the jurisdiction of the English Committee, contending that the High Court had delegated its powers under Article 235 of the Constitution to that Committee, which then issued a final order against him. The Court held that the plaint did not furnish any foundation for this contention. It noted that the plaint did not allege that the resolution of the English Committee of the Judges of the Calcutta High Court dated 16 December 1954 had failed to be adopted by the Full Court in accordance with the Court’s Rules of Business. The Court then referred to Rule 1 of Chapter I of the High Court Rules, which provides for a standing English Committee composed of the Chief Justice and at least four other judges appointed from time to time by the Chief Justice. Under Rule 2 the Committee is associated with the control and direction of the Subordinate Courts, and Rule 3 confers on the Committee the power, inter alia, to make recommendations for appointments.

The Court observed that the English Committee, by the resolution in question, merely issued a recommendation concerning the appointment of Subordinate Judges. Under rule thirteen of the High Court Rules, such a recommendation had to be circulated to all the Judges as soon as possible after each meeting of the Committee. Rule fifteen, in the relevant portion, required that all Judges be consulted on matters that included “all appointments which by law are made by the High Court and which are not otherwise expressly provided by the rules in this Chapter.” Consequently, the Court held that, following the Rules of Business, the appointment of Subordinate Judges selected from among the Munsifs had to be made by the whole High Court, acting on the recommendation of the English Committee. In the ordinary course prescribed by the Rules, the Committee’s resolution regarding the plaintiff’s selection as a Subordinate Judge would have been placed before every Judge of the Court, and it could be presumed that the Court as a whole accepted the Committee’s recommendation. The Court noted, however, that the record of the present case contained no documentary proof of this procedural step. Nonetheless, because the plaintiff had not alleged that the High Court as an institution had failed to pass the orders he challenged, the High Court did not deem it necessary to place additional documents on the record. Accordingly, the Court found no merit in the submission that the High Court had improperly delegated its powers under Article 235 of the Constitution, nor in the contention that the High Court as a whole had not issued the order that formed the plaintiff’s alleged cause of action. The Court then referred to the High Court’s own statement in paragraph six of the written statement, which explained that around 16 December 1954 the cases of several Munsifs were considered by the High Court for inclusion in the panel of officers to serve as Subordinate Judges. The plaintiff’s name was omitted at that time, and the Court decided, after receiving a special report from the District Judge, to revisit the plaintiff’s case a year later. The Court deemed the plaintiff unfit to act as a Subordinate Judge at that moment, a view that the defendants said would be supported by the relevant records. Subsequently, the plaintiff was permitted to act as a Subordinate Judge by order of the High Court; however, during the intervening period the plaintiff lost eight positions in the cadre and eventually entered the service after Sri Anath Bandhu Syam. Ultimately, the plaintiff was confirmed as a Subordinate Judge, placed on the fit list for the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service, and later appointed as an Additional District and Sessions Judge. The Court noted that, as a result, the plaintiff’s grievance was unfounded.

The Court observed that, as a result of the High Court’s order, the plaintiff was not appointed as a Subordinate Judge when his turn arrived in the normal course, for reasons that the Court did not need to examine because it had already held that the plaintiff possessed no right to promotion and consequently no cause of action in a court of law. The order caused the plaintiff to lose eight positions in the West Bengal Subordinate Judges’ cadre, a loss that naturally followed the High Court’s decision to postpone consideration of his selection by one year; the Court described this as a routine consequence of public service administration. The plaintiff argued that, before the High Court chose to pass him over in favor of other Munshifs who were lower in the Civil List, the Bengal Public Service Commission should have been consulted in accordance with Article 320(3)(c) of the Constitution, which refers to “all disciplinary matters.” The Court noted that no disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the plaintiff, and therefore there was no occasion for the State Public Service Commission to be consulted. Consequently, the Court saw no need to revisit the earlier determination of whether the constitutional provision was mandatory or merely directory. The plaintiff further contended that, even though no disciplinary action existed, the effect of the High Court’s order—his reduction by eight places in the Subordinate Judges’ list—constituted a “reduction in rank” within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. While the plaintiff’s counsel in the trial court had apparently conceded that the provisions of that article were not relied upon, the plaintiff in the present hearing attempted to invoke them. The Court found no merit in this claim, explaining that losing seniority positions within the same cadre does not amount to a reduction in rank as contemplated by Article 311(2). The Court explained that the term “rank,” according to the Oxford English Dictionary, signifies a relative position or status, and that in the constitutional context it refers to the classification of a person, not merely his place in a seniority list. Thus, within the West Bengal Judicial Service, a “reduction in rank” would mean that an individual already serving as a Subordinate Judge was demoted to a Munshif, a lower post. Since the plaintiff remained a Subordinate Judge, merely displaced in the seniority order, his loss of eight places did not constitute a reduction in rank, and the constitutional provision therefore did not apply to his case.

In the matter before it, the Court observed that judges who belong to the same cadre of Subordinate Judges retain the same rank even though they must be ordered by seniority in the Civil List; consequently, the loss of a few positions on the seniority list did not constitute a reduction in rank. Accordingly, the Court held that the constitutional provision providing for protection against reduction in rank, namely Article 311(2), was not attracted in the present case. The plaintiff further alleged that he had suffered discrimination in respect of his promotion and that Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution had been violated. The Court found that these constitutional guarantees could not be pressed in support of the plaintiff’s claim. It noted that the plaintiff’s case had been examined together with the cases of other candidates, and that the High Court, after assessing the relative fitness of the Munsifs, had placed a number of them on the panel for appointment as Subordinate Judges whenever vacancies arose. In that process the plaintiff, like the others, had been afforded equal opportunity. The Court emphasized that equal opportunity did not obligate the authorities to award the specific post to every candidate who had been considered; when the number of available posts was less than the number of candidates, the result was inevitably that many would be considered and only a few would be selected. The Court therefore concluded that the High Court’s selection in the manner it had adopted could not be described as discrimination against the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff had failed to establish a cause of action. The Court further explained that the High Court possessed the sole authority to determine the appointment of a Munsif to the higher rank of Subordinate Judge, and that it had exercised that power after a full consideration of the plaintiff’s promotion prospects, ultimately passing him over for one year. The plaintiff’s case was later reconsidered, leading to his promotion to Subordinate Judge and subsequently to the rank of Additional District and Sessions Judge. The Court held that the exercise of this power by the High Court was not subject to judicial review, and that, by virtue of Article 226, the High Court was empowered to safeguard individual rights and liberties guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution and to issue appropriate orders or writs. Moreover, under Article 235 the High Court exercised complete control over the subordinate courts, and members of the Judicial Service, as citizens, rightly regarded the High Court as the custodian of their rights in accordance with the rules it prescribed. The Court expressed surprise that the plaintiff had concluded otherwise.

The Court observed that the plaintiff claimed the High Court had failed to accord him his rightful due and that he ought to have approached the courts to enforce the rights granted to him by law as a member of the State Judicial Service. The plaintiff, who presented his own arguments before this Court, although he did not appear in the Trial Court, gave a thorough account of his position and placed all material considerations before the Court.

Nevertheless, the Court found that the plaintiff appeared to possess more learning than wisdom. It noted that, without any justification, the plaintiff had approached the courts rather than allowing his matter to be resolved by the High Court, which was presumed to have acted fairly, in accordance with established practice and the rules of that Court, and to have acted in the interests of an efficient and impartial administration of justice.

The Court concluded that the plaintiff seemed to be a victim of circumstances of his own making. He attempted to persuade the Court that he had no alternative but to obtain an injunction in his own favour. The Court declined to consider that question because, on its face, it was wholly untenable that a litigant should act as the judge in his own cause, regardless of how just his claim might appear.

In lieu of enduring delay in obtaining the injunction, caused by circumstances beyond his control, and risking an adverse judgment in the Small Cause Court, the plaintiff chose to seek an injunction favouring himself, effectively sitting as a judge in his own case. The Court held that this choice was the source of all his misfortunes in service, for which he must hold himself responsible. While the Court could sympathise with the plaintiff, it determined that, as a matter of law, he possessed no right that could be enforced through the judicial machinery.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed. However, the Court observed that the defendants‑appellants had allowed the case to be decided against them without presenting all relevant considerations before the Trial Court, notably the fact that rule 55‑A did not apply to members of the State Judicial Service. Accordingly, the Court directed that each party bear its own costs in both the appellate and the lower proceedings. The appeal was thus allowed, but without any award of costs.